SIEGE OF BOSTON.
On the 3d of July, the morning after his arrival at Cambridge,
Washington took formal command of the army. Accompanied by General
Lee, on whose military judgment he had great reliance, he visited the
different American posts, and rode to the heights commanding views
over Boston and its environs, being anxious to make himself acquainted
with the strength and relative position of both armies.
In visiting the different posts, Washington halted for a time at
Prospect Hill, which, as its name denotes, commanded a wide view over
Boston and the surrounding country. Here Putnam had taken his position
after the battle of Bunker's Hill, fortifying himself with works which
he deemed impregnable; and here the veteran was enabled to point out
to the commander-in-chief, and to Lee, the main features of the
belligerent region, which lay spread out like a map before them.
Bunker's Hill was but a mile distant to the west; the British standard
floating as if in triumph on its summit. The main force under General
Howe was intrenching itself strongly about half a mile beyond the
place of the recent battle. Howe's sentries extended a hundred and
fifty yards beyond the neck or isthmus, over which the Americans
retreated after the battle. A large force was intrenched south of the
town on the neck leading to Roxbury--the only entrance to Boston by
land. The troops were irregularly distributed in a kind of semicircle,
eight or nine miles in extent; the left resting on Winter Hill, the
most northern post, the right extending on the south to Roxbury and
Dorchester Neck.
Washington reconnoitred the British posts from various points of view.
Everything about them was in admirable order. The works appeared to be
constructed with military science, the troops to be in a high state of
discipline. The American camp, on the contrary, disappointed him. He
had expected to find eighteen or twenty thousand men under arms; there
were not much more than fourteen thousand. He had expected to find
some degree of system and discipline; whereas all were raw militia. He
had expected to find works scientifically constructed, and proofs of
knowledge and skill in engineering; whereas, what he saw of the latter
was very imperfect, and confined to the mere manual exercise of
cannon.
In riding throughout the camp, Washington observed that nine thousand
of the troops belonged to Massachusetts; the rest were from other
provinces. They were encamped in separate bodies, each with its own
regulations, and officers of its own appointment. Some had tents,
others were in barracks, and others sheltered themselves as best they
might. Many were sadly in want of clothing, and all, said Washington,
were strongly imbued with the spirit of insubordination, which they
mistook for independence.
One of the encampments, however, was in striking contrast with the
rest, and might vie with those of the British for order and exactness.
Here were tents and marquees pitched in the English style; soldiers
well drilled and well equipped; everything had an air of discipline
and subordination. It was a body of Rhode Island troops, which had
been raised, drilled, and brought to the camp by Brigadier-general
Greene,{1} of that province.
{Footnote 1: [Nathaniel Greene was born in Rhode Island in May, 1742;
was the son of Quaker parents; in his boyhood aided his father on a
farm and in a mill, but having a thirst for knowledge applied himself
sedulously to various studies. Public affairs had aroused his martial
spirit and he had applied himself to military studies. In the month of
May he had been elected commander of the Rhode Island contingent.]}
Having taken his survey of the army, Washington wrote to the President
of Congress, representing its various deficiencies, and, among other
things, urging the appointment of a commissary-general, a
quartermaster-general, a commissary of musters, and a commissary of
artillery. Above all things, he requested a supply of money as soon as
possible. "I find myself already much embarrassed for want of a
military chest." In one of his recommendations we have an instance of
frontier expediency, learnt in his early campaigns. Speaking of the
ragged condition of the army, and the difficulty of procuring the
requisite kind of clothing, he advises that a number of
hunting-shirts, not less than ten thousand, should be provided; as
being the cheapest and quickest mode of supplying this necessity.
The justice and impartiality of Washington were called into exercise
as soon as he entered upon his command in allaying discontents among
his general officers, caused by the recent appointments and promotions
made by the Continental Congress. General Spencer was so offended that
Putnam should be promoted over his head that he left the army without
visiting the commander-in-chief; but was subsequently induced to
return. General Thomas felt aggrieved by being outranked by the
veteran Pomeroy; the latter however declining to serve, he found
himself senior brigadier, and was appeased.
The Congress of Massachusetts manifested considerate liberality with
respect to head-quarters. According to their minutes, a committee was
charged to procure a steward, a housekeeper, and two or three women
cooks. The wishes of Washington were to be consulted in regard to the
supply of his table. This his station, as commander-in-chief, required
should be kept up in ample and hospitable style. Every day a number of
his officers dined with him. As he was in the neighborhood of the seat
of the Provincial Government, he would occasionally have members of
Congress and other functionaries at his board. Though social, however,
he was not convivial in his habits. He received his guests with
courtesy; but his mind and time were too much occupied by grave and
anxious concerns to permit him the genial indulgence of the table. He
would retire early from the board, leaving an aide-de-camp or one of
his officers to take his place. Colonel Mifflin was the first person
who officiated as aide-de-camp. He was a Philadelphia gentleman of
high respectability, who had accompanied him from that city, and
received his appointment shortly after their arrival at Cambridge. The
second aide-de-camp was John Trumbull,{2} son of the governor of
Connecticut. Trumbull was young, and unaccustomed to society, and soon
found himself, he says, unequal to the elegant duties of his
situation; he gladly exchanged it, therefore, for that of major of
brigade.
{Footnote 2: In after years distinguished as a historical painter.}
The member of Washington's family most deserving of mention at
present, was his secretary, Mr. Joseph Reed. With this gentleman he
had formed an intimacy in the course of his visits to Philadelphia, to
attend the sessions of the Continental Congress. Mr. Reed was an
accomplished man, had studied law in America, and at the Temple in
London, and had gained a high reputation at the Philadelphia bar. He
had since been highly instrumental in rousing the Philadelphians to
co-operate with the patriots of Boston. A sympathy of views and
feelings had attached him to Washington, and induced him to accompany
him to the camp.
The arrival of Gates in camp was heartily welcomed by the
commander-in-chief, who had received a letter from that officer,
gratefully acknowledging his friendly influence in procuring him the
appointment of adjutant-general. Washington may have promised himself
much cordial co-operation from him, recollecting the warm friendship
professed by him when he visited at Mount Vernon, and they talked
together over their early companionship in arms; but of that kind of
friendship there was no further manifestation. Gates was certainly of
great service, from his practical knowledge and military experience at
this juncture, when the whole army had in a manner to be organized;
but from the familiar intimacy of Washington he gradually estranged
himself. A contemporary has accounted for this by alleging that he was
secretly chagrined at not having received the appointment of
major-general, to which he considered himself well fitted by his
military knowledge and experience and which he thought Washington
might have obtained for him had he used his influence with Congress.
The hazardous position of the army from the great extent and weakness
of its lines, was what most pressed on the immediate attention of
Washington; and he summoned a council of war, to take the matter into
consideration. In this it was urged that, to abandon the line of
works, after the great labor and expense of their construction, would
be dispiriting to the troops and encouraging to the enemy, while it
would expose a wide extent of the surrounding country to maraud and
ravage. Beside, no safer position presented itself, on which to fall
back. This being generally admitted, it was determined to hold on to
the works, and defend them as long as possible; and, in the meantime,
to augment the army to at least twenty thousand men.
Washington now hastened to improve the defences of the camp,
strengthen the weak parts of the line, and throw up additional works
around the main forts. The army was distributed into three grand
divisions. One, forming the right wing, was stationed on the heights
of Roxbury. It was commanded by Major-general Ward, who had under him
Brigadier-generals Spencer and Thomas. Another, forming the left wing,
under Major-general Lee, having with him Brigadier-generals Sullivan
and Greene, was stationed on Winter and Prospect Hills; while the
centre, under Major-general Putnam and Brigadier-general Heath, was
stationed at Cambridge. At Washington's recommendation, Joseph
Trumbull, the eldest son of the governor, received on the 24th of July
the appointment of commissary-general of the continental army. He had
already officiated with talent in that capacity in the Connecticut
militia.
Nothing excited more gaze and wonder among the rustic visitors to the
camp than the arrival of several rifle companies, fourteen hundred men
in all, from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia; such stalwart
fellows as Washington had known in his early campaigns. Stark hunters
and bush fighters; many of them upwards of six feet high, and of
vigorous frame; dressed in fringed frocks, or rifle shirts, and round
hats. Their displays of sharp shooting were soon among the marvels of
the camp. One of these companies was commanded by Captain Daniel
Morgan, a native of New Jersey, whose first experience in war had been
to accompany Braddock's army as a wagoner. He had since carried arms
on the frontier and obtained a command. He and his riflemen in coming
to the camp had marched six hundred miles in three weeks.
While all his forces were required for the investment of Boston,
Washington was importuned by the Legislature of Massachusetts and the
Governor of Connecticut, to detach troops for the protection of
different points of the sea-coast, where depredations by armed vessels
were apprehended. The case of New London was specified by Governor
Trumbull, where Captain Wallace of the Rose frigate, with two other
ships of war, had entered the harbor, landed men, spiked the cannon,
and gone off threatening future visits.
Washington referred to his instructions, and consulted with his
general officers and such members of the Continental Congress as
happened to be in camp, before he replied to these requests; he then
respectfully declined compliance. In his reply he stated frankly and
explicitly the policy and system on which the war was to be conducted.
"It has been debated in Congress and settled," writes he, "that the
militia, or other internal strength of each province, is to be applied
for defence against those small and particular depredations, which
were to be expected, and to which they were supposed to be competent.
This will appear the more proper, when it is considered that every
town, and indeed every part of our sea-coast, which is exposed to
these depredations, would have an equal claim upon this army. The
great advantage the enemy have of transporting troops, by being
masters of the sea, will enable them to harass us by diversions of
this kind; and should we be tempted to pursue them, upon every alarm,
the army must either be so weakened as to expose it to destruction, or
a great part of the coast be still left unprotected.... I wish I could
extend protection to all, but the numerous detachments necessary to
remedy the evil would amount to a dissolution of the army, or make the
most important operations of the campaign depend upon the piratical
expeditions of two or three men-of-war and transports."
His refusal to grant the required detachments gave much
dissatisfaction in some quarters, until sanctioned and enforced by the
Continental Congress. All at length saw and acquiesced in the justice
and wisdom of his decision. It was in fact a vital question, involving
the whole character and fortune of the war; and it was acknowledged
that he met it with a forecast and determination befitting a
commander-in-chief.
The great object of Washington at present was to force the enemy to
come out of Boston and try a decisive action. His lines had for some
time cut off all communication of the town with the country, and he
had caused the live stock within a considerable distance of the place
to be driven back from the coast, out of reach of the men-of-war's
boats. At this critical juncture, when endeavoring to provoke a
general action, a startling fact came to light; the whole amount of
powder in the camp would not furnish more than nine cartridges to a
man!
A gross error had been made by the committee of supplies when
Washington, on taking command, had required a return of the
ammunition. They had returned the whole amount of powder collected by
the province, upwards of three hundred barrels; without stating what
had been expended. The blunder was detected on an order being issued
for a new supply of cartridges. It was found that there were but
thirty-two barrels of powder in store. This was an astounding
discovery. Washington instantly despatched letters and expresses to
Rhode Island, the Jerseys, Ticonderoga and elsewhere, urging immediate
supplies of powder and lead; no quantity, however small, to be
considered beneath notice.
A correspondence of an important character now took place between
Washington and General Gage. It was one intended to put the hostile
services on a proper footing. A strong disposition had been manifested
among the British officers to regard those engaged in the patriot
cause as malefactors, outlawed from the courtesies of chivalric
warfare. Washington was determined to have a full understanding on
this point. He was peculiarly sensitive with regard to Gage. They had
been companions in arms in their early days; but Gage might now affect
to look down upon him as the chief of a rebel army. Washington took an
early opportunity to let him know that he claimed to be the commander
of a legitimate force, engaged in a legitimate cause, and that both
himself and his army were to be treated on a footing of perfect
equality.