WASHINGTON'S PERPLEXITIES.--NEW YORK IN DANGER.
In the month of December a vessel had been captured, bearing supplies
from Lord Dunmore to the army at Boston. A letter on board, from his
lordship to General Howe, invited him to transfer the war to the
southern colonies; or, at all events, to send reinforcements thither;
intimating at the same time his plan of proclaiming liberty to
indentured servants, negroes, and others appertaining to rebels, and
inviting them to join his majesty's troops. In a word, to inflict upon
Virginia the horrors of a servile war. "If this man is not crushed
before spring," writes Washington, "he will become the most formidable
enemy America has. His strength will increase as a snowball."
General Lee took the occasion to set forth his own system of policy.
"Had my opinion been thought worthy of attention," would he say, "Lord
Dunmore would have been disarmed of his teeth and claws." He would
seize Tryon too, "and every governor, government man, placeman, tory
and enemy to liberty on the continent, and confiscate their estates,
or at least lay them under heavy contributions for the public. Their
persons should be secured, in some of the interior towns, as hostages
for the treatment of those of our party whom the fortune of war shall
throw into their hands; they should be allowed a reasonable pension
out of their fortunes for their maintenance."
Such was the policy advocated by Lee in his letters and conversation,
and he soon had an opportunity of carrying it partly into operation.
[Newport being threatened by a naval armament from Boston, General Lee
was despatched, at the request of the governor, to put the island in a
state of defence. Lee set out with alacrity. Having laid out works,
and given directions for fortifications, he summoned before him a
number of persons who had been in the habit of supplying the enemy,
and compelled them all to take an oath of fidelity to the continental
claim. Those who refused were put under guard and sent to Providence.
Congress was disposed to consider these measures too highhanded, but
Washington approved of them.]
December had been throughout a month of severe trial to Washington;
during which he saw his army dropping away piece-meal before his eyes.
Homeward every face was turned as soon as the term of enlistment was
at an end. Scarce could the disbanding troops be kept a few days in
camp until militia could be procured to supply their place. Washington
made repeated and animated appeals to their patriotism; they were
almost unheeded. He caused popular and patriotic songs to be sung
about the camp. They passed by like the idle wind. Home! home! home!
throbbed in every heart. "The desire of retiring into a
chimney-corner," says Washington reproachfully, "seized the troops as
soon as their terms expired."
Greene, throughout this trying month, was continually by Washington's
side. His letters expressing the same cares and apprehensions, and
occasionally in the same language with those of the commander-in-chief,
show how completely he was in his councils. The 31st of December
arrived, the crisis of the army; for with that month expired the last
of the old terms of enlistment. "We never have been so weak," writes
Greene, "as we shall be to-morrow, when we dismiss the old troops." On
this day Washington received cheering intelligence from Canada. A
junction had taken place, a month previously, between Arnold and
Montgomery at Point aux Trembles. They were about two thousand strong,
and were making every preparation for attacking Quebec.
On the following morning (January 1st, 1776,) his army did not amount
to ten thousand men, and was composed of but half-filled regiments.
Even in raising this inadequate force, it had been necessary to
indulge many of the men with furloughs, that they might visit their
families and friends. The detachments of militia from the neighboring
provinces which replaced the disbanding troops, remained but for brief
periods; so that, in despite of every effort, the lines were often but
feebly manned, and might easily have been forced.
The anxiety of Washington in this critical state of the army, may be
judged from his correspondence with Reed. "It is easier to conceive
than to describe the situation of my mind for some time past, and my
feelings under our present circumstances," writes he, on the 4th of
January. "Search the volumes of history through, and I much question
whether a case similar to ours is to be found; namely, to maintain a
post against the power of the British troops for six months together,
without powder, and then to have one army disbanded and another raised
within the same distance (musket shot) of a reinforced enemy. What may
be the issue of the last manoeuvre, time only can unfold. I wish this
month were well over our head."
In the midst of his discouragements, Washington received letters from
Knox, showing the spirit and energy with which he was executing his
mission, in quest of cannon and ordnance stores. He had struggled
manfully and successfully with all kinds of difficulties from the
advanced season, and head winds, in getting them from Ticonderoga to
the head of Lake George. "Three days ago," writes he, on the 17th of
December, "it was very uncertain whether we could get them over until
next spring; but now, please God, they shall go. I have made forty-two
exceedingly strong sleds, and have provided eighty yoke of oxen to
drag them as far as Springfield, where I shall get fresh cattle to
take them to camp."
Early in the month of January, there was a great stir of preparation
in Boston harbor. A fleet of transports were taking in supplies, and
making arrangements for the embarkation of troops. Bomb-ketches and
flat-bottomed boats were getting ready for sea, as were two
sloops-of-war, which were to convey the armament. Its destination was
kept secret; but was confidently surmised by Washington.
In the preceding month of October, a letter had been laid before
Congress, written by some person in London of high credibility, and
revealing a secret plan of operations said to have been sent out by
ministers to the commanders in Boston. The following is the purport:
Possession was to be gained of New York and Albany, through the
assistance of Governor Tryon, on whose influence with the tory part of
the population, much reliance was placed. These cities were to be very
strongly garrisoned. All who did not join the king's forces were to be
declared rebels. The Hudson River, and the East River or Sound, were
to be commanded by a number of small men-of-war and cutters, stationed
in different parts, so as wholly to cut off all communication by water
between New York and the provinces to the northward of it; and between
New York and Albany, except for the king's service; and to prevent,
also, all communication between the city of New York and the provinces
of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and those to the southward of them. "By
these means," said the letter, "the administration and their friends
fancy they shall soon either starve out or retake the garrisons of
Crown Point and Ticonderoga, and open and maintain a safe intercourse
and correspondence between Quebec, Albany, and New York; and thereby
offer the fairest opportunity to their soldiery and the Canadians, in
conjunction with the Indians to be procured by Guy Johnson, to make
continual irruptions into New Hampshire, Massachusetts and
Connecticut, and so distract and divide the Provincial forces, as to
render it easy for the British army at Boston to defeat them, break
the spirits of the Massachusetts people, depopulate their country, and
compel an absolute subjection to Great Britain."
This information had already excited solicitude respecting the Hudson,
and led to measures for its protection. It was now surmised that the
expedition preparing to sail from Boston, and which was to be
conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, might be destined to seize upon New
York. How was the apprehended blow to be parried? General Lee, who was
just returned from his energetic visit to Rhode Island, offered his
advice and services in the matter. In a letter to Washington, he urged
him to act at once, and on his own responsibility, without awaiting
the tardy and doubtful sanction of Congress, for which, in military
matters, Lee had but small regard.
"New York must be secured," writes he, "but it will never, I am
afraid, be secured by due order of the Congress, for obvious reasons.
They find themselves awkwardly situated on this head. You must step in
to their relief. I am sensible no man can be spared from the lines
under present circumstances; but I would propose that you should
detach me into Connecticut, and lend your name for collecting a body
of volunteers. I am assured that I shall find no difficulty in
assembling a sufficient number for the purposes wanted. This body in
conjunction (if there should appear occasion to summon them) with the
Jersey regiment under the command of Lord Stirling, now at
Elizabethtown, will effect the security of New York, and the expulsion
or suppression of that dangerous banditti of tories who have appeared
on Long Island with the professed intention of acting against the
authority of Congress."
Washington, while he approved of Lee's military suggestions, was
cautious in exercising the powers vested in him, and fearful of
transcending them. John Adams was at that time in the vicinity of the
camp, and he asked his opinion as to the practicability and expediency
of the plan, and whether it "might not be regarded as beyond his
line." Adams, resolute of spirit, thought the enterprise might easily
be accomplished by the friends of liberty in New York, in connection
with the Connecticut people, "who are very ready," said he, "upon such
occasions."
Thus fortified, as it were, by congressional sanction, through one of
its most important members, who pronounced New York as much within his
command as Massachusetts; he gave Lee authority to carry out his
plans. He was to raise volunteers in Connecticut; march at their head
to New York; call in military aid from New Jersey; put the city and
the post on the Hudson in a posture of security against surprise;
disarm all persons on Long Island and elsewhere, inimical to the views
of Congress, or secure them in some other manner if necessary; and
seize upon all medicines, shirts and blankets, and send them on for
the use of the American army.
Lee departed on his mission on the 8th of January. The people of New
York were thrown into a panic on hearing that Lee was in Connecticut,
on his way to take military possession of the city. They apprehended
his appearance there would provoke an attack from the ships in the
harbor. Some, who thought the war about to be brought to their own
doors, packed up their effects, and made off into the country with
their wives and children. Others beleaguered the committee of safety
with entreaties against the deprecated protection of General Lee. The
committee, through Pierre Van Cortlandt, their chairman, addressed a
letter to Lee, inquiring into the motives of his coming with an army
to New York, and stating the incapacity of the city to act hostilely
against the ships of war in port, from deficiency of powder, and a
want of military works.
Lee, in reply, dated Stamford, January 23d, disclaimed all intention
of commencing actual hostilities against the men-of-war in the harbor;
his instructions from the commander-in-chief being solely to prevent
the enemy from taking post in the city, or lodging themselves on Long
Island. Some subordinate purposes were likewise to be executed, which
were much more proper to be communicated by word of mouth than by
writing. In compliance with the wishes of the committee, he promised
to carry with him into the town just troops enough to secure it
against any present designs of the enemy, leaving his main force on
the western border of Connecticut. How he conducted himself on his
arrival in the city, we shall relate in a future chapter.