CHAPTER XVI.

CONCLUSION.

I am well aware of the imperfections of this work. I can only say that

I have tried to tell an unvarnished tale, to do no one injustice,

nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice. Beyond a few old

letters which have escaped the ravages of mice, and such official

reports as I could find, I have been compelled to rely on memory--frail

and unreliable at best, more so after the lapse of half a century. I

beg to remind those who may find fault that it is much easier to find

fault than to do good work. No two persons see events exactly alike.

This is illustrated in our courts every day.

From the standpoint of the martinet our organization could hardly be

called a regiment. A distinguished lieutenant general is reported as

saying that it was not a regiment at all but “a d--d armed mob.” If

there was ever any serious attempt to discipline it the effort was soon

abandoned. Volunteers we began, volunteers we remained to the end. If

any wished to evade duty, they found a way, and the punishment for

evasion was light. To our credit it may be said that few ever avoided

a fight. There were few real cowards among us, and they were simply

objects of pity. If a man did not wish to go into a fight he held his

horse until it was over.

One reason of our almost uniform success was the superiority of our

arms. It will be remembered that at the beginning the possession of a

good pistol was a requisite for enlistment. If a man died or was killed

his comrades kept his pistol. When a prisoner of the enemy’s cavalry

was taken this part of his outfit was added to the general stock, so

that after a few months most, if not all, had two weapons of this kind,

and some even tried to carry three or four. No other regiment of the

army was so supplied.

Again, it was a noteworthy fact that the men were all good horsemen,

accustomed to the use and management of horses from childhood. When

three or four hundred of such men, charging as fast as their horses

would go, yelling like Comanches, each delivering twelve shots with

great rapidity and reasonable accuracy, burst into the ranks of an

enemy, the enemy generally gave way. It did not take us long to find

this out; also the enemy were not slow to “catch on.”

If it be said that other commands lost more men in battle, the

explanation is simple and easy. The purpose of fighting is to destroy

the enemy in battle; all drill, organization and hard marches are to

this end--to kill and wound as many of the enemy as possible. If this

is granted, the Rangers invite comparison with the best in any army.

It is safe to claim that the regiment killed, wounded and captured a

number of the enemy at least several times our highest enlistment of

nearly 1200. If it be said that my claim for superiority is biased by

prejudice in favor of my own regiment, I will give estimates of others.

In a letter to me acknowledging an invitation to one of our reunions,

General Wheeler said:

“They were unceasingly vigilant, matchlessly brave and daring.”

General Thomas Jordan, an educated soldier, a writer of ability,

chief of staff to General Beauregard, was selected by Forrest and his

principal officers to write a history of the campaigns of that great

soldier. In a note on page 160 of his book, General Jordan says:

“This regiment was raised and commanded by the lamented Colonel Terry,

whose brief military career, beginning as a volunteer scout at the

first Manassas, was full of distinction. He was killed at Woodsonville,

Kentucky. The privates included a large number of the wealthiest and

best educated young men of Texas, who, with many others specially

trained in the business of stock raising on the vast prairies of that

State, had acquired a marvelous skill in horsemanship. The career of

this regiment has been one of the most brilliant in the annals of war.”

Dr. John A. Weyeth, who also wrote a life of Forrest, says, “No braver

men ever lived than the Texas Rangers.”

General Hood (“Advance and Retreat,” page 202) writes of the cavalry:

“I had, moreover, become convinced that our cavalry were able to

successfully compete with double their numbers. The Confederacy

possessed, in my opinion, no body of cavalry superior to that which I

found guarding the flanks of the Army of Tennessee when I assumed its

direction.”

I now quote Federal authority. Writing of the comparative merits of

the soldiers of the two armies, in a paper on the Kentucky campaign,

General Buell, while denying the superiority of the Southern soldiers

over the Northern, admits it was true of the cavalry. He says:

“Another sectional distinction produced a more marked effect in the

beginning of the war. The habits of the Southern people facilitated

the formation of cavalry corps which were comparatively efficient

even without instruction; and accordingly we see Stuart, John Morgan

and Forrest riding with impunity around the union armies, destroying

or harassing their communications. Late in the war that agency was

reversed. The South was exhausted of horses, while the Northern cavalry

increased in numbers and efficiency, and acquired the audacity which

had characterized the Southern.”

Read that again. It comes very near saying that the South was overcome

because the supply of horses failed. The writer is an educated soldier

and student of war.

L’ENVOI.

My task is done. My story is told. I have derived pleasure as well as

pain and grief from the recital; pleasure in going back over the dreary

waste of years to the morning of life, and dwelling in memory amid the

scenes of my early manhood; pain that I can not do justice to all who,

at the call of country, periled their young lives for home and the

right; grief for the heroic dead, who sleep in unmarked graves wherever

duty lead to danger and death. Their matchless courage and devotion

earned undying fame.

“Their praise is hymned by loftier harps than mine;

Yet, one I would select from that proud throng”:

Because he was my bedfellow, and I loved him as a brother; faithful in

the discharge of every duty, clean, brave, and true--William Nicholson.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Italics markup is enclosed in _underscores_.

Some typographical errors have been corrected.

Page Printed Correction Extract

------------------------------------------

58 Leutenant Lieutenant Lieutenant Baylor of the Rangers

59 brough brought a message was brought to

95 enlisments enlistments 1200 enlistments charged with

97 month months for several months

99 Alamaba Alabama Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi

End of Project Gutenberg's Terry's Texas Rangers, by Leonidas B. Giles

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