INVASION FROM CANADA.
The armament advancing against Ticonderoga, of which General St. Clair
had given intelligence, was not a mere diversion but a regular
invasion; the plan of which had been devised by the king, Lord George
Germain, and General Burgoyne, the latter having returned to England
from Canada in the preceding year. The junction of the two
armies,--that in Canada and that under General Howe in New York,--was
considered the speediest mode of quelling the rebellion; and as the
security and good government of Canada required the presence of
Governor Sir Guy Carleton, three thousand men were to remain there
with him; the residue of the army was to be employed upon two
expeditions--the one under General Burgoyne, who was to force his way
to Albany, the other under Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger, who was to
make a diversion on the Mohawk River.
The invading army was composed of three thousand seven hundred and
twenty-four British rank and file, three thousand sixteen Germans,
mostly Brunswickers, two hundred and fifty Canadians, and four hundred
Indians; beside these there were four hundred and seventy-three
artillery men, in all nearly eight thousand men. The army was
admirably appointed. Its brass train of artillery was extolled as
perhaps the finest ever allotted to an army of the size. General
Phillips, who commanded the artillery, had gained great reputation in
the wars in Germany. Brigadiers-general Fraser, Powel, and Hamilton
were also officers of distinguished merit. So was Major-general the
Baron Riedesel, a Brunswicker, who commanded the German troops.
While Burgoyne with the main force proceeded from St. Johns, Colonel
St. Leger, with a detachment of regulars and Canadians about seven
hundred strong, was to land at Oswego, and, guided by Sir John Johnson
at the head of his loyalist volunteers, tory refugees from his former
neighborhood, and a body of Indians, was to enter the Mohawk country,
draw the attention of General Schuyler in that direction, attack Fort
Stanwix, and, having ravaged the valley of the Mohawk, rejoin Burgoyne
at Albany, where it was expected they would make a triumphant junction
with the army of Sir William Howe.
Schuyler was uncertain as to the plans and force of the enemy. If
information gathered from scouts and a captured spy might be relied
on, Ticonderoga would soon be attacked. This information he
transmitted to Washington from Fort Edward on the 16th, the very day
that Burgoyne embarked at St. Johns. On the following day Schuyler was
at Ticonderoga. The works were not in such a state of forwardness as
he had anticipated, owing to the tardy arrival of troops and the want
of a sufficient number of artificers. The works in question related
chiefly to Mount Independence, a high circular hill on the east side
of the lake, immediately opposite to the old fort, and considered the
most defensible. A star fort with pickets crowned the summit of the
hill, which was table land; half way down the side of a hill was a
battery, and at its foot were strongly intrenched works well mounted
with cannon. Here the French general, De Fermois, who had charge of
this fort, was posted.
As this part of Lake Champlain is narrow, a connection was kept up
between the two forts by a floating bridge, supported on twenty-two
sunken piers in caissons, formed of very strong timber. Between the
piers were separate floats, fifty feet long and twelve feet wide,
strongly connected by iron chains and rivets. On the north side of the
bridge was a boom, composed of large pieces of timber, secured by
riveted bolts, and beside this was a double iron chain with links an
inch and a half square. The bridge, boom, and chain were four hundred
yards in length. This immense work, the labor of months, on which no
expense had been spared, was intended, while it afforded a
communication between the two forts, to protect the upper part of the
lake, presenting, under cover of their guns, a barrier which it was
presumed no hostile ship would be able to break through.
{Illustration: RUINS OF FORT TICONDEROGA. Vol. I.}
Having noted the state of affairs and the wants of the garrison,
Schuyler hastened to Fort George, whence he sent on provisions for
upwards of sixty days; and from the banks of the Hudson, additional
carpenters and working cattle. In the meantime, Burgoyne, with his
amphibious and semi-barbarous armament, was advancing up the lake. By
the 24th, scouts began to bring in word of the approaching foe. Bark
canoes had been seen filled with white men and savages. Then three
vessels under sail, and one at anchor above Split Rock, and behind it
the radeau, Thunderer. Anon came word of encampments sufficient for a
large body of troops on both sides of Gilliland's Creek, with bateaux
plying about its waters and painted warriors gliding about in canoes.
St. Clair wrote word of all this to Schuyler, and that it was supposed
the enemy were waiting the arrival of more force. Schuyler urged
Washington for reinforcements as soon as possible, and hastened to
Albany to bring up the militia.
While there he received word from St. Clair that the enemy's fleet and
army were arrived at Crown Point, and had sent off detachments, one up
Otter Creek to cut off the communication by Skenesborough, and another
on the west side of the lake to cut off Fort George. Claims for
assistance came hurrying on from other quarters. A large force (St.
Leger's) was said to be arrived at Oswego, and Sir John Johnson with
his myrmidons on his way to attack Fort Schuyler, the garrison of
which was weak and poorly supplied with cannon.
Schuyler bestirs himself with his usual zeal amid the thickening
alarms. He writes urgent letters to the committee of safety of New
York, to General Putnam at Peekskill, to the Governor of Connecticut,
to the President of Massachusetts, to the committee of Berkshire, and
lastly to Washington, stating the impending dangers and imploring
reinforcements. He exhorts General Herkimer to keep the militia of
Tryon County in readiness to protect the western frontier and to check
the inroad of Sir John Johnson, and he assures St. Clair that he will
move to his aid with the militia of New York as soon as he can collect
them.
Dangers accumulate at Ticonderoga according to advices from St. Clair
(28th). Seven of the enemy's vessels are lying at Crown Point; the
rest of their fleet is probably but a little lower down. Morning guns
are heard distinctly at various places. Some troops have debarked and
encamped at Chimney Point. There is no prospect, he says, of being
able to defend Ticonderoga unless militia come in, and he has thought
of calling in those from Berkshire. "Should the enemy invest and
blockade us," writes he, "we are infallibly ruined; we shall be
obliged to abandon this side (of the lake), and then they will soon
force the other from us, nor do I see that a retreat will in any shape
be practicable."
The enemy came advancing up the lake on the 30th, their main body
under Burgoyne on the west side, the German reserve under Baron
Riedesel on the east; communication being maintained by frigates and
gunboats, which, in a manner, kept pace between them. On the 1st of
July, Burgoyne encamped four miles north of Ticonderoga, and began to
intrench and to throw a boom across the lake. His advanced guard under
General Fraser took post at Three Mile Point, and the ships anchored
just out of gunshot of the fort.
General St. Clair was a gallant Scotchman who had seen service in the
old French war as well as in this, and beheld the force arrayed
against him without dismay. It is true his garrison was not numerous,
not exceeding three thousand five hundred men, of whom nine hundred
were militia. They were badly equipped also, and few had bayonets; yet
they were in good heart. Schuyler at this time was at Albany, sending
up reinforcements of Continental troops and militia, and awaiting the
arrival of further reinforcements, for which sloops had been sent down
to Peekskill. He was endeavoring also to provide for the security of
the department in other quarters. The savages had been scalping in the
neighborhood of Fort Schuyler; a set of renegade Indians were
harassing the settlements on the Susquehanna; and the threatenings of
Brant, the famous Indian chief, and the prospect of a British inroad
by the way of Oswego, had spread terror through Tryon County, the
inhabitants of which called upon him for support.
Such was the state of affairs in the north, of which Washington from
time to time had been informed. An attack on Ticonderoga appeared to
be impending; but as the garrison was in good heart, the commander
resolute, and troops were on the way to reinforce him a spirited and
perhaps successful resistance was anticipated by Washington. His
surprise may therefore be imagined on receiving a letter from
Schuyler, dated July 7th, conveying the astounding intelligence that
Ticonderoga was evacuated!
Schuyler had just received the news at Stillwater on the Hudson when
on his way with reinforcements for the fortress. The first account was
so vague that Washington hoped it might prove incorrect. It was
confirmed by another letter from Schuyler, dated on the 9th at Fort
Edward. A part of the garrison had been pursued by a detachment of the
enemy as far as Fort Anne in that neighborhood, where the latter had
been repulsed; as to St. Clair himself and the main part of his
forces, they had thrown themselves into the forest, and nothing was
known what had become of them! "I am here," writes Schuyler, "at the
head of a handful of men, not above fifteen hundred, with little
ammunition, not above five rounds to a man, having neither balls nor
lead to make any. The country is in the deepest consternation; no
carriages to remove the stores from Fort George, which I expect every
moment to hear is attacked; and what adds to my distress is that a
report prevails that I had given orders for the evacuation of
Ticonderoga."
Washington's first attention was to supply the wants of General
Schuyler. An express was sent to Springfield for musket cartridges,
gunpowder, lead, and cartridge papers. Ten pieces of artillery with
harness and proper officers were to be forwarded from Peekskill, as
well as intrenching tools. Of tents he had none to furnish, neither
could heavy cannon be spared from the defence of the Highlands. Six
hundred recruits, on their march from Massachusetts to Peekskill, were
ordered to repair to his aid--this was all the force that Washington
could venture at this moment to send; but this addition to his troops,
supposing those under St. Clair should have come in, and any number of
militia have turned out, would probably form an army equal, if not
superior, to that said to be under Burgoyne. Beside, it was
Washington's idea that the latter would suspend his operations until
General Howe should make a movement in concert. Supposing that
movement would be an immediate attempt against the Highlands, he
ordered Sullivan with his division to Peekskill to reinforce General
Putnam. At the same time he advanced with his main army to Pompton,
and thence to the Clove, a rugged defile through the Highlands on the
west side of the Hudson. We will leave Washington at his encampment in
the Clove, anxiously watching the movements of the fleet and the lower
army, while we turn to the north to explain the mysterious retreat of
General St. Clair.
In the accounts given of the approach of Burgoyne to Ticonderoga, it
was stated that he had encamped four miles north of the fortress and
intrenched himself. On the 2d of July, Indian scouts made their
appearance in the vicinity of a blockhouse and some outworks about the
strait or channel leading to Lake George. As General St. Clair did not
think the garrison sufficient to defend all the outposts, these works
with some adjacent saw-mills were set on fire and abandoned. The
extreme left of Ticonderoga was weak, and might easily be turned; a
post had therefore been established in the preceding year, nearly half
a mile in advance of the old French lines, on an eminence to the north
of them. General St. Clair, through singular remissness, had neglected
to secure it. Burgoyne soon discovered this neglect, and hastened to
detach General Phillips and Fraser with a body of infantry and light
artillery to take possession of this post. They did so without
opposition. Heavy guns were mounted upon it; Fraser's whole corps was
stationed there; the post commanded the communication by land and
water with Lake George, so as to cut off all supplies from that
quarter. In fact, such were the advantages expected from this post,
thus neglected by St. Clair, that the British gave it the significant
name of Mount Hope.
The enemy now proceeded gradually to invest Ticonderoga. A line of
troops was drawn from the western part of Mount Hope round to Three
Mile Point, where General Fraser was posted with the advance guard,
while General Riedesel encamped with the German reserve in a parallel
line on the opposite side of Lake Champlain, at the foot of Mount
Independence. For two days the enemy occupied themselves in making
their advances and securing these positions, regardless of a cannonade
kept up by the American batteries.
With all the pains and expense lavished by the Americans to render
these works impregnable, they had strangely neglected the master key
by which they were all commanded. This was Sugar Hill, a rugged
height, the termination of a mountain ridge which separates Lake
Champlain from Lake George. It stood to the south of Ticonderoga,
beyond the narrow channel which connected the two lakes, and rose
precipitously from the waters of Champlain to the height of six
hundred feet. It had been pronounced by the Americans too distant to
be dangerous. Colonel Trumbull, some time an aide-de-camp to
Washington, had proved the contrary in the preceding year by throwing
a shot from a six-pounder in the fort nearly to the summit. It was
then pronounced inaccessible to an enemy. This Trumbull had likewise
proved to be an error, by clambering with Arnold and Wayne to the top,
whence they perceived that a practicable road for artillery might
easily and readily be made. Trumbull had insisted that this was the
true point for the fort, commanding the neighboring heights, the
narrow parts of both lakes, and the communication between. His
suggestions were disregarded; their wisdom was now to be proved.
The British general, Phillips, on taking his position, had regarded
the hill with a practised eye. He caused it to be reconnoitred by a
skilful engineer. The report was that it overlooked and had the entire
command of Fort Ticonderoga and Fort Independence--being about
fourteen hundred yards from the former, and fifteen hundred from the
latter; that the ground could be levelled for cannon, and a road cut
up the defiles of the mountain in four and twenty hours. Measures were
instantly taken to plant a battery on that height. While the American
garrisons were entirely engaged in a different direction, cannonading
Mount Hope and the British lines without material effect, and without
provoking a reply, the British troops were busy throughout the day and
night cutting a road through rocks and trees and up rugged defiles.
Guns, ammunition and stores, all were carried up the hill in the
night; the cannon were hauled up from tree to tree, and before morning
the ground was levelled for the battery on which they were to be
mounted. To this work, thus achieved by a _coup de main_, they gave
the name of Fort Defiance.
On the 5th of July, to their astonishment and consternation, the
garrison beheld a legion of red-coats on the summit of this hill,
constructing works which must soon lay the fortress at their mercy. In
this appalling emergency, General St. Clair called a council of war.
What was to be done? The batteries from this new fort would probably
be open the next day: by that time Ticonderoga might be completely
invested, and the whole garrison exposed to capture. They had not
force sufficient for one half the works, and General Schuyler,
supposed to be at Albany, could afford them no relief. The danger was
imminent; delay might prove fatal. It was unanimously determined to
evacuate both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence that very night, and
to retreat to Skenesborough (now Whitehall), at the upper part of the
lake, about thirty miles distant, where there was a stockaded fort.
The main body of the army, led by General St. Clair, were to cross to
Mount Independence and push for Skenesborough by land, taking a
circuitous route through the woods on the east side of the lake, by
the way of Castleton.
The cannon, stores and provisions, together with the wounded and the
women, were to be embarked on board of two hundred bateaux and
conducted to the upper extremity of the lake by Colonel Long with six
hundred men, two hundred of whom, in five armed galleys, were to form
a rear-guard.
It was now three o'clock in the afternoon; yet all the preparations
were to be made for the coming night, and that with as little bustle
and movement as possible, for they were overlooked by Fort Defiance,
and their intentions might be suspected. Everything, therefore, was
done quietly, but alertly; in the meantime, to amuse the enemy a
cannonade was kept up every half hour toward the new battery on the
hill. As soon as the evening closed, and their movements could not be
discovered, they began in all haste to load the boats. Such of the
cannon as could not be taken were ordered to be spiked. Everything was
conducted with such silence and address that, although it was a
moonlight night, the flotilla departed undiscovered, and was soon
under the shadows of mountains and overhanging forests.
The retreat by land was not conducted with equal discretion and
mystery. General St. Clair had crossed over the bridge to the Vermont
side of the lake by three o'clock in the morning, and set forward with
his advance through the woods toward Hubbardton; but, before the
rear-guard under Colonel Francis got in motion, the house at Fort
Independence, which had been occupied by the French general, De
Fermois, was set on fire--by his orders, it is said, though we are
loth to charge him with such indiscretion, such gross and wanton
violation of the plan of retreat. The consequences were disastrous.
The British sentries at Mount Hope were astonished by a conflagration
suddenly lighting up Mount Independence and revealing the American
troops in full retreat; for the rear-guard, disconcerted by this
sudden exposure, pressed forward for the woods in the utmost haste and
confusion.
The drums beat to arms in the British camp. Alarm guns were fired from
Mount Hope; General Fraser dashed into Ticonderoga with his pickets,
giving orders for his brigade to arm in all haste and follow. By
daybreak he had hoisted the British flag over the deserted fortress;
before sunrise he had passed the bridge and was in full pursuit of the
American rear-guard.
Burgoyne's measures were prompt. General Riedesel was ordered to
follow and support Fraser with a part of the German troops; garrisons
were thrown into Ticonderoga and Mount Independence; the main part of
the army was embarked on board of the frigates and gunboats; the
floating bridge with its boom and chain, which had cost months to
construct, was broken through by nine o'clock; when Burgoyne set out
with his squadron in pursuit of the flotilla.
We left the latter making its retreat on the preceding evening towards
Skenesborough. The lake above Ticonderoga becomes so narrow that, in
those times, it was frequently called South River. The bateaux, deeply
laden, made their way slowly in a lengthened line. The rear-guard of
armed galleys followed at wary distance. No immediate pursuit,
however, was apprehended. The floating bridge was considered an
effectual impediment to the enemy's fleet.
About three o'clock in the afternoon of the succeeding day, the
heavily laden bateaux arrived at Skenesborough. The disembarkation had
scarcely commenced when the thundering of artillery was heard from
below. Could the enemy be at hand? It was even so. The British
gunboats, having pushed on in advance of the frigates, had overtaken
and were firing upon the galleys. The latter defended themselves for a
while, but at length two struck and three were blown up. The fugitives
from them brought word that the British ships not being able to come
up, troops and Indians were landing from them and scrambling up the
hills, intending to get in the rear of the fort and cut off all
retreat.
All now was consternation and confusion. The bateaux, the storehouses,
the fort, the mill were all set on fire, and a general flight took
place toward Fort Anne, about twelve miles distant. Some made their
way in boats up Wood Creek, a winding stream. The main body under
Colonel Long retreated by a narrow defile cut through the woods,
harassed all night by alarms that the Indians were close in pursuit.
Both parties reached Fort Anne by daybreak. It was a small picketed
fort, near the junction of Wood Creek and East Creek, about sixteen
miles from Fort Edward. General Schuyler arrived at the latter place
on the following day. The number of troops with him was
inconsiderable, but hearing of Colonel Long's situation, he
immediately sent him a small reinforcement, with provisions and
ammunition, and urged him to maintain his post resolutely. On the same
day Colonel Long's scouts brought in word that there were British
red-coats approaching. They were in fact a regiment under
Lieutenant-colonel Hill, detached from Skenesborough by Burgoyne in
pursuit of the fugitives. Long sallied forth to meet them, posting
himself at a rocky defile. As the enemy advanced he opened a heavy
fire upon them in front; the British took post upon a high hill to
their right, where they were warmly besieged for nearly two hours, and
would certainly have been forced had not some of their Indian allies
arrived. This changed the fortune of the day. The Americans had nearly
expended their ammunition, and had not enough left to cope with this
new enemy. They retreated, therefore, to Fort Anne, carrying with them
a number of prisoners. Supposing the troops under Colonel Hill an
advance guard of Burgoyne's army, they set fire to the fort and pushed
on to Fort Edward.
St. Clair's retreat through the woods from Mount Independence
continued the first day until night, when he arrived at Castleton,
thirty miles from Ticonderoga. His rear-guard halted about six miles
short, at Hubbardton, to await the arrival of stragglers. It was
composed of three regiments, under Colonels Seth Warner, Francis and
Hale; in all about thirteen hundred men. Early the next morning, a
sultry morning of July, while they were taking their breakfast, they
were startled by the report of fire-arms. Their sentries had
discharged their muskets, and came running in with word that the enemy
were at hand.
It was General Fraser, with his advance of eight hundred and fifty
men, who had pressed forward in the latter part of the night, and now
attacked the Americans with great spirit, notwithstanding their
superiority in numbers; in fact he expected to be promptly reinforced
by Riedesel and his Germans. The Americans met the British with great
spirit; but at the very commencement of the action, Colonel Hale, with
a detachment placed under his command to protect the rear, gave way,
leaving Warner and Francis with but seven hundred men to bear the
brunt of the battle. These posted themselves behind logs and trees in
'backwood' style, whence they kept up a destructive fire, and were
evidently gaining the advantage, when General Riedesel came pressing
into the action with his German troops; drums beating and colors
flying. There was now an impetuous charge with the bayonet. Colonel
Francis was among the first who fell, gallantly fighting at the head
of his men. The Americans, thinking the whole German force upon them,
gave way and fled, leaving the ground covered with their dead and
wounded. Many others who had been wounded perished in the woods, where
they had taken refuge. Their whole loss in killed, wounded and taken,
was upwards of three hundred; that of the enemy one hundred and
eighty-three.
The noise of the firing when the action commenced had reached General
St. Clair at Castleton. He immediately sent orders to two militia
regiments which were in his rear, and within two miles of the
battle-ground to hasten to the assistance of his rear-guard. They
refused to obey and hurried forward to Castleton. At this juncture St.
Clair received information of Burgoyne's arrival at Skenesborough, and
the destruction of the American works there: fearing to be intercepted
at Fort Anne, he immediately changed his route, struck into the woods
on his left, and directed his march to Rutland, leaving word for
Warner to follow him. The latter overtook him two days afterwards,
with his shattered force reduced to ninety men. As to Colonel Hale,
who had pressed towards Castleton at the beginning of the action, he
and his men were overtaken the same day by the enemy, and the whole
party captured without making any fight. It has been alleged in his
excuse, with apparent justice, that he and a large portion of his men
were in feeble health and unfit for action; for his own part he died
while yet a prisoner, and never had the opportunity which he sought to
vindicate himself before a court-martial.
On the 12th St. Clair reached Fort Edward, his troops haggard and
exhausted by their long retreat through the woods. Such is the story
of the catastrophe at Fort Ticonderoga which caused so much surprise
and concern to Washington, and of the seven days' mysterious
disappearance of St. Clair which kept every one in the most painful
suspense. The loss of artillery, ammunition, provisions and stores, in
consequence of the evacuation of these northern posts was prodigious,
but the worst effect was the consternation spread throughout the
country. A panic prevailed at Albany, the people running about as if
distracted, sending off their goods and furniture. The great barriers
of the North it was said were broken through, and there was nothing to
check the triumphant career of the enemy.