THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN.--ATTACK ON PEEKSKILL.
The Howes learned to their mortification that "the mere running
through a province is not subduing it." The British commanders had
been outgeneralled, attacked and defeated. They had nearly been driven
out of the Jerseys, and were now hemmed in and held in check by
Washington and his handful of men castled among the heights of
Morristown. So far from holding possession of the territory they had
so recently overrun, they were fain to ask safe conduct across it for
a convoy to their soldiers captured in battle. It must have been a
severe trial to the pride of Cornwallis when he had to inquire by
letter of Washington whether money and stores could be sent to the
Hessians captured at Trenton and a surgeon and medicines to the
wounded at Princeton; and Washington's reply must have conveyed a
reproof still more mortifying. No molestation, he assured his
lordship, would be offered to the convoy by any part of the regular
army under his command; but _"he could not answer for the militia, who
were resorting to arms in most parts of the State, and were
excessively exasperated at the treatment they had met with from both
Hessian and British troops."_
In fact, the conduct of the enemy had roused the whole country against
them. The proclamations and printed protections of the British
commanders, on the faith of which the inhabitants in general had
stayed at home and forbore to take up arms, had proved of no avail.
The Hessians could not or would not understand them, but plundered
friend and foe alike. The British soldiery often followed their
example, and the plunderings of both were at times attended by those
brutal outrages on the weaker sex which inflame the dullest spirits to
revenge. The whole State was thus roused against its invaders. In
Washington's retreat of more than a hundred miles through the Jerseys,
he had never been joined by more than one hundred of its inhabitants;
now sufferers of both parties rose as one man to avenge their personal
injuries. The late quiet yeomanry armed themselves and scoured the
country in small parties to seize on stragglers, and the militia began
to signalize themselves in voluntary skirmishes with regular troops.
Morristown, where the main army was encamped, had not been chosen by
Washington as a permanent post, but merely as a halting-place where
his troops might repose after their excessive fatigues and their
sufferings from the inclement season. Further considerations persuaded
him that it was well situated for the system of petty warfare which he
meditated, and induced him to remain there. It was protected by
forests and rugged heights. It was nearly equidistant from Amboy,
Newark, and Brunswick, the principal posts of the enemy; so that any
movement made from them could be met by a counter movement on his
part, while the forays and skirmishes by which he might harass them
would school and season his own troops. He had three faithful generals
with him: Greene, Sullivan, and Knox.
Washington's military family at this time was composed of his
aides-de-camp, Colonels Meade and Tench Tilghman of Philadelphia; and
his secretary, Colonel Robert H. Harrison of Maryland. His
head-quarters at first were in what was called the Freemason's Tavern,
on the north side of the village green. His troops were encamped about
the vicinity of the village, at first in tents, until they could build
log huts for shelter against the winter's cold. The main encampment
was near Bottle Hill, in a sheltered valley which was thickly wooded
and had abundant springs.
The enemy being now concentrated at New Brunswick and Amboy, General
Putnam was ordered by Washington to move from Crosswicks to Princeton,
with the troops under his command. He was instructed to draw his
forage as much as possible from the neighborhood of Brunswick, about
eighteen miles off, thereby contributing to distress the enemy; to
have good scouting parties continually on the look-out; to keep
nothing with him but what could be moved off at a moment's warning,
and, if compelled to leave Princeton, to retreat towards the mountains
so as to form a junction with the forces at Morristown. Putnam had
with him but a few hundred men. "You will give out your strength to be
twice as great as it is," writes Washington; a common expedient with
him in those times of scanty means.
Cantonments were gradually formed between Princeton and the Highlands
of the Hudson, which made the left flank of Washington's position, and
where General Heath had command. General Philemon Dickinson, who
commanded the New Jersey militia, was stationed on the west side of
Millstone River, near Somerset court-house, one of the nearest posts
to the enemy's camp at Brunswick. A British foraging party of five or
six hundred strong, sent out by Cornwallis, with forty wagons and
upward of a hundred draught horses, mostly of the English breed,
having collected sheep and cattle about the country, were sacking a
mill on the opposite side of the river where a large quantity of flour
was deposited. While thus employed, Dickinson set upon them with a
force equal in number but composed of raw militia and fifty
Philadelphia riflemen. He dashed through the river, waist deep, with
his men, and charged the enemy so suddenly and vigorously that, though
supported by three field-pieces, they gave way, left their convoy, and
retreated so precipitately that he made only nine prisoners. A number
of killed and wounded were carried off by the fugitives on light
wagons.
{Illustration: COL. MORRIS' HOUSE. Vol. II.}
To counteract the proclamation of the British commissioners, promising
amnesty to all in rebellion who should, in a given time, return to
their allegiance, Washington now issued a counter proclamation (Jan.
25th), commanding every person who had subscribed a declaration of
fidelity to Great Britain, or taken an oath of allegiance, to repair
within thirty days to head-quarters, or the quarters of the nearest
general officer of the Continental army or of the militia, and there
take the oath of allegiance to the United States of America, and give
up any protection, certificate or passport he might have received from
the enemy; at the same time granting full liberty to all such as
preferred the interest and protection of Great Britain to the freedom
and happiness of their country, forthwith to withdraw themselves and
families within the enemy's lines. All who should neglect or refuse to
comply with this order were to be considered adherents to the crown
and treated as common enemies.
A cartel for the exchange of prisoners had been a subject of
negotiation previous to the affair of Trenton, without being adjusted.
The British commanders were slow to recognize the claims to equality
of those they considered rebels; Washington was tenacious in holding
them up as patriots ennobled by their cause. Among the cases which
came up for attention was that of Ethan Allen, the brave but eccentric
captor of Ticonderoga. His daring attempts in the "path of renown" had
cost him a world of hardships;--thrown into irons as a felon;
threatened with a halter; carried to England to be tried for treason;
confined in Pendennis Castle; retransported to Halifax, and now a
prisoner in New York. Washington had been instructed, considering his
long imprisonment, to urge his exchange. This had scarce been urged,
when tidings of the capture of General Lee presented a case of still
greater importance to be provided for. Lee was reported to be in
rigorous confinement in New York, and treated with harshness and
indignity. The British professed to consider him a deserter, he having
been a lieutenant-colonel in their service, although he alleged that
he had resigned his commission before joining the American army.
On the 13th of January, Washington addressed the following letter to
Sir William Howe: "I am directed by Congress to propose an exchange of
five of the Hessian field-officers taken at Trenton for Major-general
Lee; or, if this proposal should not be accepted, to demand his
liberty upon parole, within certain bounds, as has ever been granted
to your officers in our custody. I am informed, upon good authority,
that your reason for keeping him hitherto in stricter confinement than
usual is that you do not look upon him in the light of a common
prisoner of war but as a deserter from the British service, as his
resignation has never been accepted, and that you intend to try him as
such by a court-martial. I will not undertake to determine how far
this doctrine may be justifiable among yourselves, but I must give you
warning that Major-general Lee is looked upon as an officer belonging
to, and under the protection of the United Independent States of
America, and that any violence you may commit upon his life and
liberty will be severely retaliated upon the lives or liberties of the
British officers, or those of their foreign allies in our hands."
In this letter he likewise adverted to the treatment of American
prisoners in New York; several who had recently been released having
given the most shocking account of the barbarities they had
experienced.
Sir William, in reply, proposed to send an officer of rank to
Washington to confer upon a mode of exchange and subsistence of
prisoners. This proposal led to the appointment of two officers for
the purpose, Colonel Walcott by General Howe, and Colonel Harrison,
"the old secretary," by Washington.
Lee's actual treatment was not so harsh as had been represented. He
was in close confinement it is true, but three rooms had been fitted
up for his reception in the Old City Hall of New York, having nothing
of the look of a prison excepting that they were secured by bolts and
bars. Congress, in the meantime, had resorted to their threatened
measure of retaliation. On the 20th of February they had resolved that
the Board of War be directed immediately to order the five Hessian
field-officers and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell into safe and close
custody, "it being the unalterable resolution of Congress to retaliate
on them the same punishment as may be inflicted on the person of
General Lee."
In a letter to the President of Congress, Washington gives his
moderating counsels on the whole subject of retaliation. "Though I
sincerely commiserate," writes he, "the misfortunes of General Lee,
and feel much for his present unhappy situation, yet with all possible
deference to the opinion of Congress, I fear that these resolutions
will not have the desired effect, are founded on impolicy, and will,
if adhered to, produce consequences of an extensive and melancholy
nature.... The balance of prisoners is greatly against us, and a
general regard to the happiness of the whole should mark our conduct.
Can we imagine that our enemies will not mete the same punishments,
the same indignities, the same cruelties, to those belonging to us in
their possession that we impose on theirs in our power? Why should we
suppose them to possess more humanity than we have ourselves? Or why
should an ineffectual attempt to relieve the distresses of one brave,
unfortunate man, involve many more in the same calamities?"
Washington was not always successful in instilling his wise moderation
into public councils. Congress adhered to their vindictive policy,
merely directing that no other hardships should be inflicted on the
captive officers than such confinement as was necessary to carry their
resolve into effect. There were other circumstances besides the
treatment of General Lee to produce this indignant sensibility on the
part of Congress. Accounts were rife at this juncture of the cruelties
and indignities almost invariably experienced by American prisoners at
New York; and an active correspondence on the subject was going on
between Washington and the British commanders, at the same time with
that regarding General Lee.
The captive Americans who had been in the naval service were said to
be confined, officers and men, in prison-ships which, from their
loathsome condition and the horrors and sufferings of all kinds
experienced on board of them, had acquired the appellation of
_floating hells_. Those who had been in the land service were crowded
into jails and dungeons like the vilest malefactors; and were
represented as pining in cold, in filth, in hunger and nakedness. [In
the correspondence between Lord Howe and Washington on this subject,
the British commander denied the charges of undue severity in the
treatment of prisoners, and pronounced the tales current on the
subject as idle and unnatural reports. But the evidence of the truth
of that statement is too complete to admit of doubt.] The _Jersey
Prison-ship_ is proverbial in our revolutionary history; and the bones
of the unfortunate patriots who perished on board, form a monument on
the Long Island shore. The horrors of the _Sugar House_, converted
into a prison, are traditional in New York; and the brutal tyranny of
Cunningham, the provost marshal, over men of worth confined in the
common jail for the sin of patriotism, has been handed down from
generation to generation. That Lord Howe and Sir William were ignorant
of the extent of these atrocities we really believe, but it was their
duty to be well informed.
The difficulties arising out of the case of General Lee interrupted
the operations with regard to the exchange of prisoners; and gallant
men, on both sides, suffered prolonged detention in consequence; and
among the number the brave, but ill-starred Ethan Allen.
The early part of the year brought the annual embarrassments caused by
short enlistments. The brief terms of service for which the
Continental soldiery had enlisted, a few months perhaps, at most a
year, were expiring, and the men, glad to be released from camp duty,
were hastening to their rustic homes. Militia had to be the dependence
until a new army could be raised and organized, and Washington called
on the council of safety of Pennsylvania speedily to furnish temporary
reinforcements of the kind. All his officers that could be spared were
ordered away, some to recruit, some to collect the scattered men of
the different regiments, who were dispersed, he said, almost over the
continent. General Knox was sent off to Massachusetts to expedite the
raising of a battalion of artillery. Different States were urged to
levy and equip their quotas for the Continental army.
While anxiously exerting himself to strengthen his own precarious
army, the security of the northern department was urged upon his
attention. Schuyler represented it as in need of reinforcements and
supplies of all kinds. He apprehended that Carleton might make an
attack upon Ticonderoga as soon as he could cross Lake Champlain on
the ice. That important fortress was under the command of a brave
officer, Colonel Anthony Wayne, but its garrison had dwindled down to
six or seven hundred men, chiefly New England militia. In the present
destitute situation of his department as to troops, Schuyler feared
that Carleton might not only succeed in an attempt on Ticonderoga, but
might push his way to Albany. Although Washington considered a winter
attack of the kind specified by Schuyler too difficult and dangerous
to be very probable, he urged reinforcements from Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, whence they could be furnished most speedily.
Massachusetts, in fact, had already determined to send four regiments
to Schuyler's aid as soon as possible.
Notwithstanding all Washington's exertions in behalf of the army under
his immediate command, it continued to be deplorably in want of
reinforcements, and it was necessary to maintain the utmost vigilance
at all his posts to prevent his camp from being surprised. The
operations of the enemy might be delayed by the bad condition of the
roads, and the want of horses to move their artillery, but he
anticipated an attack as soon as the roads were passable, and
apprehended a disastrous result unless speedily reinforced.
The designs of the enemy being mere matter of conjecture, measures
varied accordingly. As the season advanced, Washington was led to
believe that Philadelphia would be their first object at the opening
of the campaign, and that they would bring round all their troops from
Canada by water to aid in the enterprise. Under this persuasion he
wrote to General Heath, ordering him to send eight Massachusetts
battalions to Peekskill. At Peekskill, he observed, "they would be
well placed to give support to any of the Eastern or Middle States; or
to oppose the enemy, should they design to penetrate the country up
the Hudson; or to cover New England, should they invade it."
On the 18th of March he despatched General Greene to Philadelphia, to
lay before Congress such matters as he could not venture to
communicate by letter. Greene had scarce departed when the enemy began
to give signs of life. The delay in the arrival of artillery, more
than his natural indolence, had kept General Howe from formally taking
the field; he now made preparations for the next campaign by detaching
troops to destroy the American deposits of military stores. One of the
chief of these was at Peekskill, the very place whither Washington had
directed Heath to send troops from Massachusetts, and which he thought
of making a central point of assemblage. Brigadier-general McDougall
had the command of it in the absence of General Heath, but his force
did not exceed two hundred and fifty men.
As soon as the Hudson was clear of ice, a squadron of vessels of war
and transports, with five hundred troops under Colonel Bird ascended
the river. McDougall had intelligence of the intended attack, and
while the ships were making their way across the Tappan Sea and
Haverstraw Bay, exerted himself to remove as much as possible of the
provisions and stores to Forts Montgomery and Constitution in the
Highlands. On the morning of the 23d the whole squadron came to anchor
in Peekskill Bay, and five hundred men landed in Lent's Cove, on the
south side of the bay, whence they pushed forward with four light
field-pieces drawn by sailors. On their approach, McDougall set fire
to the barracks and principal storehouses, and retreated about two
miles to a strong post, commanding the entrance to the Highlands and
the road to Continental Village, the place of the deposits. It was the
post which had been noted by Washington in the preceding year where a
small force could make a stand and hurl down masses of rock on their
assailants. Hence, McDougall sent an express to Lieutenant-colonel
Marinus Willet, who had charge of Fort Constitution, to hasten to his
assistance.
The British, finding the wharf in flames where they had intended to
embark their spoils, completed the conflagration, besides destroying
several small craft laden with provisions. They kept possession of the
place until the following day, when a scouting party, which had
advanced towards the entrance of the Highlands, was encountered by
Colonel Marinus Willet with a detachment from Fort Constitution, and
driven back to the main body after a sharp skirmish in which nine of
the marauders were killed. Four more were slain on the banks of
Canopas Creek as they were setting fire to some boats. The enemy were
disappointed in the hope of carrying off a great deal of booty, and
finding the country around was getting under arms they contented
themselves with the mischief they had done and re-embarked in the
evening by moonlight, when the whole squadron swept down the Hudson.