Naval Affairs (continued).--Importance of New Orleans.--Attack
feared from up the River.--Preparations for Defense.--Strength of
the Forts.--Other Defenses.-The General Plan.--Ironclads.--
Raft-Fleet of the Enemy.--Bombardment of the Forts commenced.--
Advance of the Fleet.--Its Passage of the Forts.--Batteries below
the City.--Darkness of the Night.--Evacuation of the City by
General Lovell on Appearance of the Enemy.--Address of General
Duncan to Soldiers in the Forts.--Refusal to surrender.--Meeting of
the Garrison of Fort Jackson.--The Forts surrendered.--Ironclad
Louisiana destroyed.--The Tugs and Steamers.--The Governor Moore.--
The Enemy's Ship Varuna sunk.--The McRae.--The State of the City
and its Defenses considered.--Public Indignation.--Its Victims.--
Efforts made for its Defense by the Navy Department.--The
Construction of the Mississippi.
New Orleans was the most important commercial port in the
Confederacy, being the natural outlet of the Mississippi Valley, as
well to the ports of Europe as to those of Central and Southern
America. It was the depot which, at an early period, had led to
controversies with Spain, and its importance to the interior had been
a main inducement to the purchase of Louisiana. It had become before
1861 the chief cotton-mart of the United States, and its defense
attracted the early attention of the Confederate Government. The
approaches for an attacking party were numerous. They could through
several channels enter Lake Pontchartrain, to approach the city in
rear for land-attack, could ascend the Mississippi from the Gulf, or
descend it from the Northwest, where it was known that the enemy was
preparing a formidable fleet of iron-clad gunboats. In the early part
of 1862, so general an opinion prevailed that the greatest danger to
New Orleans was by an attack from above, that General Lovell sent to
General Beauregard a large part of the troops then in the city.
At the mouth of the Mississippi there is a bar, the greatest depth of
water on which seldom exceeded eighteen feet, and it was supposed
that heavy vessels of war, with their armament and supplies, would
not be able to cross it. Such proved to be the fact, and the vessels
of that class had to be lightened to enable them to enter the river.
In that condition of affairs, an inferior fleet might have engaged
them with a prospect of success. Captain Hollins, who was in command
of the squadron at New Orleans, and who had on a former occasion
shown his fitness for such service, had been sent with the greater
part of his fleet up the river to join the defense there being made.
Two powerful vessels were under construction, the Louisiana and the
Mississippi, but neither of them was finished. A volunteer fleet of
transport-vessels had been fitted up by some river-men, but it was in
the unfortunate condition of not being placed under the orders of the
naval commander. A number of fire-rafts had been also provided, which
were to serve the double purpose of lighting up the river in the
event of the hostile fleet attempting to pass the forts under cover
of the night, and of setting fire to any vessel with which they might
become entangled.
After passing the bar, there was nothing to prevent the ascent of the
river until Forts Jackson and St. Philip were reached. These works,
constructed many years before, were on opposite banks of the river.
Their armament, as reported by General Lovell, December 5, 1861,
consisted of--Fort Jackson: six forty-two-ponders, twenty-six
twenty-four-pounders, two thirty-two-pounder rifles, sixteen
thirty-two-pounders, three eight-inch columbiads, one ten-inch
columbiad, two eight-inch mortars, one ten-inch mortar, two
forty-pounder howitzers, and ten twenty-four-pounder howitzers. Fort
St. Philip: six forty-two-ponders, nine thirty-two-pounders,
twenty-two twenty-four-pounders, four eight-inch columbiads, one
eight-inch mortar, one ten-inch mortar, and three field-guns.
General Duncan reported that, on the 27th of March, he was informed
by Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St.
Philip, of the coast-defenses, which were under his (General
Duncan's) command, that the enemy's fleet was crossing the bars, and
entering the Mississippi River in force; whereupon he repaired to
Fort Jackson. After describing the condition of the forts from the
excess of water and sinking of the entire site, as well as the
deficiency of guns of heavy caliber in the forts, he proceeds:
"It became necessary in their present condition to bring in and
mount, and to build the platforms for, the three ten-inch and three
eight-inch columbiads, the rifled forty-two-pounder, and the five
ten-inch seacoast mortars recently obtained from Pensacola on the
evacuation of that place, together with the two rifled seven-inch
guns temporarily borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans.
It was also found necessary to repair the old water-battery to the
rear of and below Fort Jackson, which had never been completed, for
the reception of a portion of these guns, as well as to construct
mortar-proof magazines, and shell-rooms within the same."
One of the seven-inch rifled guns borrowed from the navy was
subsequently returned, so that, when the forts were attacked, the
armament was one hundred and twenty-eight guns and mortars.
The garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip were about one thousand
men on December 5, 1861; afterward, so far as I know, the number was
not materially changed.
The prevailing belief that vessels of war, in a straight, smooth
channel, could pass batteries, led to the construction of a raft
between the two forts which, it was supposed, would detain the ships
under fire of the forts long enough for the guns to sink them, or at
least to compel them to retire. The power of the river when in flood,
and the drift-wood it bore upon it, broke the raft; another was
constructed, which, when the drift-wood accumulated upon it, met a
like fate. Whether obstructions differently arranged--such as booms
secured to the shores, with apparatus by which they could be swung
across the channel when needful, or logs such as were used, except
that, being unconnected together, but each separately secured by
chain and anchor, they might severally yield to the pressure of the
driftwood, sinking, so as to allow it to pass over them, and, when
relieved of the weight, rising again--or whether other expedient
could have been made permanent and efficient, is a problem which need
not be discussed, as the time for its application has passed from us.
The general plan for the defense of New Orleans consisted of two
lines of works: an exterior one, passing through the forts near the
month of the river, and the positions taken to defend the various
water approaches; nearer to the city was the interior line, embracing
New Orleans and Algiers, which was intended principally to repel an
attack by land, but also, by its batteries on the river-bank, to
resist approach by water. The total length of the intrenchments on
this interior line was more than eight miles. When completed, it
formed, in connection with impassable swamps, a very strong line of
defense. At the then high stage of the river, all the land between it
and the swamps was so saturated with water, that regular approaches
could not have been made. The city, therefore, was at the time
supposed to be doubly secure from a land-attack.
In the winter of 1861-'62 I sent one of my aides-de-camp to New
Orleans to make a general inspection, and hold free conference with
the commanding General. Upon his return, he reported to me that
General Lovell was quite satisfied with the condition of the
land-defenses--so much so as to say that his only fear was that the
enemy would not make a land-attack.
Considered since the event, it may seem strange that, after the fall
of Donelson and Henry, and the employment of the enemy's gunboats in
the Tennessee and Cumberland, it was still generally argued that the
danger to New Orleans was that the gunboats would descend the
Mississippi, and applications were made to have the ship Louisiana
sent up the river as soon as she was completed.
The interior lines of defense mounted more than sixty guns of various
caliber, and were surrounded by wide and deep ditches. On the various
water approaches, including bays and bayous on the west and east
sides of the river, there were sixteen different forts, and these,
together with those on the river and the batteries of the interior
line, had in position about three hundred guns.
One ironclad, the Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns of heavy caliber,
though she was not quite completed, was sent down to coöperate with
the forts. Her defective steam-power and imperfect steering apparatus
prevented her from rendering active coöperation. The steamship
Mississippi, then under construction at New Orleans, was in such an
unfinished condition as to be wholly unavailable when the enemy
arrived. In the opinion of naval officers she would have been, if
completed, the most powerful ironclad then in the world, and could
have driven the enemy's fleet out of the river and raised the
blockade at Mobile. There were also several small river-steamers
which were lightly armed, and their bows were protected so that they
could act as rams and otherwise aid in the defense of the river; but,
from the reports received, they seem, with a few honorable
exceptions, to have rendered little valuable service.
The means of defense, therefore, mainly relied on were the two
heavy-armed forts, Jackson and St. Philip, with the obstruction
placed between them: this was a raft consisting of cypress-trees,
forty feet long, and averaging four or five feet at the larger end.
They were placed longitudinally in the river, about three feet apart,
and held together by gunwales on top, and strung upon two
two-and-a-half-inch chain cables fastened to their lower sides. This
raft was anchored in the river, abreast of the forts.
The fleet of the enemy below the forts consisted of seven steam
sloops of war, twelve gunboats, and several armed steamers, under
Commodore Farragut; also, a mortar-fleet consisting of twenty sloops
and some steam-vessels. The whole force was forty-odd vessels of
different kinds, with an armament of three hundred guns of heavy
caliber, of improved models.
The bombardment of the forts by the mortar-fleet commenced on April
18th, and, after six days of vigorous and constant shelling, the
resisting power of the forts was not diminished in any perceptible
degree. On the 23d there were manifest preparations by the enemy to
attempt the passage of the forts. This, as subsequently developed,
was to be done in the following manner. The sloops of war and the
gunboats were each formed in two divisions, and, selecting the
darkest hour of the night, between 3 and 4 A.M. of the 24th, moved up
the river in two columns. The commanders of the forts had vainly
endeavored to have the river lighted up in anticipation of an attack
by the fleet.
In the mean time, while the fleet moved up the river, there was kept
up from the mortars a steady bombardment on the forts, and these
opened a fire on the columns of ships and gunboats, which, from the
failure to send down the fire-rafts to light up the river, was less
effective than it otherwise would have been. The straight, deep
channel enabled the vessels to move at their greatest speed, and thus
the forts were passed.
Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the coast defenses, says,
in his report of the passing of Forts Jackson and St. Philip by the
enemy's fleet:
"The enemy evidently anticipated a strong demonstration to be made
against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however,
that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance
offered to his passage was the anticipated fire of the forts--the
broken and scattered raft being no obstacle--I am satisfied that he
was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gantlet at all
hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be that as it
may, a rapid rush was made by him in columns of twos in echelon, so
as not to interfere with each other's broadsides. The mortar-fire was
furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and, in dashing by, each of
the vessels delivered broadside after broadside, of shot, shell,
grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.
"Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and
fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at
their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape,
and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in
getting above and beyond our range. The absence of light on the
river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so
dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and, in consequence, the
gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes
of the enemy's guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's dash was
successful mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and
several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar
results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass
or to reconnoiter when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy
and effect."
The vessels which passed the fort anchored at the quarantine station
about six miles above, and in the forenoon proceeded up the river.
Batteries had been constructed where the interior line of defense
touched both the right and the left bank of the river. The high stage
of the river gave to its surface an elevation above that of the
natural bank; but a continuous levee to protect the land from
inundation existed on both sides of the river. When the ascending
fleet approached these batteries, a cross-fire, which drove two of
the vessels back, was opened upon it, and continued until all the
ammunition was exhausted. The garrison was then withdrawn-casualties,
one killed and one wounded. The regret which would naturally arise
from the fact of these batteries not having a sufficient supply of
ammunition is modified, if not removed, by the statement of the
highly accomplished and gallant officer, Major-General M. L. Smith,
who was then in command of them. He reported:
"Had the fall of New Orleans depended upon the enemy's first taking
Forts Jackson and Philip, I think the city would have been safe from
an attack from the Gulf. The forts, in my judgment, were impregnable
as long as they were in free and open communication with the city.
This communication was not endangered while the obstruction existed.
The conclusion, then, is briefly this: While the obstruction existed,
the city was safe; when it was swept away, as the defenses then
existed, it was within the enemy's power."
On the other hand, General Duncan, whose protracted, skillful, and
gallant defense of the forts is above all praise, closes his official
report with the following sentence: "Except for the cover afforded by
the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that
the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St.
Philip." The darkness to which he referred was not only that of
night, but also the absence of the use of the means prepared to light
up the river. As further proof of the intensity of the darkness, and
the absence of that intelligent design and execution which had been
claimed, I will quote a sentence from the report of Commodore
Farragut: "At length the fire slackened, the smoke cleared off, and
we saw to our surprise that we were above the forts."
On the 25th of April the enemy's gunboats and ships of war anchored
in front of the city and demanded its surrender. Major-General M.
Lovell, then in command, refused to comply with the summons, but,
believing himself unable to make a successful defense, and in order
to avoid a bombardment, agreed to withdraw his forces, and turn it
over to the civil authorities. Accordingly, the city was evacuated on
the same day. The forts still continued defiantly to hold their
position. By assiduous exertion the damage done to the works was
repaired, and the garrisons valiantly responded to the resolute
determination of General Duncan and Colonel Higgins to defend the
forts against the fleet still below, as well as against that which
had passed and was now above. On the 26th Commodore Porter,
commanding the mortar-fleet below, sent a flag-of-truce boat to
demand the surrender of the forts, saying that the city of New
Orleans had surrendered. To this Colonel Higgins replied, April 27th,
that he had no official information that New Orleans had been
evacuated, and until such notice was received he would not entertain
for a moment a proposition to surrender the forts. On the same day
General Duncan, commanding the coast-defenses, issued the following
address:
"SOLDIERS OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP: You have nobly, gallantly,
and heroically sustained with courage and fortitude the terrible
ordeals of fire, water, and a hail of shot and shell wholly
unsurpassed during the present war. But more remains to be done. The
safety of New Orleans and the cause of the Southern Confederacy--our
homes, families, and everything dear to man--yet depend upon our
exertions. We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we
were before the bombardment. Twice has the enemy demanded your
surrender, and twice has he been refused.
"Your officers have every confidence in your courage and patriotism,
and feel every assurance that you will cheerfully and with alacrity
obey all orders, and do your whole duty as men and as becomes the
well-tried garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Be vigilant,
therefore, stand by your guns, and all will yet be well.
"J. K. DUNCAN,
"_Brigadier-General, commanding coast-defenses._"
Not less lofty and devoted was the spirit evinced by Colonel Higgins.
His naval experience had been energetically applied in the attempts
to preserve and repair the raft. As immediate commander of Fort St.
Philip he had done all which skill and gallantry could achieve, and,
though for forty-eight hours during the bombardment he never left the
rampart, yet, with commendable care for his men, he kept them so
under cover that, notwithstanding the long and furious assault to
which the fort was subjected, the total of casualties in it was two
killed and four wounded. Their conduct was such as was to be
anticipated, for, had these officers been actuated by a lower motive
than patriotism, had they been seeking the rewards which power
confers, they would not have taken service with the weaker party.
Their meed was the consciousness of duty well done in a righteous
cause, and the enduring admiration and esteem of a people who had
only these to confer.
During the 25th, 26th, and 27th, there had been an abatement of fire
on the forts, and with it had subsided the excitement which imminent
danger creates in the brave. A rumor became current that the city had
surrendered, and no reply had been received to inquiries sent on the
24th and 25th. About midnight on the 27th the garrison of Fort
Jackson revolted _en masse_, seized upon the guard, and commenced to
spike the guns. Captain S. O. Comay's company, the Louisiana
Cannoneers of St. Mary's Parish, and a few others remained true to
their cause and country. The mutiny was so general that the officers
were powerless to control it, and therefore decided to let those go
who wished to leave, and after daybreak to communicate with the fleet
below and negotiate for the terms which had been previously offered
and declined.
Under the incessant fire to which the forts had been exposed, and the
rise of the water in the casemates and lower part of the works, the
men had been not only deprived of sleep, but of the opportunity to
prepare their food. Heroically they had braved alike dangers and
discomfort; had labored constantly to repair damages; to extinguish
fires caused by exploding shells; to preserve their ammunition by
bailing out the water which threatened to submerge the magazine: yet,
in a period of comparative repose, these men, who had been cheerful
and obedient, as suddenly as unexpectedly, broke out into open
mutiny. Under the circumstances which surrounded him, General Duncan
had no alternative. It only remained for him to accept the
proposition which had been made for a surrender of the forts. As this
mutiny became known about midnight of the 27th, soon after daylight
of the 28th a small boat was procured, and notice of the event was
sent to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana, and also to Fort St.
Philip. The officers of that fort concurred in the propriety of the
surrender, though none of their men had openly revolted.
A flag of truce was sent to Commodore Porter to notify him of a
willingness to negotiate for the surrender of the forts. The
gallantry with which the defense had been conducted was recognized by
the enemy, and the terms were as liberal as had been offered on
former occasions.
The garrisons were paroled, the officers were to retain their
side-arms, and the Confederate flags were left flying over the forts
until after our forces had withdrawn. If this was done as a generous
recognition of the gallantry with which the forts had been defended,
it claims acknowledgment as an instance of martial courtesy--the
flower that blooms fairest amid the desolations of war.
Captain Mitchell, commanding the Confederate States naval forces, had
been notified by General Duncan of the mutiny in the forts and of the
fact that the enemy had passed through a channel in rear of Fort St.
Philip and had landed a force at the quarantine, some six miles
above, and that, under the circumstances, it was deemed necessary to
surrender the forts. As the naval forces were not under the orders of
the general commanding the coast-defenses, it was optional with the
naval commander to do likewise or not as to his fleet. After
consultation with his officers. Captain Mitchell decided to destroy
his flagship, the Louisiana, the only formidable vessel he had,
rather than allow her to fall into the hands of the enemy. The crew
was accordingly withdrawn, and the vessel set on fire.
Commodore Porter, commanding the fleet below, came up under a flag of
truce to Fort Jackson, and, while negotiations were progressing for
the surrender, the Louisiana, in flames, drifted down the river, and,
when close under Fort St. Philip, exploded and sank.
The defenses afloat, except the Louisiana, consisted of tugs and
river-steamers, which had been converted to war purposes by
protecting their bows with iron so as to make them rams, and putting
on them such armament as boats of that class would bear; and these
were again divided into such as were subject to control as naval
vessels, and others which, in compliance with the wish of the
Governor of Louisiana and many influential citizens, were fitted out
to a great extent by State and private sources, with the condition
that they should be commanded by river-steamboat captains, and should
not be under the control of the naval commander. This, of course,
impaired the unity requisite in battle. For many other purposes they
might have been used without experiencing the inconvenience felt when
they were brought together to act as one force against the enemy. The
courts of inquiry and the investigation by a committee of Congress
have brought out all the facts of the case, but with such conflicting
opinions as render it very difficult, in reviewing the matter, to
reach a definite and satisfactory conclusion. This much it may be
proper to say, that expectations, founded upon the supposition that
these improvised means could do all which might fairly be expected
from war-vessels, were unreasonable, and a judgment based upon them
is unjust to the parties involved. The machinery of the Louisiana was
so incomplete as to deprive her of locomotion, but she had been so
well constructed as to possess very satisfactory resisting powers, as
was shown by the fact that the broadsides of the enemy's vessels,
fired at very close quarters, had little or no effect upon her
shield. Without power of locomotion, her usefulness was limited to
employment as a floating battery. The question as to whether she was
in the right position, or whether, in her unfinished condition, she
should have been sent from the city, is one, for an answer to which I
must refer the inquirer to the testimony of naval men, who were
certainly most competent to decide the issue.
One of the little river-boats, the Governor Moore, commanded by
lieutenant Beverly Kennon, like the others, imperfectly protected at
the bow, struck and sunk the Varuna, in close proximity to other
vessels of the enemy's fleet. Such daring resulted in his losing, in
killed and wounded, seventy-four out of a crew of ninety-three. Then
finding that he must destroy his ship to prevent her from falling
into the hands of the enemy, he set her on fire, and testified as
follows:
"I ordered the wounded to be placed in a boat, and all the men who
could to save themselves by swimming to the shore and hiding
themselves in the marshes. I remained to set the ship on fire. After
doing so, I went on deck with the intention of leaving her, but found
the wounded had been left with no one to take care of them. I
remained and lowered them into a boat, and got through just in time
to be made a prisoner. The wounded were afterward attended by the
surgeons of the Oneida and Eureka."
This, he says, was the only foundation for the accusation of having
burned his wounded with his ship. Another, the Manassas,
lieutenant-commanding Warley, though merely an altered "tug-boat,"
stoutly fought the large ships; but, being wholly unprotected, except
at her bow, was perforated in many places, as soon as the guns were
brought to bear upon her sides, and floated down the river a burning
wreck. Another of the same class is thus referred to by Colonel
Higgins:
"At daylight, I observed the McRae, gallantly fighting at terrible
odds, contending at close quarters with two of the enemy's powerful
ships. Her gallant commander, Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, fell during
the conflict, severely, but I trust not mortally, wounded."
This little vessel, after her unequal conflict, was still afloat,
and, with permission of the enemy, went up to New Orleans to convey
the wounded as well from our forts as from the fleet.
On the 23d of April, 1862, General Lovell, commanding the military
department, had gone down to Fort Jackson, where General Duncan,
commanding the coast-defenses, then made his headquarters. The
presence of the department commander did not avail to secure the full
coöperation between the defenses afloat and the land-defenses, which
was then of most pressing and immediate necessity.
When the enemy's fleet passed the forts, he hastened back to New
Orleans, his headquarters. The confusion which prevailed in the city,
when the news arrived that the forts had been passed by the enemy's
fleet, shows how little it was expected. There was nothing to
obstruct the ascent of the river between Forts Jackson and St. Philip
and the batteries on the river where the interior line of defense
rested on its right and left banks, about four miles below the city.
The guns were not sufficiently numerous in these batteries to inspire
much confidence; they were nevertheless well served until the
ammunition was exhausted, after which the garrisons withdrew, and
made their way by different routes to join the forces withdrawn from
New Orleans.
Under the supposition entertained by the generals nearest to the
operations, the greatest danger to New Orleans was from above, not
from below, the city; therefore, most of the troops had been sent
from the city to Tennessee, and Captain Hollins, with the greater
part of the river-fleet, had gone up to check the descent of the
enemy's gunboats.
Batteries like those immediately below the city had been constructed
where the interior line touched the river above, and armed to resist
an attack from that direction. Doubtful as to the direction from
which, and the manner in which, an attempt might be made to capture
the city, such preparations as circumstances suggested were made
against many supposable dangers by the many possible routes of
approach. To defend the city from the land, against a bombardment by
a powerful fleet in the river before it, had not been contemplated.
All the defensive preparations were properly, I think, directed to
the prevention of a near approach by the enemy. To have subjected the
city to bombardment by a direct or plunging fire, as the surface of
the river was then higher than the land, would have been
exceptionally destructive. Had the city been filled with soldiers
whose families had been sent to a place of safety, instead of being
filled with women and children whose natural protectors were
generally in the army and far away, the attempt might have been
justified to line the levee with all the effective guns and open fire
on the fleet, at the expense of whatever property might be destroyed
before the enemy should be driven away. The case was the reverse of
the hypothesis, and nothing could have been more unjust than to
censure the commanding General for withdrawing a force large enough
to induce a bombardment, but insufficient to repel it. His answer to
the demand for the surrender showed clearly enough the motives by
which he was influenced. His refusal enabled him to withdraw the
troops and most of the public property, and to use them, with the
ordnance and ordnance stores thus saved, in providing for the defense
of Vicksburg, but especially it deprived the enemy of any pretext for
bombarding the town and sacrificing the lives of the women and
children. It appears that General Lovell called for ten thousand
volunteers from the citizens, but failed to get them. There were many
river-steamboats at the landing, and, if the volunteers called for
were intended to man these boats and board the enemy's fleet before
their land-forces could arrive, it can not be regarded as utterly
impracticable. The report of General Butler shows that he worked his
way through one of the bayous in rear of Fort St. Philip to the
Mississippi River above the forts so as to put himself in
communication with the fleet at the city, and to furnish Commodore
Farragut with ammunition. From this it is to be inferred that the
fleet was deficient in ammunition, and the fact would have rendered
boarding from river-boats the more likely to succeed. In this
connection it may be remembered that, during the war, John Taylor
Wood, Colonel and A. D. C. to the President, who had been an officer
of high repute in the "old Navy," did in open boats attack armed
vessels, board and capture them, though found with nettings up,
having been warned of the probability of such an attack.[57]
Many causes have been assigned for the fall of New Orleans. Two of
them are of undeniable force: First, the failure to light up the
channel; second, the want of an obstruction which would detain the
fleet under fire of the forts. General Duncan's report and testimony
justify the conclusion that to the thick veil of darkness the enemy
was indebted for his ability to run past the forts.
The argument that the guns were not of sufficiently large caliber to
stop the fleet is not convincing. If all the guns had been of the
largest size, that would not have increased the accuracy but would
have diminished the rapidity of the fire, and therefore in the same
degree would have lessened the chances of hitting objects in the
dark. Further, it appears that the forts always crippled or repulsed
any vessels which came up in daylight.
The forts would have been better able to resist bombardment if they
had been heavily plated with iron; but that would not have prevented
the fleet from passing them as they did. Torpedoes might have been
placed on the bar at the mouth of the river before the enemy got
possession of it, and subsequently, if attached to buoys, they might
have been used in the deep channel above. Many other things which
were omitted might and probably would have been done had attention
been earlier concentrated on the danger which at last proved fatal.
If the volunteer river-defense fleet was ineffective, as alleged,
because it was not subject to the orders of the naval commander, that
was an evil without a remedy. The Governor of Louisiana had arranged
with the projectors that they should not be subject to the naval
commander, and the alternative of not accepting them with that
condition was that they would not agree to convert their steamers
into war-vessels. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that they were
worse than none, their presence can not be properly enumerated among
the causes of the failure.
The fall of New Orleans was a great disaster, over which there was
general lamentation, mingled with no little indignation. The excited
feeling demanded a victim, and conflicting testimony of many
witnesses most nearly concerned made it convenient to select for
censure those most removed and least active in their own
justification. Thus the naval constructors of the Mississippi and the
Secretary of the Navy became the special objects of attack. The
selection of these had little of justice in it, and could not serve
to relieve others of their responsibility, as did the old-time doom
of the scapegoat. New Orleans had never been a ship-building port,
and when the Messrs. Tift, the agents to build the iron-dad steamer
Mississippi, arrived there, they had to prepare a ship-yard, procure
lumber from a distance, have the foundries and rolling-mills adapted
to such iron-work as could be done in the city, and contract
elsewhere for the balance. They were ingenious, well informed in
matters of ship-building, and were held in high esteem in Georgia and
Florida, where they had long resided. They submitted a proposition to
the Secretary of the Navy to build a vessel on a new model. The
proposition was accepted after full examination of the plan proposed,
the novelty of which made it necessary that they should have full
control of the work of construction. To the embarrassments above
mentioned were added interruptions by calling off the workmen
occasionally for exercise and instruction as militiamen, the city
being threatened by the enemy. From these causes, unexpected delay in
the completion of the ship resulted, regret for which increased as
her most formidable character was realized.
These constructors--the brothers Tift--hoped to gain much
reputation by the ship which they designed, and, from this motive,
agreed to give their full service and unremitted attention in its
construction without compensation or other allowance than their
current expenses. It would, therefore, on the face of it, seem to
have been a most absurd suspicion that they willingly delayed the
completion of the vessel, and at last wantonly destroyed it.
Mr. E. C. Murray, who was the contractor for building the Louisiana,
in his testimony before a committee of the Confederate Congress,
testified that he had been a practical ship-builder for twenty years
and a contractor for the preceding eighteen years, having built about
a hundred and twenty boats, steamers, and sailing-vessels. There was
only a fence between his shipyard and that where the Mississippi was
constructed. Of this latter vessel he said:
"I think the vessel was built in less time than any vessel of her
tonnage, character, and requiring the same amount of work and
materials, on this continent. That vessel required no less than two
million feet of lumber, and, I suppose, about one thousand tons of
iron, including the false works, blockways, etc. I do not think that
amount of materials was ever put together on this continent within
the time occupied in her construction. I know many of our naval
vessels, requiring much less materials than were employed in the
Mississippi, that took about six or twelve months in their
construction. She was built with rapidity, and had at all times as
many men at work upon her as could work to advantage--she had, in
fact, many times more men at work upon her than could conveniently
work. They worked on nights and Sundays upon her, as I did upon the
Louisiana, at least for a large portion of the time."
The Secretary of the Navy knew both of the Tifts, but had no near
personal relations or family connection with either, as was
recklessly alleged.
He, in accepting their proposition, connected with it the detail of
officers of the navy to supervise expenditures and aid in procuring
materials. Assisted by the chief engineer and constructor of the
navy, minute instructions were given as to the manner in which the
work was to be conducted. As early as the 19th of September he sent
twenty ship-carpenters from Richmond to New Orleans to aid in the
construction of the Mississippi. On the 7th of October authority was
given to have guns of heaviest caliber made in New Orleans for the
ship. Frequent telegrams were sent in November, December, and
January, showing great earnestness about the work on the ship. In
February and March notice was given of the forwarding from Richmond
of capstan and main-shaft, which could not be made in New Orleans. On
March 22d the Secretary, by telegraph, directed the constructors to
"strain every nerve to finish the ship," and added, "work day and
night." April 5th he again wrote: "Spare neither men nor money to
complete her at the earliest moment. Can not you hire night-gangs for
triple wages?" April 10th the Secretary again says: "Enemy's boats
have passed Island 10. Work day and night with all the force you can
command to get the Mississippi ready. Spare neither men nor money."
April 11th he asks, "When will you launch, and when will she be ready
for action?" These inquiries indicate the prevalent opinion, at that
time, that the danger to New Orleans was from the ironclad fleet
above, and not the vessels at the mouth of the river; but the anxiety
of the Secretary of the Navy and the efforts made by him were of a
character applicable to either or both the sources of danger. Thus we
find as early as the 24th of February, 1862, that he instructed
Commander Mitchell to make all proper exertions to have guns and
carriages ready for both the iron-clad vessels the Mississippi and
the Louisiana. Reports having reached him that the work on the latter
vessel was not pushed with sufficient energy, on the 15th of March he
authorized Commander Mitchell to consult with General Lovell, and, if
the contractors were not doing everything practicable to complete her
at the earliest moment, that he should take her out of their hands,
and, with the aid of General Lovell, go on to complete her himself.
On the 5th of April, 1862, Secretary Mallory instructed Commander
Sinclair, who had been assigned to the command of the Mississippi, to
urge on by night and day the completion of the ship. In March, 1861,
the Navy Department sent from Montgomery officers to New Orleans,
with instructions to purchase steamers and fit them for war purposes.
Officers were also sent to the North to purchase vessels suited to
such uses, and in the ensuing May an agent was dispatched to Canada
and another to Europe for like objects; and in April, 1861, contracts
were made with foundries at Richmond and New Orleans to make guns for
the defense of New Orleans. On the 8th of May, 1861, the Secretary of
the Navy communicated at some length to the Committee on Naval
Affairs of the Confederate Congress his views in favor of iron-clad
vessels, arguing as sell for their efficiency as the economy in
building them, believing that one such vessel could successfully
engage a fleet of the wooden vessels which constituted the enemy's
navy. His further view was that we could not hope to build wooden
fleets equal to those with which the enemy were supplied. The
committee, if it should be deemed expedient to construct an iron-clad
ship, was urged to prompt action by the forcible declaration, "Not a
moment should be lost."
Commander George Minor, Confederate States Navy, Chief of the Bureau
of Ordnance, reported the number of guns sent by the Navy Department
to New Orleans, between July 1, 1861, and the fall of the city, to
have been one hundred and ninety-seven, and that before July
twenty-three guns had been sent there from Norfolk, being a total of
two hundred and twenty guns, of which forty-five were of large
caliber, supplied by the Navy Department for the defense of New
Orleans.
Very soon after the Government was removed to Richmond, the Secretary
of the Navy, with the aid of Commander Brooke, designed a plan for
converting the sunken frigate Merrimac into an iron-clad vessel. She
became the famous Virginia, the brilliant career of which silenced
all the criticisms which had been made upon the plan adopted. On May
20, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy instructed Captain Ingraham,
Confederate States Navy, to ascertain the practicability of obtaining
wrought-iron plates suited for ships' armor. After some
disappointment and delay, the owners of the mills at Atlanta were
induced to make the necessary changes in the machinery, and undertake
the work. Efforts at other places in the West had been unsuccessful,
and this was one of the difficulties which an inefficient department
would not have overcome. The iron-clad gunboats Arkansas and
Tennessee were commenced at Memphis, but the difficulty in obtaining
mechanics so interfered with their construction, that the Secretary
of the Navy was compelled, December 24, 1861, to write to General
Polk, who was commanding at Columbus, Kentucky, asking that mechanics
might be detached from his forces, so as to insure the early
completion of the vessels. So promptly had the iron-clad boats been
put under contract, that the arrangements had all been made in
anticipation of the appropriation, and the contract was signed "on
the very day the law was passed."
On December 25, 1861, Lieutenant Isaac N. Brown, Confederate States
Navy, a gallant and competent officer, well and favorably known in
his subsequent service as commander of the ram Arkansas, was sent to
Nashville. Information had been received that four river-boats were
there, and for sale, which were suited for river defense. Lieutenant
Brown was instructed to purchase such as should be adaptable to the
required service, "and to proceed forthwith with the necessary
alteration and armament."
In the latter part of 1861, it having been found impossible with the
means in Richmond and Norfolk to answer the requisitions for ordnance
and ordnance stores required for the naval defenses of the
Mississippi, a laboratory was established in New Orleans, and
authority given for the casting of heavy cannon, construction of
gun-carriages, and the manufacture of projectiles and ordnance
equipments of all kinds. On December 12, 1861, the Secretary of the
Navy submitted an estimate for an appropriation to meet the expenses
incurred "for ordnance and ordnance stores for the defense of the
Mississippi River."
Secretary Mallory, in answer to inquiries of a joint committee of
Congress, in 1863, replied that he had sent a telegram to Captain
Whittle, April 17, 1862, as follows:
"Is the boom, or raft, below the forts in order to resist the enemy,
or has any part of it given way? State condition."
On the next day the following answer was sent:
"I hear the raft below the forts is not in best condition; they are
strengthening it by additional lines. I have furnished anchors."
To further inquiry about the raft by the Committee, the Secretary
answered:
"The commanding General at New Orleans had exclusive charge of the
construction of the raft, or obstruction, in question, and his
correspondence with the War Department induced confidence in the
security of New Orleans from the enemy. I was aware that this raft
had been injured, but did not doubt that the commanding General would
renew it, and place an effectual barrier across the river, and I was
anxious that the navy should afford all possible aid. . . . A large
number of anchors were sent to New Orleans from Norfolk for the raft."
Though much more might be added, it is hoped that what has been given
above will sufficiently attest the zeal and capacity of the Secretary
of the Navy, and his anxiety, in particular, to protect the city of
New Orleans, whether assailed by fleets descending or ascending the
river.
Having thus reviewed at length the events, immediate and remote,
which were connected with the great catastrophe, the fall of our
chief commercial city, and the destruction of the naval vessels on
which our hopes most rested for the protection of the lower
Mississippi and the harbors of the Gulf, the narrative is resumed of
affairs at the city of New Orleans.
[Footnote 57: Captain Wood had a number of light row-boats built,
holding each about twenty men. They were fitted with cradles to wagons,
and could be quickly moved to any point by road or rail. He writes:
"In August, 1863, I left Richmond with four boats and sixty men for
the Rappahannock, to look after one or two gunboats that had been
operating in that river. Finding always two cruising together, I
determined to attempt the capture of both at once. About midnight,
with muffled oars, we pulled for them at anchor near the mouth of the
river. They discovered us two hundred yards off. We dashed alongside,
cut our way through and over the boarder nettings with the old navy
cutlass, gained the deck, and, after a sharp, short fight, drove the
enemy below. The prizes proved to be the gunboats Satellite and
Reliance, two guns each. Landing the prisoners, we cruised for two
days in the Chesapeake Bay. A number of vessels were captured and
destroyed."]