the command of the Captains Collins of the Weymouth, Pitchford of the
America, and George Ourry from the Panther. They were cantoned between
the 79th regiment and the marines. The rest of the company's troops
of all sorts were likewise landed, and put under cover. The Spaniards
advanced out of the garrison, under the command of the Chevalier
Fayett, [37] with four hundred men, and two field-pieces; and from a
church, about two hundred yards to the right of that we yesterday took
possession of, near the sea, begun a cannonade upon the right flank
of our post. Some Seapoys, under Ens. Carty, who behaved very well,
were first sent to skirmish with them, supported by three piquets of
the 79th regiment, and one hundred seamen, all under the command of
Col. Monson, who soon drove the enemy back into the town. In their
precipitate flight, one of the field-pieces was left upon the glacis.
The superior skill and bravery of our people were so evident from
this affair, that it occasioned a second summons to the Governor;
but to no purpose: the answer was much more spirited than their
conduct had been. [38] Col. Monson had orders to keep possession of
this second church, if he found it tenible: for as we had not men
enough, or dry ground to make regular approaches, we were forced into
these measures, rash as they seem, and contrary to all rules of our
profession, by our critical situation. From the top of this post, which
we called No 2, we had a perfect view of the enemy's works. The front
we were obliged to attack, was defended by the bastions of St. Diego
and St. Andrew [i.e., San Diego and San Andrés], with orillons and
retired flanks, a ravelin which covered the royal gate, a wet ditch,
covered way, and glacis. The bastions were in excellent order, lined
with a great number of fine brass cannon; but their ravelin was not
armed, the covered way out of repair, the glacis by much too low,
and the ditch was not produced round the capital of the bastion of
St. Diego, which determined us to attack it, and make our dispositions
accordingly. [39] The negligence and omission of the enemy to post
sentries in the covered way, gave us an opportunity of sounding the
ditch; which perilous enterprise was effected by a small party of the
79th regiment, under Capt. Fletcher, who begged leave to undertake
it. The Spaniards fired from their bastion, and killed or wounded
three of our people. The depth of the water was only five feet, the
breadth about thirty yards. As the great extent of this populous city
made it impossible to invest it with our handful of men, two sides
were constantly open to the Spaniards, to introduce supplies of men
and provisions, and carry out their effects. They availed themselves
of our weakness. Their own garrison of eight hundred men of the
Royal regiment, under the command of the Marcus of Villa Mediana,
brigadier-general, was augmented by a body of ten thousand Indians
from the province of Pampanga, a fierce and barbarous people. These
disadvantages were not to be remedied, as we could not take possession
of Minondo, Tondo, and La vera Cruz, the posts which commanded
the river, and communication with the country. The inundations had
secured their Parian suburb; but no difficulties could check the
ardor of the troops, who labored incessantly in making fascines and
gabions, and preparing everything for the construction and opening
of our batteries. One for small shells was completed this night,
and played upon the bastion of St. Diego. Its position was behind the
church, nearest the sea, called No 1. The officers of the artillery
and engineers exerted themselves in a manner, that nothing but their
zeal for the public service could have inspired.
Twenty-seventh. The Governor sent out a flag of truce, to apologize
for some barbarities committed by the savages lately mentioned, who
had murdered some straggling seamen; and to request, that a nephew
of his, taken in the bay, might be sent on shore. This gentleman had
been dispatched from the Philippina galleon, just arrived on the coast
from Acapulco, with the first advices of the war. Hostilities ceased
till eleven at night, when we recommenced our fire from the mortars,
increased them to four, and placed a six-pounder on our left flank,
as a further security for our post at St. Jago's church. As the
capture of the galleon, and her treasure, might be well esteemed a
national object, Mr. Cornish proposed sending the Panther and Argo
from the squadron to intercept her, which was consented to; and the
officers of the navy very generously agreed to our sharing any prizes
that might be taken in this cruise, as we had before consented to
their sharing with us in any booty that might be taken at land; and
the distribution to be made according to the rules his Majesty has
fixed for the sea-service. The Admiral likewise sent on shore eight
twenty-four pounders ship guns, and two eighteen-pounders, for our
battering train; as, to save time, we brought only the land-carriages
and platforms from Madrass.
Twenty-eighth. The Governor's nephew was landed. My secretary,
Lieut. Fryar, was ordered to conduct him into the town with a
flag of truce. In the mean time, a large party of the garrison,
intermixed with Indians, sallied out to attack our second post,
No 2. by which Lieut. Fryar was advancing to the ravelin-gate. The
barbarians, without respecting his character, inhumanly murdered him,
mangling his body in a manner too shocking to mention. In their fury
they mortally wounded the other gentleman, who had endeavoured to
save Mr. Fryar. Our party received their onset with much firmness
and bravery, and repulsed them with some loss on their side. As it
was evident that the Indians alone were guilty of this horrid piece
of barbarity, our soldiers shewed them no mercy.
Twenty-ninth. The Admiral, at my request, ordered the Elizabeth,
Com. Tyddyman, and the Falmouth, Capt. Brereton, to place themselves
as near the town as the depth of water would permit, and second our
operations, by enfilading the front we intended to attack; but the
shallows kept them at too great a distance to answer the purpose
effectually, though their shot struck much confusion and terror into
the inhabitants. We continued our bombardment day and night.
Thirtieth. The engineers traced out Adm. Cornish's battery for
eight twenty-four pounders, on the left of St. Jago's church; but
the violence of the rains retarded our progress; and the absence of
two ships, that had on board a considerable quantity of fascines,
and many of our working and intrenching tools, put us to some
inconveniences. The Admiral's goodness supplied these defects: all
the smiths and carpenters in the fleet were employed in making those
instruments; and by their industry and dispatch, we were enabled to
proceed. The Elizabeth and Falmouth persevered in their cannonade
upon the town, which was returned from the enemy's sea-line without
any effect.
October first and second. The weather grew so very tempestuous,
that the whole squadron was in danger, and all communication with it
entirely cut off. [40] The violence of the storm forced the South-sea
castle storeship (which was lately arrived) from her anchors, and
drove her on shore: even in this situation the ship was of great
use. Capt. Sherwood enfiladed the whole sea-beach to the southward,
and kept in awe a large body of Indians, who menaced the Polverista,
and our magazines at the Malata. Nothwithstanding the deluge of
rain which accompanied the wind, by the perseverance of the troops
and seamen, we completed the battery for the twenty-four pounders,
raised a mortar-battery for the heavy shells of ten and thirteen
inches, made a good parallel and communication from the church to
the gun-battery, and established a spacious place of arms on the
left of it, near the sea. The roaring of the waves prevented the
enemy from hearing the noise of our workmen in the night. They gave
us no interruption, but seemed to trust entirely to the elements;
while the Governor (the Archbishop) gave out, that an angel from the
Lord was gone forth to destroy us like the host of Sennacherib. [41]
On the afternoon of the 2d, the seamen, with wonderful activity,
brought up and mounted all the guns in the battery; which we masked.
Third. The weather became moderate. At day-light the battery was
opened against the left face of the bastion of St. Diego, towards
the saliant angle. One hundred seamen were appointed to assist the
corps of artillery in this service. Our cannon, by the most excellent
skill and management of Maj. Barker, and the officers under him, were
served with such justness, quickness, and dexterity, that the twelve
pieces on that face of the bastion were silenced in a few hours, and
the Spaniards drove from them. We had but two men killed. At night
we began a battery for three guns, on the left of our place of arms,
to silence those that were in barbet upon the orillon of the bastion
of St. Andrew, which annoyed our flank. We maintained a brisk fire of
grape and musketry all the night, to prevent the enemy from repairing
their embrasures and remounting the cannon. The mortars, now augmented
to seven, were kept constantly playing upon the gorge of the bastion,
and the contiguous defences.
Fourth. About three hours before day one thousand of the Indians
attacked the cantonment of the seamen. They were encouraged to this
attempt by the incessant rains in which they flattered themselves our
fire-arms would be useless. Their approach was favoured by a great
number of thick bushes that grew upon the side of a rivulet, which
they passed in the night, and by keeping close, eluded the vigilance
of the patroles. Upon the alarm, Col. Monson and Capt. Fletcher,
with the piquets, were dispatched to the assistance of the seamen,
who very sensibly kept firm in their posts, and were contented to
repulse them till day-break; when a fresh piquet of the 79th regiment
appearing upon the Indians right flank, they fled, were pursued,
and dispersed, with the loss of three hundred men. Had their skill or
weapons been equal to their strength and ferocity, it might have cost
us dear. Although armed chiefly with bows, arrows, and lances, they
advanced up to the very muzzles of our pieces, repeated their assaults,
and died like wild beasts, gnawing the bayonets. This attack cost us
some few men; but we lost a most excellent sea officer, Capt. Porter,
lieutenant of the Norfolk, sincerely and justly lamented by all. We
had scarce finished this affair, when another body of them, with part
of the Spanish garrison, again attacked the church No 2. forced the
Seapoys from their post in it, nearest the town, and took possession
of the top, from whence they killed and wounded several of our people,
who were entirely exposed to all their weapons. Notwithstanding this
disadvantageous situation, the European soldiers maintained their
post behind the church with great firmness and patience, and at last
dislodged the enemy, with the assistance of some field-pieces, and the
good conduct of Maj. Fell, field-officer of the day, Capt. Fletcher,
and other brave officers sent to their relief. The Spaniards left
seventy dead behind them, in and about the church. On our side,
Capt. Strahan, of the 79th regiment, a very good officer, was mortally
wounded, and forty private men wounded or killed. This was the enemy's
last effort: all their Indians, excepting one thousand eight hundred,
discouraged by their losses, returned home. Our working parties and
the fire of our batteries, which had been a little interrupted by these
attacks, recommenced with greater spirit than ever. We found likewise
the good effects of giving the enemy no time to repair their embrasures
or carriages in the night. They opened only an inconsiderable fire
from three or four embrasures in the curtain, too oblique to have
much effect: before night those defences were ruined.
Fifth. Maj. Barker's fire was so violent, that the breach appeared
practicable. Our cannon from the three-gun battery silenced those
of the enemy on the orillon of St. Andrew. We were in hopes that the
Spaniards would be sensible of their danger, and think of giving up
the town. But they were obstinate, without bravery, or any generous
resolution of defending the breach. In the evening, the design of
storming the place was communicated to the principal officers of each
department only, and the necessary preparations made. [42]
Sixth. At four o'clock in the morning we filed off from our quarters,
in small bodies, to give the less suspicion; and, by degrees, assembled
at St. Jago's church; observing the utmost silence, and concealing
ourselves in the place of arms, and the parallel between the church and
the battery. Maj. Barker kept up a brisk fire upon the works, and those
places where the enemy might be lodged or intrenched. Our mortars were
well applied for the same purpose. At day-break we discerned a large
body of Spaniards formed on the bastion of St. Andrew, which gave us
reason to imagine they had got some information of our design, and
intended to annoy us with their musquetry and grape from the retired
flank of that bastion, where they had still two cannon placed: but
upon the explosion of some shells that fell among them, they went
off. We took immediate advantage of this, and by the signal of a
general discharge of our artillery and mortars, rushed on to the
assault, under cover of a thick smoke that blew directly upon the
town. Sixty volunteers of different corps, under Lieut. Russel of
the 79th, led the way, supported by the grenadiers of that regiment:
the engineers, with the pioneers, and other workmen, to clear and
enlarge the breach, and make lodgments, in case the enemy should have
been too strongly intrenched in the gorge of the bastion, followed:
Col. Monson and Maj. More were at the head of two grand divisions
of the 79th: the battalion of seamen advanced next, sustained by
the other two divisions of the 79th: the company's troops closed the
rear. They all mounted the breach with amazing spirit and rapidity. The
few Spaniards upon the bastion dispersed so suddenly, that it was
thought they depended upon their mines. Capt. Stevenson had orders
to make a strict search to discover them; but our precautions were
needless. We met with little resistance, except at the Royal gate,
and from the galleries of the lofty houses which surround the grand
square. In the guard-house over the Royal gate one hundred of the
Spaniards and Indians, who would not surrender, were put to the
sword. [43] Three hundred more, according to the enemy's account,
were drowned in attempting to escape over the river, which was very
deep and rapid. [44] The Governor and principal officers retired to
the citadel, and were glad to surrender as prisoners at discretion,
as that place was in no good posture of defence. [45] Capt. Dupont of
the 79th, with one hundred men, took possession of it. The Marquis of
Villa Mediana, with the rest of the Spanish officers, were admitted
as prisoners of war on their paroles of honour; and to conciliate
the affections of the natives, all the Indians who fell into our
hands were dismissed in safety. Our joy, upon this fortunate event,
was greatly clouded by the loss of Maj. More, who was transfixed with
an arrow near the Royal gate, [46] and died immediately, universally
lamented for his good qualities, Capt. Sleigh of the grenadiers, and
some other good officers, were wounded. We had about thirty private
men killed or wounded. In consequence of the terms dictated to the
Spaniards, the port of Cavite and citadel, with several large ships,
and a vast quantity of warlike and naval stores, were surrendered to
us. Capt. Champion, with 100 marines, and as many Seapoys, imbarked
on board the Seahorse to take possession of it. The Spanish garrison
of 300 men, on the approach of our people, mutinied against their
officers, plundered some houses, and went off into the country with
their arms.
As a small acknowledgment of the great services which the whole army
had received from Capt. Kempenfelt, the Admiral's Captain, I begged
he would act at Cavite with a commission as governor for his Majesty,
being well assured that no one could discharge that trust with more
conduct and abilities. [47]
Spanish officers of note prisoners of war
Don Felix de Eguiluz, Lieutenant-General of Artillery.
The Marquis of Villa Mediana, Brigadier-General, and Colonel of the
King's regiment.
Don Miguel Valdes, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Commandant of the second
battalion of ditto.
Don Joseph de Riarte, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Governor of the Cavite.
Don Francisco Rodriguez, Serjeant-Major of ditto.
Don Manuel Fernandes Toribio, Commandant and Serjeant-Major of the
citadel of St. Jago.
Don Christoval Ros, Serjeant-Major of Manila.
Don Thomas de Castro, [48] Chief Engineer, and Colonel of the King's
regiment.
14 Captains, 13 Lieutenants, 12 Ensigns, 2 Adjutants, 1 Physician,
1 Surgeon, 11 Serjeants, 261 Rank and File.
Of the Marine, 4 Captains, 2 Ensigns.
Of the Artillery, 1 Captain-Commandant, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign,
1 Adjutant, 1 Commissary.
Of the Irregular Pampangos, 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants,
1 Ensign.
2 Adjutants of the Cavite.
2 Adjutants of the citadel of St. Jago.
4 Adjutants of the city of Manila.
1 Captain and Engineer of ditto.
Of the Cadet Company 5
The Governor-General's life-guard 8
Killed and Wounded of the British forces
79th reg. Killed: Maj. More, Capt. Strahan, Lieut. Fryar, 6
privates. Wounded: Capt. Sleigh of the grenadiers, Lieuts Hazlewood
and Garnons, Ens. Hog, 45 pr.
Battalion of seamen. Killed: Capt. Peter Porter, lieutenant of
the Norfolk, Mr. White, surgeon's mate of ditto, 7 pr. seamen,
5 marines. Wounded: Second-Lieut. Thomas Spearing, of the marines,
of the Lenox, Mr. Neal, midshipman of ditto, one serjeant, 18 pr.
Company's troops. Drowned: Lieut. Hardwick, one serjeant, 2
pr. Wounded: one serjeant, 5 pr.
Artillery. Killed: one pr. Wounded: one serjeant, 3 pr.
Seapoys. Killed 8. Wounded 31.
Abstract
K. W. Tot.
Officers 6 6 12
Serjeants 1 3 4
Private 29 102 131
-- --- ---
36 111 147
Return of brass and iron ordnance, powder, shot, shells, &c. found
in the town and citadel of Manila.
Brass ordnance, 342 serviceable, 8 unserviceable.
Iron ordnance, 108 serviceable, 15 unserviceable.
Brass mortars, 6 inch and beds ... 2
Iron howitzers 7.
Carriages, 66 serviceable, 85 unserviceable.
Of the above, 4 brass guns and 7 swivels were spiked, and 8 wounded.
Shot, of all sizes, from 28 pounders to four ounces, 18,073.
Grape ditto 2411.
Double-headed 118.
Link 88.
Spiked 39.
Lead, one and a half pounders, 1000.
Shells, from 13 inch to 7 inch, 44.
Hand granadoes 248.
Gunpowder boxes 38, computed to contain 2280 lb.
Ditto matt bags 141, computed to contain 6345 lb.
Cartridges filled, 894 4989 lb.
Musquets, repairable 270, unserviceable 257.
Ditto barrels 360.
Spontoons 4; halberts 12; bayonets, very old, 200; spunges, with
rammer-heads, unserviceable, 200; bamboo cartridges, of different
sizes, 240.
Return of brass and iron ordnance, &c. found at Cavite.
Brass ordnance, 137 serviceable, 1 unserviceable.
Iron ditto, 68 serviceable, 24 unserviceable.
Iron howitzers and carriages, 11 serviceable.
Carriages, 96 serviceable, 41 unserviceable.
Shot, of all sizes, from 52 pounders to 3 pounders, 13,620.
Double-headed ditto 411.
Link ditto 347.
Grape ditto 987.
Shells, 13 and 8 inch, 18.
Powder-boxes 138, containing 7680 lb.
Cartridges 1221, containing 7904 lb.
Musquets, 280 serviceable, 12 unserviceable.
Bayonets 108, cutlasses 28.
ROJO'S JOURNAL
Journal of what occurred at the attack and defense of the city of
Manila, the capital of Philipinas islands, and of the archipelago of
San Lazaro, from September 22 to October 5, 1762, the day on which it
was taken by assault by Brigadier Guillermo Drapert, commander-in-chief
of the British troops of the East Indias.
Before commencing this journal, it is fitting to give a brief
description of the location of Manila, and of the destitute condition
in which the enemy found its fortifications and defenses in order
that we may present a clear idea of the vigorous resistance that was
made even to the last extremity. [49]
The city of Manila, according to the map of Father Murillo, is located
in 14° 40' of north latitude, and 158° 35' east longitude, on a
tongue of land which terminates in a point, and forming the figure
of a jug or flagon, whose extremity or neck is formed by the above
point itself and contains the royal fort of Santiago. At the west it
is terminated by a large bay at the north by the Pasig River, which
bathes its walls. On the land side from south to east, it is defended
by four flat bastions with their casemates, and right flanks covered
with orillons, and with ditches, covered way, and glacis. Along the
sea, the city is fortified by a long curtain with five little flat
bastions, a reduct located at a great distance from the wall. The
lines of defense have such disproportion from one another, that those
bastions cannot be defended reciprocally. It is impossible, further,
to prevent the approach by the curtain, because there is neither
ditch nor terreplein. Then too, the parapets are only one foot wide,
and the curtain six.
The curtain embracing the north side, bathed by the river, and which
has a kind of curvature where it forms two reëntrant angles, is in
the same condition of weakness as that of the sea, and is defended
by two small bastions, which present the same defect noted above in
their lines of defense.
From the bastion of San Gabriel to the gate of the Parián on the east
of the city, is located a false screen or barbacan with its parapet
and banquette. It is defective, for it is fallen, and has no gate
for the retreat of the soldiers. The gate of the Parián is covered
and defended by a small outer work in the form of a crown, and the
royal gate by a ravelin so poorly placed and so poorly ordered, that
it cannot defend the faces of the collateral bastions of San Andrés
and of the foundry. The flanks of the two latter bastions are not any
more capable of defending the faces of the ravelin. It must be added
to the above that all those fortifications are very old and defective:
the walls; the chemise, or revetement, three feet thick at the cordon,
without counterfort; the escarp and counter-escarp fallen in part;
and almost everything useless.
The covered way is very short and filled with thickets and bushes. Its
parapet is in ruins and it has no stockade or palisade. It is so low,
that it leaves the most essential parts of the bastions and curtains
open clear to the foot. The embrasures are poorly placed. The gates on
the sea side, are pierced through, and so old and so used up, that they
cannot offer any resistance at all. The esplanades of the boulevards
are so irregular and so rough, that it is impossible to maneuver
with the artillery, which, besides, was mounted on ship's carriages
so old that they could not be fired without danger of being dismounted.
The royal fort of Santiago is composed of two demi-bastions which
dominate the city, and of a third one which points outward and
prevents the approach of the enemy. It has two circular platforms,
and several flanks intended for the same use. The curtains which
unite these bastions have no terreplein, and the places from which
to fire are distributed without any measure or proportion.
The garrison of this place consisted of the royal regiment, which
has been composed, since its creation, of twenty companies of one
hundred men apiece, under the command of captains, lieutenants,
and ensigns. These companies have never been full, and have never
amounted to fifteen hundred men. When the enemy arrived, this regiment
was diminished to such an extent both by the mortality and desertion
of some men, and by the different detachments which were told off for
the galleons and for other posts, that there were not more than five
hundred and fifty-six soldiers. There were only eighty cannoneers,
and those even were native Indians, who were but little skilled in the
management of artillery. At the arrival of the enemy, four militia
companies were formed, of sixty men each, and called commercial
troops. [50]