CHAPTER XI.

(Year of Rome 703.)

(BOOK VIII.[540] OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)

[Sidenote: Expedition against the Bituriges and Carnutes.]

I. The capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the

united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general

submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army,

during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours

which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past

summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls;

and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they

could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by

partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the

attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of

resisting them with advantage.

Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but

gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony,

quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of

December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was

in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the

Ædui, and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand.

Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he

proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast

territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put

a stop to the preparations for insurrection.

His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread

over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were

surprised before they could enter into their _oppida_, for Cæsar had

strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion,

especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden

presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who

succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring

nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and

obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others.

This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear,

engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the

Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his

protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other

chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate

in submitting.

The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter,

supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in

intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of

prize-money, 200 sestertii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion.

He then sent them into their winter quarters, and returned to Bibracte,

after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice,

the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the

Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he

marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which

had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.

On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned

their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs

and _oppida_ destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every

direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the

season, established his camp at Genabum (_Gien_), and lodged his

soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in

tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary

infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down

everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring

countries.[541]

[Sidenote: Campaign against the Bellovaci.]

II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings and stifled the

germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass

without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions

he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius.

Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the

Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their

head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the

Suessiones, who had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the

dependence of the Remi.

He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his

dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He

again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders

to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into

that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded

one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without

taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by

turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities

of the war permitted.

When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci,

established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every

direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the

designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was

general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not

remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act

as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt

that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that

they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci,[542] the Caletes, the

Veliocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height

surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne)

(_see Plate 29_); their baggage had been transported to more distant

woods. The command was divided among several chiefs, but the greater

part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans.

Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous

Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries

(probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with

one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing

with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having

afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans

were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep

their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of

ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that

season.

This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence,

and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He

took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his

troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old

soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young

men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence,

although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery

and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them

only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he

placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was

not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the

11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost

a square, he came unawares in sight of the Bellovaci. At the unexpected

view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm

step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had

engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before

their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was

wide (_magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente_), separated the

two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of

the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the

idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls,

in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [_in Castris_],

in the forest of Compiègne).[543] (_See Plates 29 and 30._) He caused it

to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with

accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment

(_loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis_),[544] and preceded by a

double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom;[545] towers of

three stories were constructed from distance to distance, and united

together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by

hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double

fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on

the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw

their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed

on the _vallum_, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from

the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended

by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.

These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the

confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were

feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced

with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there

were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain

which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few

foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which

was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had

brought only 500 German cavalry.

The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable

position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an

investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater

number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as

possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in

winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it with the 6th and the

14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to

come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this

time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the

other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this

daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently

performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much

ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by

foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his

death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to

dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was

hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised

the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the

Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which

were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the

fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent

for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined

in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little

resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized

not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve.

Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled

cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some

even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general

discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse

as they became arrogant on the smallest success.

Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the

arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his

legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment

like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away

by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the

baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused

multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous

chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up

in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw

no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or,

on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were

making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions

advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed

that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with

another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a

narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions

crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was

defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his

troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the

plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses

of the enemy with their missiles.

The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position,

were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;

besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if

divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led

Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a

camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed,

the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry

distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had

recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed

from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the

Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the

same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and,

towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to

them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish

troops, who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy,

he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry

in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as

the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a

disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride

through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass

over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by

nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position,

they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent

ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to

forage.[546]

[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne.]

III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner

that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and

1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the

abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In

consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was

always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some

light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of

legions, followed them as near as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of

about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by

forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the

Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls;

feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons,

towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides.

Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity

favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the

first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without

concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, “which,” says

Hirtius, “happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a

dangerous confusion.” There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained

separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced,

its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest

of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all

sides, without any decisive result, until the enemy’s infantry,

debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to

fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed

themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the

combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of

the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone

the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the

advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to

flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended

to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped

through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken

under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell

pierced with wounds.

After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the

enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles

from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not

without great difficulties.

The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death

of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their

infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by

sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to

send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored

forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and

that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them

from oppression, for during his life it was not the Senate who

governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied,

“that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other

Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was

very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how

could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace,

a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war,

contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the

desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon

themselves was for him a sufficient reparation.”

The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the

exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently

drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following

reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed

that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that,

without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his

treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus

with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of

the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow,

and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had

time to escape.[547]

[Sidenote: Devastation of the Country of the Eburones.]

IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt

of further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the

newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to

withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a

stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries.

He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion,

and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite

part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the

Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where

the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions,

appeared not to be sufficiently strong;[548] lastly, he ordered T.

Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion,[549] which

he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies

of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians,

who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of

Trieste).

As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the

Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was

still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything

by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return

to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the

legions and the auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he

sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who,

always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the

presence of a Roman army.[550]

[Sidenote: Expedition against Dumnacus.]

V. During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to

go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial

insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne,

learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the

Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king,

who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably

faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum (_Poitiers_).

On the road, he learnt from prisoners that Duratius was shut up there,

and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of Dumnacus, chief

of the Andes. Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to

measure his strength with the enemy; he contented himself with

establishing his camp in a strong position. At the news of his approach,

Dumnacus raised the siege, and marched to meet the legions. But, after

several days’ fruitless attempts to force their camp, he returned to

attack Lemonum.

Meanwhile, the lieutenant Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several

peoples, learnt from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the country

of the Pictones; he marched without delay to the assistance of

Duratius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope

of opposing at the same time the troops shut up in Lemonum and the army

of succour. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not thinking

himself safe until he had placed the Loire between him and the Romans;

but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge (at Saumur).

Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a sight of the

enemy, Fabius, who came from the north, and had lost no time, doubted

not, from what he heard from the people of the country, that Dumnacus,

in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge. He therefore

marched thither with his legions, preceded, at a short distance, by his

cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on its march,

dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.

During the night of the following day, Fabius again sends his cavalry

forward, with orders to delay the march of the enemy, so as to give time

for the arrival of the infantry. The two cavalries are soon engaged; but

the enemy, thinking that he had to contend only with the same troops as

the day before, draws up his infantry in line, so as to support the

squadrons, when, suddenly, the legions appear in order of battle. At

this sight, the barbarians are struck with terror, the long train of

baggage is thrown into confusion, and they disperse. More than 12,000

men were killed, and all the baggage fell into the hands of the Romans.

Only 5,000 fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received by the

Senonan Drappes, the same who, in the first revolt of the Gauls, had

collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers, to

intercept the convoys of the Romans. They took the direction of the

Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius, who, as has been seen in the

preceding chapter (p. 275), had before attempted a similar invasion.

Rebilus pursued them with two legions, in order to avoid the shame of

seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible

rabble.

As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the Carnutes and

the other peoples, whose forces had already been reduced by the defeat

they had just experienced with Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often

beaten, had never been completely subdued; they gave hostages; the

Armorican peoples followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his

own territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul.[551]

[Sidenote: Capture of Uxellodunum.]

VI. Drappes and Lucterius, when they learnt that they were pursued by

Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the

province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci, and threw

themselves into the _oppidum_ of Uxellodunum (_Puy-d’Issolu_, near

Vayrac), an exceedingly strong place, formerly under the dependence of

Lucterius, who soon excited the inhabitants into revolt.

Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all

sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of

access to armed men. Knowing that there was in the _oppidum_ so great a

quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send them secretly away

without being overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the infantry, he

divided his cohorts into three bodies, and established three camps on

the highest points. (_See Plate 31._) Next, he ordered a

countervallation to be made. On seeing these preparations, the besieged

remembered the ill fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate.

Lucterius, who had witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment

of that town, took especial care for the provisions, and, with the

consent of all, having 2,000 men in Uxellodunum, he left by night, with

Drappes and the rest of the troops, to procure them.

After a few days they collected, by good-will or by force, a great

quantity of provisions. During this time the garrison of the _oppidum_

attacked the redoubts of Rebilus several times, which obliged him to

interrupt the work of the countervallation, which, indeed, he would not

have had sufficient forces to defend.

Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles

from the _oppidum_, with the intention of introducing the provisions

gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with

part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the

night-time, endeavoured to introduce beasts of burden into the town, by

a narrow and woody path. The noise of their march gave warning to the

sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to

sally from the neighbouring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the

convoy, the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped

with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.

Rebilus soon learnt from prisoners that the rest of the troops which had

left the _oppidum_ were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles, and

that, by a fortunate chance, not one fugitive had taken that direction

to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance

all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one

legion without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three camps.

When he came near the enemy, he learnt by his scouts that the

barbarians, according to their custom, neglecting the heights, had

placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that

the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were

already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the

legion, drawn up in order of battle, and took possession of the heights.

As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled their ardour, the

cohorts rush forward from all sides, the Gauls were taken or killed, the

booty was immense, and Drappes fell into the hands of the Romans.

Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few

wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any

attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his

circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his

troops, and shared with him the labours of the siege.

While the south of Gaul was the scene of serious troubles, Cæsar left

the quæstor Mark Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the

Bellovaci. To deprive the Belgæ of all idea of revolt, he had proceeded

to the neighbouring countries with two legions, had exacted hostages,

and restored confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived

among the Carnutes, who, the year before, had been the first to revolt,

he saw that the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm,

and he resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall

only upon Gutruatus, the instigator of the war. This man was brought and

delivered up; and although Cæsar was naturally inclined to indulgence,

he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties of his soldiers, who made

that chief responsible for all the dangers they had run, and for all the

misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died under the stripes, and was

afterwards beheaded.

It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the

letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum,

and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up

in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish

their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should acquire the conviction

that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in

resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other

states, which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover

their independence.

Moreover, it was known everywhere amongst the Gauls that Cæsar had only

one summer more to hold his command, and that after that they would

have nothing more to fear. He left, therefore, the lieutenant Quintus

Calenus[552] at the head of his two legions, with orders to follow him

by ordinary marches, and with his cavalry he hastened by long marches

towards Uxellodunum.

Cæsar, arriving unexpectedly before that town, found it completely

invested on all accessible points. He judged that it could not be taken

by assault (_neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla conditione

posse_), and, as it was abundantly provided with provisions, he

conceived the project of depriving the inhabitants of water. The

mountain was surrounded nearly on every side by very low ground; but on

one side there existed a valley through which a river (the Tourmente)

ran. As it flowed at the foot of two precipitous mountains, the

disposition of the localities did not admit of turning it aside and

conducting it into lower channels. It was difficult for the besieged to

come down to it, and the Romans rendered the approaches to it still more

dangerous. They placed posts of archers and slingers, and brought

engines which commanded all the slopes which gave access to the river.

The besieged had thenceforth no other means of procuring water but by

fetching it from an abundant spring which arose at the foot of the wall,

300 feet from the channel of the Tourmente. (_See Plate 31._) Cæsar

resolved to drain this spring, and for this purpose he did not hesitate

to attempt a laborious undertaking: opposite the point where it rose, he

ordered covered galleries to be pushed forwards against the mountain,

and, under protection of these, a terrace to be raised, labours which

were carried on in the middle of continual fights and incessant

fatigues. Although the besieged, from their elevated position, fought

without danger, and wounded many Romans, yet the latter did not yield to

discouragement, but continued their task. At the same time they made a

subterranean gallery, which, running from the covered galleries, was

intended to lead up to the spring. This work, carried on free from all

danger, was executed without being perceived by the enemy; the terrace

attained a height of sixty feet, and was surmounted by a tower of ten

stories, which, without equalling the elevation of the wall, a result it

was impossible to obtain, still commanded the fountain. (_See Plate

32._) Its approaches, battered by engines from the top of this tower,

became inaccessible; in consequence of this, many men and animals in the

place died of thirst. The besieged, terrified at this mortality, filled

barrels with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them in flames upon

the Roman works, making at the same time a sally, so as to prevent them

from extinguishing the fire; soon it spread to the covered galleries and

the terrace, which stopped the progress of the inflammable materials.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground and the increasing danger,

the Romans still persevered in their struggle. The battle took place on

a height, within sight of the army; loud cries were raised on both

sides; each individual sought to rival his fellows in zeal, and the more

he was exposed to view, the more courageously he faced the missiles and

the fire.

Cæsar, as he was sustaining great loss, determined to feign an assault,

in order to create a diversion: he ordered some cohorts to climb the

hill on all sides, uttering loud cries. This movement terrified the

besieged, who, fearing to be attacked on other points, called back to

the defence of the wall those who were setting fire to the works. Then

the Romans were able to extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, the siege

span out in length; the Gauls, although exhausted by thirst and reduced

to a small number, did not cease to defend themselves vigorously. At

length, the subterranean gallery having reached the veins of the spring,

they were taken and turned aside. The besieged, seeing the fountain all

at once dried up, believed, in their despair, that it was an

intervention of the gods, submitted to necessity, and surrendered.

Cæsar considered that the pacification of Gaul would never be completed

if the same resistance was encountered in many other towns. He thought

it indispensable to spread terror by a severe example, so much the more

as “the well-known mildness of his temper,” says Hirtius, “would not

allow this necessary rigour to be ascribed to cruelty.” He ordered all

those who had carried arms to have their hands cut off, and sent them

away, as living witnesses of the chastisement reserved for rebels.

Drappes, who had been taken prisoner, starved himself to death;

Lucterius, who had been arrested by the Arvernan Epasnactus, a friend of

the Romans, was delivered up to Cæsar.[553]

[Sidenote: Excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu.]

VII. The excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu in 1865 leave no further doubt

as to the site of Uxellodunum. (_See Plates 31 and 32._)

The Puy d’Issolu is a lofty mountain, situated not far from the right

bank of the Dordogne, between Vayrac and Martel; it is isolated on all

sides except towards the north, where it is joined by a defile of 400

mètres wide (the Col de Roujon) to heights named the Pech-Demont. Its

plateau, crowned by a circle of perpendicular rocks, commands, almost in

every direction, the low ground which surrounds it. This is what the

author of the VIIIth book _De Bello Gallico_ expresses by these words:

_Infima vallis totum pæne montem cingebat in quo positum erat præruptum

undique oppidum Uxellodunum_. This plateau, with a surface of eighty

hectares in extent, presents strongly-marked undulations: its general

incline lies from the north to the south, in the direction of the length

of the mountain mass; its highest point is 317 mètres above the level of

the sea, and it rises 200 mètres above the valleys which surround it.

The whole eastern slope of the mountain, that which looks towards Vayrac

and the Dordogne, is surmounted with rocks, which have a height of as

much as forty mètres; consequently, no operation took place on this side

during the time of the siege. The western slope alone was the theatre of

the different combats. Its declivities are not inaccessible, especially

between the village of Loulié and the hamlet of Leguillat, but they are

sufficiently abrupt to make the Latin author say: _Quo, defendente

nullo, tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile_. At the very foot of

this declivity, and at 200 mètres beneath the culminating point of the

plateau, the Tourmente flows, a little river ten mètres broad, embanked

between this declivity and that of the opposite heights: _Flumen infimam

vallem dividebat_, &c. Such a disposition of the localities, as well as

the slight descent of the Tourmente (one mètre in 1,000), rendered it

impossible to turn off that river. (_Hoc flumem averti loci natura

prohibebat_, &c.)

There is no spring on the plateau of Puy-d’Issolu; but several issue

from the sides of the mountain, one of which, that of Loulié, is

sufficiently abundant to provide for the necessities of a numerous

population. This was the spring which the Romans succeeded in turning

off. At the time of the siege, it issued from the side of the mountain

at _S_ (_see Plate 31_), at twenty-five mètres from the wall of the

_oppidum_, and at a distance of about 300 mètres from the Tourmente.

These 300 mètres make about 200 Roman paces. We see, therefore, that in

the Latin text the word _pedum_ must be replaced by _passuum_. We also

see that the word _circuitus_ (VIII. 4) must be taken in the sense of

the _course_ of the river.

The “Commentaries” say (VIII. 33) that Rebilus established three camps

in very elevated positions. Their sites are indicated by the nature of

the localities: the first, _A_, was on the heights of Montbuisson; the

second, _B_, on those of the Château de Termes; the third, _C_, opposite

the defile of Roujon, on the Pech-Demont. It appears from the

excavations that the Romans had not retrenched the two first, which is

easily explained, for the heights to the west of the Puy-d’Issolu are

impregnable. Moreover, the Romans at Uxellodunum were not in the same

situation as at Alesia. There they had before them 80,000 men, and in

their rear a very numerous army of succour; here, on the contrary, it

was only a question of reducing a few thousand men. The camp _C_

required to be protected, because it was possible for troops to descend

from the tableau of the Puy-d’Issolu towards the defile of Roujon,

which, being situated fifty mètres lower down, gives an easy access to

the heights of Pech-Demont. The excavations have, in fact, brought to

light a double line of parallel fosses, which barred the defile behind,

and formed at the same time a countervallation.

The Gauls could only quit the town by this defile, and by the western

slope of the mountain. It became, consequently, interesting to ascertain

if the Romans made a countervallation along the Tourmente, on the slopes

of the heights of the castle of Termes and of Montbuisson.

Unfortunately, the railway from Perigueux to Capdenac, which passes over

the very site where the countervallation might have been made, has

destroyed all traces of the Roman works: the excavations made above this

line have produced no result.

The most interesting discovery was that of the subterranean

gallery.[554] Until the moment when the excavations were commenced, a

part of the rain-water absorbed by the plateau of the Puy-d’Issolu

issued near the village of Loulié by two springs, _A_ and _A’_. (_See

Plate 32._) The spring _A’_ flows from a ravine, and corresponds to the

_thalweg_ of the slope; as to the source _A_, it is easily seen by the

appearance of the ground that it has been turned from its natural

course. The excavations, in fact, have proved that it is produced by the

waters which run in the Roman gallery. This gallery has been opened over

an extent of forty mètres. It was dug in a solid mass of tufa nearly ten

mètres thick, which had been formed in the centuries anterior to Cæsar.

Its form is that of a semicircular vault, supported by two perpendicular

sides; its average dimensions are 1·80m. in height, by a width of 1·50

mètres. The mud carried along by the waters, and accumulated since the

time of the siege of Uxellodunum, had almost filled the gallery, leaving

only at the top of the _intrados_ an empty space in the form of a

segment of a circle, with 0·50m. chord by 0·15m. for the absciss of its

curve. Through this empty space the water ran at the time of the

excavations.

Before reaching the tufa, the first subterranean works of the Romans had

been made in the pure soil, which had to be propped: fragments of

blindage have been found, some of them fixed in silicious mud, corroded

or reduced to the state of ligneous paste, others petrified by their

long contact with the waters charged with calcareous sediments. A

considerable number of these petrified blocks, and remains of wood,

collected in the interior of the gallery, are deposited in the museum of

Saint-Germain.

The gallery does not lead directly to the spring which existed in the

time of the Gauls. The Roman miners, after having made their way

straightforward for a length of six mètres, came upon a thick bed of

blue marl of the lias: they turned to their left to avoid digging

through it, and advanced four mètres farther, following the marl, which

they left to the right. When they reached the end of the marls, a

horizontal layer of hard rock, one mètre thick, obliged them to bring

the gallery back to its former direction, and to raise it, in order to

avoid this new obstacle without going out of the tufas, which, formed by

the waters, would necessarily lead towards the spring. (_See Plate 32._)

From this second turning, the gallery continued close to the line of

separation of the marls and the tufas. It rose rapidly, until it reached

the limit of the deposits of tufa. At this point blindage had again been

necessary. It was there chiefly that the blocks of petrification

presented a peculiar character: some lay thrown down in the gallery,

pierced by sockets with a rectangular section, which show the dimensions

and the way in which it had been worked; others, with a rounded base,

are veritable uprights, still standing on the rock.

Independently of the excavations made to find the Roman fosses and the

subterranean gallery, others have been made on the slope of Loulié, in

the soil which is near the spring. They have brought to light numerous

fragments of Gaulish pottery and of amphoræ, and, which is a further

confirmation of the identity of the Puy d’Issolu with Uxellodunum,

remains of arms similar in all respects to those found in the fosses of

Alesia.[555] Under the earthfalls which during nineteen centuries have

taken place on the slope of Loulié, all the traces of the fire described

in the “Commentaries” have been also found. The site of the terrace and

the covered galleries which were fired were also traced on the ground.

_Plate 32_ represents the slope which was the scene of the struggle: the

terrace, the tower, and the covered galleries are represented on it, as

well as the subterranean gallery, according to a very exact survey made

on the spot.

[Sidenote: Complete Submission of Gaul.]

VIII. Whilst these events were taking place on the banks of the

Dordogne, Labienus, in a cavalry engagement, had gained a decisive

advantage over a part of the Treviri and Germans, had taken prisoner

their chief, and thus subjected that people, who were always ready to

support any insurrection against the Romans. The Æduan Surus fell also

into his hands: he was a chief distinguished for his courage and his

birth, and the only one of that nation who had not yet laid down his

arms.

From that moment Cæsar considered Gaul to be completely pacified; he

resolved, however, to go himself to Aquitaine, which he had not yet

visited, and which Publius Crassus had partly conquered. Arriving there

at the head of two legions, he obtained the complete submission of that

country without difficulty: all the tribes sent him hostages. He

proceeded next to Narbonne with a detachment of cavalry, and charged

his lieutenants to put the army into winter quarters. Four legions,

under the orders of Mark Antony, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and

Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium; two among the Ædui, and two among

the Turones, on the frontier of the Carnutes, to hold in check all the

countries bordering on the ocean. These two last legions took up their

winter quarters on the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the

Arverni, so that no part of Gaul should be without troops. Cæsar

remained but a short time in the province, presiding hastily over the

assemblies, determining cases of public contestation, and rewarding

those who had served him well. He had had occasion, more than any one,

to know their sentiments individually, because, during the general

revolt of Gaul, the fidelity and succour of the province had aided him

in triumphing over it. When these affairs were settled, he returned to

his legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemetocenna

(_Arras_).

There he was informed of the last attempts of Commius, who, continuing a

partisan war at the head of a small number of cavalry, intercepted the

Roman convoys. Mark Antony had charged C. Volusenus Quadratus, prefect

of the cavalry, to pursue him; he had accepted the task eagerly, in the

hope of succeeding this time better than the first; but Commius, taking

advantage of the rash ardour with which his enemy had rushed upon him,

had wounded him seriously, and escaped; he was discouraged, however, and

had promised Mark Antony to retire to any spot which should be

appointed him, on condition that he should never be compelled to appear

before a Roman.[556] This condition having been accepted, he had given

hostages.[557]

Gaul was henceforth subjugated; death or slavery had carried off its

principal citizens. Of all the chiefs who had fought for its

independence, only two survived, Commius and Ambiorix. Banished far from

their country, they died unknown.

BOOK IV.

RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM

696 TO 705.

CHAPTER I.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.

[Sidenote: Difficulties of Cæsar’s Task.]

I. In the preceding book we have given, from the “Commentaries,” the

relation of the war in Gaul, and endeavoured to elucidate doubtful

questions, and to discover the localities which were the scenes of so

many combats. It will now be not uninteresting to recapitulate the

principal events of the eight campaigns of the Roman proconsul,

separated from all their technical details. We will at the same time

examine what was passing, during this period, on the banks of the Tiber,

and the events which led to the Civil War.

Writers who dislike glory take pleasure in undervaluing it. They seem to

wish thus to invalidate the judgment of past ages: we seek in preference

to confirm it, by explaining why the renown of certain men has filled

the world. To bring to light the heroic examples of the past, to show

that glory is the legitimate reward of great actions, is to pay homage

to the public opinion of all times. Man struggling with difficulties

which seem insurmountable, and conquering them by his genius, offers a

spectacle always worthy of our admiration; and this admiration will be

the more justified, according to the greater disproportion between the

end and the means.

Cæsar is going to quit Rome, to go far from the debates of the Forum,

the agitation of the comitia, and the intrigues of a corrupt town, in

order to take the command of his troops. Let us, then, for a moment lay

aside the statesman, and consider only the warrior, the great captain.

The Roman proconsul is not one of those barbarian chieftains who, at the

head of innumerable hordes, throw themselves upon a foreign country to

ravage it with fire and sword. His mission is not to destroy, but to

extend to a distance the influence of the Republic, by protecting the

peoples of Gaul, either against their own dissensions, or against the

encroachments of their dangerous neighbours. The dangers from which

Italy had been saved by the victories of Marius are not forgotten. Men’s

memory still recalls the savage bravery, and, still more, the multitude

of those barbarians who, before the battle of Aix, had employed six

entire days in defiling in front of the camp of Marius;[558] they still

fear a renewal of these inundations of peoples, and Cæsar’s first duty

is to avert similar perils. Already the Helvetii and their allies, to

the number of 368,000, are on the road towards the Rhine; 120,000

Germans have established themselves in Gaul; 24,000 Harudes, their

countrymen, have just followed the same example; others are marching

after them, and more than 100,000 Suevi are preparing to cross the

Rhine.

The Narbonnese forms the proconsul’s basis of operation, but it is

partly composed of populations recently subjugated, whose fidelity is as

yet doubtful. Rome has in Gaul allied peoples, but they have lost their

preponderance. The different states, divided among themselves by

intestine rivalries, offer an easy prey to the enemy; but let the Roman

army come to occupy their territory in a permanent manner, and thus

wound their feelings of independence, and all the warlike youth will

unite, eager to begin a struggle full of perils for the invaders. Cæsar

is obliged, therefore, to act with extreme prudence, to favour the

ambition of some, repress the encroachments of others, and spare the

susceptibility of all, taking care not to wound their religion, their

laws, or their manners; he is obliged at the same time to draw a part of

his forces from the country he occupies, and obtain thence men,

subsidies, and provisions. The greatest difficulty experienced by the

commander of an army operating in a country the good-will of which he

seeks to conciliate, is to enable his troops to live without exhausting

it, and to assure the welfare of his soldiers without exciting the

discontent of the inhabitants. “To seek to call,” says the Emperor

Napoleon I. in his _Mémoires_, “a nation to liberty and independence; to

desire that a public spirit should form in the midst of it, and that it

should furnish troops; and at the same time to take from it its

principal resources, are two contradictory ideas, and to conciliate them

is the province of talent.”[559]

Thus, to fight between two and three hundred thousand Helvetii and

Germans, to hold in dominion eight millions of Gauls, and to maintain

the Roman province--such is the task which Cæsar has undertaken, and, to

carry it out, he has as yet only at hand a single legion. What means

will he have to overcome all these obstacles? His genius and the

ascendency of civilisation over barbarism.

[Sidenote: Campaign against the Helvetii.]

II. Cæsar starts from Rome towards the middle of March, 696, and arrives

in eight days at Geneva. Immediately the Helvetii, who had appointed

their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhine towards the 24th of March,

the day of the equinox, ask his permission to cross Savoy, with the

intention of going to establish themselves in Saintonge. He adjourns his

answer to the 8th of April, and employs the fifteen days thus gained in

fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, from Geneva to the

Pas-de-l’Ecluse, in raising troops in the Roman province, and in

renewing the old bonds of friendship with the Burgundians,[560] who will

soon furnish him with men, horses, and provisions.

By rendering the passage of the Rhone impossible, and by binding to his

cause the peoples who occupied the whole course of the Saône, from

Pontailler to near Trévoux, he had cut off from the Helvetii the road to

the south, and thrown difficulties in their way towards the west. Still,

these persisted none the less in their design; they made an arrangement

with the people of Franche-Comté, to whom the passage of the

Pas-de-l’Ecluse belonged, to debouch by that defile into the plains of

Ambérieux and on the plateau of the Dombes. They could thus arrive at

the Saône, pass it peaceably or by force, proceed into the valley of the

Loire by crossing the mountains of Charolais, and penetrate thence into

Saintonge.

As soon as Cæsar was aware of this project, he immediately decided on

his course of action: he foresaw that a long time would elapse before

the Helvetii effected a passage across the unquiet countries of so many

hosts; he reckons that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men,

women, and children, carrying three months’ provisions in wagons, would

be slow to move; he repairs to the Cisalpine, raises two legions there,

sends to Aquileia for the three who were in winter quarters there, and,

crossing the Alps again, arrives, two months afterwards, at the

confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights of Sathonay. He

learns that the Helvetii have been employed during twenty days in

crossing the Saône between Trévoux and Villefranche, but that a part of

them still remain on the left bank; seizes the opportunity, attacks the

latter, defeats them, and thus diminishes the number of his adversaries

by one-fourth; then, crossing the Saône, he follows during fifteen days

the mass of the Helvetian emigration, which was advancing towards the

sources of the Bourbince. As he finds himself in want of provisions, he

turns off from his road, and marches towards Bibracte (_Mont Beuvray_),

the citadel and principal town of the Burgundians. This march to the

right leads the Helvetii to believe that he is afraid of encountering

them; they then march back, and attack him unexpectedly; a great battle

is fought, and, with his four old legions only, Cæsar gains the victory.

The immigration, already considerably diminished by the battle of the

Saône, no longer counts more than 130,000 individuals, who make their

retreat towards the country of Langres. The Roman general does not

pursue them; he remains three days burying the dead and attending to the

wounded. But his influence is already so great, that, to deprive the

wreck of the vanquished army of provisions, he has only to give orders

to the peoples whose territory they cross. Deprived of all resources,

the fugitives discontinue their march, and make their submission. He

hastens to overtake them towards Tonnerre. When he arrives in the midst

of them, he adopts a generous policy, and gains, by his generous

behaviour, those whom he had subjugated by his arms.

There was in the Helvetic conglomeration a people renowned for their

valor, the Boii; Cæsar permits the Burgundians to receive them into the

number of their fellow-citizens, and give them lands at the confluence

of the Allier and the Loire. As to the other barbarians, with the

exception of 6,000 who had attempted to withdraw from the capitulation

by flight, he obliges them to return to their country, dismisses them

without ransom, instead of selling them as slaves, and thus drawing from

them a considerable profit, according to the general usage of that

period.[561] By preventing the Germans from establishing themselves in

the countries abandoned by the immigration, he made a calculation of

interest secondary to a high political sentiment, and foresaw that

Helvetia, by its geographical position, was destined to be a bulwark

against invasion from the north, and that, then as now, it was important

for the power seated on the Rhone and the Alps to have on its eastern

frontiers a friendly and independent people.[562]

[Sidenote: Campaign against Ariovistus.]

III. The victory gained near Bibracte has, at one blow, restored the

prestige of the Roman arms. Cæsar has become the arbitrator of the

destinies of a part of Gaul: all the peoples comprised between the

Marne, the Rhone, and the mountains of Auvergne, obey him.[563] The

Helvetii have returned into their country; the Burgundians have

re-conquered their ancient preponderance. The assembly of Celtic Gaul,

held with his permission at Bibracte, invokes his protection against

Ariovistus, and, to the far north, the people of Trèves hasten to

denounce to him a threatened invasion of Germans. It had always been a

part of the policy of the Republic to extend its influence by going to

the succour of oppressed peoples. Cæsar could not fail to regulate his

conduct upon this principle. Not only did it concern him to deliver the

Gauls from a foreign yoke, but he sought to deprive the Germans of the

possibility of settling on the banks of the Saône, and thus threatening

the Roman province, and perhaps Italy itself.

Before having recourse to arms, Cæsar, who, during his consulship, had

caused Ariovistus to be declared the ally and friend of the Roman

republic, undertook to try upon him the means of persuasion. He sent to

demand an interview, and received only a haughty reply. Soon, informed

that, three days before, the German king has crossed his frontiers at

the head of a numerous army, and that, on another side, the hundred

cantons of the Suevi are threatening to cross the Rhine towards Mayence,

he starts from Tonnerre in haste to go forward to meet him. When he

arrives near Arc-en-Barrois, he learns that Ariovistus is marching with

all his troops upon Besançon. He then turns to the right, anticipates

him, and takes possession of that important place. No doubt, at the news

of the march of the Roman army, Ariovistus slackened his own, and halted

in the neighbourhood of Colmar.

After remaining a few days at Besançon, Cæsar takes the way to the

Rhine, avoids the mountainous spurs of the Jura, proceeds by

Pennesières, Arcey, and Belfort, and debouches towards Cernay in the

fertile plains of Alsace. The two armies are only twenty-four miles

apart. Cæsar and Ariovistus have an interview; its only result is to

increase their mutual resentment. The latter conceives the project of

cutting the line of operation of the Romans, and, passing near the site

of the modern Mulhouse, he proceeds, by a circuitous movement, to

establish himself on the stream of the little Doller, to the south of

the Roman army, which, encamped on the Thur, supports its rear on the

last spurs of the Vosges, near Cernay. In this position, Ariovistus

intercepts Cæsar’s communications with Franche-Comté and Burgundy. The

latter, to restore them, distributes his troops into two camps, and

causes a second camp to be made, less considerable than the first, on

his right, near the little Doller. During several days, he seeks in vain

to draw Ariovistus to a battle; then, learning that the matrons have

advised the Germans not to tempt fortune before the new moon, he unites

his legions, places all the auxiliaries on his right, marches resolutely

to assault the camp of the Germans, forces them to accept battle, and

defeats them after an obstinate resistance. In their flight, they take

the same road by which they had advanced, and, pursued for a distance of

fifty miles, they re-pass the Rhine towards Rhinau. As to the Suevi, who

had assembled near Mayence, when they are informed of the disaster of

their allies, they hasten to regain their country.

Thus, in his first campaign, Cæsar, by two great battles, had delivered

Gaul from the invasion of the Helvetii and the Germans; all the Gauls

looked upon him as a liberator. But services rendered are very soon

forgotten when people owe their liberty and independence to a foreign

army.

Cæsar places his troops in winter quarters in Franche-Comté, leaves the

command to Labienus, and starts for Cisalpine Gaul, where he is obliged,

as proconsul, to preside over the provincial assemblies. Nearer Rome

during the winter, he could follow more easily the political events of

the metropolis.

[Sidenote: Sequel of the Consulship of L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus

Galbinus.]

IV. While the armies were augmenting the power of the Republic without,

at Rome the intestine struggles continued with new fury. It could hardly

be otherwise among the elements of discord and anarchy which were at

work, and which, since the departure of Cæsar, were no longer held under

control by a lofty intelligence and a firm will. Moral force, so

necessary to every government, no longer existed anywhere, or rather, it

did not exist where the institutions willed it to be, in the Senate;

and, according to the remark of a celebrated German historian, this

assembly which ruled the world, was incapable of ruling the town.[564]

For a long time the prestige of one man in visible power was master over

that of the Senate; Pompey, by his military renown, and by his alliance

with Cæsar and Crassus, continued dominant, although he had not then any

legal power. Cæsar had reckoned upon him to continue his work, and curb

the bad passions which were in agitation in the highest regions as well

as in the lowest depths of society: but Pompey had neither the mind nor

energy necessary to master at the same time the arrogance of the nobles

and the turbulence of certain partisans of the demagogy; he was soon

exposed to the censure of both parties.[565] Moreover entirely under the

influence of the charms of his young wife, he appeared indifferent to

what was passing around him.[566]

The relation of the events at Rome during the eight years of Cæsar’s

abode in Gaul will only offer us an uninterrupted series of vengeances,

murders, and acts of violence of every description. How, indeed, could

order be maintained in so vast a city without a permanent military

force; when each man of importance took with him, for his escort, his

clients or slaves in arms, and thus, within it, everybody had an army

except the Republic? From this moment, as we shall see, the quarrels

which are about to spring up among the parties will result always in

riots; the slaves and gladiators will be enrolled as the ordinary

actors.

[Sidenote: Intrigues of Clodius.]

V. Clodius, whose imprudent support of those who were subsequently

called the triumvirs had increased his influence, continued, after

Cæsar’s departure, to court a vain popularity, and to excite the

passions which had been imperfectly allayed. Not satisfied with having,

at the beginning of his tribuneship, re-established those religious,

commercial, and political associations, which, composed chiefly of the

dregs of the people, were a permanent danger to society; with having

made distributions of wheat, restrained the censors in their right of

exclusion, forbidden the auspices to be taken or the sky observed on the

day fixed for the meeting of the comitia,[567] and with having provoked

the exile of Cicero, he turned his restless activity against

Pompey,[568] whom he soon deeply offended, by causing to be taken away

and set at liberty a son of Tigranes, King of Armenia, made prisoner in

the war against Mithridates, and retained as a pledge for the

tranquillity of Asia.[569] At the same time he began judicial

proceedings against some of Pompey’s friends, and replied to the

expostulations which were addressed to him, “That he was glad to learn

how far the great man’s credit went.”[570] The latter then conceived the

idea of recalling Cicero, to oppose him to Clodius, just as, a few

months before, he had raised Clodius against Cicero. We see the game of

political see-saw is not new.

[Sidenote: Pompey consults Cæsar on the Return of Cicero.]

VI. Under these circumstances, the opinion of Cæsar was of great weight.

Pompey wrote to consult him,[571] and P. Sextius, one of those nominated

as the new tribunes, repaired to Gaul to ascertain his mind.[572] It

appears certain that it was favourable,[573] for, so early as the

Calends of June, 696, hardly two months after the decree against

Cicero, a tribune of the people, L. Ninnius, demanded his recall in the

Senate. This proposal was on the point of being carried, when another

tribune of the people, Ælius Ligus, _interceded_.[574] The Senate, in

its irritation, declared that it would take into consideration no

political or administrative affair until it had voted on Cicero’s

return.[575] We thus judge how much the assembly took to heart the

success of this measure, and how much, in supporting it, Pompey

flattered the sentiments of the majority.

[Sidenote: Pompey believes himself threatened by a Slave of Clodius.]

VII. A singular occurrence determined his reconciliation with the

Senate: on the 3rd of the Ides of Sextilis (the 5th of August), a slave

of Clodius let a dagger fall in Pompey’s way, as he was entering the

curia; arrested by the lictors, and questioned by the consul A.

Gabinius, the slave declared that his master had ordered him to

assassinate the great citizen.[576] This attempt, whether serious or

not, produced a sufficient impression on Pompey to prevent him, for a

long time, from going to the Forum, or showing himself in public.[577]

The demands in favour of Cicero were renewed; and on the 4th of the

Calends of November (the 20th of October) eight tribunes of the people,

most of them men devoted to Pompey, proposed formally in the Senate the

recall of the exile. One of these was T. Annius Milo, a violent, bold

man, without scruples, and resembling Clodius in all things, but his

open adversary. Clodius and his brother, the prætor Appius, again

succeeded in defeating this motion.[578] At last, with the extreme of

audacity, the turbulent tribune, when near the close of his functions,

dared to attack Cæsar himself, and tried to obtain the revocation of the

Julian laws; but this attempt was powerless in face of the splendour of

the victories gained over the Helvetii and the Germans.

CHAPTER II.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.

[Sidenote: War against the Belgæ.]

I. Cæsar’s victories had awakened among the Gauls feelings of

admiration, but also of distrust; they could not see without fear that

it had required only six legions to scatter two invasions, each counting

100,000 combatants. There are successes which, by their very brilliancy,

alarm even those who profit by them. Nearly all Gaul looks on with

jealousy at events which prove the superiority of permanent armies over

populations without military organization. A small number of experienced

and disciplined soldiers, under the guidance of a great captain, make

all the peoples tremble from the Rhine to the ocean, and even the

islanders of Great Britain feel themselves unsafe against the attacks of

the Roman power; the Belgæ especially, proud of having formerly alone

repulsed the invasion of the Cimbri and the Teutones, feel their warlike

instincts revive. Provocations which have come from the other side of

the Straits increase their distrust; these picture to them the abode of

the Roman army in Franche-Comté as a threat against the independence of

the whole of Gaul. The greatest part of the peoples comprised between

the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Ocean, and the Seine, agitate, combine, and

assemble an army of 300,000 men.

Informed in Italy of these preparations, Cæsar raises two new legions,

rejoins his army in Franche-Comté, and decides immediately on invading

the country of the Belgæ. The first who present themselves on his road

are the people of Champagne. Surprised by his sudden arrival, they

submit, and even offer him subsidies and auxiliaries. Cæsar is able to

add to his eight legions and his light troops the contingents from

Rheims, and join them with those of Burgundy and Trèves. In spite of

this augmentation of his forces, the enemy he has to combat is four

times more numerous. To defeat them, he sends the Burgundians to make a

diversion and ravage the territory of Beauvais, then he crosses the

Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and selects, behind the Miette, a marshy stream,

a defensive position which he renders inexpugnable.

The Belgæ, whose army occupies, on the right bank of the Miette, an

extent of twelve kilomètres, are powerless to force the position of the

Romans, and fail in all their attempts to cross the Aisne at Pontavert.

Soon, discouraged by the want of provisions, disputes among themselves,

and the news that the Burgundians have just invaded the territory of

Beauvais, they separate, because each, believing his own country

threatened, thinks only of going to its defence. The Belgian league is

thus dissolved almost without combat. Cæsar then hastens to chastise

each people one after the other; he seizes in their turn Soissons and

Breteuil, the principal citadels of the Soissonais and Beauvaisis, and

arrives at Amiens.

But the coalitions of the peoples of the north succeed each other like

the waves of the sea; after the Helvetii, the Germans; after the

Germans, the people of the Beauvaisis; after them, the inhabitants of

Hainault. These have assembled on the Sambre, and wait to be re-enforced

by the peoples of German origin established in the neighbourhood of

Namur. Cæsar then marches towards the Sambre by its left bank. When he

arrives near the enemy concealed in the woods of the right bank, on the

heights of Haumont, he unites six legions, places the two others in

reserve with the baggage of the army, and, reaching the heights of

Neuf-Mesnil, begins to fortify his camp; but hardly have the soldiers

commenced their work, when the Belgæ debouch from all the issues of the

forest, cross the shallow waters of the Sambre, scale the abrupt slopes,

and fall upon the Romans, who, taken by surprise and unable to form

their line of battle, range themselves without order under the first

ensigns which offer themselves. The confusion is extreme; Cæsar is

obliged, sword in hand, to throw himself into the thick of the fight.

Nevertheless, the fortune of the battle is gradually restored; the

centre and left wing have repulsed their assailants; the latter arrives

to succour the right wing in its peril; the two legions of the

rear-guard hasten to the field of battle; then victory decides for the

Romans, and the peoples of Hainault are nearly annihilated. In this

engagement the experience and valour of the old veteran soldiers save

the Roman army from the impetuosity of the Belgæ. After this exploit,

Cæsar marches towards Namur, in which the inhabitants of the whole

country have shut themselves up on the news of the defeat of their

allies, and he makes himself master of that place.

While he was completing the conquest of Belgic Gaul, one of his

lieutenants, the young Publius Crassus, detached, after the battle of

the Sambre, into Normandy and Brittany, reduced to submission the

peoples of those provinces, so that at that time the greatest part of

Gaul acknowledged the authority of the Republic: the effect of Cæsar’s

victories was such that the Ubii, a German people from beyond the Rhine,

established between the Maine and the Sieg, sent their congratulations

to the conqueror with the offer of their services.

Before leaving for the Cisalpine, Cæsar sent a legion into the Valais,

to chastise the inhabitants of those Alpine valleys, who, at the

beginning of the year, had attacked in their march the two new legions

on their way from Italy; it was his aim also to open easy communications

with the Cisalpine by the Simplon and Saint-Bernard. But his lieutenant

Galba, after a sanguinary battle, was obliged to retreat and take up his

winter quarters in Savoy. Thus Cæsar’s designs could not be realised. It

was reserved for another great man, nineteen centuries afterwards, to

level that formidable barrier of the Alps.

[Sidenote: Return of Cicero.]

II. Let us now resume the account of events in Rome subsequent to the

Calends of January, 697 (20th of December, 696). The consuls who entered

upon their office were P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther and Q. Cecilius

Metellus Nepos; the first, a friend of Cicero; the second, favourable

to Clodius from hatred to the celebrated orator who had offended

him.[579]

Lentulus brought forward the question of the recall of the exile.[580]

L. Aurelius Cotta, a man of esteem and of consular dignity, declared

that the banishment of Cicero, pronounced in the sequel of extreme acts

of violence, carried in itself the cause of its nullity; and that,

therefore, there was no need of a law to revoke an act that was contrary

to the laws.[581] Pompey combated the opinion of Cotta, and sustained

that it was necessary that Cicero should owe his recall, not only to the

authority of the Senate, but also to a vote of the people. Nothing

further was proposed but to present a _plebiscitum_ to the comitia.

Nobody opposed it, when Sextus Atilius, tribune of the people, demanded

the adjournment,[582] and, by those dilatory manœuvres so familiar to

the Romans, obliged the Senate to defer the presentation of the law to

the 22nd of the same month. When the day arrived, the two parties

prepared to support their opinion by force. Q. Fabricius, tribune of the

people, favourable to Cicero, sought in the morning to gain possession

of the rostra. Clodius was no longer tribune, but he continued to guide

the populace. To the professional agitators in his pay he had joined a

troop of gladiators, brought to Rome, by his brother Appius, for the

funeral of one of his kinsmen.[583] The troop of Fabricius was easily

put to the rout; a tribune, M. Cistius, had hardly presented himself,

when he was driven away. Pompey had his toga covered with blood, and

Quintus Cicero, whom he had brought with him to the Forum to speak to

the people in favour of his brother, was obliged to hide himself; the

gladiators rushed upon another tribune, P. Sextius, and left him for

dead. “The struggle was so violent,” Cicero says, “that the corpses

obstructed the Tiber and filled the sewers, and the Forum was inundated

with blood to such a degree that it was found necessary to wash it with

sponges. A tribune was killed, and the house of another was threatened

with fire.”[584] The amazement was so great, that the question of the

recall of the exile was again adjourned. It was thus by the sword that

everything was decided in Rome in its disorder and abasement.

In fact, to obtain the recall of Cicero, the Senate saw itself obliged

to oppose riot to riot, and to make use of P. Sextius, who had recovered

from his wounds, as well as of Milo, who had organised, with military

discipline, an armed band in condition to make head against the

rioters.[585] At the same time, it hoped to intimidate the urban mob by

bringing into Rome, from all parts of Italy,[586] the citizens upon whom

it relied. In fine, the very men who had, two years before, engaged

Bibulus to embarrass all Cæsar’s measures by observing the sky,[587] now

prohibited, under pain of being considered as an enemy of the

Republic,[588] those religious artifices which suspended all

deliberations. The result was that the law of recall was passed.

Cicero re-entered Rome on the eve of the Nones of September (the 15th of

August, 697), in the midst of the warmest demonstrations of joy. The

Senate had thus at last triumphed over the factious opposition of

Clodius; but it was not without great efforts, nor without frequently

having had recourse on its own side to violence and arbitrary acts.

[Sidenote: Pompey is charged with the Supplying of Food.]

III. From the first moment of his return, Cicero gave all his care to

augmenting the influence of Pompey and reconciling him with the Senate.

The famine under which Italy suffered that year furnished him with the

occasion. The populace rose suddenly, hurried first to a theatre, where

games were celebrating, and afterwards to the Capitol, uttering threats

of death and fire against the Senate, to which they attributed the

public distress.[589] Before this, in July, at the time of the

Apollinarian games,[590] a riot had occurred from the same motive.

Cicero, by his persuasive eloquence, calmed the irritated mob, and

proposed to entrust to Pompey the care of provisioning, and to confer

upon him for five years proconsular powers in Italy and out of

Italy.[591] The senators, in their terror, adopted this measure

immediately. It was, as at the time of the war of the pirates, to give

to one man an excessive power _over all the earth_, according to the

words of the decree. Fifteen lieutenants were associated with him, of

whom Cicero was one.[592] But the creation of this new office did not

put an end to the discontent of the multitude. Clodius tried to persuade

the people that the famine was fictitious, and that the Senate had

created it, in order to have a pretext for making Pompey master over

everything.[593] He overlooked no occasion for stirring up troubles.

Although the Senate had given Cicero an indemnity of more than two

millions of sestertii,[594] and decided that his house should be rebuilt

in the same place, Clodius, who sought to prevent the rebuilding of it,

came several times to blows with Milo, in struggles which resembled

regular battles, their adherents carrying bucklers and swords. Every day

witnessed a riot in the streets. Milo swore he would kill Clodius, and

Cicero confessed at a later period that the victim and the arm which was

to strike were pointed out beforehand.[595]

[Sidenote: Festivals to commemorate Cæsar’s Victories.]

IV. It was towards the end of the year 697 that the news of Cæsar’s

prodigious successes against the Belgæ reached Rome; they excited there

the warmest enthusiasm. As soon as the Senate was informed of them, it

voted fifteen days of thanksgiving to celebrate them.[596] This number

of days had never before been accorded to anybody. Marius had obtained

five, and Pompey, when he had vanquished Mithridates, only ten. The

decree of the Senate was expressed in more flattering terms than had

ever been used for any general. Cicero himself took part in obtaining

this high testimony of public gratitude.[597]

[Sidenote: Riots at Rome.]

V. In spite of these demonstrations, there continued to exist among a

certain class a secret hatred against the conqueror of Gaul: in the

month of December, 697, Rutilius Lupus, named tribune for the following

year, proposed to revoke Cæsar’s laws, and to suspend the distribution

of the lands in Campania;[598] he expatiated in accusations against that

general and Pompey. The senators were silent; Cn. Marcellinus, the

consul nominate, declared that in the absence of Pompey nothing could be

decided. On another hand, Racilius, tribune of the people, rose to renew

the old accusations against Clodius.[599] In order to baffle the designs

of the latter, who aspired to the office of ædile, and who, once named,

would have been inviolable, the consuls nominate proposed that the

election of the judges should take place before that of the ædiles. Cato

and Cassius opposed this. Cicero eagerly seized the opportunity of

fulminating against Clodius; but the latter, who was prepared, defended

himself at length, and during this time his adherents excited, by

attacking Milo’s men, such an uproar on the steps of the Temple of

Castor, where the Senate held its sitting, that the Forum became a new

field of battle. The senators fled, and all projects of laws were

abandoned.[600]

In the presence of these sanguinary collisions, the elections of ædiles

and quæstors could not take place; moreover, Milo and Sextius, from

feelings of personal vengeance, prevented the Consul Q. Metellus from

convoking the comitia. As soon as the consul named a day of assembly,

the two tribunes declared immediately that _they were observing the

sky_; and, for fear that this cause of adjournment might not be

sufficient, Milo established himself in the Campus Martius with his

followers in arms. Metellus tried to hold the comitia by surprise,[601]

and proceeded by night to the Campus Martius through bye streets; but he

was well watched. Before he arrived at the place, he was met and

recognised by Milo, who signified to him, in virtue of his tribunitial

power, the _obnunciation_, that is, the declaration of a religious

obstacle to the holding of the popular assemblies.[602] Thus ended the

year 697.

During these inglorious struggles, in which both parties dishonoured

themselves by acts of violence, Cæsar had, in two campaigns, saved Italy

from the invasion of the barbarians, and vanquished the most warlike

peoples of Gaul. Thus, at Rome, venality and anarchy prevailed; with the

army, devotedness and glory. Then, as at certain epochs of our own

revolution, we may say that the national honour had taken refuge under

the flag.

CHAPTER III.

EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.

[Sidenote: Presence in Rome of Ptolemy Auletes.]

I. The Consuls of the year preceding had just been succeeded by Cn.

Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus; the latter

allied by family to Cæsar, whose niece, Atia, he had married.[603] It

was in vain that the chief magistrates succeeded each other annually,

the change of persons led to no change in the state of the Republic.

There happened about this time a circumstance which showed to what a low

degree of contempt law and morality had fallen. Ptolemy Auletes, King of

Egypt, father of the famous Cleopatra, hated by his subjects, had fled

from Alexandria, and arrived in Rome, towards the end of 697, in spite

of the advice of M. Cato, whom he had met at Rhodes. He came to solicit

the protection of the Republic against the Egyptians, who, in his

absence, had given the crown to his daughter Berenice. He had obtained

the title, then the object of so much emulation, of friend and ally of

the Roman people, by purchasing the suffrages of a great number of

considerable personages, which had obliged him to exact heavy taxes from

his subjects. He was at first well received, for it was known that he

had brought with him his treasure, ready for distribution among his new

protectors. Pompey gave him a lodging in his house,[604] and declared

publicly in his favour. But the Egyptians, when they were informed of

his departure, sent an embassy, composed of more than a hundred persons,

to defend their cause; most of them were assassinated on their way by

Ptolemy’s agents; and the rest, terrified or corrupted by force of

bribery, never carried out their mission.[605] This affair made so much

noise, that Favonius, called the _ape_ of Cato, because he imitated his

austerity, denounced the conduct of Ptolemy in the Senate, and added

that he knew one of the Egyptian deputies, named Dio, who was ready to

confirm his assertions. Dio did not dare to appear, and, a short time

after, was assassinated. In spite of this crime, Pompey persisted in his

friendship for Ptolemy, and no one dared to prosecute the guest of so

powerful a man.[606]

Several plans were proposed for replacing the King of Egypt on the

throne, and this enterprise, which promised glory and profit, excited

everybody’s ambition. Those who, probably, were opposed to it, proposed

to consult the Sibylline books, which gave the answer: “If the King of

Egypt come to ask you for succour, do not refuse him your friendship,

but grant him no army.” Caius Cato, tribune of the people, kinsman of M.

Porcius Cato, and yet his adversary, lost no time in divulging this

reply, although it was not permitted, without a decree of the Senate, to

publish the Sibylline oracles.[607] The Senate decreed that the King of

Egypt should be restored to his throne by the Roman magistrates, but

without an armed intervention.[608] But this mission was a cause of

great dispute: some proposed to charge Lentulus Spinther with it, others

preferred Pompey, with the obligation to employ only two lictors; the

jealousy of the candidates caused it soon to be renounced. Ptolemy,

abandoning all hope, quitted Rome and retired to Ephesus.[609] He was

restored subsequently by Gabinius.

[Sidenote: Clodius named Ædile. Trial of Milo.]

II. The election for the ædileship had taken place on the 11th of the

Calends of February of the year 698 (28th of December, 697), and, thanks

to the money he had distributed, Clodius had been named ædile.[610] He

had hardly been invested with this office, which protected him from the

prosecutions of Milo, when he turned round and attacked his accuser,

charging him with an armed conspiracy, precisely the same crime with

which Milo reproached him. It was not Milo he had in view, but his

powerful protectors. Moreover, alleging unfavourable auspicia, or

employing for that purpose some tribunes of the people, he absolutely

opposed the presentation by the consuls of all public affairs of any

importance, not excepting the curiate law, which decreed their commands

to the proconsuls and proprætors.[611]

The trial with which he was threatened by Clodius gave little uneasiness

to Milo, who had lost none of his habitual audacity. In fact, at a time

when a political personage could not be in safety unless escorted by a

band of armed men, it was difficult to condemn Milo for having

gladiators in his pay, especially when his enemies had set the example

of having recourse to similar auxiliaries.

The judicial struggle was at hand, and preparations were made as for a

combat. The accused had for his defenders Cicero and Pompey; the greater

part of the Senate was favourable to him, and, as a precaution against

riots, his friends brought their clients from all parts of Italy, and

even from Cisalpine Gaul.[612] Clodius and Caius Cato, on their side,

had assembled all their forces. They calculated, moreover, that the

populace, rendered still more turbulent by the dearth, would give a very

ill reception to Pompey, who found no remedy for the public misery; and

to Cicero, who, as superstitious people said, had drawn upon the town

the anger of the gods, by choosing to rebuild his house on a piece of

ground consecrated to the goddess _Libertas_.[613] It appears that many

enemies of Pompey secretly encouraged and aided Clodius. Crassus himself

was suspected of giving money to him, as well as to Caius Cato.

On the 8th of the Ides of February, (the 12th January, 698), Milo

appeared before his judges.[614] When Pompey presented himself to speak

in his defence, the mob, excited by Clodius, received him with hooting

and insults. The town mob knew all Pompey’s vanities, and wounded them

with subtle cruelty. He, meanwhile, though every moment interrupted,

kept his temper, and strove to speak. Clodius replied to him; but his

adversaries also had a mob organised and paid to abuse him, and to sing

infamous verses on the subject of his amours with his own sister.[615]

In this strange and ignoble dispute Milo was forgotten; it had become

nothing more than a sort of duel between Clodius and Pompey. Clodius, in

the midst of his satellites, cried out at the utmost extent of his

voice, “Who is the man who makes us die of hunger?” And all the

populace, with the unity of a tragic chorus, cried “Pompey!”--“Who wants

to go into Egypt?” cried Clodius again. A thousand voices replied,

“Pompey!”--“Who ought to be sent there?” “Crassus!”[616] Clodius added,

“Who is the autocrat whom nothing satisfies? Who is the man who seeks a

man? Who scratches his head with a single finger?” “Pompey! Pompey!” the

crowd continued repeating. After all these mutual provocations, the two

parties, tired of shouting, came to blows. Cicero prudently made his

escape,[617] and the victory once again remained with the nobles, who

were probably supported by a greater number of gladiators.[618] The

judgment of Milo, adjourned to another day, gave rise again to similar

scenes; but he was acquitted.

[Sidenote: Return of Cato.]

III. In the midst of these intestine quarrels, M. Cato returned from

Cyprus to Rome. He brought with him the treasure of Ptolemy, the brother

of Ptolemy Auletes, amounting to 7,000 talents (about 40,000,000

francs), a considerable quantity of personal goods, and a great number

of slaves. Ptolemy had poisoned himself on the report of Cato’s arrival,

leaving him no other trouble than that of collecting his treasures, for

the Cypriots, then slaves, in the hope of becoming the allies and

friends of Rome, received him with open arms. Proud of his expedition,

which he had carried out with the most perfect integrity, he was very

anxious that it should be approved.[619]

The return of Cato could bring no remedy to the deeply troubled state of

the Republic.[620] His virtue was not one of those which attract, but of

those which repulse. Blaming everybody, because, perhaps, everybody was

to blame, he remained the only one of his party.

From the moment of his arrival, he found himself at the same time in

opposition with Cicero, who attacked the legality of his mission; and

with Clodius, who, having entrusted it to him in his quality of tribune,

counted on appropriating all the glory of it to himself. In these new

intrigues of Clodius, Cæsar, it is said, supported him, and furnished

him with subjects of accusation against Cato.[621]

[Sidenote: State of Anarchy in Rome.]

IV. A concise view of the events at Rome at this time shows to what a

degree the moral level had been abased. It was no longer those memorable

struggles between the patricians and the plebeians, where the greatness

of the object aimed at ennobled the means. It was no longer a question

of defending secular rights, or of acquiring new rights, but of vulgar

ambitions and personal interests to be satisfied.

Nothing indicates more the decay of society than when law becomes an

engine of war for the use of the different parties, instead of remaining

the sincere expression of the general needs. Each man who arrived at

power rendered himself guilty on the morrow of that which he had

condemned on the eve, and made the institutions of his country the

slaves of his momentary passion. At one time it was the Consul Metellus

who, in 697, retarded the nomination of the quæstors, in order to

prevent that of the judges, with the view of shielding Clodius, his

kinsman, from a judiciary accusation;[622] at another time it was Milo

and Sextius who, by way of reprisals against the same consul, opposed

all imaginable obstacles to the convocation of the comitia;[623] lastly,

it was the Senate itself which (in 698) sought to retard the election of

the judges, in order to deprive Clodius of the chance of being named

ædile. The ancient custom of taking the auspices was no longer, in the

eyes of anybody, more than a political manœuvre. Not one of the great

personages whom the momentary favour of the people and the Senate raise

to distinction preserve any true sentiment of rectitude. Cicero, who

sees the whole Republic in himself, and who attacks as monstrous all

which is done against him and without him, declares all the acts of the

tribuneship of Clodius illegal; the rigid Cato, on the contrary,

defends, through personal interest, these same acts, because Cicero’s

pretension wounds his pride, and invalidates the mission he has received

from Clodius.[624] Caius Cato violates the law by making public the

Sibylline oracle. On all sides people have recourse to illegal means,

which vary according to their several tempers; some, like Milo, Sextius,

and Clodius, openly place themselves at the head of armed bands; others

act with timidity and dissimulation, like Cicero, who, one day, after a

previous unsuccessful attempt, carries away by stealth from the Capitol

the plate of brass which bore inscribed the law which had proscribed

him. A singular error of men, who believe that they efface history by

destroying a few visible signs of the past!

This relaxation of the social bonds caused inevitably the dispersion of

all the forces, the union of which would have been so useful to the

public good. It was no sooner agreed, in a moment of danger, to give to

one man the authority necessary to restore order and tranquillity, than,

at the same moment, everybody united to attack and degrade him, as if

each were afraid of his own work. Cicero has hardly returned from exile,

when the friends who have recalled him become jealous of his influence;

they see with pleasure a certain degree of coldness arise between Pompey

and him, and secretly support the intrigues of Clodius.[625] Pompey,

amid the famine and the public agitation, is hardly invested with new

powers, before the Senate on one side, and the popular faction on the

other, plot together to ruin his credit: by clever intrigues, they

awaken the old hatred between him and Crassus.

Pompey believed, or pretended to believe, that there was a conspiracy

against his life. He would no longer attend the Senate, unless the

session were held close to his residence, he seemed to think it so

dangerous to pass through the town.[626] “Clodius,” he said, “seeks to

assassinate me. Crassus pays him, and Cato encourages him. All the

talkers, Curio, Bibulus, all my enemies excite him against me. The

populace, who love the tattle of the tribune, have almost abandoned me;

the nobility is hostile to me; the Senate is unjust towards me; the

youth is entirely perverted.” He added that he would take his

precautions, and that he would surround himself with people from the

country.[627]

Nobody was safe from the most odious imputations. Caius Cato accused the

Consul P. Lentulus of having assisted Ptolemy with the means of

quitting Rome clandestinely.[628] M. Cato was exasperated against

everybody. Lastly, an implacable party never ceased manifesting, by its

motions, without result, it is true, its rancour and animosity against

the proconsul of Gaul. Towards the spring of 698, L. Domitius

Ahenobarbus, the brother-in-law of Cato, whose sister Porcia he had

espoused, and who had enriched himself with the spoils of the victims of

Sylla, proposed to deprive him of his command.[629] Others renewed the

proposal to put an end to the distribution of the lands of the Campania,

and revived the opposition to the Julian laws.[630] But Cicero, at the

request of Pompey, obtained the adjournment of this question to the

month of May.[631] He was, indeed, himself perplexed on this question,

and confessed that he had no very clear views upon it.[632]

[Sidenote: The Interview at Lucca.]

V. In the midst of the general confusion, many citizens turned their

eyes towards Cæsar. Appius Claudius had already paid him a visit.[633]

Crassus left Rome suddenly to join him at Ravenna, at the beginning of

the spring of 698, before the campaign against the Veneti, and explain

to him the state of affairs, for, as Cicero says in a letter of a

subsequent date, there was no occurrence so small in Rome that Cæsar was

not informed of it.[634]

Some time afterwards, Pompey, who was to embark at Pisa, to proceed to

Sardinia, in order to hasten the supply of wheat, arrived at Lucca,

where he had an interview with Cæsar and Crassus. A crowd of people

assembled similarly in that town; some were drawn thither by the

prestige of Cæsar’s glory, others by his well-known generosity, all by

the vague instinct which, in moments of crisis, points to the place

where strength exists, and gives a presentiment of the side from which

safety is to come. The Roman people sent him a deputation of

senators.[635] All the most illustrious and powerful personages in Rome,

such as Pompey, Crassus, Appius, governor of Sardinia, Nepos, proconsul

of Spain,[636] came to show their warm admiration for him and invoke his

support;[637] even women repaired to Lucca, and the concourse was so

great that as many as 200 senators were seen there at a time; 120

lictors, the obligatory escort of the first magistrates,[638] besieged

the door of the proconsul. “Already,” Appius writes, “he disposed of

everything by his ascendance, by his riches, and by the affectionate

eagerness with which he conferred obligations upon everybody.”[639]

What took place in this interview? No one knows; but we may conjecture

from the events which were the immediate consequences of it. It is

evident, in the first place, that Crassus and Pompey, who had recently

quarrelled, were reconciled by Cæsar, who, no doubt, placed before their

eyes the arguments most calculated to reconcile them: “The public

interest required it; they alone could put an end to the state of

anarchy which afflicted the capital; in a country which was a prey to

vulgar ambitions, it required, to control them, ambitions which were

greater, but, at the same time, purer and more honourable; they must

easily have seen that it was not in the power of a man like Cicero, with

his tergiversations, his cowardice, and his vanity, or Cato, with his

stoicism, belonging to another age, or Domitius Ahenobarbus, with his

implacable hatred and his selfish passions, to restore order, or put an

end to the divisions of opinion. In order to obtain these results, it

was necessary that Crassus and Pompey should labour resolutely to obtain

the consulship.[640] As to himself, he only asked to remain at the head

of his army, and complete the conquest he had undertaken. Gaul was

vanquished, but not subjugated. Some years were still necessary to

establish there the Roman domination. This fickle and warlike people,

always ready for revolt, was secretly incited and openly supported by

two neighbouring nations, the Britons and the Germans. In the last war

against the Belgæ, the promoters of the rising, according to the

confession of the Bellovaci, had clearly shown, by taking refuge in

Britain after their defeat, whence came the provocation. Even at this

very moment, the insurrection which was in preparation among the tribes

of the Veneti, on the shores of the ocean, was instigated by these same

islanders. As to the Germans, the defeat of Ariovistus had not

discouraged them; and several contingents of that nation were lately

found with the troops of Hainault. He intends to chastise these two

peoples, and to carry his arms beyond the Rhine as well as beyond the

sea; let them, then, leave him to finish his enterprise. Already the

Alps are levelled; the barbarians, who, hardly forty-four years ago,

were ravaging Italy, are driven back into their deserts and forests. A

few years more, and fear or hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or

laws, will have bound for ever Gaul to the empire.”[641]

Language like this could not fail to be understood by Pompey and by

Crassus. People are easily persuaded when the public interest offers

itself through the prism of self-love and personal interest. Beyond the

consulship, Crassus and Pompey saw at once the government of provinces

and the command of armies. As to Cæsar, the logical realisation of his

desires was the prolongation of his powers. Only one difficulty lay in

the way of the execution of this plan. The period of the elections was

near at hand, and neither Pompey nor Crassus had taken steps to offer

themselves as candidates for the consulship within the time fixed by the

law; but it had been so usual for many years to delay the comitia, under

frivolous pretexts, that the same thing might easily be done on the

present occasion with a more legitimate object.

Cæsar promised to support their election with all his power, by his

recommendations, and by sending his soldiers on leave to vote in the

comitia. In fact, his soldiers, either recruited from the veterans whom

he had carried from Rome, or among Roman citizens established in great

numbers in Cisalpine Gaul, had the right to give their vote in Rome, and

enjoy the legitimate influence which is the reward of a life of dangers

and self-denial. Cicero assures us of this in these words: “Do you

consider, in seeking the consulship, as a weak support the will of the

soldiers, so powerful by their number and by the influence which they

exercise in their families? Moreover, what authority must the vote of

our warriors have over the whole Roman people in the question of

nominating a consul! For, in the consular comitia, it is the generals

they choose, and not the rhetoricians. It is a very powerful

recommendation to be able to say, I was wounded, he has restored me to

life; he shared the booty with me. It was under him that we captured the

enemy’s camp, that we gave battle; he never required from the soldier

more labour than he took upon himself; his success is as great as his

courage. Can you imagine what a favourable influence such discourses

have upon people’s minds?”[642] Thus Cæsar conformed to the established

practice, in allowing his soldiers to exercise their rights of citizens.

[Sidenote: Consequences of the interview at Lucca. Conduct of Cicero.]

VI. The result of the interview at Lucca had been to unite in a common

feeling the most important men in the Republic. Some historians have

seen in it a mysterious conspiracy, and they have not hesitated to

qualify it with the name of _triumvirate_, a denomination as

inapplicable to this agreement as to that which took place in 694. An

interview in the midst of so many illustrious citizens, who have

assembled from all sides to salute a victorious general, had hardly the

appearance of a mystery, and the mutual understanding of some men of

influence in the same political thought was not a conspiracy. Some

authors have, nevertheless, pretended that the Senate, informed of this

plot devised in Cisalpine Gaul, had expressed its indignation; but there

is nothing to support this allegation; if it had been the case, would

they, a few months after the interview at Lucca, have granted Cæsar

everything he desired, and rejected everything that was displeasing to

him? We see, indeed, that at the annual distribution of the governments

of provinces, the senators hostile to Cæsar proposed that he should be

deprived of his command, or, at least, of the part of his command

decreed by the Senate.[643] Yet, not only was this proposal rejected,

but the Senate gave him ten lieutenants and subsidies to pay the legions

he had raised on his own authority, in addition to the four legions

originally placed at his disposal by the Senate. In fact, the triumphs

of Cæsar had excited people’s minds. Public opinion, that irresistible

force in all times, had declared loudly for him, and his popularity

reflected upon Pompey and Crassus.[644] The Senate had then silenced

its animosity, and even Cæsar showed himself full of deference for that

assembly.[645]

It must be said, in praise of humanity, that true glory possesses the

privilege of rallying all generous hearts; only men who are madly in

love with themselves, or hardened by party fanaticism, can resist this

general attraction towards those who constitute the greatness of their

country. At this period, with the exception of a few spiteful and

intractable individuals, the greater part of the senators felt the

general impulse, as we learn from the orations of Cicero.[646]

But if, on one side, the members of this pretended triumvirate are

represented as closely leagued together against the Republic, on the

other, Dio Cassius asserts that, at this time, Pompey and Crassus were

conspiring against Cæsar. This opinion has no better foundation. We see,

on the contrary, by a letter of Cicero, how warmly Pompey at that time

advocated the party of his father-in-law. Pompey, when he was leaving

Lucca, met with Quintus Cicero, and, addressing him with warmth, he bade

him remind his brother of his past engagements: “Cicero ought not to

forget that what Pompey had done for his recall was also the work of

Cæsar, whose acts he had promised not to attack; if he would not serve

him, at least let him abstain from all hostility.”[647] These reproaches

did not remain without effect. Cicero, very apt to turn to the side of

fortune, wrote to Atticus: “There is an end to everything; and since

those who are without power will have me no longer, I will seek friends

among those who have the power.”[648]

He had already acted with the senators in voting thanks for Cæsar’s

victories, since which he had employed all his efforts in seconding

every proposal in favour of the conqueror of Gaul. As the part Cicero

acted on this occasion has had a particular importance, it will not be

uninteresting to quote his words: “Could I be the enemy of a man whose

couriers and letters, in concert with his renown, make our ears listen

every day to the names of so many peoples, of so many nations, of so

many countries which he has added to our empire? I am inflamed with

enthusiasm, senators, and you are the less inclined to doubt it, since

you are animated by the same sentiments.[649] He has combated, with the

greatest success, the most warlike and powerful nations of the Germans

and Helvetii; he has overthrown, subdued, and driven back the others,

and has accustomed them to obey the Roman people. Countries, which no

history, no relation, no public report had hitherto brought to our

knowledge, have been overrun by our general, our troops, our arms. We

had formerly but one way into Gaul; the other parts were occupied by

peoples who were either enemies of this empire, or little to be

trusted, or unknown, or at least ferocious, barbarous, and warlike;

there was no one who was not desirous of seeing them vanquished and

subdued.[650] A report has been recently presented to us on the pay of

the troops. I was not satisfied with giving my opinion, but I laboured

to secure its adoption; I replied at great length to those who held a

contrary opinion; I assisted in drawing up the decree; then, again, I

granted more to the person than to I know not what necessity. I thought

that, even without such a succour of money, with the mere produce of the

booty, Cæsar might have maintained his army and terminated the war; but

I did not consider that we ought, by a narrow parsimony, to diminish the

lustre and glory of his triumph.

“Moreover, there has been a question of giving Cæsar ten lieutenants:

some absolutely opposed the grant, others required precedents; these

would have put off the consideration to another day; those granted it,

without employing flattering terms. Under these circumstances, from the

manner in which I spoke, everybody understood that, while I sought to

serve the interests of the Republic, I did still more to honour Cæsar.”

In another speech, the same orator exclaims: “The Senate has decreed

Cæsar public prayers in the most honourable form, and for a number of

days hitherto without example. In spite of the exhausted state of the

treasury, it has provided for the pay of his victorious army; it has

decided that ten lieutenants shall be given to the general, and that,

by derogation of the law Sempronia, a successor should not be sent him.

It was I who moved these measures, and who spoke in support of them;

and, rather than listen to my old disagreement with Cæsar, I lent myself

to what is demanded, under present circumstances, by the interest of the

Republic and the need of peace.”[651]

But if in public Cicero expressed himself with so much clearness, in his

private intercourse he was still tender of the opinion of his former

friends. It is, indeed, the only manner in which we can explain a

contradiction too glaring even in a temper so inconstant. In fact, at

the moment when he was boasting openly of the services he had assisted

in rendering to Cæsar, he wrote to his friend P. Lentulus, proconsul in

Cilicia: “They have just granted Cæsar subsidies and ten lieutenants,

and they have paid no regard to the law Sempronia, which required that a

successor should be given to him. But it is too sorrowful a subject, and

I will not dwell upon it.”[652]

[Sidenote: Intrigues of Pompey and Crassus to obtain the Consulship.]

VII. From what precedes, it is evident that unpopularity did not fall

upon Cæsar, but upon the means employed by Crassus and Pompey for the

purpose of obtaining the consulship.

They made use of Caius Cato, kinsman of the Stoic, and of other men

equally undeserving of esteem, to cause delay in the time of holding the

comitia, and thus lead to the creation of an interrex,[653] which would

facilitate their election, since the consuls, who were the ordinary

presidents of the assembly of the people, were opposed to them.

The relations of the events of this period present great confusion. Dio

Cassius informs us that, in the sequel of violent disputes in the curia,

between Pompey, who had recently returned from Sardinia, and the Consul

Marcellinus, the Senate, in sign of its displeasure, decreed that it

would go into mourning, as for a public calamity, and immediately

carried the decree into effect. Caius Cato opposed his veto. Then the

Consul Cn. Marcellinus, at the head of the Senate, proceeded to the

Forum, and harangued the people to ask it for the comitia, without

success probably, since the senators returned immediately to the place

of their session. Clodius, who, since the conference of Lucca, had

become more intimate with Pompey, appeared suddenly among the crowd,

interrupted the consul, and bantered him on this display of untimely

mourning. In the public place Clodius would easily carry the approval of

the multitude; but when he attempted to return to the Senate, he

encountered the most resolute opposition. The senators rushed to meet

him and prevent him from entering; many of the knights assailed him with

insults; they would have treated him still worse, had not the populace

rushed to his aid and delivered him, threatening to commit to the flames

the entire assembly.[654]

On another hand, Pompey, with more authority and less violence,

protested against the last senatus-consultus. Lentulus Marcellinus,

addressing him in full Senate, demanded if it were true, as reported,

that he aimed at the consulship. “As yet I know not what I shall do,”

replied Pompey, roughly. Then, perceiving the bad impression caused by

these disdainful words, he added immediately, “For the good citizens,

there is no use in my being consul; against the factious, perhaps I am

necessary.”[655] To a similar question, Crassus replied, modestly, “that

he was ready to do whatever would be useful to the Republic.” Then

Lentulus bursting into reproaches against Pompey’s ambition, the latter

interrupted him insolently. “Remember,” he said, “that thou art indebted

to me for everything. Thou wast dumb, I made thee a talker; thou wast a

greedy beggar, I turned thee into a glutton, who vomits to eat again.”

This language will give an idea of the violence of political passions at

that period. The senators, and Marcellinus himself, seeing that they

could not contend against the influence of these two men, withdrew.

During the rest of the year they took no part in public affairs; they

confined themselves to wearing mourning, and absenting themselves from

the festivals of the people.

[Sidenote: Campaign against the Peoples on the Shores of the Ocean.]

VII. While Pompey and Crassus, in accord with the convention of Lucca,

employed all the means in their power to arrive at the consulship, Cæsar

had his regards still fixed on a conquest which every year seemed

achieved, yet every year it had to be commenced again. If the Gauls,

divided into so many different peoples, were incapable of uniting for

their common defence, they did not allow themselves to be discouraged by

a single misfortune. Hardly were they crushed on one point, when the

standard of insurrection was raised somewhere else.

In 698, the agitation showed itself first along the shores of the ocean,

from the Loire to the Seine. The peoples of the Morbihan, masters of a

considerable fleet, and possessing the exterior trade, placed themselves

at the head of the movement. They entered into alliance with all the

peoples who dwelt on the coasts between the Loire and the Scheldt, and

sent for assistance from England, with which country they were in

constant relation. Under these circumstances, Cæsar foresaw that it was

on the sea that he must curb the spirit of these maritime peoples. He

gave orders for the building of ships on the Loire, demanded others from

the peoples of the Charente and the Gironde, and sent from Italy Decimus

Brutus with galleys and sailors. As soon as the season permitted, he

repaired in person to the neighbourhood of Nantes, not far from Angers,

where Publius Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion. From

the moment of his arrival his attention extended over the vast territory

where he was to establish the domination of Rome. With this aim, he

distributed his troops as follows: Labienus is sent with the cavalry to

the east, in the direction of Trèves, to hold the Germans in check; on

his way, he will confirm the fidelity of the people of Champagne and

their neighbours; P. Crassus is sent towards Aquitaine, to subdue that

country; Sabinus towards Normandy, to combat the insurgents of the

Cotentin; Cæsar reserves for himself the operations in the Morbihan.

After besieging, not without great difficulties, several small

fortresses which, placed at the extremity of promontories, were

surrounded with water at high tide, he resolved to wait for his fleet,

and took a position on the coast, at Saint-Gildas, to the south of

Vannes. Decimus Brutus led his vessels out of the Loire, encountered the

enemy in sight of the Roman army, and, by a concurrence of fortunate

circumstances, destroyed the Gaulish fleet; the flower of Brittany

perished in the combat. The Morbihan and the neighbouring states

submitted, and, nevertheless, the conqueror put to death all the

principal citizens.

Cæsar’s conduct towards the inhabitants of this province has been justly

blamed by the Emperor Napoleon I. “These people,” he says, “had not

revolted; they had furnished hostages, and had promised to live

peaceably; but they were in possession of all their liberty and all

their rights. They had given Cæsar cause to make war upon them, no

doubt, but not to violate international law in regard to them, and to

commit so atrocious an abuse of victory. This conduct was not just, and

it was still less politic. Such means never answer their object, they

exasperate and revolt nations. The punishment of particular chiefs is

all that justice and policy permit.”[656]

While Brittany was vanquished on the sea, Sabinus gained a decisive

victory over the peoples of Normandy, near Avranches; and, at the same

time, Publius Crassus reduced Aquitaine. Although this young lieutenant

of Cæsar had only a single legion, a corps of cavalry, and some

auxiliaries, he gained possession of the strong fortress of Sos, and

inflicted a sanguinary defeat on the peoples situated between the

Garonne and the Adour. His glory was the greater, as the Aquitanians had

called to their assistance the Spanish chiefs, the wreck of that famous

army which Sertorius had so long formed on the model of the Roman

tactics.

Although the season was far advanced, Cæsar still resolved to subjugate

the peoples of Brabant and the Boulonnais, and marched against them. The

Gauls retired into their forests; he was then obliged to clear a road in

the woods by cutting down the trees, which, placed to the right and

left, formed on each side a rampart against the enemy. The bad state of

the weather obliged him to retire before he had completed his task.

In this campaign of 698, most of the countries which extend from the

mouth of the Adour to that of the Scheldt had felt the weight of the

Roman arms. The sea was free; Cæsar was at liberty to attempt a descent

upon England.

CHAPTER IV.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.

[Sidenote: Campaign against the Usipetes and the Tencteri.]

I. The successes of the preceding campaign, and the existence of a Roman

fleet in the waters of the Morbihan, must have given Cæsar the hope that

nothing henceforth would prevent an expedition against Great Britain;

yet new events came to delay his projects.

In the winter between 698 and 699, the Usipetes and the Tencteri,

peoples of German origin, to escape the oppression of the Suevi, passed

the Rhine not far from its mouth, towards Xanten and Clèves. They

numbered 400,000, of all ages and both sexes; they sought new lands to

settle in, and, in the spring of 699, the head of the emigration had

already reached the country where now stand Aix-la-Chapelle and Liége.

Cæsar, alarmed at this event, starts for the army sooner than usual,

proceeds to Amiens, there assembles his troops, and finds the Gaulish

chiefs profoundly shaken in their fidelity by the approach of these new

barbarians, whose co-operation they hope to obtain. He confirms their

feeling of duty, obtains a contingent of cavalry, marches to encounter

the Usipetes and the Tencteri, and arrives on the Meuse, which he

crosses at Maëstricht. These latter, on hearing of the approach of the

Roman army, had concentrated in Southern Gueldres. Established on the

river Niers, in the plains of Goch, they send a deputation to Cæsar, who

had arrived near Venloo, to ask him not to attack them, but to allow

them to keep the lands they had conquered. The Roman general refuses,

and continues his march. After new conferences, the object of which, on

the part of the Germans, was to give their cavalry, sent beyond the

Meuse, time to return, a truce of one day is accepted. Cæsar declares,

nevertheless, that he will advance to Niers. Suddenly, however, his

vanguard is treacherously attacked in its march and routed by the German

cavalry; he then believes himself freed from his engagements; and when

next day the deputies come to excuse this perfidious aggression, he has

them arrested, falls unexpectedly on the camp of the Germans, and

pursues them without remission to the confluence of the Rhine and the

Meuse (towards the place occupied now by Fort Saint-André), where these

unfortunate people nearly all perish.

In the sequel of this exploit, which brought him little glory, and in

which doubt has been thrown on his good faith, Cæsar resolved to cross

the Rhine, on the pretence of claiming from the Sicambri the cavalry of

the Usipetes and the Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them, but, in

reality, to intimidate the Germans, and make them abandon the practice

of seconding the insurrections in Gaul. He therefore proceeded up the

valley of the Rhine, and arrived at Bonn, opposite the territory of the

Ubii, a people which had already solicited his alliance and support

against the Suevi. He caused to be built in ten days a bridge of piles,

which he crossed with his troops, but he did not penetrate far into

Germany: unable to come up with either the Sicambri or the Suevi, who

had withdrawn into the interior of their country, he re-crossed to the

left bank, and caused the bridge to be broken.

[Sidenote: First Descent in England.]

II. Though the summer was already advanced, Cæsar determined to take

advantage of the time which still remained to pass into England and

visit that island, concerning which people had but confused notions, and

which was only known to the Romans by the intervention of the islanders

in all the wars in Gaul. He therefore started from Bonn, travelled

towards Boulogne, marking out, as we might say, the road which

subsequently Augustus ordered to be constructed between those two towns,

and collected in that port the ships of the neighbouring coasts and the

fleet which, the year before, had vanquished that of the Morbihan. After

sending one of his officers to assure himself of the point of landing,

he started from Boulogne, in the night of the 24th to the 25th of

August, with two legions, reconnoitred in his turn the coast of Dover,

and landed at Deal. The shore was covered with armed men, who offered a

vigorous opposition to the landing of the Roman army, which, having

repulsed them, established itself on land near the sea. The Britons,

astonished at such boldness, came from all sides to implore peace and

make their submission. But the elements conspired against the invaders,

and a dreadful tempest destroyed the transport ships and galleys. At the

news of this disaster, the Britons raised their heads again; on their

side the Roman soldiers, far from desponding, hastened to repair their

ships with so much zeal that, out of eighty, sixty-eight were made fit

for sea again. Not far from Cæsar’s camp, the Britons one day drew a

legion into an ambuscade; this led to a general battle, in which the

Romans were victorious. Then Cæsar, hurried by the approach of the

equinox, treated with the chiefs of some tribes, received hostages, and

crossed again to the continent on the 12th of September, having remained

eighteen days only in England. On the day after his arrival at Boulogne,

the two legions he brought with him were dispatched against the people

of the territory of Boulogne, who had taken refuge, since the preceding

year, in the marshes of their country; other troops were sent to

chastise the inhabitants of Brabant. After these expeditions, Cæsar

placed his legions in winter quarters among the Belgæ, and then departed

to visit the opposite part of his vast command, namely, Illyria, where

also he had to protect the Roman frontiers against the incursion of the

barbarians.

[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Habits when in Campaign.]

We are astonished, in reading the “Commentaries”, at the ease with which

Cæsar repaired every year from Gaul into Italy, or into Illyria. There

must have been relays established on the principal lines along which he

had to travel, not only for his own use, but also for the couriers who

carried dispatches. We have seen that, in 696, Cæsar passed in eight

days from the banks of the Tiber to Geneva. According to Suetonius, he

travelled 100 miles a day, or 150 kilometres in twenty-four hours,

which makes a little more than six kilometres an hour. The couriers took

twenty-eight or thirty days to go from England to Rome. Plutarch informs

us that, in order to lose no time, Cæsar travelled by night, sleeping in

a chariot or litter.[657] By day he had with him a secretary, who wrote

under his dictation, and he was followed by a soldier who carried his

sword. In his military marches he went sometimes on horseback, but most

frequently he preceded the soldiers on foot, and, with head uncovered,

he gave no care either to sun or rain.[658]

In the midst of the most perilous enterprises, he found time to

correspond with men of influence, and even to read poems which Cicero

sent him, to whom he sent back his opinions and criticisms;[659] his

mind was incessantly occupied with the events which were passing in

Rome.

[Sidenote: Consulship of Pompey and Crassus.]

IV. At the beginning of the year 699, the consuls were not yet

nominated. In such circumstances, the Senate appointed _interreges_,

who, invested with the consular powers, succeeded each other in office

every five days. It was by favour of this interregnum that the comitia

were held. The result was foreseen. Besides their immense _clientelle_,

Pompey and Crassus were assured of the support of Cæsar, who, as we

have said, had taken care to send on leave a great number of his

legionaries to vote.[660] They arrived in charge of Publius Crassus, son

of the triumvir, whose exploits in Aquitaine had given him celebrity.

The only candidate of the previous year, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus,

excited by Cato, his brother-in-law, persisted in his candidature to the

last moment. Starting before daybreak to the comitia, with M.Cato and

many of his clients, he and his followers were exposed to violent

attacks. The slave who walked before him with a lantern in his hand was

killed, and Cato wounded. Domitius was seized with terror, and sought

shelter in his house. The interrex who presided over the comitia

proclaimed, without opposition, Crassus and Pompey consuls.