BATTLE OF CAMDEN.
Lord Cornwallis, when left in military command at the South by Sir
Henry Clinton, was charged, it will be recollected, with the invasion
of North Carolina. It was an enterprise in which much difficulty was
to be apprehended, both from the character of the people and the
country. The original settlers were from various parts, most of them
men who had experienced political or religious oppression, and had
brought with them a quick sensibility to wrong, a stern appreciation
of their rights, and an indomitable spirit of freedom and
independence. It was this spirit which gave rise to the confederacy,
called the Regulation, formed to withstand the abuses of power; and
the first blood shed in our country, in resistance to arbitrary
taxation, was at Almance in this province, in a conflict between the
regulators and Governor Tryon. Above all, it should never be
forgotten, that at Mecklenburg, in the heart of North Carolina, was
fulminated the first declaration of independence of the British crown,
upwards of a year before like declaration by Congress.
The physical difficulties arising from the nature of the country
consisted in its mountain fastnesses in the northwestern part, its
vast forests, its sterile tracts, its long rivers, destitute of
bridges, and which, though fordable in fair weather, were liable to be
swollen by sudden storms and freshets, and rendered deep, turbulent
and impassable. These rivers, in fact, which rushed down from the
mountain, but wound sluggishly through the plains, were the military
strength of the country, as we shall have frequent occasion to show in
the course of our narrative.
Lord Cornwallis forbore to attempt the invasion of North Carolina
until the summer heats should be over and the harvests gathered in. In
the meantime he disposed of his troops in cantonments, to cover the
frontiers of South Carolina and Georgia, and maintain their internal
quiet. The command of the frontiers was given by him to Lord Rawdon,
who made Camden his principal post. This town, the capital of Kershaw
District, a fertile, fruitful country, was situated on the east bank
of the Wateree River, on the road leading to North Carolina. It was to
be the grand military depot for the projected campaign.
The proclamation of Sir Henry Clinton, putting an end to all
neutrality, and the rigorous penalties and persecutions with which all
infractions of its terms were punished, had for a time quelled the
spirit of the country. By degrees, however, the dread of British power
gave way to impatience of British exactions. Symptoms of revolt
manifested themselves in various parts. They were encouraged by
intelligence that De Kalb, sent by Washington, was advancing through
North Carolina at the head of two thousand men, and that the militia
of that State and of Virginia were joining his standard. This was soon
followed by tidings that Gates, the conqueror of Burgoyne, was on his
way to take command of the Southern forces.
The prospect of such aid from the North reanimated the Southern
patriots. One of the most eminent of these was Thomas Sumter, whom the
Carolinians had surnamed the Game Cock. [He was now between forty and
fifty years of age, brave, hardy and vigorous. He had seen service
against the Indians, and in the French war, and had held the rank of
lieutenant-colonel in the Continental line. After the fall of
Charleston he had sought refuge with his family in one of the open
savannahs that lie concealed amid the swamps with which the lower part
of South Carolina abounds. In one of his temporary absences his
retreat had been invaded, his house burnt to the ground, and his wife
and children driven forth without shelter.] Private injury had thus
been added to the incentives of patriotism. Emerging from his
hiding-place, he had thrown himself among a handful of his
fellow-sufferers who had taken refuge in North Carolina. They chose
him at once as a leader, and resolved on a desperate struggle for the
deliverance of their native State. Destitute of regular weapons, they
forged rude substitutes out of the implements of husbandry. Old
mill-saws were converted into broad-swords; knives at the ends of
poles served for lances; while the country housewives gladly gave up
their pewter dishes and other utensils, to be melted down and cast
into bullets for such as had fire-arms.
When Sumter led this gallant band of exiles over the border, they did
not amount in number to two hundred; yet with these he attacked and
routed a well-armed body of British troops and tories, the terror of
the frontier. His followers supplied themselves with weapons from the
slain. In a little while his band was augmented by recruits. Parties
of militia, also, recently embodied under the compelling measures of
Cornwallis, deserted to the patriot standard. Thus reinforced to the
amount of six hundred men, he made, on the 30th of July, a spirited
attack on the British post at Rocky Mount, near the Catawba, but was
repulsed. A more successful attack was made by him, eight days
afterwards, on another post at Hanging Rock.
The advance of De Kalb with reinforcements from the North, had been
retarded by various difficulties, the most important of which was want
of provisions. This had been especially the case, he said, since his
arrival in North Carolina. The legislative or executive power, he
complained, gave him no assistance, nor could he obtain supplies from
the people but by military force. There was no flour in the camp, nor
were dispositions made to furnish any. His troops were reduced for a
time to short allowance, and at length, on the 6th of July, brought to
a positive halt at Deep River. The North Carolina militia, under
General Caswell, were already in the field, on the road to Camden,
beyond the Pedee River. He was anxious to form a junction with them,
but a wide and sterile region lay between him and them, difficult to
be traversed, unless magazines were established in advance, or he were
supplied with provisions to take with him. For three weeks he remained
in this encampment, foraging an exhausted country for a meagre
subsistence, and was thinking of deviating to the right, and seeking
the fertile counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan, when on the 25th of
July, General Gates arrived at the camp.
Gates approved of De Kalb's standing orders, but at the first review
of the troops, to the great astonishment of the baron, gave orders for
them to hold themselves in readiness to march at a _moment's warning_.
It was evident he meant to signalize himself by celerity of movement
in contrast with protracted delays. It was in vain the destitute
situation of the troops was represented to him, and that they had not
a day's provision in advance. His reply was, that wagons laden with
supplies were coming on, and would overtake them in two days.
On the 27th he actually put the army in motion over the Buffalo Ford,
on the direct road to Camden. Colonel Williams, the adjutant-general
of De Kalb, warned him of the sterile nature of that route, and
recommended a more circuitous one further north, which passed through
the abundant county of Mecklenburg. Gates persisted in taking the
direct route, which proved all that had been represented. It led
through a region of pine barrens, sand hills and swamps, with few
human habitations, and those mostly deserted. The supplies of which he
had spoken never overtook him. His army had to subsist itself on lean
cattle roaming almost wild in the woods; and to supply the want of
bread with green Indian corn, unripe apples and peaches. The
consequence was a distressing prevalence of dysentery.
Having crossed the Pedee River on the 3d of August, the army was
joined by a handful of brave Virginia regulars under Lieutenant-colonel
Porterfield, who had been wandering about the country since the
disaster of Charleston; and on the 7th, the much-desired junction took
place with the North Carolina militia. On the 13th they encamped at
Rugeley's Mills, otherwise called Clermont, about twelve miles from
Camden, and on the following day were reinforced by a brigade of seven
hundred Virginia militia under General Stephens.
On the approach of Gates, Lord Rawdon had concentrated his forces at
Camden. The post was flanked by the Wateree River and Pine-tree Creek,
and strengthened with redoubts. Lord Cornwallis had hastened hither
from Charleston on learning that affairs in this quarter were drawing
to a crisis, and had arrived here on the 13th. The British effective
force thus collected was something more than two thousand, including
officers. About five hundred were militia and tory refugees from North
Carolina. The forces under Gates according to the return of his
adjutant-general, were three thousand and fifty-two fit for duty; more
than two-thirds of them, however, were militia.
On the 14th he received an express from General Sumter, who, with his
partisan corps, after harassing the enemy at various points, was now
endeavoring to cut off their supplies from Charleston. The object of
the express was to ask a reinforcement of regulars to aid him in
capturing a large convoy of clothing, ammunition and stores, on its
way to the garrison, and which would pass Wateree Ferry, about a mile
from Camden. Gates accordingly detached Colonel Woolford of the
Maryland line with one hundred regulars, a party of artillery, and two
brass field-pieces. On the same evening he moved with his main force
to take post at a deep stream about seven miles from Camden, intending
to attack Lord Rawdon or his redoubts should he march out in force to
repel Sumter.
By a singular coincidence, Lord Cornwallis on the very same evening
sallied forth from Camden to attack the American camp at Clermont.
About two o'clock at night the two forces blundered, as it were, on
each other about half way. A skirmish took place between their
advanced guards, in which Porterfield of the Virginia regulars was
mortally wounded. Some prisoners were taken on either side. Gates was
astounded at being told that the enemy at hand was Cornwallis with
three thousand men. Calling a council of war he demanded what was best
to be done. For a moment or two there was blank silence. It was broken
by General Stevens of the Virginia militia, with the significant
question, "Gentlemen, is it not too late _now_ to do anything but
fight?" No other advice was asked or offered, and all were required to
repair to their respective commands. In forming the line, the first
Maryland division, including the Delawares, was on the right,
commanded by De Kalb. The Virginia militia under Stevens, were on the
left. Caswell with the North Carolinians formed the centre. The
artillery was in battery on the road. Each flank was covered by a
marsh. The second Maryland brigade formed a reserve, a few hundred
yards in rear of the first.
At daybreak (Aug. 16th), the enemy were dimly descried advancing in
column; they appeared to be displaying to the right. Gates ordered
that Stevens should advance briskly with his brigade of Virginia
militia and attack them while in the act of displaying. No sooner did
Stevens receive the order than he put his brigade in motion, but
discovered that the right wing of the enemy was already in line. A few
sharp-shooters were detached to run forward, post themselves behind
trees within forty or fifty yards of the enemy to extort their fire
while at a distance, and render it less terrible to the militia. The
expedient failed. The British rushed on shouting and firing. The
inexperienced militia, dismayed and confounded by this impetuous
assault, threw down their loaded muskets and fled. The panic spread to
the North Carolina militia. Part of them made a temporary stand, but
soon joined with the rest in flight, rendered headlong and disastrous
by the charge and pursuit of Tarleton and his cavalry.
Gates, seconded by his officers, made several attempts to rally the
militia, but was borne along with them. The day was hazy; there was no
wind to carry off the smoke, which hung over the field of battle like
a thick cloud. Nothing could be seen distinctly. Supposing that the
regular troops were dispersed like the militia, Gates gave up all for
lost, and retreated from the field.
The regulars, however, had not given away. The Maryland brigades and
the Delaware regiment, unconscious that they were deserted by the
militia, stood their ground, and bore the brunt of the battle. Though
repeatedly broken, they as often rallied, and braved even the deadly
push of the bayonet. At length a charge of Tarleton's cavalry on their
flank threw them into confusion, and drove them into the woods and
swamps. None showed more gallantry on this disastrous day than the
Baron De Kalb; he fought on foot with the second Maryland brigade, and
fell exhausted after receiving eleven wounds. His aide-de-camp, De
Buysson, supported him in his arms and was repeatedly wounded in
protecting him. He announced the rank and nation of his general, and
both were taken prisoners. De Kalb died in the course of a few days.
General Gates in retreating had hoped to rally a sufficient force at
Clermont to cover the retreat of the regulars, but the further they
fled, the more the militia were dispersed, until the generals were
abandoned by all but their aides. To add to the mortification of
Gates, he learned in the course of his retreat that Sumter had been
completely successful, and having reduced the enemy's redoubt on the
Wateree, and captured one hundred prisoners and forty loaded wagons,
was marching off with his booty on the opposite side of the river;
apprehending danger from the quarter in which he had heard firing in
the morning.
Cornwallis was apprehensive that Sumter's corps might form a rallying
point to the routed army. On the morning of the 17th of August,
therefore, he detached Tarleton in pursuit with a body of cavalry and
light infantry, about three hundred and fifty strong. Sumter was
retreating up the western side of the Wateree, much encumbered by his
spoils and prisoners. Tarleton pushed up by forced and concealed
marches on the eastern side. At dusk Tarleton descried the fires of
the American camp about a mile from the opposite shore. In the morning
his sentries gave word that the Americans were quitting their
encampment. It was evident they knew nothing of a British force being
in pursuit of them. Tarleton now crossed the Wateree. The delay in
crossing, and the diligence of Sumter's march, increased the distance
between the pursuers and the pursued. About noon a part of Tarleton's
force gave out through heat and fatigue. Leaving them to repose on the
bank of Fishing Creek, he pushed on with about one hundred dragoons,
the freshest and most able; still marching with great circumspection.
A sergeant and five dragoons rode up to the summit of a neighboring
hill to reconnoitre. Crouching on their horses they made signs to
Tarleton. He cautiously approached the crest of the hill, and looking
over, beheld the American camp on a neighboring height in a most
negligent condition. The troops, having for the last four days been
almost without food or sleep, were indulged in complete relaxation.
Their arms were stacked, and they were scattered about, some
strolling, some lying on the grass under the trees, some bathing in
the river. Sumter himself had thrown off part of his clothes on
account of the heat of the weather.
Tarleton prepared for instant attack. His cavalry and
infantry formed into one line, dashed forward with a general
shout, and, before the Americans could recover from their
surprise, got between them and the parade ground on which the muskets
were stacked. All was confusion and consternation in the American
camp. Some opposition was made from behind baggage wagons, and there
was skirmishing in various quarters, but in a little while there was a
universal flight to the river and the woods. Between three and four
hundred were killed and wounded; all their arms and baggage with two
brass field-pieces fell into the hands of the enemy, who also
recaptured the prisoners and booty taken at Camden. Sumter with about
three hundred and fifty of his men effected a retreat; he galloped
off, it is said, without saddle, hat or coat.
It was not until the beginning of September that Washington received
word of the disastrous reverse at Camden. The shock was the greater as
previous reports from that quarter had represented the operations a
few days preceding the action as much in our favor. It was evident to
Washington that the course of war must ultimately tend to the Southern
States, yet the situation of affairs in the North did not permit him
to detach any sufficient force for their relief. All that he could do
for the present was to endeavor to hold the enemy in check in that
quarter. For this purpose he gave orders that some regular troops,
enlisted in Maryland for the war, and intended for the main army,
should be sent to the southward. He wrote to Governor Rutledge of
South Carolina (12th September), to raise a permanent, compact,
well-organized body of troops, instead of depending upon a numerous
army of militia, always "inconceivably expensive, and too fluctuating
and undisciplined" to oppose a regular force. He was still more urgent
and explicit on this head in his letters to the President of Congress
(September 15th). "Regular troops alone," said he, "are equal to the
exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence; and whenever
a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No
militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular
force."
He had scarce written the foregoing, when he received a letter from
the now unfortunate Gates, dated at Hillsborough, August 30th and
September 3d, giving particulars of his discomfiture. No longer
vaunting and vainglorious, he pleads nothing but his patriotism, and
deprecates the fall which he apprehends awaits him. The appeal which
he makes to Washington's magnanimity to support him in this day of his
reverse, is the highest testimonial he could give to the exalted
character of the man whom he once affected to underrate and aspired to
supplant.
Washington still cherished the idea of a combined attack upon New York
as soon as a French naval force should arrive. The destruction of the
enemy here would relieve this part of the Union from an internal war,
and enable its troops and resources to be united with those of France
in vigorous efforts against the common enemy elsewhere. Hearing,
therefore, that the Count de Guichen with his West India squadron was
approaching the coast, Washington prepared to proceed to Hartford, in
Connecticut, there to hold a conference with the Count de Rochambeau
and the Chevalier de Ternay, and concert a plan for future operations,
of which the attack on New York was to form the principal feature.