Military Arrangements of the Enemy.--Marshall and Garfield.--
Fishing Creek.--Crittenden's Report.--Fort Henry; its Surrender.--
Fort Donelson; its Position.--Assaults.--Surrender.--Losses.
Important changes in the military arrangements of the enemy were made
about this time. Major-General George B. McClellan was assigned to
the chief command of his army, in place of Lieutenant-General Scott,
retired. A Department of Ohio was constituted, embracing the States
of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Kentucky east of the Cumberland and
Tennessee Rivers; and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was assigned to
its command. At the same time. General Henry W. Halleck superseded
General John C. Fremont in command of the United States Department of
the West. General W. T. Sherman was removed from Kentucky and sent to
report to General Halleck. General A. S. Johnston was now confronted
by General Halleck in the West and by General Buell in Kentucky. The
former, with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Generals Grant and C.
F. Smith, threatened equally Columbus, the key of the lower
Mississippi River, and the water-lines of the Cumberland and the
Tennessee, with their defenses at Forts Donelson and Henry. The right
wing of General Buell also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his
center was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing
against General Zollicoffer at Mill Spring, on the upper Cumberland.
If the last-named position could be forced, the way seemed open to
East Tennessee, by either the Jacksboro or the Jamestown routes, on
the one hand, and to Nashville on the other. At the northeastern
comer of Kentucky there was a force under Colonel Garfield, of Ohio,
opposed to the Confederate force under General Humphrey Marshall.
The strength of Marshall's force in effective men was about sixteen
hundred. Knowing that a body of the enemy under Colonel Garfield was
advancing to meet him, and that a small force was moving to his rear,
he fell back some fifteen miles, and took position on Middle Creek,
near Prestonsburg. On January 10, 1862, Garfield attacked him. The
firing was kept up, with some intervals, about four hours, and was
occasionally very sharp and spirited. Marshall says in his report:
"The enemy did not move me from any one position I assumed, and at
nightfall withdrew from the field, leaving me just where I was in the
morning. . . . He came to attack, yet came so cautiously that my left
wing never fired a shot, and he never came up sufficiently to engage
my center or left wing." Garfield was said to have fallen back
fifteen miles to Paintsville, and Marshall seven miles, where he
remained two days, then slowly pursued his retreat. He stated his
loss at ten killed and fourteen wounded, and that of the enemy to
have been severe.
The battle of Fishing Creek has been the subject of harsh criticism,
and I think it will be seen by the report herein inserted that great
injustice has been done to General George B. Crittenden, who
commanded on that occasion.
In July, 1880, I wrote to him requesting a statement of the affair at
Fishing Creek, and a short time before his decease he complied with
my request by writing as follows:
"In November, 1862, I assumed, by assignment, the command of a
portion of East Tennessee and southeastern Kentucky, which embraced
the troops stationed at Mill Springs, on the Cumberland River, and
under the command of General Zollicoffer, who, as I understood the
matter, had been stationed there by General Johnston to prevent the
enemy under Schopf, and confronting him on the opposite side of the
river, from crossing and penetrating into Tennessee. Schopf's camp
was at Somerset, on Fishing Creek, a tributary of the Cumberland,
emptying into it a mile above Mill Springs. He was several miles away
from the bank of the Cumberland, so that both the river and creek
intervened between him and General Zollicoffer. While I was detained
in Knoxville, on business connected with my command, I received an
official communication from General Zollicoffer, informing me that he
had crossed the Cumberland by fording, and was fortifying a camp on
the right bank, etc. By the messenger who bore me this communication
I ordered him to recross the river and resume his original position
on the left bank. Early in January, I reached Mill Springs, and
found, to my surprise. General Zollicoffer still on the right bank.
He called on me immediately, and informed me that his messenger who
bore back my order had lost several days in returning, and that when
it was received he supposed that I would arrive almost immediately;
and, hoping to be able to convince me that it would be better to
remain on the right bank, he had postponed crossing until, by a rise
in the river, it had become impossible to do so; that all his
artillery and a large portion of his wagons were on the right bank,
and his only means of transferring them to the other bank were a
small ferry-boat and a very small stem-wheel steamer, entirely
inadequate to the purpose. I was dissatisfied, but, as I knew that
the General had been actuated by pure motives, I accepted his excuse.
Details were promptly placed in the woods, to prepare timber for
flat-boats to transport the artillery and wagons to the left bank of
the river. The weather was execrable, and the men unskilled, so that
the work progressed slowly.
"Such was the posture of affairs, when, on the 18th of January, I was
informed that General Thomas was approaching with a large force of
all arms, and would encamp that night within a few miles of us. Here
was thrust upon me the very contingency which my order to General
Zollicoffer was intended to obviate. It rained violently throughout
this day until late in the afternoon. It occurred to me that Fishing
Creek must so rise as to render it impossible for Schopf to connect
with Thomas. Acting upon this idea, I summoned a council of superior
officers, and, laying before them the circumstances of the case,
asked their advice. There was not one of them who did not concur with
me in the opinion that Thomas must be attacked immediately, and, if
possible, by surprise; that such attack, if successful merely in
repulsing him, would probably give us time to cross the Cumberland
with artillery and wagons, by means of our boats, then being built.
"Accordingly, at twelve o'clock in the night, we marched for the
position of the enemy, ascertained to be some six miles away. We had
scarcely taken up the line of march, when the rain began to fall, the
darkness became intense, and the consequent confusion great, so that
day dawned before we reached his position. The attack, as a surprise,
failed: nevertheless, it was promptly made. It rained violently
throughout the action, rendering all the flint-lock guns useless. The
men bearing them were allowed to fall back on the reserve.
"The action was progressing successfully, when the fall of General
Zollicoffer was announced to me. Apprehending disastrous
consequences, I hastened to the front. My apprehensions were well
founded. I found the line of battle in confusion and falling back,
and, after a vain effort to restore the line, yielded to necessity,
and, by the interposition of the reserve, covered the shattered line
and effected my retreat to camp without loss.
"I reached camp late in the afternoon. Not long afterward the enemy
opened fire at long range; night coming on, he ceased to fire. The
few shot and shells that fell in the camp so plainly demonstrated the
demoralization of the men, that I doubted, even if I had had rations,
which I had not, whether the camp could have been successfully
defended for twenty-four hours. There was not, and had not been for
some time in the camp, rations beyond the daily need. This state of
affairs was due to the exhaustion of the neighboring country, and the
impracticability of the roads.
"It became now my sole object to transfer the men with their arms,
the cavalry-horses, and teams to the left bank of the river. This was
successfully accomplished by dawn of the next day.
"I attributed the loss of the battle, in a great degree, to the
inferiority of our arms and the untimely fall of General Zollicoffer,
who was known and highly esteemed by the men, who were almost all
Tennesseeans. I think I have shown that the battle of Fishing Creek
was a necessity, and that I ought not to be held responsible for that
necessity. As to how I managed it, I have nothing further to say."
General Crittenden's gallantry had been too often and too
conspicuously shown in battle during the war with Mexico and on the
Indian frontier to admit of question, and the criticism has been
directed solely to the propriety of the attack at Fishing Creek. His
explanation is conclusive against any arraignment of him for the
presence of the troops on the right bank of the Cumberland, or for
his not immediately withdrawing them to the left bank when his
position was threatened. Under these circumstances, to attack one
portion of the enemy, when a junction with the other part could not
be effected, was to act in accordance with one of the best-settled
rules of war.
The unforeseen accident of renewed rain, with intense darkness,
delayed his march beyond reasonable expectation; and, whereas the
whole force should have reached the enemy's encampment before dawn,
the advance of two regiments only reached there after broad daylight.
To hesitate, would have been to give the enemy time for preparation,
and I think it was wisely decided to attack at once and rely upon the
rear coming up to support the advance; but the rear, encumbered with
their artillery, were so far behind that, though the advance were
successful in their first encounter, they did not receive the
hoped-for support until they had suffered severely, and then the
long-known and trusted commander of the forces there, the gallant and
most estimable Zollicoffer, fell; whence confusion resulted. General
Crittenden had been but a few days with the troops, a disadvantage
which will be readily appreciated. Had the whole force been in
position at early dawn, so as to have surprised the enemy, the plan
would have been executed, and victory would have been the probable
result; after which, Schöpf's force might have been readily disposed
of. But, had the attack done no more than to check the advance of
Thomas until the boats under construction could have been finished,
so as to enable Crittenden to save his artillery and equipments, it
would have justified the attempt. I therefore think the strategy not
only defensible but commendable, and the affair to be ranked with one
of the many brilliant conceptions of the war. The reader will not
fail to remark the evidence which General Crittenden's report affords
of the fallacy of representing the South as having been prepared by
supplying herself with the _materiél_ necessary for war. The heart of
even a noble enemy must be moved at the spectacle of citizens
defending their homes, with muskets of obsolete patterns and
shot-guns, against an invader having all the modern improvements in
arms. The two regiments constituting the advance were Battle's
Twentieth Tennessee and the Fifteenth Mississippi, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Walthall. With dauntless courage they
engaged the whole array of the enemy, and drove him from his first
position. When at length our forces fell back to their intrenched
camp, it was with sullen determination, and the pursuit was so
cautious that whenever it ventured too near it was driven back by our
rear guard. The valiant advance--the Fifteenth Mississippi and
Twentieth Tennessee--bore the burden of the day. The Mississippians
lost two hundred and twenty out of four hundred engaged, and the
Tennesseeans lost half as many, this being about three fourths the
casualties in our force.
That night General Crittenden crossed his troops over the river, with
the exception of those too badly wounded to travel. He was compelled
to leave his artillery and wagons, not having the means of
transporting them across, and moved with the remnant of his army
toward Nashville.
Both by General Crittenden and those who have criticised him for
making the attack at Fishing Creek, it is assumed that General
Zollicoffer made a mistake in crossing to the right bank of the
Cumberland, and that thence it resulted as a consequence that General
Johnston's right flank of his line through Bowling Green was
uncovered. I do not perceive the correctness of the conclusion, for
it must be admitted that General Zollicoffer's command was not
adequate to resist the combined forces of Thomas and Schopf, or that
the Cumberland River was a sufficient obstacle to prevent them from
crossing either above or below the position at Mill Springs. General
Zollicoffer may well have believed that he could better resist the
crossing of the Cumberland by removing to the right bank rather than
by remaining on the left. The only difference, it seems to me, would
have been that he could have retreated without the discomfiture of
his force or the loss of his artillery and equipments, but, in either
case, Johnston's right flank would have been alike uncovered.
To Zollicoffer and the other brave patriots who fell with him, let
praise, not censure, be given; and to Crittenden, let tardy justice
render the meed due to a gallant soldier of the highest professional
attainments, and whose fault, if fault it be, was a willingness to
dare much in his country's service.
When the State of Tennessee seceded, measures were immediately
adopted to occupy and fortify all the strong points on the
Mississippi, as Memphis, Randolph, Fort Pillow, and Island No. 10. As
it was our purpose not to enter the State of Kentucky and construct
defenses for the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers on her territory,
they were located within the borders of Tennessee, and as near to the
Kentucky line as suitable sites could be found. On these were
commenced the construction of Fort Donelson on the west side of the
Cumberland, and Fort Henry on the east side of the Tennessee, and
about twelve miles apart. The latter stood on the low lands adjacent
to the river about high-water mark, and, being just below a bend in
the river and at the head of a straight stretch of two miles, it
commanded the river for that distance. It was also commanded by high
ground on the opposite bank of the river, which it was intended
should be occupied by our troops in case of a land attack. The power
of ironclad gunboats against land defenses had not yet been shown,
and the low position of the fort brought the battery to the
water-level, and secured the advantage of ricochet firing, the most
effective against wooden ships.
Fort Donelson was placed on high ground; and, with the plunging fire
from its batteries, was thereby more effective against the ironclads
brought to attack it on the water side. But on the land side it was
not equally strong, and required extensive outworks and a
considerable force to resist an attack in that quarter.
In September, 1861, Lieutenant Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, was
instructed to make an examination of the works at the two forts. He
reported that Fort Henry was nearly completed. It was built, not at
the most favorable position, but it was a strong work, and, instead
of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it
should be completed, and other works constructed on the high lands
just above the fort on the opposite side of the river. Measures for
the accomplishment of this plan were adopted as rapidly as the means
at disposal would allow.
In relation to Donelson, it was his opinion that, although a better
position might have been chosen for this fortification on the
Cumberland, under the circumstances surrounding the command, it would
be better to retain and strengthen the position chosen.
General Polk, in a report to General Johnston just previous to the
battle of Shiloh, said: "The principal difficulty in the way of a
successful defense of the rivers, was the want of an adequate force--
a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerists." This
was the unavoidable result of the circumstances heretofore related,
but tells only half of the story. To match the vessels of the enemy
(floating forts) we required vessels like theirs, or the means of
constructing them. We had neither.
The efforts which were put forth to resist the operations on the
Western rivers, for which the United States made such vast
preparations, were therefore necessarily very limited. There was a
lack of skilled labor, of ship-yards, and of materials for
constructing ironclads, which could not be readily obtained or
prepared in a beset and blockaded country. Proposals were considered
both for building gunboats and for converting the ordinary
side-wheel, high-pressure steamboats into gunboats. But the engineer
department, though anxious to avail itself of this means of defense,
decided that it was not feasible. There was not plate-iron with which
to armor a single vessel, and even railroad-iron could not be spared
from its uses for transportation. Unless a fleet could have been
built to match the enemy's, we had to rely on land-batteries,
torpedoes, and marching forces. It was thought best to concentrate
the resources on what seemed practicable. One ironclad gunboat,
however, the Eastport, was undertaken on the Tennessee River, but
under so many difficulties that, after the surrender of Fort Henry,
while still unfinished, it was destroyed, lest it should fall to the
enemy.[7]
The fleet of gunboats prepared by the United States for the
Mississippi and its tributaries consisted of twelve, seven of which
were iron-clad, and able to resist all except the heaviest solid
shot. The boats were built very wide in proportion to their length,
so that in the smooth river-waters they might have almost the
steadiness of land-batteries when discharging their heavy guns. This
flotilla carried one hundred and forty-three guns, some sixty-four
pounders, some thirty-two pounders, and some seven-inch rifled guns
carrying eighty-pound shells.
On February 2d General Grant started from Cairo with seventeen
thousand men on transports. Commodore Foote accompanied him with
seven gunboats. On the 4th the landing of the troops commenced three
miles or more below Fort Henry. General Grant took command on the
east bank with the main column, while General Charles F. Smith, with
two brigades of some five to six thousand men, landed on the left
bank, with orders to take the earthwork opposite Fort Henry, known as
Fort Hindman. On the 5th the landing was completed, and the attack
was made on the next day. The force of General Tilghman, who was in
command at Fort Henry, was about thirty-four hundred men. It is
evident that on the 5th he intended to dispute Grant's advance by
land; but on the 6th, before the attack by the gunboats, he changed
his purpose, abandoned all hope of a successful defense, and made
arrangements for the escape of his main body to Fort Donelson, while
the guns of Fort Henry should engage the gunboats. He ordered Colonel
Hindman to withdraw the command to Fort Donelson, while he himself
would obtain the necessary delay for the movement by use of the
battery, and standing a bombardment in Fort Henry. For this purpose
he retained his heavy artillery company--seventy-five men--to work
the guns, a number unequal to the strain and labor of the defense.[8]
Noon was the time fixed for the attack; but Grant, impeded by the
overflow of water, and unwilling to expose his men to the heavy guns
of the fort, held them back to await the result of the gunboat
attack. In the mean time the Confederate troops were in retreat. Four
ironclads, mounting forty-eight heavy guns, approached and took
position within six hundred yards of the fort, firing as they
advanced. About half a mile behind these came three unarmored
gunboats, mounting twenty-seven heavy guns, which took a more distant
position, and kept up a bombardment of shells that fell within the
works. Some four hundred of the formidable missiles of the ironclad
boats were also thrown into the fort. The officers and men inside
were not slow to respond, and as many as fifty-nine of their shots
were counted as striking the gunboats. On the ironclad Essex a
cannon-ball ranged her whole length; another shot, passing through
the boiler, caused an explosion that scalded her commander, Porter,
and many of the seamen and soldiers on board.
[Map of the Battlefield of Fort Donelson]
Five minutes after the fight began, the twenty-four pounder rifled
gun, one of the most formidable in the fort, burst, disabling every
man at the piece. Then a shell exploded at the muzzle of one of the
thirty-two pounders, ruining the gun, and killing or wounding all the
men who served it. About the same moment a premature discharge
occurred at one of the forty-two pounder guns, killing three men and
seriously injuring others. The ten-inch columbiad, the only gun able
to match the artillery of the assailants, was next rendered useless
by a priming-wire that was jammed and broken in the vent. An heroic
blacksmith labored for a long time to remove it, under the full fire
of the enemy, but in vain. The men became exhausted and lost
confidence; and Tilghman, seeing this, in person served a thirty-two
pounder for some fifteen minutes. Though but four of his guns were
disabled, six stood idle for want of artillerists, and but two were
replying to the enemy. After an engagement of two hours and ten
minutes, he ceased firing and lowered his flag. For this soldierly
devotion and self-sacrifice the gallant commander and his brave band
must be honored while patriotism has an advocate and self-sacrifice
for others has a votary. Our casualties were five killed and sixteen
wounded; those of the enemy were sixty-three of all kinds. Twelve
officers and sixty-three non-commissioned officers and privates were
surrendered with the fort. The Tennessee River was thus open, and a
base by short lines was established against Fort Donelson.
The next movement was a combined attack by land and water upon Fort
Donelson. This fort was situated on the left bank of the Cumberland,
as has been stated, near its great bend, and about forty miles from
the mouth of the river. It was about one mile north of the village of
Dover, where the commissary and quartermaster's supplies were in
depot. The fort consisted of two water-batteries on the hillside,
protected by a bastioned earthwork of irregular outline on the
summit, inclosing about one hundred acres. The water-batteries were
admirably placed to sweep the river approaches, with an armament of
thirteen guns; eight thirty-two pounders, three thirty-two pound
carronade, one ten-inch columbiad, and one rifled gun of thirty-two
pound caliber. The field-work, which was intended for infantry
supports, occupied a plateau about one hundred feet above the river,
commanding and protecting the water-batteries at close musket range.
These works afforded a fair defense against gunboats; but they were
not designed or adapted for resistance to a land attack or investment
by an enemy.
Generals Pillow and Floyd were ordered with their separate commands
to Fort Donelson. General Buckner also was sent with a division from
Bowling Green; so that the Confederate effective force at the fort
during the siege was between fourteen thousand five hundred and
fifteen thousand men.[9] The force of General Grant was not less than
thirty to thirty-five thousand men. On February 12th he commenced his
movement across from Fort Henry, and the investment of Donelson was
made without any serious opposition. On the 13th General Buckner
reports that "the fire of the enemy's artillery and riflemen was
incessant throughout the day; but was responded to by a well-directed
fire from the intrenchments, which inflicted upon the assailant a
considerable loss, and almost silenced his fire late in the
afternoon." The object of the enemy undoubtedly was to discover the
strength and position of our forces. The artillery-fire was continued
at intervals during the night. Nearly every Confederate regiment
reported a few casualties from the shot and shell which frequently
fell inside of the works. Meanwhile, a gunboat of thirteen guns
arrived in the morning, and, taking a position behind a headland,
fired one hundred and thirty-eight shots, when our one hundred and
twenty-eight pound shot crashed through one of her ports, injuring
her machinery and crippling her. The enemy's fire did no damage to
the fort itself, but a shot disabled a gun and killed Captain Dixon,
a valuable engineer, whose loss was greatly deplored.
The weather became cold during the night, and a driving snow-storm
prevailed, so that some of the soldiers were frozen, and the wounded
between the lines suffered extremely. The fleet of gunboats under
Commodore Foote arrived, bringing enforcements to the enemy. These
were landed during the night and the next day, which was occupied
with placing them in position. Nevertheless, though no assault was
made, a rambling and ineffective fire was kept up. About 3 P.M. the
commander of the naval force, expecting an easy victory, like that at
Fort Henry, brought his four ironclads, followed by two gunboats, up
to the attack. Each of the ironclads mounted thirteen guns and the
gunboats nine. Any one of them was more than a match for the guns of
the fort. Their guns were eight, nine, and ten inch, three in the bow
of each. Our columbiad and the rifled gun were the only two pieces
effective against the ironclads. The enemy moved directly toward the
water-batteries, firing with great weight of metal. It was the
intention of Commodore Foote to silence these batteries, pass by, and
take a position where he could enfilade the fort with broadsides. The
gunboats opened at a mile and a half distance, and advanced until
within three or four hundred yards. The shot and shell of the fleet
tore up the earthworks, but did no further injury. But the
Confederate guns, aimed from an elevation of not less than thirty
feet by cool and courageous hands, sent their shot with destructive
power, and overcame all the enemy's advantages in number and weight
of guns. The bolts of our two heavy guns went crashing through iron
and massive timbers with resistless force, scattering slaughter and
destruction through the fleet.[10] Hoppin, in his "Life of Commodore
Foote," says:
"The Louisville was disabled by a shot, which cut away her
rudder-chains, making her totally unmanageable, so that she drifted
with the current out of action. Very soon the St. Louis was disabled
by a shot through her pilot-house, rendering her steering impossible,
so that she also floated down the river. The other two armored
vessels were also terribly struck, and a rifled cannon on the
Carondelet burst, so that these two could no longer sustain the
action; and, after fighting for more than an hour, the little fleet
was forced to withdraw. The St. Louis was struck fifty-nine times,
the Louisville thirty-six times, the Carondelet twenty-six, the
Pittsburg twenty, the four vessels receiving no less than one hundred
and forty-one wounds. The fleet, gathering itself together, and
rendering mutual help to its disabled members, proceeded to Cairo to
repair damages."
The loss of the enemy was fifty-four killed and wounded. The report
of Major Gilmer, who laid out these works, says:
"Our batteries were uninjured, and not a man in them killed. The
repulse of the gunboats closed the operations of the day, except a
few scattering shots along the land defenses."
In consequence of reënforcements to the enemy, the plan of operations
for the next day was determined by the Confederate generals about
midnight. The whole of the left wing of the army except eight
regiments was to move out of the trenches, attack, turn, and drive
the enemy's right until the Wynn's Ferry road, which led to Charlotte
through a good country, was cleared, and an exit thus secured.
The troops, moving in the small hours of the night over the icy and
broken roads, which wound through the obstructed area of defense,
made slow progress, and delayed the projected operations. At 4 A.M.
on the 15th, Pillow's troops were ready, except one brigade, which
came late into action. By six o'clock, Baldwin's brigade was engaged
with the enemy, only two or three hundred yards from his lines, and
the bloody contest of the day had begun. At one o'clock the enemy's
right was doubled back. The Wynn's Ferry road was cleared, and it
only remained for the Confederates to do one of two things: The first
was, to seize the golden moment and, adhering to the original purpose
and plan of the sortie, move off rapidly by the route laid open by
such strenuous efforts and so much bloodshed; the other depended on
the inspiration of a master-mind, equal to the effort of grasping
every element of the combat, and which should complete the partial
victory by the utter rout and destruction of the enemy.
"While one or the other alternative seems to have been the only
possible safe solution," says the author of "The Life of Gen. Albert
Sidney Johnston," "the Confederate commander tried neither. A fatal
middle policy was suddenly but dubiously adopted, and not carried
out. The spirit of vacillation and divided counsels prevented that
unity of action which is essential to success. For seven hours the
Confederate battalions had been pushing over rough ground and through
thick timber, at each step meeting fresh troops massed, where the
discomfited regiments rallied. Hence the vigor of assault slackened,
though the wearied troops were still ready and competent to continue
their onward movement. Ten fresh regiments, over three thousand men,
had not fired a musket. But in the turmoil of battle no one knew the
relations of any command to the next, or indeed whether his neighbor
was friend or foe.
"General Buckner had halted, according to the preconcerted plan, to
allow the army to pass out by the opened road and to cover their
retreat. At this point of the fight, Pillow, finding himself at
Hindman's position, heard of (or saw) preparations by General C. F.
Smith for an assault on the Confederate right; but, whether he
understood this to be the purpose or construed the movement as the
. . . signs of a flight, was left uncertain by his language at the
time. He ordered the regiments which had been engaged to return to the
trenches, and instructed Buckner to hasten to defend the imperiled
point. Buckner, not recognizing him as a superior authorized to
change the plan of battle, or the propriety of such change, refused
to obey, and, after receiving reiterated orders, started to find
Floyd, who at that moment joined him. He urged upon Floyd the
necessity of carrying out the original plan of evacuation. Floyd
assented to this view, and told Buckner to stand fast until he could
see Pillow. He then rode back and saw Pillow, and, hearing his
arguments, yielded to them. Floyd simply says that he found the
movement so nearly executed that it was necessary to complete it.
Accordingly, Buckner was recalled. In the mean time, Pillow's right
brigades were retiring to their places in the trenches, under orders
from the commanders."
The conflict on the left soon ended. Three hundred prisoners, five
thousand stand of small-arms, six guns, and other spoils of victory,
had been won by our forces. But the enemy, cautiously advancing,
gradually recovered most of his lost ground. It was about 4 P.M. when
the assault on the right was made by General C. F. Smith. The enemy
succeeded in carrying the advanced work, which General Buckner
considered the key to his position. The loss of the enemy during the
siege was four hundred killed, seventeen hundred and eighty-five
wounded, and three hundred prisoners. Our losses were about three
hundred and twenty-five killed and one thousand and ninety-seven
wounded; including missing, it was estimated at fifteen hundred.
After nightfall a consultation of the commanding officers was held,
and, after a consideration of the question in all its aspects as to
what should be done, it was decided that a surrender was inevitable,
and, that to accomplish its objects, it must be made before the
assault, which was expected at daylight. General Buckner in his
report, says:
"I regarded the position of the army as desperate, and that the
attempt to extricate it by another battle, in the suffering and
exhausted condition of the troops, was almost hopeless. The troops
had been worn down with watching, with labor, with fighting. Many of
them were frosted by the cold, all of them were suffering and
exhausted by their incessant labors. There had been no regular issue
of rations for several days, and scarcely any means of cooking. The
ammunition was nearly expended. We were completely invested by a
force fully four times the strength of our own."
The decision to surrender having been made, it remained to determine
by whom it should be made. Generals Floyd and Pillow declared they
would not surrender and become prisoners; the duty was therefore
allotted to General Buckner. Floyd said, "General Buckner, if I place
you in command, will you allow me to draw out my brigade?" General
Buckner replied, "Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon
my communication." Floyd said, "General Pillow, I turn over the
command.". General Pillow, regarding this as a mere technical form by
which the command was to be conveyed to Buckner, then said, "I pass
it." Buckner assumed the command, sent for a bugler to sound the
parley, for pen, ink, and paper, and opened the negotiations for
surrender.
There were but two roads by which it was possible for the garrison to
retire. If they went by the upper road, they would certainly have to
cut through the main body of the enemy; if by the lower road, they
would have to wade through water three feet deep. This, the medical
director stated, would be death to more than one half the command, on
account of the severity of the weather and their physical prostration.
To cut through the enemy, if effected, would, it was supposed,
involve the loss of three fourths of the command, a sacrifice which,
it was conceded, would not be justifiable.
The enemy had, in the conflict of the preceding day, gained
possession of our rifle-pits on the right flank, and General Buckner,
an experienced soldier, held that the fort would immediately fall
when the enemy attacked in the morning. General Pillow dissented from
this conclusion, believing that the fort could be defended until
boats could be obtained to convey the garrison across the river, and
also advocated an attempt to cut through the investing lines of the
enemy. Being overruled on both points, he announced his determination
to leave the post by any means available, so as to escape a
surrender, and he advised Colonel N. B. Forrest, who was present, to
go out with his cavalry regiment, and any others he could take with
him through the overflow. General Floyd's brigade consisted of two
Virginia regiments and one Mississippi regiment; these, as before
mentioned, it was agreed that General Floyd might withdraw before the
surrender. Two of the field-officers, Colonel Russell and Major
Brown, of the Mississippi regiment, the twentieth, had been officers
of the First Mississippi Riflemen in the war with Mexico; and the
twentieth, their present regiment, was reputed to be well instructed
and under good discipline. This regiment was left to be surrendered
with the rest of the garrison, under peculiar circumstances, of which
Major Brown, then commanding, gives the following narrative:
"About twelve o'clock of the night previous to the surrender, I
received an order to report in person at headquarters. On arriving I
met Colonel N. B. Forrest, who remarked: 'I have been looking for
you; they are going to surrender this place, and I wanted you with
your command to go out with me, but they have other orders for you.'
On entering the room. Generals Floyd and Pillow also informed me of
the proposed proceedings. General Floyd ordered me to take possession
of the steamboat-landing with my command; that he had reserved the
right to remove his brigade; that, after having guarded the landing,
my command should be taken aboard the boat; the Virginia regiments,
first crossing to the other side of the river, could make their way
to Clarksville.
"I proceeded at once with my command to the landing; there was no
steamboat there, but I placed my regiment in a semicircular line so
as to cover the landing-place. About daylight the steamer came down,
landed, and was soon loaded with the two Virginia regiments, they
passing through my ranks. At the same time the General and staff, or
persons claiming to belong to the staff, passed aboard. The boat,
being a small one, was considerably crowded. While the staging of the
boat was being drawn aboard. General Floyd hallooed to me, from the
'hurricane-roof,' that he would cross the river with the troops
aboard and return for my regiment. But, about the time of the
departure of the boat, General S. B. Buckner came and asserted that
he had turned over the garrison and all the property at sunrise;
that, if the boat was not away immediately, he would be charged by
the enemy with violating the terms of the surrender. I mention this
incident as furnishing, I suppose, the reason why my regiment was
left on the bank of the river.
"Sorrowfully I gave the necessary orders to stack arms and
surrender. . . .
"Both morally and materially the disaster was a severe blow to us.
Many, wise after the event, have shown their skill in telling what
all knew afterward, but nobody told before."
[Footnote 7: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]
[Footnote 8: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]
[Footnote 9: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]
[Footnote 10: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]