BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.--HOSTILITIES ON THE DELAWARE.
Having given the catastrophe of the British invasion from the North,
we will revert to that part of the year's campaign which was passing
under the immediate eye of Washington. We left him encamped at Pott's
Grove towards the end of September, giving his troops a few days'
repose after their severe fatigues. Being rejoined by Wayne and
Smallwood with their brigades, and other troops being arrived from the
Jerseys, his force amounted to about eight thousand Continentals and
three thousand militia: with these he advanced on the 30th of
September to Skippack Creek, about fourteen miles from Germantown,
where the main body of the British army lay encamped; a detachment
under Cornwallis occupying Philadelphia.
Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, Admiral Lord Howe with
great exertions had succeeded in getting his ships of war and
transports round from the Chesapeake into the Delaware, and had
anchored them along the western shore from Reedy Island to Newcastle.
They were prevented from approaching nearer by obstructions which the
Americans had placed in the river. The lowest of these were at
Billingsport (Bylling's Point), where chevaux-de-frise in the channel
of the river were protected by a strong redoubt on the Jersey shore.
Higher up were Fort Mifflin on Mud (or Fort) Island, and Fort Mercer
on the Jersey shore; with chevaux-de-frise between them. Washington
had exerted himself to throw a garrison into Fort Mifflin, and keep up
the obstructions of the river. Sir William Howe had concerted
operations with his brother by land and water, to reduce the forts and
clear away the obstructions of the river. With this view he detached a
part of his force into the Jerseys to proceed, in the first instance,
against the fortifications at Billingsport.
Washington had been for some days anxiously on the lookout for some
opportunity to strike a blow of consequence, when two intercepted
letters gave him intelligence of this movement. He immediately
determined to make an attack upon the British camp at Germantown,
while weakened by the absence of this detachment. To understand the
plan of the attack, some description of the British place of
encampment is necessary.
Germantown, at that time, was little more than one continued street,
extending two miles north and south. Beyond the village, and about a
hundred yards east of the road, stood a spacious stone edifice, the
country-seat of Benjamin Chew, chief justice of Pennsylvania previous
to the Revolution. Four roads approached the village from above; that
is, from the north. The Skippack, which was the main road, led over
Chestnut Hill and Mount Airy down to and through the village towards
Philadelphia, forming the street of which we have just spoken. On its
right and nearly parallel was the Monatawny or Ridge road, passing
near the Schuylkill, and entering the main road below the village. On
the left of the Skippack or main road was the Limekiln road, running
nearly parallel to it for a time, and then turning towards it, almost
at right angles, so as to enter the village at the market-place. Still
further to the left or east, and outside of all, was the Old York
road, falling into the main road some distance below the village.
The main body of the British forces lay encamped across the lower part
of the village, divided into almost equal parts by the main street or
Skippack road. The right wing commanded by General Grant, was to the
east of the road, the left wing to the west. Each wing was covered by
strong detachments and guarded by cavalry. General Howe had his
head-quarters in the rear. The advance of the army, composed of the 2d
battalion of British light-infantry, with a train of artillery, was
more than two miles from the main body, on the west of the road, with
an outlying picket stationed with two six-pounders at Allen's house on
Mount Airy. About three-quarters of a mile in the rear of the
light-infantry, lay encamped in a field opposite "Chew's House," the
40th regiment of infantry, under Colonel Musgrave.
According to Washington's plan for the attack, Sullivan was to command
the right wing, composed of his own division, principally Maryland
troops, and the division of General Wayne. He was to be sustained by a
_corps de reserve_, under Lord Stirling, composed of Nash's North
Carolina and Maxwell's Virginia brigades, and to be flanked by the
brigade of General Conway. He was to march down the Skippack road and
attack the left wing; at the same time General Armstrong, with the
Pennsylvania militia, was to pass down the Monatawny or Ridge road,
and get upon the enemy's left and rear. Greene with the left wing,
composed of his own division and the division of General Stephen, and
flanked by McDougall's brigade, was to march down the Limekiln road,
so as to enter the village at the market-house. The two divisions were
to attack the enemy's right wing in front, McDougall with his brigade
to attack it in flank, while Smallwood's division of Maryland militia
and Forman's Jersey brigade, making a circuit by the Old York road,
were to attack it in the rear. Two-thirds of the forces were thus
directed against the enemy's right wing, under the idea that, if it
could be forced, the whole army must be pushed into the Schuylkill, or
compelled to surrender. The attack was to begin on all quarters at
daybreak.
About dusk, on the 3d of October, the army left its encampment at
Matuchen Hills, by its different routes. Washington accompanied the
right wing. It had fifteen miles of weary march to make over rough
roads, so that it was after daybreak when the troops emerged from the
woods on Chestnut Hill. The morning was dark with a heavy fog. A
detachment advanced to attack the enemy's out-picket, stationed at
Allen's House. The patrol was led by Captain Allen McLane. He fell in
with double sentries, whom he killed with the loss of one man. The
alarm, however, was given; the distant roll of a drum and the call to
arms resounded through the murky air. The picket guard, after
discharging their two six-pounders, were routed, and retreated down
the south side of Mount Airy to the battalion of light-infantry who
were forming in order of battle. As their pursuers descended into the
valley, the sun rose, but was soon obscured. Wayne led the attack upon
the light-infantry. They broke at first but soon formed again, when a
heavy and well-directed fire took place on both sides. They again gave
way, but being supported by the grenadiers, returned to the charge.
Sullivan's division and Conway's brigade formed on the west of the
road, and joined in the attack; the rest of the troops were too far to
the north to render any assistance. The infantry, after fighting
bravely for a time, broke and ran, leaving their artillery behind.
They were hotly pursued by Wayne. His troops remembered the bloody
20th of September, and the ruthless slaughter of their comrades. It
was a terrible melée. The fog, together with the smoke of the cannonry
and musketry, made it almost as dark as night; our people mistaking
one another for the enemy, frequently exchanged shots before they
discovered their error. The whole of the enemy's advance were driven
from their camping ground, leaving their tents standing, with all
their baggage. Colonel Musgrave, with six companies of the 40th
regiment, threw himself into Chew's House, barricaded the doors and
lower windows, and took post above stairs; the main torrent of the
retreat passed by pursued by Wayne into the village.
As the residue of this division of the army came up to join in the
pursuit, Musgrave and his men opened a fire of musketry upon them from
the upper windows of his citadel. This brought them to a halt. Some of
the officers were for pushing on; but General Knox stoutly objected,
insisting on the old military maxim, never to leave a garrisoned
castle in the rear. His objection unluckily prevailed. A flag sent
with a summons to surrender was fired upon. The house was now
cannonaded, but the artillery was too light to have the desired
effect. An attempt was made to set fire to the basement. He who
attempted it was shot dead from a grated cellar window. At length a
regiment was left to keep guard upon the mansion and hold its garrison
in check, and the rear division again pressed forward.
This half hour's delay, however, of nearly one-half of the army,
disconcerted the action. The divisions and brigades thus separated
from each other by the skirmishing attack upon Chew's House, could not
be re-united. The fog and smoke rendered all objects indistinct at
thirty yards' distance; the different parts of the army knew nothing
of the position or movements of each other, and the commander-in-chief
could take no view nor gain any information of the situation of the
whole. The original plan of attack was only effectively carried into
operation in the centre. Still the action, though disconnected,
irregular and partial, was animated in various quarters. Sullivan,
being reinforced by Nash's North Carolina troops and Conway's brigade,
pushed on a mile beyond Chew's House, where the left wing of the enemy
gave way before him.
Greene and Stephen, with their divisions, having had to make a
circuit, were late in coming into action, and became separated from
each other, part of Stephen's division being arrested by a heavy fire
from Chew's House and pausing to return it. Greene, however, with his
division, pressed rapidly forward, drove an advance regiment of
light-infantry before him, took a number of prisoners, and made his
way quite to the market-house in the centre of the village, where he
encountered the right wing of the British drawn up to receive him. The
impetuosity of his attack had an evident effect upon the enemy, who
began to waver. Forman and Smallwood, with the Jersey and Maryland
militia, were just showing themselves on the right flank of the enemy,
and our troops seemed on the point of carrying the whole encampment.
At this moment a singular panic seized our army. Various causes are
assigned for it. Sullivan alleges that his troops had expended all
their cartridges, and were alarmed by seeing the enemy gathering on
their left, and by the cry of a light-horseman, that the enemy were
getting round them. Wayne's division, which had pushed the enemy
nearly three miles, was alarmed by the approach of a large body of
American troops on its left flank, which it mistook for foes, and fell
back in defiance of every effort of its officers to rally it. In its
retreat it came upon Stephen's division and threw it into a panic,
being, in its turn, mistaken for the enemy; thus all fell into
confusion, and our army fled from their own victory.
In the meantime the enemy, having recovered from the first effects of
the surprise, advanced in their turn. General Grey brought up the left
wing, and pressed upon the American troops as they receded. Lord
Cornwallis, with a squadron of light-horse from Philadelphia, arrived
just in time to join in the pursuit. The retreat of the Americans was
attended with less loss than might have been expected, and they
carried off all their cannon and wounded. The retreat continued
through the day to Perkiomen Creek, a distance of twenty miles.
The loss of the enemy in this action is stated by them to be
seventy-one killed, four hundred and fifteen wounded, and fourteen
missing: among the killed was Brigadier-general Agnew. The American
loss was one hundred and fifty killed, five hundred and twenty-one
wounded, and about four hundred taken prisoners. Among the killed was
General Nash of North Carolina. Among the prisoners was Colonel
Mathews of Virginia.
The sudden retreat of the army gave Washington surprise, chagrin and
mortification. "Every account," said he subsequently, in a letter to
the President of Congress, "confirms the opinion I at first
entertained, that our troops retreated at the instant when victory was
declaring herself in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair
which it seems had taken place in the British army, were scarcely to
be paralleled; and it is said, so strongly did the ideas of a retreat
prevail, that Chester was fixed on for their rendezvous. I can
discover no other cause for not improving this happy opportunity, than
the extreme haziness of the weather."
The plan of attack was too widely extended for strict concert, and too
complicated for precise co-operation, as it had to be conducted in the
night, and with a large proportion of undisciplined militia.
But although the Americans were balked of the victory, which seemed
within their grasp, the impression made by the audacity of this
attempt upon Germantown was greater we are told than that caused by
any single incident of the war after Lexington and Bunker's Hill.
Washington remained a few days at Perkiomen Creek, to give his army
time to rest and recover from the disorder incident to a retreat.
Having been reinforced by the arrival of twelve hundred Rhode Island
troops from Peekskill, under General Varnum, and nearly a thousand
Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania troops, he gradually drew nearer
to Philadelphia, and took a strong position at White Marsh, within
fourteen miles of that city. By a resolution of Congress, all persons
taken within thirty miles of any place occupied by British troops, in
the act of conveying supplies to them, were subjected to martial law.
Acting under the resolution, Washington detached large bodies of
militia to scour the roads above the city, and between the Schuylkill
and Chester, to intercept all supplies going to the enemy.
On the forts and obstructions in the river, Washington mainly counted
to complete the harassment of Philadelphia. These defences had been
materially impaired. The works at Billingsport had been attacked and
destroyed, and some of the enemy's ships had forced their way through
the chevaux-de-frise placed there. The American frigate Delaware,
stationed in the river between the upper forts and Philadelphia, had
run aground before a British battery and been captured.
It was now the great object of the Howes to reduce and destroy, and of
Washington to defend and maintain the remaining forts and
obstructions. Fort Mifflin, which we have already mentioned, was
erected on a low, green, reedy island in the Delaware, a few miles
below Philadelphia, and below the mouth of the Schuylkill. It
consisted of a strong redoubt with extensive outworks and batteries.
There was but a narrow channel between the island and the Pennsylvania
shore. The main channel, practicable for ships, was on the other side.
In this were sunk strong chevaux-de-frise, difficult either to be
weighed or cut through, and dangerous to any ships that might run
against them; subjected as they would be to the batteries of Fort
Mifflin on one side, and on the other to those of Fort Mercer, a
strong work at Red Bank on the Jersey shore.
Fort Mifflin was garrisoned by troops of the Maryland line, under
Lieutenant-colonel Samuel Smith of Baltimore; and had kept up a brave
defence against batteries erected by the enemy on the Pennsylvania
shore. A reinforcement of Virginia troops made the garrison between
three and four hundred strong. Floating batteries, galleys, and
fire-ships, commanded by Commodore Hazelwood, were stationed under the
forts and about the river.
Fort Mercer had hitherto been garrisoned by militia, but Washington
now replaced them by four hundred of General Varnum's Rhode Island
Continentals. Colonel Christopher Greene was put in command; a brave
officer who had accompanied Arnold in his rough expedition to Canada,
and fought valiantly under the walls of Quebec. Colonel Greene was
accompanied by Captain Mauduit Duplessis, who was to have the
direction of the artillery. He was a young French engineer of great
merit, who had volunteered in the American cause, and received a
commission from Congress. The chevaux-de-frise in the river had been
constructed under his superintendence.
Greene, aided by Duplessis, made all haste to put Fort Mercer in a
state of defence; but before the outworks were completed, he was
surprised (October 22) by the appearance of a large force emerging
from a wood within cannon shot of the fort. Their uniforms showed them
to be Hessians. They were, in fact, four battalions twelve hundred
strong of grenadiers, picked men, beside light-infantry and chasseurs,
all commanded by Count Donop, who had figured in the last year's
campaign. Colonel Greene, in nowise dismayed by the superiority of the
enemy forming in glistening array before the wood, prepared for a
stout resistance. In a little while an officer was descried, riding
slowly up with a flag, accompanied by a drummer. Greene ordered his
men to keep out of sight, that the fort might appear but slightly
garrisoned.
When within proper distance the drummer sounded a parley, and the
officer summoned the garrison to surrender; with a threat of no
quarter in case of resistance. Greene's reply was that the post would
be defended to the last extremity. The flag rode back and made a
report. Forthwith the Hessians were seen at work throwing up a battery
within half a mile of the outworks. It was finished by four o'clock,
and opened a heavy cannonade, under cover of which the enemy were
preparing to approach.
As the American outworks were but half finished and were too extensive
to be manned by the garrison, it was determined by Greene and
Duplessis that the troops should make but a short stand there, to gall
the enemy in their approach, and then retire within the redoubt, which
was defended by a deep intrenchment, boarded and fraised.
Donop led on his troops in gallant style under cover of a heavy fire
from his battery. They advanced in two columns to attack the outworks
in two places. As they advanced they were excessively galled by a
flanking fire from the American galleys and batteries, and by sharp
volleys from the outworks. The latter, however, as had been concerted,
were quickly abandoned by the garrison. The enemy entered at two
places, and imagining the day their own, the two columns pushed on
with shouts to storm different parts of the redoubt. As yet no troops
were to be seen; but as one of the columns approached the redoubt on
the north side, a tremendous discharge of grape-shot and musketry
burst forth from the embrasures in front, and a half-masked battery on
the left. The slaughter was prodigious; the column was driven back in
confusion. Count Donop, with the other column, in attempting the south
side of the redoubt, had passed the abatis when a similar tempest of
artillery and musketry burst upon them. Some were killed on the spot,
many were wounded, and the rest were driven out. Donop himself
received a mortal wound; Lieutenant-colonel Mingerode, the second in
command, was also dangerously wounded. Several other of the best
officers were slain or disabled. The troops retreated in confusion,
hotly pursued, and were again cut up in their retreat by the flanking
fire from the galleys and floating batteries. The loss of the enemy in
killed and wounded, in this brief but severe action, was about four
hundred men; that of the Americans, eight killed and twenty-nine
wounded.
According to the plan of the enemy, Fort Mifflin, opposite to Fort
Mercer, was to have been attacked at the same time by water. The force
employed was the Augusta of sixty-four guns, the Roebuck of
forty-four, two frigates, the Merlin sloop of eighteen guns, and a
galley. They forced their way through the lower line of
chevaux-de-frise; but the Augusta and Merlin ran aground below the
second line, and every effort to get them off proved fruitless. To
divert attention from their situation, the other vessels drew as near
to Fort Mifflin as they could, and opened a cannonade. They kept up a
fire upon the fort throughout the evening, and recommenced it early in
the morning, as did likewise the British batteries on the Pennsylvania
shore; hoping that under cover of it the ships might be got off. A
strong adverse wind, however, kept the tide from rising sufficiently
to float them.
The Americans discovered their situation, and sent down four
fire-ships to destroy them, but without effect. A heavy fire was now
opened upon them, from the galleys and floating batteries. It was
warmly returned. In the course of the action, a red-hot shot set the
Augusta on fire. It was impossible to check the flames. She blew up
while the second lieutenant, the chaplain, the gunner, and several of
the crew were yet on board, most of whom perished. The Merlin was now
set on fire and abandoned; the Roebuck and the other vessels dropped
down the river, and the attack on Fort Mifflin was given up.
These signal repulses of the enemy had an animating effect on the
public mind, and were promptly noticed by Congress. Colonel Greene,
who commanded at Fort Mercer, Lieutenant-colonel Smith of Maryland,
who commanded at Fort Mifflin, and Commodore Hazelwood, who commanded
the galleys, received the thanks of that body; and subsequently, a
sword was voted to each, as a testimonial of distinguished merit.
We have heretofore had occasion to advert to the annoyances and
perplexities occasioned to Washington by the claims and pretensions of
foreign officers who had entered into the service. Among the officers
who came out with Lafayette, was the Baron De Kalb, a German by birth,
but who had long been employed in the French service, and though a
silver-haired veteran, sixty years of age, was yet fresh and active
and vigorous. In the month of September, Congress had given him the
commission of major-general, to date with that of Lafayette.
This instantly produced a remonstrance from Brigadier-general Conway,
who considered himself slighted and forgot, in their giving a superior
rank to his own to a person who had not rendered the cause the least
service, and who had been his inferior in France. He claimed,
therefore, for himself the rank of major-general, and was supported in
his pretensions by persons both in and out of Congress; especially by
Mifflin, the quartermaster-general.
Washington had already been disgusted by the overweening presumption
of Conway, and was surprised to hear that his application was likely
to be successful. He wrote on the 17th of October to Richard Henry
Lee, then in Congress, warning him that such an appointment would be
as unfortunate a measure as ever was adopted. "I would ask," writes
he, "why the youngest brigadier in the service should be put over the
heads of the oldest, and thereby take rank and command of gentlemen
who but yesterday were his seniors?... This truth I am well assured of
that they will not serve under him. I leave you to guess, therefore,
at the situation this army would be in at so important a crisis, if
this event should take place."
This opposition to his presumptuous aspirations at once threw Conway
into a faction forming under the auspices of General Mifflin. This
gentleman had recently tendered his resignation of the commission of
major-general and quartermaster-general on the plea of ill health, but
was busily engaged in intrigues against the commander-in-chief,
towards whom he had long cherished a secret hostility. Conway now
joined with him heart and hand, and soon became so active and
prominent a member of the faction that it acquired the name of
_Conway's Cabal_. The object was to depreciate the military character
of Washington, in comparison with that of Gates, to whom was
attributed the whole success of the Northern campaign.
Gates was perfectly ready for such an elevation. In fact, in the
excitement of his vanity, he appears to have forgotten that there was
a commander-in-chief, to whom he was accountable. He neglected to send
him any despatch on the subject of the surrender of Burgoyne,
contenting himself with sending one to Congress, then sitting at
Yorktown. Washington was left to hear of the important event by casual
rumor, until he received a copy of the capitulation in a letter from
General Putnam.
Gates was equally neglectful to inform him of the disposition he
intended to make of the army under his command. He delayed even to
forward Morgan's rifle corps, though their services were no longer
needed in his camp, and were so much required in the South. It was
determined, therefore, in a council of war, that one of Washington's
staff should be sent to Gates to represent the critical state of
affairs. Colonel Alexander Hamilton, his youthful but intelligent
aide-de-camp, was charged with this mission. He bore a letter from
Washington to Gates, dated October 30th, of which the following is an
extract: "By this opportunity I do myself the pleasure to congratulate
you on the signal success of the army under your command.... At the
same time, I cannot but regret that a matter of such magnitude, and so
interesting to our general operations, should have reached me by
report only; or through the channel of letters not bearing that
authenticity which the importance of it required, and which it would
have received by a line under your signature stating the simple fact."
Such was the calm and dignified notice of an instance of official
disrespect, almost amounting to insubordination. It is doubtful
whether Gates, in his state of mental effervescence, felt the noble
severity of the rebuke.
A fortuitous circumstance, which we shall explain hereafter, apprised
Washington about this time that a correspondence, derogatory to his
military character and conduct was going on between General Conway and
General Gates. Washington conducted himself with dignified
forbearance, contenting himself with letting Conway know, by the
following brief note, dated November 9th, that his correspondence was
detected:
"SIR--A letter which I received last night contained the following
paragraph--'In a letter from General Conway to General Gates, he says:
_Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad
counsellors would have ruined it._'"
"I am, sir, your humble servant,
"GEORGE WASHINGTON."
The brevity of this note rendered it the more astounding. It was a
hand-grenade thrown into the midst of the cabal. The effect upon other
members we shall show hereafter: it seems, at first, to have
prostrated Conway. He immediately sent in his resignation. It was not,
however, accepted by Congress; on the contrary he was supported by the
cabal, and was advanced to further honors, which we shall specify
hereafter. In the meantime, the cabal went on to make invidious
comparisons between the achievements of the two armies, deeply
derogatory to that under Washington. Publicly, he took no notice of
them.
The non-arrival of reinforcements from the Northern army continued to
embarrass Washington's operations. The enemy were making preparations
for further attempts upon Forts Mercer and Mifflin. General Howe was
constructing redoubts and batteries on Province Island, on the west
side of the Delaware, within five hundred yards of Fort Mifflin, and
mounting them with heavy cannon. Washington consulted with his general
officers what was to be done. Had the army received the expected
reinforcements from the North, it might have detached sufficient force
to the west side of the Schuylkill to dislodge the enemy from Province
Island; but at present it would require almost the whole of the army
for the purpose. This would leave the public stores at Easton,
Bethlehem and Allentown, uncovered, as well as several of the
hospitals. It would also leave the post at Red Bank unsupported,
through which Fort Mifflin was reinforced and supplied. It was
determined, therefore, to await the arrival of the expected
reinforcements from the North, before making any alteration in the
disposition of the army. In the meantime, the garrisons of Forts
Mercer and Mifflin were increased, and General Varnum was stationed at
Red Bank with his brigade, to be at hand to render reinforcements to
either of them as occasion might require.
On the 10th of November, General Howe commenced a heavy fire upon Fort
Mifflin from his batteries, which mounted eighteen, twenty-four, and
thirty-two pounders. Major Fleury acquitted himself with intelligence
and spirit as engineer; but an incessant cannonade and bombardment for
several days, defied all repairs. The block-houses were demolished,
the palisades beaten down, the guns dismounted, the barracks reduced
to ruins. Captain Treat, a young officer of great merit, who commanded
the artillery, was killed, as were several non-commissioned officers
and privates; and a number were wounded. The survivors, who were not
wounded, were exhausted by want of sleep, hard duty, and constant
exposure to the rain. Colonel Smith himself was disabled by severe
contusions, and obliged to retire to Red Bank.
The fort was in ruins; there was danger of its being carried by storm,
but the gallant Fleury thought it might yet be defended with the aid
of fresh troops. Such were furnished from Varnum's brigade:
Lieutenant-colonel Russell, of the Connecticut line, replaced Colonel
Smith. He in his turn was obliged to relinquish the command through
fatigue and ill health, and was succeeded by Major Thayer of Rhode
Island, aided by Captain (afterwards commodore) Talbot. On the fourth
day the enemy brought a large Indiaman, cut down to a floating
battery, to bear upon the works; but though it opened a terrible fire,
it was silenced before night. The next day several ships-of-war got
within gunshot. Two prepared to attack it in front; others brought
their guns to bear on Fort Mercer; while two made their way into the
narrow channel between Mud Island and the Pennsylvania shore, to
operate with the British batteries erected there.
At a concerted signal a cannonade was opened from all quarters. The
heroic little garrison stood the fire without flinching; the danger,
however, was growing imminent. The batteries on Province Island
enfiladed the works. The ships in the inner channel approached so near
as to throw hand-grenades into the fort, while marines stationed in
the round-tops stood ready to pick off any of the garrison that came
in sight. The scene now became awful; incessant firing from ships,
forts, gondolas and floating batteries, with clouds of sulphurous
smoke, and the deafening thunder of cannon. Before night there was
hardly a fortification to defend; palisades were shivered, guns
dismounted, the whole parapet levelled. There was terrible slaughter;
most of the company of artillery were destroyed; Fleury himself was
wounded. Captain Talbot received a wound in the wrist, but continued
bravely fighting until disabled by another wound in the hip.
To hold out longer was impossible. Colonel Thayer made preparations to
evacuate the fort in the night. Everything was removed in the evening
that could be conveyed away without too much exposure to the murderous
fire from the round-tops. The wounded were taken over to Red Bank,
accompanied by part of the garrison. Thayer remained with forty men
until eleven o'clock, when they set fire to what was combustible of
the fort they had so nobly defended, and crossed to Red Bank by the
light of its flames.
The loss of this fort was deeply regretted by Washington, though he
gave high praise to the officers and men of the garrison. Colonel
Smith was voted a sword by Congress, and Fleury received the
commission of lieutenant-colonel. Washington still hoped to keep
possession of Red Bank, and thereby prevent the enemy from weighing
the chevaux-de-frise before the frost obliged their ships to quit the
river. "I am anxiously waiting the arrival of the troops from the
northward," writes he, "who ought, from the time they have had my
orders to have been here before this. Colonel Hamilton, one of my
aides, is up the North River, doing all he can to push them forward,
but he writes me word that he finds many unaccountable delays thrown
in his way. The want of these troops has embarrassed all my measures
exceedingly."
The delays in question will best be explained by a few particulars
concerning the mission of Colonel Hamilton. [Hamilton had expected to
find matters in such a train that he would have little to do but hurry
on ample reinforcements already on the march; but he soon discovered
that it was designed to retain the greater part of the Northern army
at Albany and in the Highlands, sparing only about four thousand men
to the commander-in-chief. Morgan and his riflemen had been tardily
detached, he having met them on the march near New Windsor on the
morning of November 2d. Putnam, he found, was busy with the project of
an attack on New York; and Gates was full of reasons why more troops
should not be despatched southward, claiming that there was no
certainty that Sir Henry Clinton had gone to join Howe, and that there
was a possibility of his returning up the river. If his army were
depleted, Albany would be exposed, New England left open to the
ravages of the enemy, and his own contemplated movement against
Ticonderoga abandoned. It was with the greatest difficulty that
Hamilton induced Gates to detach the brigades of Poor and Patterson to
the aid of the commander-in-chief. Washington would not have received
a man, he declared, if the whole could have been kept at Albany with
any decency. Governor Clinton, Hamilton found, was the only general
officer who appreciated Washington's position, and disposed to promote
the general good, independent of personal considerations. Putnam who,
unlike Gates, was innocent of intrigues against the commander-in-chief,
was still so bent upon his favorite scheme of an attack on New York,
that only Hamilton's positive orders, as from Washington, to send the
Continental troops under him southward, retaining the militia, brought
the bellicose veteran to a reluctant compliance. Washington, in a
letter to Putnam, reprimanded his tardiness, concluding with, "I could
wish that in future my orders may be immediately complied with, without
arguing upon the propriety of them." The intrigues in progress around
him made it necessary for Washington at this moment to assert his
superior command, although he acquitted Putnam of any part in them.]
In the meantime, Sir William Howe was following up the reduction of
Fort Mifflin by an expedition against Fort Mercer, which still impeded
the navigation of the Delaware. On the 17th of November, Lord
Cornwallis was detached with two thousand men to cross from Chester
into the Jerseys, where he would be joined by a force advancing from
New York. Apprised of this movement, Washington detached General
Huntington with a brigade, to join Varnum at Red Bank. General Greene
was also ordered to repair thither with his division, and an express
was sent off to General Glover who was on his way through the Jerseys
with his brigade, directing him to file off to the left towards the
same point. These troops, with such militia as could be collected,
Washington hoped would be sufficient to save the fort. Before they
could form a junction, however, and reach their destination,
Cornwallis appeared before it. A defence against such superior force
was hopeless. The works were abandoned; they were taken possession of
by the enemy who proceeded to destroy them. After the destruction had
been accomplished, the reinforcements from the North, so long and so
anxiously expected, and so shamefully delayed, made their appearance.
"Had they arrived but ten days sooner," writes Washington to his
brother, "it would, I think, have put it in my power to save Fort
Mifflin, which defended the chevaux-de-frise, and consequently have
rendered Philadelphia a very ineligible situation for the enemy this
winter."
The evil which Washington had so anxiously striven to prevent had now
been effected. The American vessels stationed in the river had lost
all protection. Some of the galleys escaped past the batteries of
Philadelphia in a fog, and took refuge in the upper part of the
Delaware; the rest were set on fire by their crews and abandoned.
Washington advised the navy board, now that the enemy had the command
of the river, to have all the American frigates scuttled and sunk
immediately. The board objected to sinking them, but said they should
be ballasted and plugged, ready to be sunk in case of attack.
Washington warned them that an attack would be sudden, so as to get
possession of them before they could be sunk or destroyed;--his advice
and warning were unheeded; the consequence will hereafter be shown.