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HISTORY
OF
JULIUS CÆSAR.
[Illustration: colophon]
VOL. II.
THE WARS IN GAUL.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.
PUBLISHER’S NOTE.
It is, perhaps, not without interest, in publishing the second volume of
the History of Julius Cæsar, written by the Emperor Napoleon III., to
call to memory the names of Sovereigns and Princes who have employed
themselves upon the same subject.
_The King of France, Charles VIII._, showed an especial admiration for
the _Commentaries_ of Cæsar, and the celebrated monk, Robert Gaguin,
presented to him, in 1480, the translation he had made in French of the
eight books of the War in Gaul. We are informed of this in the edition
of the _translation_ by the learned monk, printed in 1500. This edition,
in large 4to, is from the press of Antoine Verard. (See J. Ch. Brunet,
_Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I.,
p. 518, and the _Biographie Universelle_, article _Charles VIII._)
_Charles V._, who professed a great admiration for Cæsar, left a copy of
the _Commentaries_ filled with marginal notes, written with his own
hand. It was at his instigation that the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferdinand
Gonzaga, sent a scientific mission into France to study Cæsar’s
campaigns on the localities. The forty plans which were made by the
members of this commission, and among which that of Alise is found, were
published in 1575, in the edition of James Strada.
_The Sultan Soliman II._, contemporary of Charles V., whom he had taken
for his model, sent through all Europe to procure as many copies of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_ as could be found, which he ordered to be
collated, and caused a translation to be made into the Turkish language
for his own daily reading.
_The King of France, Henri IV._, translated the two first books of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_. The manuscript of this translation was deposited
in the Bibliothèque du Roi, and M. des Noyers took it thence to deliver
it to Louis XIII., who, in his turn, translated the two last books of
the _Commentaries_. These two translations were joined together, and
printed at the Louvre in 1630.
_Louis XIV._ translated the first book of the _Commentaries_. His
translation was printed at Paris in 1651, in folio, with figures. This
work has not been reprinted; it is now very rare. The reader may consult
on this subject the _Méthode d’étudier l’Histoire_ of the Abbé
Lenglet-Dufresnoy, tom. II., p. 481; and J. Ch. Brunet, _Manuel du
Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 519.
_The great Condé_, who had studied with care the campaigns of Cæsar,
encouraged the translation of the _Commentaries_ undertaken by Nicolas
Perrot d’Ablancourt; it was the translation most esteemed and the most
in vogue during the last century.
_Christina, Queen of Sweden_, had composed _Reflections on the Life and
Actions of Cæsar_, as we are informed by J. Arckenholz in his work
entitled _Mémoires concernant Christine, Reine de Suède_, Amsterdam,
1751-1760, tom. IV., No. 6, p. 4.
_Louis Philippe Joseph d’Orléans_, surnamed _Egalité_, was a great
reader of the _Commentaries_. He caused a map of Cæsar’s campaigns in
Gaul to be made.
Lastly, _the Emperor Napoleon I._, at St. Helena, dictated a _Précis des
Guerres de César_ to Comte Marchand, who published it in Paris in 1836,
in 8vo.
CONTENTS.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
PAGE
I. ENTERPRISING CHARACTER OF THE GAULS. 1
II. WARS OF THE ROMANS BEYOND THE ALPS. 3
III. CONTINUAL PRE-OCCUPATION OF THE ROMANS IN REGARD TO THE
GAULS. 7
IV. PLAN FOLLOWED IN THE RELATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL. 13
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.
I. GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION. (_See Plate 1._) 15
II. POLITICAL DIVISIONS. (_See Plate 2._) 22
III. MANNERS. 32
IV. INSTITUTIONS. 41
CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. PROJECTS OF INVASION BY THE HELVETII. (_See Plate 3._) 49
II. CÆSAR’S ARRIVAL AT GENEVA. 52
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE RETRENCHMENT OF THE RHONE. (_See
Plate 8._) 52
IV. THE HELVETII BEGIN THEIR MARCH TOWARDS THE SAÔNE. CÆSAR
UNITES HIS TROOPS. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 59
V. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII ON THE SAÔNE. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 64
VI. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII NEAR BIBRACTE. (_See Plates 4 and 5._) 72
VII. PURSUIT OF THE HELVETII 76
VIII. OBSERVATIONS 79
CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. SEAT OF THE SUEVI AND OTHER GERMAN TRIBES. (_See Plate 2._) 80
II. THE GAULS SOLICIT CÆSAR TO COME TO THEIR SUCCOUR. 83
III. MARCH OF CÆSAR UPON BESANÇON. (_See Plate 4._) 86
IV. PANIC IN THE ROMAN ARMY. 88
V. MARCH TOWARDS THE VALLEY OF THE RHINE. (_See Plate 4._) 91
VI. INTERVIEW BETWEEN CÆSAR AND ARIOVISTUS. (_See Plate 6._) 94
VII. MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. (_See Plates 2 and 6._) 97
VIII. BATTLE AGAINST THE GERMANS. (_See Plate 4._) 99
IX. OBSERVATIONS. 103
CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ
(Year of Rome 697.)
(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. LEAGUE OF THE BELGÆ. CÆSAR ADVANCES FROM BESANÇON TO
THE AISNE. (_See Plate 4._) 106
II. CÆSAR’S CAMP AT BERRY-AU-BAC. (_See Plates 2, 7, 8, and 9._) 109
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 113
IV. RETREAT OF THE BELGÆ. 115
V. CAPTURE OF NOVIODUNUM AND BRATUSPANTIUM. (_See Plate 7._) 116
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE NERVII. (_See Plates 7 and 10._) 118
VII. BATTLE ON THE SAMBRE. (_See Plate 10._) 121
VIII. SIEGE OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI. (_See Plate 11._) 128
IX. SUBJUGATION OF THE ARMORICA BY P. CRASSUS. 131
X. EXPEDITION OF GALBA INTO THE VALAIS. 132
CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)
(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
WAR OF THE VENETII--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE--MARCH
AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.
I. INSURRECTION OF THE MARITIME PEOPLES. (_See Plate 12._) 135
II. WAR AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 137
III. NAVAL COMBAT AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 141
IV. VICTORY OF SABINUS OVER THE UNELLI. (_See Plate 13._) 144
V. CONQUEST OF AQUITAINE BY P. CRASSUS. 146
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII. 150
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 151
CHAPTER VII.
(Year of Rome 699.)
(BOOK IV. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND
THE MENAPII.
I. CÆSAR’S MARCH AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI.
(_See Plate 14._) 153
II. ROUT OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 158
III. FIRST PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. (_See Plates 14 and 15._) 160
IV. DESCRIPTION OF BRITAIN IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR. 165
V. FIRST EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN. (_See Plates 16 and 17._) 172
VI. CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND MENAPII. 184
VII. ORDER FOR REBUILDING THE FLEET. DEPARTURE FOR ILLYRIA. 185
VIII. POINTS OF EMBARKING AND LANDING. DATE OF THE ARRIVAL
IN BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 186
IX. RÉSUMÉ OF THE DATES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 699. 202
CHAPTER VIII.
(Year of Rome 700.)
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
I. INSPECTION OF THE FLEET. MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 204
II. DEPARTURE FOR THE ISLE OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 206
III. MARCH INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. (_See Plate 16._) 208
IV. DESTRUCTION OF A PART OF THE FLEET. 210
V. CÆSAR RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 211
VI. MARCH TOWARDS THE THAMES. (_See Plate 16._) 214
VII. SUBMISSION OF A PART OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 216
VIII. RE-EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY. 217
IX. OBSERVATIONS. (_See Plate 16._) 219
X. PRESUMED DATES OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN BRITAIN. 223
XI. DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEGIONS IN THEIR WINTER QUARTERS.
(_See Plates 14 and 18._) 225
XII. DEFEAT OF SABINUS AT ADUATUCA. 228
XIII. ATTACK ON CICERO’S CAMP. 234
XIV. CÆSAR MARCHES TO THE SUCCOUR OF CICERO. (_See Plates 14
and 27, Fig. 8._) 236
XV. CÆSAR PLACES HIS TROOPS IN WINTER QUARTERS. LABIENUS
DEFEATS INDUTIOMARUS. 246
XVI. OBSERVATIONS. 250
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701.)
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE EBURONES.
I. CÆSAR AUGMENTS HIS ARMY. 253
II. WAR AGAINST THE NERVII. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GAUL. 254
III. SUBMISSION OF THE MENAPII. 256
IV. SUCCESS OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 257
V. SECOND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. 260
VI. WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX. (_See Plates 2 and 14._) 262
VII. THE SICAMBRI ATTACK ADUATUCA. (_See Plate 18._) 265
CHAPTER X.
(Year of Rome 702.)
(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES
OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.
I. REVOLT OF GAUL. 272
II. CÆSAR BEGINS THE CAMPAIGN. (_See Plate 19._) 275
III. TAKING OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM. (_See
Plate 19._) 278
IV. SIEGE OF AVARICUM. (_See Plate 20._) 287
V. ARRIVAL OF CÆSAR AT DECETIA, AND MARCH TOWARDS AUVERGNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 21._) 299
VI. BLOCKADE OF GERGOVIA. (_See Plates 21 and 22._) 303
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 319
VIII. CÆSAR LEAVES GERGOVIA IN ORDER TO JOIN LABIENUS. 320
IX. EXPEDITION OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE PARISII. (_See Plate 23._) 323
X. THE GAULS ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE. 329
XI. JUNCTION OF CÆSAR AND LABIENUS. BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 24._) 331
XII. BLOCKADE OF ALESIA. (_See Plates 25, 26, 27, and 28._) 338
XIII. DETAILS OF THE EXCAVATIONS AT MONT AUXOIS. (_See Plates
25, 27, and 28._) 358
CHAPTER XI.
(Year of Rome 703.)
(BOOK VIII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BITURIGES AND CARNUTES. 367
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI. (_See Plates 29 and 30._) 369
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 377
IV. DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY OF THE EBURONES. 379
V. EXPEDITION AGAINST DUMNACUS. 381
VI. CAPTURE OF UXELLODUNUM. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 383
VII. EXCAVATIONS MADE AT PUY D’ISSOLU. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 390
VIII. COMPLETE SUBMISSION OF GAUL. 395
BOOK IV.
RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION
OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM 696 TO 705.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.
I. DIFFICULTIES OF CÆSAR’S TASK. 399
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII. 402
III. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS. 405
IV. SEQUEL OF THE CONSULSHIP OF L. CALPURNIUS PISO AND AULUS
GALBINIUS. 408
V. INTRIGUES OF CLODIUS. 409
VI. POMPEY CONSULTS CÆSAR ON THE RETURN OF CICERO. 410
VII. POMPEY BELIEVES HIMSELF THREATENED BY A SLAVE OF CLODIUS. 411
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.
I. WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ. 413
II. RETURN OF CICERO. 416
III. POMPEY IS CHARGED WITH THE SUPPLYING OF FOOD. 419
IV. FESTIVALS TO COMMEMORATE CÆSAR’S VICTORIES. 420
V. RIOTS AT ROME. 421
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.
I. PRESENCE IN ROME OF PTOLEMY AULETES. 424
II. CLODIUS NAMED ÆDILE. TRIAL OF MILO. 426
III. RETURN OF CATO. 429
IV. STATE OF ANARCHY IN ROME. 430
V. THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. 433
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. CONDUCT OF
CICERO. 438
VII. INTRIGUES OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS TO OBTAIN THE CONSULSHIP. 443
VIII. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PEOPLES ON THE SHORES OF THE OCEAN. 445
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.
I. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 449
II. FIRST DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 451
III. CÆSAR’S HABITS WHEN IN CAMPAIGN. 452
IV. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS. 453
V. MOTION OF TREBONIUS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCES. 456
VI. POMPEY’S SUMPTUARY LAW. 461
VII. DEPARTURE OF CRASSUS FOR SYRIA. 462
VIII. CATO PROPOSES TO DELIVER CÆSAR TO THE GERMANS. 464
CHAPTER V.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700.
I. SECOND DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 467
II. DISPLACEMENT OF THE ARMY. DISASTER OF SABINUS. 468
III. L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS AND APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER,
CONSULS. 470
IV. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PTOLEMY IN EGYPT. 472
V. CORRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. 474
VI. DEATH OF CÆSAR’S DAUGHTER. 476
VII. CÆSAR’S BUILDINGS AT ROME. 477
VIII. HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO. 478
CHAPTER VI.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.
I. EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GAUL. SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE. 484
II. PURSUIT OF AMBIORIX. 485
III. C. DOMITIUS CALVINUS AND M. VALERIUS MESSALA, CONSULS. 486
IV. EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST THE PARTHIANS, AND HIS
DEATH. 488
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF CRASSUS. 499
CHAPTER VII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.
I. MURDER OF CLODIUS. 501
II. THE REPUBLIC IS DECLARED IN DANGER. 505
III. POMPEY SOLE CONSUL. 506
IV. TRIAL OF MILO. 508
V. POMPEY TAKES AS HIS ASSOCIATE CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS
SCIPIO. 514
VI. INSURRECTION OF GAUL, AND CAMPAIGN OF 702. 516
CHAPTER VIII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.
I. NEW TROUBLES IN GAUL, AND THE CAMPAIGN ON THE AISNE. 528
II. CÆSAR’S POLICY IN GAUL AND AT ROME. 530
III. SULPICIUS RUFUS AND M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, CONSULS. 536
IV. SPIRIT WHICH ANIMATES CÆSAR’S ADVERSARIES. 538
V. THE QUESTION OF RIGHT BETWEEN THE SENATE AND CÆSAR. 542
VI. INTRIGUES TO DEPRIVE CÆSAR OF HIS COMMAND. 548
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS, CONSULS. 554
II. CÆSAR REPAIRS TO THE CISALPINE. 559
III. POMPEY RECEIVES OVATIONS, AND ASKS CÆSAR TO RETURN HIS
TWO LEGIONS. 564
IV. THE SENATE VOTES IMPARTIALLY. 569
V. VIOLENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGAINST CÆSAR. 570
VI. STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 572
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS, CONSULS. 579
II. LENTULUS CARRIES THE SENATE AGAINST CÆSAR. 581
III. CÆSAR HARANGUES HIS TROOPS. 588
IV. CÆSAR IS DRIVEN TO CIVIL WAR. 590
V. CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON. 592
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX A.
CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE
JULIAN STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709. 595
APPENDIX B.
CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS, FOR THE YEAR OF
ROME 699 (55 B. C.) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS. 638
APPENDIX C.
LIST OF ANCIENT COINS FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
PAGE
NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE. 640
COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME. 642
COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY. 644
COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY. 644
GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF THE OSE). 645
APPENDIX D.
NOTICE ON CÆSAR’S LIEUTENANTS.
1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS. 648
2. PUBLIUS LUCINIUS CRASSUS. 648
3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA. 649
4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS. 649
5. Q. PEDIUS. 649
6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA. 649
7. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS. 650
8. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS. 651
9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS. 652
10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS. 652
11. CAIUS FABIUS. 653
12. L. ROSCIUS. 653
13. TITUS SEXTIUS. 653
14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO. 654
15. CAIUS TREBONIUS. 655
16. MINUCIUS BASILUS. 656
17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS. 656
18. M. SILANUS. 656
19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS. 656
20. M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS. 657
21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY). 657
22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS. 657
28. Q. FUFIUS CALENUS. 658
24. L. CÆSAR. 658
LIST OF PLATES TO VOLUME II.
PAGE
1. GENERAL MAP OF GAUL 15
2. GENERAL MAP OF THE PEOPLES OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR 23
3. COURSE OF THE RHONE, FROM GENEVA TO THE PAS DE L’ECLUSE 54
4. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 696 60
5. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE HELVETII 78
6. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF ARIOVISTUS 97
7. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 697 107
8. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE 110
9. CAMP OF CÆSAR ON THE AISNE 111
10. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE 121
11. PLAN OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI 129
12. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VENETI 137
13. EXPEDITION OF SABINUS TO THE UNELLI 145
14. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 699 153
15. BRIDGE OF PILES BUILT ON THE RHINE 162
16. MAP OF BRITAIN FOR THE TWO EXPEDITIONS 175
17. PLAN OF DOVER 176
18. PLAN OF ADUATUCA 231
19. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 702 277
20. PLAN OF AVARICUM 288
21. PLAN OF GERGOVIA 304
22. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT GERGOVIA 307
23. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AT LUTETIA 325
24. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE 334
25. PLAN OF ALESIA 340
26. VIEWS OF MONT AUXOIS 343
27. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT ALESIA 345
28. _Idem_ 346
29. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI 370
30. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT MONT SAINT-PIERRE 372
31. PLAN OF UXELLODUNUM 384
32. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT UXELLODUNUM 390
JULIUS CÆSAR.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
[Sidenote: Enterprising Character of the Gauls.]
I. There are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by
certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had
been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved
in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we
should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far
apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom.
Such had been the Gauls.
The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an
organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise.
Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries
before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at
greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the
time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions
started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern
Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now _Western Hungary_);
the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country
lying between those mountains and the Po.[1] The invaders soon
transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the
whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took
the name of _Cisalpine Gaul_. More than two centuries afterwards, the
descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the
Capitol.[2] Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from
Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube,[3] ravaging Northern
Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple
of Delphi.[4] Others, arriving at Byzantium,[5] pass into Asia,
establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount
Taurus, since called _Gallo-Græcia_, or _Galatia_, and maintain in it a
sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus.[6]
These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of
adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in
fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364
to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once
the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it
were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern
Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of
colonies.
Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the
Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, ich have already been spoken of in the
first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive,
crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly
had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic,
when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the
inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of
his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy,
they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years.
The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take
into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time,
Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from
beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia
(565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of
Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held
the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).
[Sidenote: Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps.]
II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of
Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian
tribes of the Maritime Alps,[7] for the first time carried their arms
to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche,
and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of
eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve
stadia (2·22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable
them to pass through Gaul into Spain.[8] Nevertheless, the legions
pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered
territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked
again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the
support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against
the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards,[9] the proconsul C. Sextius
Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of
Aix (_Aquæ Sextiæ_).[10]
The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their
dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated
into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the
Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former,
and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue
(_Sulgas_), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus,
grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and
the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus,
king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of
_Allobrogicus_.[11] The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the
Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans;[12] they remained
independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the
Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to
their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against
Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the
Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute.[13]
In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius,
which gave its name to the Roman province called _Narbonensis_.[14]
The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the
south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century
of the foundation of Rome it seems to have re-commenced with greater
intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones,[15] after ravaging
Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to
protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the
valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them
a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried
there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous
resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against
the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were
successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M.
Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647;[16] lastly, in
the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio[17] and Cn. Manlius
Maximus. The two last each lost his army.[18] The very existence of Rome
was threatened.
Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at
the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653),
destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.
The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones;
sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the
rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had
brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea.
Sallust[19] ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn.
Manlius, and Cicero[20] designates under the same name the barbarians
who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the
north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed
to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.
From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of
increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was
restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus,
and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The
vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of
governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the
Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to
denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their
revelations.[21]
The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne,[22] which was devoted to
the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C.
Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after,
the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Cæsar,”
says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls,
thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying
the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and
homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of
peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the
war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone
resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion.”[23]
[Sidenote: Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the
Gauls.]
III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of
the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples
established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud
the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says
Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples
must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer
for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight.”[24] On his part,
Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all
our wise men have looked upon Gaul as _the most redoubtable enemy of
Rome_. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us
until now from combating them all.”[25]
In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii
prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and
resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such
circumstances.[26] In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the
Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy _en
masse_ ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military
service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a
special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was
forbidden to touch except in that eventuality.[27] Accordingly, when, in
705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes
that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.[28]
War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the
consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a
desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This
explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm
excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional
sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the
fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the
greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the
fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia,
and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a
check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the
power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on
the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally
as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation.
If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say
what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the
North rushing eagerly upon Italy?
And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul.
Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian
Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the
revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of
thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,[29] and even twenty,[30] for
Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices
during sixty days.[31]
When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of
this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he
is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar
motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the
sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power
by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted
view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly
estimating the causes which have produced them.
The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the
civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former
had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for
that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his
personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his
military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course.
We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate
struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great
Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have
returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as
Cicero says,[32] “he had already done enough for his glory, if he had
not done enough for the Republic;” and the same orator adds: “Why would
Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the
Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he
retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the
towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by
the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our
empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder
than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable
than the multiplicity of Cæsar’s victories? Can he find limits farther
off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the
people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours?
Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not
rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and
to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the
greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their
policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to
recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme
honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the
affection of the people.”[33]
Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy,
claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as
Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.
If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having
an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced
a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the
measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his
army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to
Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it
quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul,
sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the
contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without
hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of
the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his
troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head
of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from
the Sambre as far as the Saône.[34] He keeps within the limit of his
government without making any preparation which indicates hostile
intentions,[35] wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by
justice rather than by arms.[36] In fact, he has collected so little
money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure
him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily
renounce their pay.[37] Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional
reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and
his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of
the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power
which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory
which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of
the country.
[Sidenote: Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul.]
IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in
Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Cæsar,” he says, “has
written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art,
his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself
naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to
future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little
minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous
ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of
writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and
luminous brevity.”[38] Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the
following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar
has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing
the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons
than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and
accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it
was composed.”[39]
If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as
little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting
ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative
of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have
abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and
developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a
more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we
have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient
geography did not furnish corresponding names.
The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to
the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments.
The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text,
will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the
countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.