[1] Elie Bocthor (1784-1821) was a French orientalist of Coptic
origin. He was the author of a _Traite des conjugaisons_ written in
Arabic, and left his Dictionary in MS.
CAUTERETS, a watering-place of south-western France in the department of
Hautes-Pyrenees, 20 m. S. by W. of Lourdes by rail. Pop. (1906) 1030. It
lies in the beautiful valley of the Gave de Cauterets, and is well known
for its copious thermal springs. They are chiefly characterized by the
presence of sulphur and silicate of soda, and are used in the treatment
of diseases of the respiratory organs, rheumatism, skin diseases and
many other maladies. Their temperature varies between 75 deg. and 137
deg. F. The springs number twenty-four, and there are nine bathing
establishments. Cauterets is a centre for excursions, the Monne (8935
ft.), the Cabaliros (7655 ft.), the Pic de Chabarrou (9550 ft.), the
Vignemale (10,820 ft.), and other summits being in its neighbourhood.
CAUTIN, a province of southern Chile, bounded N. by Arauco, Malleco and
Bio-Bio, E. by Argentina, S. by Valdivia, and W. by the Pacific. Its
area is officially estimated at 5832 sq. m. Cautin lies within the
temperate agricultural and forest region of the south, and produces
wheat, cattle, lumber, tan-bark and fruit. The state central railway
from Santiago to Puerto Montt crosses the province from north to south,
and the Cautin, or Imperial, and Tolten rivers (the latter forming its
southern boundary) cross from east to west, both affording excellent
transportation facilities. The province once formed part of the
territory occupied by the Araucanian Indians, and its present political
existence dates from 1887. Its population (1905) was 96,139, of whom a
large percentage were European immigrants, principally Germans. The
capital is Temuco, on the Rio Cautin; pop. (1895) 7078. The principal
towns besides Temuco are Lautaro (3139) and Nueva Imperial (2179), both
of historic interest because they were fortified Spanish outposts in the
long struggle with the Araucanians.
CAUTLEY, SIR PROBY THOMAS (1802-1871), English engineer and
palaeontologist, was born in Suffolk in 1802. After some years' service
in the Bengal artillery, which he joined in 1819, he was engaged on the
reconstruction of the Doab canal, of which, after it was opened, he had
charge for twelve years (1831-1843). In 1840 he reported on the proposed
Ganges canal, for the irrigation of the country between the rivers
Ganges, Hindan and Jumna, which was his most important work. This
project was sanctioned in 1841, but the work was not begun till 1843,
and even then Cautley found himself hampered in its execution by the
opposition of Lord Ellenborough. From 1845 to 1848 he was absent in
England owing to ill-health, and on his return to India he was appointed
director of canals in the North-Western Provinces. After the Ganges
canal was opened in 1854 he went back to England, where he was made
K.C.B., and from 1858 to 1868 he occupied a seat on the council of
India. He died at Sydenham, near London, on the 25th of January 1871. In
1860 he published a full account of the making of the Ganges canal, and
he also contributed numerous memoirs, some written in collaboration with
Dr Hugh Falconer, to the _Proceedings_ of the Bengal Asiatic Society and
the Geological Society of London on the geology and fossil remains of
the Sivalik Hills.
CAUVERY, or KAVERI, a river of southern India. Rising in Coorg, high up
amid the Western Ghats, in 12 deg. 25' N. lat. and 75 deg. 34' E. long.,
it flows with a general south-eastern direction across the plateau of
Mysore, and finally pours itself into the Bay of Bengal through two
principal mouths in Tanjore district. Its total length is 472 m., the
estimated area of its basin 27,700 sq.m. The course of the river in
Coorg is very tortuous. Its bed is generally rocky; its banks are high
and covered with luxuriant vegetation. On entering Mysore it passes
through a narrow gorge, but presently widens to an average breadth of
300 to 400 yds. Its bed continues rocky, so as to forbid all navigation;
but its banks are here bordered with a rich strip of cultivation. In its
course through Mysore the channel is interrupted by twelve anicuts or
dams for the purpose of irrigation. From the most important of these,
known as the Madadkatte, an artificial channel is led to a distance of
72 m., irrigating an area of 10,000 acres, and ultimately bringing a
water-supply into the town of Mysore. In Mysore state the Cauvery forms
the two islands of Seringapatam and Sivasamudram, which vie in sanctity
with the island of Seringam lower down in Trichinopoly district. Around
the island of Sivasamudram are the celebrated falls of the Cauvery,
unrivalled for romantic beauty. The river here branches into two
channels, each of which makes a descent of about 200 m. in a succession
of rapids and broken cascades. After entering the Madras presidency, the
Cauvery forms the boundary between the Coimbatore and Salem districts,
until it strikes into Trichinopoly district. Sweeping past the historic
rock of Trichinopoly, it breaks at the island of Seringam into two
channels, which enclose between them the delta of Tanjore, the garden of
southern India. The northern channel is called the Coleroon (Kolidam);
the other preserves the name of Cauvery. On the seaward face of its
delta are the open roadsteads of Negapatam and French Karikal. The only
navigation on any portion of its course is carried on in boats of
basket-work. It is in the delta that the real value of the river for
irrigation becomes conspicuous. This is the largest delta system, and
the most profitable of all the works in India. The most ancient
irrigation work is a massive dam of unhewn stone, 1080 ft. long, and
from 40 to 60 ft. broad, across the stream of the Cauvery proper, which
is supposed to date back to the 4th century, is still in excellent
repair, and has supplied a model to British engineers. The area of the
ancient system was 669,000 acres, the modern about 1,000,000 acres. The
chief modern work is the anicut across the Coleroon, 2250 ft. long,
constructed by Sir Arthur Cotton between 1836 and 1838. The Cauvery
Falls have been utilized for an electric installation, which supplies
power to the Kolar gold-mines and light to the city of Mysore.
The Cauvery is known to devout Hindus as Dakshini Ganga, or the Ganges
of the south, and the whole of its course is holy ground. According to
the legend there was once born upon earth a girl named Vishnumaya or
Lopamudra, the daughter of Brahma; but her divine father permitted her
to be regarded as the child of a mortal, called Kavera-muni. In order to
obtain beatitude for her adoptive father, she resolved to become a river
whose waters should purify from all sin. Hence it is that even the holy
Ganges resorts underground once in the year to the source of the
Cauvery, to purge herself from the pollution contracted from the crowd
of sinners who have bathed in her waters.
CAVA DEI TIRRENI, a town and episcopal see of Campania, Italy, in the
province of Salerno, 6 m. N.W. by rail from the town of Salerno. Pop.
(1901) town, 7611; commune, 23,415. It lies fairly high in a richly
cultivated valley, surrounded by wooded hills, and is a favourite resort
of foreigners in spring and autumn, and of the Neapolitans in summer. A
mile to the south-west is the village of Corpo di Cava (1970 ft.), with
the Benedictine abbey of La Trinita della Cava, founded in 1025 by St
Alferius. The church and the greater part of the buildings were entirely
modernized in 1796. The old Gothic cloisters are preserved. The church
contains a fine organ and several ancient sarcophagi. The archives, now
national property, include documents and MSS. of great value (e.g. the
_Codex Legum Longobardorum_ of 1004) and fine _incunabula_. The abbot is
keeper, and also head of a boarding school.
See M. Morcaldi, _Codex Diplomaticus Cavensis_ ( Naples and Milan,
1873-1893).
CAVAEDIUM, in architecture, the Latin name for the central hall or court
within a Roman house, of which five species are described by Vitruvius.
(1) The _Tuscanicum_ responds to the greater number apparently of those
at Pompeii, in which the timbers of the roof are framed together, so as
to leave an open space in the centre, known as the compluvium; it was
through this opening that all the light was received, not only in the
hall itself, but in the rooms round. The rain from the roof was
collected in gutters round the compluvium, and discharged from thence
into a tank or open basin in the floor called the impluvium. (2) In the
_tetrastylon_ additional support was required in consequence of the
dimensions of the hall; this was given by columns placed at the four
angles of the impluvium. (3) _Corinthian_ is the term given to the
species where additional columns were required. (4) In the
_displuviatum_ the roofs, instead of sloping down towards the
compluvium, sloped outwards, the gutters being on the outer walls; there
was still an opening in the roof, and an impluvium to catch the rain
falling through. This species of roof, Vitruvius states, is constantly
in want of repair, as the water does not easily run away, owing to the
stoppage in the rain-water pipes. (5) The _testudinatum_ was employed
when the hall was small and another floor was built over it; no example
of this type has been found at Pompeii, and only one of the cavaedium
displuviatum.
CAVAGNARI, SIR PIERRE LOUIS NAPOLEON (1841-1879), British military
administrator, the son of a French general by his marriage with an Irish
lady, was born at Stenay, in the department of the Meuse, on the 4th of
July 1841. He nevertheless obtained naturalization as an Englishman, and
entered the military service of the East India Company. After passing
through the college at Addiscombe, he served through the Oudh campaign
against the mutineers in 1858 and 1859. In 1861 he was appointed an
assistant commissioner in the Punjab, and in 1877 became deputy
commissioner of Peshawar and took part in several expeditions against
the hill tribes. In 1878 he was attached to the staff of the British
mission to Kabul, which the Afghans refused to allow to proceed. In May
1879, after the death of the amir Shere Ali, Cavagnari negotiated and
signed the treaty of Gandamak with his successor, Yakub Khan. By this
the Afghans agreed to admit a British resident at Kabul, and the post
was conferred on Cavagnari, who also received the Star of India and was
made a K.C.B. He took up his residence in July, and for a time all
seemed to go well, but on the 3rd of September Cavagnari and the other
European members of the mission were massacred in a sudden rising of
mutinous Afghan troops. (See AFGHANISTAN.)
CAVAIGNAC, JEAN BAPTISTE (1762-1829), French politician, was born at
Gourdon (Lot). He was sent by his department as deputy to the
Convention, where he associated himself with the party of the Mountain
and voted for the death of Louis XVI. He was constantly employed on
missions in the provinces, and distinguished himself by his rigorous
repression of opponents of the revolution in the departments of Landes,
Basses-Pyrenees and Gers. With his colleague Jacques Pinet (1754-1844)
he established at Bayonne a revolutionary tribunal with authority in the
neighbouring towns. Charges of cruelty were preferred against him by a
local society before the Convention in 1795, but were dismissed. He had
represented the Convention in the armies of Brest and of the Eastern
Pyrenees in 1793, and in 1795 he was sent to the armies of the Moselle
and the Rhine. He filled various minor administrative offices, and in
1806 became an official at Naples in Murat's government. During the
Hundred Days he was prefect of the Somme. At the restoration he was
proscribed as a regicide, and spent the last years of his life at
Brussels, where he died on the 24th of March 1829. His second son was
General Eugene Cavaignac (q.v.).
The eldest son, ELEONORE LOUIS GODEFROI CAVAIGNAC (1801-1845), was, like
his father, a republican of the _intransigeant_ type. He was bitterly
disappointed at the triumph of the monarchical principle after the
revolution of July 1830, in which he had taken part. He took part in the
Parisian risings of October 1830, 1832 and 1834. On the third occasion
he was imprisoned, but escaped to England in 1835. When he returned to
France in 1841 he worked on the staff of _La Reforme_, and carried on an
energetic republican propaganda. In 1843 he became president of the
Society of the Rights of Man, of which he had been one of the founders
in 1832. He died on the 5th of May 1845. The recumbent statue (1847) of
Godefroi Cavaignac on his tomb at Montmartre (Paris) is one of the
masterpieces of the sculptor Francois Rude.
Jean Baptiste's brother, JACQUES-MARIE, VICOMTE CAVAIGNAC (1773-1855),
French general, served with distinction in the army under the republic
and successive governments. He commanded the cavalry of the XI. corps in
the retreat from Moscow, and eventually became Vicomte Cavaignac and
inspector-general of cavalry.
CAVAIGNAC, LOUIS EUGENE (1802-1857), French general, son of J.B.
Cavaignac, was born at Paris on the 15th of October 1802. After going
through the usual course of study for the military profession, he
entered the army as an engineer officer in 1824, and served in the Morea
in 1828, becoming captain in the following year. When the revolution of
1830 broke out he was stationed at Arras, and was the first officer of
his regiment to declare for the new order of things. In 1831 he was
removed from active duty in consequence of his declared republicanism,
but in 1832 he was recalled to the service and sent to Algeria. This
continued to be the main sphere of his activity for sixteen years, and
he won especial distinction in his fifteen months' command of the
exposed garrison of Tlemcen, a command for which he was selected by
Marshal Clausel (1836-1837), and in the defence of Cherchel (1840).
Almost every step of his promotion was gained on the field of battle,
and in 1844 the duc d'Aumale himself asked for Cavaignac's promotion to
the rank of _marechal de camp_. This was made in the same year, and he
held various district commands in Algeria up to 1848, when the
provisional government appointed him governor-general of the province
with the rank of general of division. The post of minister of war was
also offered to Cavaignac, but he refused it owing to the unwillingness
of the government to quarter troops in Paris, a measure which the
general held to be necessary for the stability of the new regime. On his
election to the National Assembly, however, Cavaignac returned to Paris.
When he arrived on the 17th of May he found the capital in an extremely
critical state. Several _emeutes_ had already taken place, and by the
22nd of June 1848 a formidable insurrection had been organized. The only
course now open to the National Assembly was to assert its authority by
force. Cavaignac, first as minister of war and then as dictator, was
called to the task of suppressing the revolt. It was no light task, as
the national guard was untrustworthy, regular troops were not at hand in
sufficient numbers, and the insurgents had abundant time to prepare
themselves. Variously estimated at from 30,000 to 60,000 men, well armed
and organized, they had entrenched themselves at every step behind
formidable barricades, and were ready to avail themselves of every
advantage that ferocity and despair could suggest to them. Cavaignac
failed perhaps to appreciate the political exigencies of the moment; as
a soldier he would not strike his blow until his plans were matured and
his forces sufficiently prepared. When the troops at last advanced in
three strong columns, every inch of ground was disputed, and the
government troops were frequently repulsed, till, fresh regiments
arriving, he forced his way to the Place de la Bastille and crushed the
insurrection in its headquarters. The contest, which raged from the 23rd
to the morning of the 26th of June, was without doubt the bloodiest and
most resolute the streets of Paris have ever seen, and the general did
not hesitate to inflict the severest punishment on the rebels.
Cavaignac was censured by some for having, by his delay, allowed the
insurrection to gather head; but in the chamber he was declared by a
unanimous vote to have deserved well of his country. After laying down
his dictatorial powers, he continued to preside over the Executive
Committee till the election of a regular president of the republic. It
was expected that the suffrages of France would raise Cavaignac to that
position. But the mass of the people, and especially the rural
population, sick of revolution, and weary even of the moderate
republicanism of Cavaignac, were anxious for a stable government.
Against the five and a half million votes recorded for Louis Napoleon,
Cavaignac received only a million and a half. Not without chagrin at his
defeat, he withdrew into the ranks of the opposition. He continued to
serve as a representative during the short remainder of the republic. At
the _coup d'etat_ of the 2nd December 1851 he was arrested along with
the other members of the opposition; but after a short imprisonment at
Ham he was released, and, with his newly-married wife, lived in
retirement till his death, which took place at Ourne (Sarthe) on the
28th of October 1857.
His son, JACQUES MARIE EUGENE GODEFROI CAVAIGNAC (1853-1905), French
politician, was born in Paris on the 21st of May 1853. He made public
profession of his republican principles as a schoolboy at the Lycee
Charlemagne by refusing in 1867 to receive a prize at the Sorbonne from
the hand of the prince imperial. He received the military medal for
service in the Franco-Prussian War, and in 1872 entered the Ecole
Polytechnique. He served as a civil engineer in Angouleme until 1881,
when he became master of requests in the council of state. In the next
year he was elected deputy for the arrondissement of Saint-Calais
(Sarthe) in the republican interest. In 1885-1886 he was under-secretary
for war in the Henri Brisson ministry, and he served in the cabinet of
Emile Loubet (1892) as minister of marine and of the colonies. He had
exchanged his moderate republicanism for radical views before he became
war minister in the cabinet of Leon Bourgeois (1895-1896). He was again
minister of war in the Brisson sabinet in July 1898, when he read in the
chamber a document which definitely incriminated Captain Alfred Dreyfus.
On the 30th of August, however, he stated that this had been discovered
to be a forgery by Colonel Henry, but he refused to concur with his
colleagues in a revision of the Dreyfus prosecution, which was the
logical outcome of his own exposure of the forgery. Resigning his
portfolio, he continued to declare his conviction of Dreyfus's guilt,
and joined the Nationalist group in the chamber, of which he became one
of the leaders. He also was an energetic supporter of the Ligue de la
Patrie Francaise. In 1899 Cavaignac was an unsuccessful candidate for
the presidency of the republic. He had announced his intention of
retiring from political life when he died at his country-seat near Flee
(Sarthe) on the 25th of September 1905. He wrote an important book on
the _Formation de la Prusse contemporaine_ (2 vols., 1891-1898), dealing
with the events of 1806-1813.
CAVAILLON, a town of south-eastern France in the department of Vaucluse,
20 m. S.E. of Avignon by rail. Pop. (1906) town, 5760; commune, 9952.
Cavaillon lies at the southern base of Mont St Jacques on the right bank
of the Durance above its confluence with the Coulon. It has a hotel de
ville of the 18th century, a church of the 12th century, dedicated to St
Veran, and the mutilated remains of a triumphal arch of the Roman
period. The town is an important railway junction and the commercial
centre of a rich and well-irrigated plain, which produces melons and
other fruits, early vegetables (artichokes, tomatoes, celery, potatoes),
and other products in profusion. Silk-worms are reared, and silk is an
important article of trade. The preparation of preserved vegetables,
fruits and other provisions, distilling, and the manufacture of straw
hats and leather are carried on. Numerous minor relics of the Roman
period have been found to the south of the present town, on the site of
the ancient _Cabellio_, a place of some note in the territory of the
Cavares. In medieval and modern history the town has for the most part
followed the fortunes of the Comtat Venaissin, in which it was included.
Till the time of the Revolution it was the see of a bishop, and had a
large number of monastic establishments.
CAVALCANTI, GUIDO (c. 1250-1300), Italian poet and philosopher, was the
son of a philosopher whom Dante, in the _Inferno_, condemns to torment
among the Epicureans and Atheists; but he himself was a friend of the
great poet. By marriage with Beatrice, daughter of Farinata Uberti, he
became head of the Ghibellines; and when the people, weary of continual
brawls, aroused themselves, and sought peace by banishing the leaders of
the rival parties, he was sent to Sarzana, where he caught a fever, of
which he died. Cavalcanti has left a number of love sonnets and canzoni,
which were honoured by the praise of Dante. Some are simple and
graceful, but many are spoiled by a mixture of metaphysics borrowed from
Plato, Aristotle and the Christian Fathers. They are mostly in honour of
a French lady, whom he calls Mandetta. His _Canzone d'Amore_ was
extremely popular, and was frequently published; and his complete
poetical works are contained in Giunti's collection (Florence, 1527;
Venice, 1531-1532). He also wrote in prose on philosophy and oratory.
See D.G. Rossetti, _Dante and his Circle_ (1874).
CAVALIER, JEAN (1681-1740), the famous chief of the Camisards (q.v.),
was born at Mas Roux, a small hamlet in the commune of Ribaute near
Anduze (Gard), on the 28th of November 1681. His father, an illiterate
peasant, had been compelled by persecution to become a Roman Catholic
along with his family, but his mother brought him up secretly in the
Protestant faith. In his boyhood he became a shepherd, and about his
twentieth year he was apprenticed to a baker. Threatened with
prosecution for his religious opinions he went to Geneva, where he
passed the year 1701; he returned to the Cevennes on the eve of the
rebellion of the Camisards, who by the murder of the Abbe du Chayla at
Pont-de-Monvert on the night of the 24th of July 1702 raised the
standard of revolt. Some months later he became their leader. He showed
himself possessed of an extraordinary genius for war, and Marshal
Villars paid him the high compliment of saying that he was as courageous
in attack as he was prudent in retreat, and that by his extraordinary
knowledge of the country he displayed in the management of his troops a
skill as great as that of the ablest officers. Within a period of two
years he was to hold in check Count Victor Maurice de Broglie and
Marshal Montrevel, generals of Louis XIV., and to carry on one of the
most terrible partisan wars in French history.
He organized the Camisard forces and maintained the most severe
discipline. As an orator he derived his inspiration from the prophets of
Israel, and raised the enthusiasm of his rude mountaineers to a pitch so
high that they were ready to die with their young leader for the sake of
liberty of conscience. Each battle increased the terror of his name. On
Christmas day 1702 he dared to hold a religious assembly at the very
gates of Alais, and put to flight the local militia which came forth to
attack him. At Vagnas, on the 10th of February 1703, he routed the royal
troops, but, defeated in his turn, he was compelled to find safety in
flight. But he reappeared, was again defeated at Tour de Bellot (April
30), and again recovered himself, recruits flocking to him to fill up
the places of the slain. By a long series of successes he raised his
reputation to the highest pitch, and gained the full confidence of the
people. It was in vain that more rigorous measures were adopted against
the Camisards. Cavalier boldly carried the war into the plain, made
terrible reprisals, and threatened even Nimes itself. On the 16th of
April 1704 he encountered Marshal Montrevel himself at the bridge of
Nages, with 1000 men against 5000, and, though defeated after a
desperate conflict, he made a successful retreat with two-thirds of his
men. It was at this moment that Marshal Villars, wishing to put an end
to the terrible struggle, opened negotiations, and Cavalier was induced
to attend a conference at Pont d'Avene near Alais on the 11th of May
1704, and on the 16th of May he made submission at Nimes. These
negotiations, with the proudest monarch in Europe, he carried on, not as
a rebel, but as the leader of an army which had waged an honourable war.
Louis XIV. gave him a commission as colonel, which Villars presented to
him personally, and a pension of 1200 livres. At the same time he
authorized the formation of a Camisard regiment for service in Spain
under his command.
Before leaving the Cevennes for the last time he went to Alais and to
Ribaute, followed by an immense concourse of people. But Cavalier had
not been able to obtain liberty of conscience, and his Camisards almost
to a man broke forth in wrath against him, reproaching him for what they
described as his treacherous desertion. On the 21st of June 1704, with a
hundred Camisards who were still faithful to him, he departed from Nimes
and came to Neu-Brisach (Alsace), where he was to be quartered. From
Dijon he went on to Paris, where Louis XIV. gave him audience and heard
his explanation of the revolt of the Cevennes. Returning to Dijon,
fearing to be imprisoned in the fortress of Neu-Brisach, he escaped with
his troop near Montbeliard and took refuge at Lausanne. But he was too
much of a soldier to abandon the career of arms. He offered his services
to the duke of Savoy, and with his Camisards made war in the Val
d'Aosta. After the peace he crossed to England, where he formed a
regiment of refugees which took part in the Spanish expedition under the
earl of Peterborough and Sir Cloudesley Shovel in May 1705. At the
battle of Almansa the Camisards found themselves opposed to a French
regiment, and without firing the two bodies rushed one upon the other.
Cavalier wrote later (July 10, 1707): "The only consolation that
remains to me is that the regiment I had the honour to command never
looked back, but sold its life dearly on the field of battle. I fought
as long as a man stood beside me and until numbers overpowered me,
losing also an immense quantity of blood from a dozen wounds which I
received." Marshal Berwick never spoke of this tragic event without
visible emotion.
On his return to England a small pension was given him and he settled at
Dublin, where he published _Memoirs of the Wars of the Cevennes under
Col. Cavalier_, written in French and translated into English with a
dedication to Lord Carteret (1726). Though Cavalier received, no doubt,
assistance in the publication of the Memoirs, it is none the less true
that he provided the materials, and that his work is the most valuable
source for the history of his life. He was made a general on the 27th of
October 1735, and on the 25th of May 1738 was appointed
lieutenant-governor of Jersey. Writing in the following year (August 26,
1739) he says: "I am overworked and weary; I am going to take the waters
in England so as to be in a fit condition for the war against the
Spaniards if they reject counsels of prudence." He was promoted to the
rank of major-general on the 2nd of July 1739, and died in the following
year. In the parochial register of St Luke's, Chelsea, there is an
entry: "Burial A.D. 1740, May 18, Brigadier John Cavalier."
There is a story which represents him as the fortunate rival of Voltaire
for the hand of Olympe, daughter of Madame Dunoyer, author of the
_Lettres galantes_. During his stay in England he married the daughter
of Captain de Ponthieu and Marguerite de la Rochefoucauld, refugees
living at Portarlington. Malesherbes, the courageous defender of Louis
XVI., bears the following eloquent testimony to this young hero of the
Cevennes:--"I confess," he says, "that this warrior, who, without ever
having served, found himself by the mere gift of nature a great
general,--this Camisard who was bold to punish a crime in the presence
of a fierce troop which maintained itself by little crimes--this coarse
peasant who, when admitted at twenty years of age into the society of
cultivated people, caught their manners and won their love and esteem,
this man who, though accustomed to a stormy life, and having just cause
to be proud of his success, had yet enough philosophy in him by nature
to enjoy for thirty-five years a tranquil private life--appears to me to
be one of the rarest characters to be found in history."
For a more detailed account see F. Puaux, _Vie de Jean Cavalier_
(1868); David C.A. Agnew, _Protestant Exiles from France_, ii. 54-66
(Lond., 1871); Charvey, _Jean Cavalier: nouveaux documents inedits_
(1884). Eugene Sue popularized the name of the Camisard chief in _Jean
Cavalier ou les fanatiques des Cevennes_ (1840). (F. Px.)
CAVALIER, a horseman, particularly a horse-soldier or one of gentle
birth trained in knightly exercises. The word is taken from one of the
French words which derived ultimately from the Late Lat. _caballarius_,
a horseman, from Lat. _caballus_, properly a pack-horse, which gave the
Fr. _cheval._ a _chevalier_. This last word is the regular French for
"knight," and is chiefly used in English for a member of certain foreign
military or other orders, particularly of the Legion of Honour. Cavalier
in English was early applied in a contemptuous sense to an overbearing
swashbuckler--a roisterer or swaggering gallant. In Shakespeare (_2
Henry IV._ v. iii. 62) Shallow calls Bardolph's companions "cavaleros."
"Cavalier" is chiefly associated with the Royalists, the supporters of
Charles I. in the struggle with the Parliament in the Great Rebellion.
Here again it first appears as a term of reproach and contempt, applied
by the opponents of the king. Charles in the _Answer to the Petition_
(June 13, 1642) speaks of cavaliers as a "word by what mistake soever it
seemes much in disfavour." Further quotations of the use of the word by
the Parliamentary party are given in the _New English Dictionary_. It
was soon adopted (as a title of honour) by the king's party, who in
return applied Roundhead to their opponents, and at the Restoration the
court party preserved the name, which survived till the rise of the term
Tory (see WHIG AND TORY). The term "cavalier" has been adopted from the
French as a term in fortification for a work of great command
constructed in the interior of a fort, bastion or other defence, so as
to fire over the main parapet without interfering with the fire of the
latter. A greater volume of fire can thus be obtained, but the great
height of the cavalier makes it an easy target for a besieger's guns.
CAVALIERE, EMILIO DEL, 16th-century Italian musical composer, was born
in Rome about 1550 of a noble family. He held a post at the court of
Ferdinand I. of Tuscany from 1588 to 1597, and during his residence at
Florence was on terms of intimacy with J. Peri, O. Rinuccini, G. Caccini
and the rest of the Bardi circle. In 1597 he returned to Rome, and
became connected with the Congregation of the Oratory founded by St
Philip Neri. Here in 1600 was performed Cavaliere's contribution to the
musical reformation initiated by his circle of friends in Florence--_La
Rappresentazione di Anima e di Corpo_, a sacred drama, which is regarded
as the first example of what is now called oratorio. It is generally
supposed that he was no longer living when the work was performed, but
some authorities assign 1602 as the date of his death.
Cavaliere's style is more facile than that of Peri and Caccini, but he
is inferior to them in depth of musical expression. He is, however,
important as being the first to apply the new monodic style to sacred
music, and as the founder of the Roman school of the 17th century which
included Mazzocchi, Carissimi and Alessandro Scarlatti.
See also H. Goldschmidt, _Studien zur Geschichte der italienischen
Oper im 17. Jahrhundert_, Band i.
CAVALLI, FRANCESCO (1599?-1676), Italian musical composer, was born at
Crema in 1599 or 1600. His real name was Pier Francesco Caletti-Bruni,
but he is better known by that of Cavalli, the name of his patron, a
Venetian nobleman. He became a singer at St Mark's in Venice in 1617,
second organist in 1639, first organist in 1665, and in 1668 _maestro di
cappella_. He is, however, chiefly important for his operas. He began to
write for the stage in 1639 (_Le Nozze di Teti e di Peleo_), and soon
established so great a reputation that he was summoned to Paris in 1660
to produce an opera (_Serse_) at the Louvre in honour of the marriage of
Louis XIV. He visited Paris again in 1662, bringing out his _Ercole
Amante_. His death occurred in Venice on the 14th of January 1676.
Twenty-seven operas of Cavalli are still extant, most of them being
preserved in the library of St Mark at Venice. Monteverde had found
opera a musico-literary experiment, and left it a magnificent dramatic
spectacle. Cavalli succeeded in making opera a popular entertainment. He
reduced Monteverde's extravagant orchestra to more practical limits,
introduced melodious arias into his music and popular types into his
_libretti_. His operas have all the characteristic exaggerations and
absurdities of the 17th century, but they have also a remarkably strong
sense of dramatic effect as well as a great musical facility, and a
grotesque humour which was characteristic of Italian grand opera down to
the death of Alessandro Scarlatti.
CAVALLINI, PIETRO (c. 1259-1344), Italian painter, born in Rome, was an
artist of the earliest epoch of the modern Roman school, and was taught
painting and mosaic by Giotto while employed at Rome; it is believed
that he assisted his master in the mosaic of the Navicella or ship of St
Peter, in the porch of the church of that saint. He also studied under
the Cosmati. Lanzi describes him as an adept in both arts, and mentions
with approbation his grand fresco of a Crucifixion at Assisi, still in
tolerable preservation; he was, moreover, versed in architecture and in
sculpture. According to George Vertue, it is highly probable that
Cavallini executed, in 1279, the mosaics and other ornaments of the tomb
of Edward the Confessor in Westminster Abbey. He would thus be the
"Petrus Civis Romanus" whose name is inscribed on the shrine; but a
comparison of dates invalidates this surmise. He died in 1344, at the
age of eighty-five, in the odour of sanctity, having in his later years
been a man of eminent piety. He is said to have carved for the Basilica
of San Paolo fuori le Mura, close to Rome, a crucifix which spoke in
1370 to a female saint. Some highly important works by Cavallini in the
church of Santa Cecilia in Trastevere, Rome, have been recently
discovered.
CAVALLO, TIBERIUS (1749-1809), Anglo-Italian electrician and natural
philosopher, was born on the 30th of March 1749 at Naples, where his
father was a physician. In 1771 he came to England with the intention of
pursuing a mercantile career, but he soon turned his attention to
scientific work. Although he made several ingenious improvements in
scientific instruments, his mind was rather imitative and critical than
creative. He published numerous works on different branches of physics,
including _A Complete Treatise on Electricity_ (1777), _Treatise on the
Nature and Properties of Air and other permanently Elastic Fluids_
(1781), _History and Practice of Aerostation_ (1785), _Treatise on
Magnetism_ (1787), _Elements of Natural and Experimental Philosophy_
(1803), _Theory and Practice of Medical Electricity_ (1780), and
_Medical Properties of Factitious Air_ (1798). He died in London on the
21st of December 1809.
CAVALLOTTI, FELICE (1842-1898), Italian politician, poet and dramatic
author, was born at Milan on the 6th of November 1842. In 1860 and 1866
he fought with the Garibaldian Corps, but first attained notoriety by
his anti-monarchical lampoons in the _Gazzetta di Milano_ and in the
_Gazzettina Rosa_ between 1866 and 1872. Elected to parliament as deputy
for Corteolona in the latter year, he took the oath of allegiance after
having publicly impugned its validity. Eloquence and turbulent,
combativeness in and out of parliament secured for him the leadership of
the extreme Left on the death of Bertani in 1886. During his twelve
years' leadership his party increased in number from twenty to seventy,
and at the time of his death his parliamentary influence was greater
than ever before. Though ambitious and addicted to defamatory methods of
personal attack which sometimes savoured of political blackmail,
Cavallotti's eloquent advocacy of democratic reform, and apparent
generosity of sentiment, secured for him a popularity surpassed by that
of no contemporary save Crispi. Services rendered in the cholera
epidemic of 1885, his numerous lawsuits and thirty-three duels, his
bitter campaign against Crispi, and his championship of French
interests, combined to enhance his notoriety and to increase his
political influence. By skilful alliances with the marquis di Rudini he
more than once obtained practical control of the Italian government, and
exacted notable concessions to Radical demands. He was killed on the 6th
of March 1898 in a duel with Count Macola, editor of the conservative
_Gazetta di Venezia_, whom he had assailed with characteristic
intemperance of language. By his death the house of Savoy lost a
relentless foe, and the revolutionary elements in Italy a gifted, if not
entirely trustworthy, leader. (H. W. S.)
CAVALRY (Fr. _cavalerie_, Ger. _Kavallerie_ or _Reiterei_, derived
ultimately from late Lat. _caballus_, horse), a word which came into use
in military literature about the middle of the 16th century as applied
to mounted men of all kinds employed for combatant purposes, whether
intended primarily for charging in masses, in small bodies, or for
dismounted fighting. By degrees, as greater refinement of terminology
has become desirable, the idea has been narrowed down until it includes
only "horsemen trained to achieve the purpose of their commander by the
combined action of man and horse," and this definition will be found to
cover the whole field of cavalry activity, from the tasks entrusted to
the cavalry "corps" of 10,000 sabres down to the missions devolving on
isolated squadrons and even troops.
Early use of mounted warriors.
_History_--The evolution of the cavalry arm has never been uniform at
any one time over the surface of the globe, but has always been locally
modified by the conditions of each community and the stage of
intellectual development to which at any given moment each had attained.
The first condition for the existence of the arm being the existence of
the horse itself, its relative scarcity or the reverse and its
adaptability to its environment in each particular district have always
exercised a preponderating influence on the development of cavalry
organization and tactics. The indigenous horses of Europe and Asia being
very small, the first application of their capabilities for war purposes
seems everywhere to have been as draught animals for chariots, the
construction of which implies not only the existence of level surfaces,
perhaps of actual roads, but a very considerable degree of mechanical
skill in those who designed and employed them. The whole of the
classical and Oriental mythologies, together with the earliest monuments
of Egypt, Assyria and India, are convincing on this point. Nowhere can
we find a trace either of description or delineation of animals
physically capable of carrying on their backs the armed men of the
period. All the earliest allusions to the use of the horse in war either
point directly to the employment as a draught animal, or where not
specific, as in the description of the war-horse in Job, they would
apply equally well to one harnessed to a chariot as to one ridden under
the saddle.
The first trace of change is to be found, according to Prof. Wm.
Ridgeway (_Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse_, p. 243), in
an Egyptian relief showing Nubians mounted on horses of an entirely
different breed, taller and more powerful than any which had gone before
them. These horses appear to have come from the vicinity of Dongola, and
the strain still survives in the Sudan. The breed is traced into Arabia,
where only second-rate horses had been reared hitherto, and thence to
different parts of Europe, where eventually centres of cavalry activity
developed. The first detailed evidence of the existence of organized
bodies of mounted men is to be found in Xenophon, whose instructions for
the breaking, training and command of a squadron remain almost as a
model for modern practice. Their tactical employment, however, seems
still to have been relatively insignificant, for the horses were still
far too small and too few to deliver a charge with sufficient momentum
to break the heavy armed and disciplined hoplites. The strain of ancient
battle was of an entirely different order to that of modern fighting. In
the absence of projectiles of sufficient range and power to sweep a
whole area, the fighting was entirely between the front ranks of the
opposing forces. When a front rank fighter fell, his place was
immediately taken by his comrade in the rear, who took up the individual
combat, excited by his comrade's fate but relatively fresh in mind and
muscle. This process of feeding the fight from the rear could be
protracted almost indefinitely. If then, as a consequence of a charge, a
few mounted men did penetrate the ranks, they encountered such a crowd
of well-protected and fresh swordsmen that they were soon pulled off
their ponies and despatched. Now and again great leaders, Alexander,
Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, for instance, succeeded in riding down
their opponents, but in the main, and as against the Roman infantry in
particular, mounted troops proved of very little service on the
battlefield.
It was, however, otherwise in the sphere of strategy. There, information
was of even greater importance, because harder to obtain, than it is
nowadays, and the army which could push out its feelers to the greater
distance, surround its enemy and intercept his communications, derived
nearly the same advantages as it does at present. Hence both sides
provided themselves with horsemen, and when these met, each in the
performance of their several duties, charges of masses naturally ensued.
This explains the value attaching in the old days to the possession of
horse-flesh and the rapid spread of the relatively new Dongola or
African strain over the then known world.
The primitive instinct of aboriginal man is to throw stones or other
missiles for purposes of defence (apes will throw anything they can
find, but they never use sticks); hence, as the Romans penetrated ever
farther amongst the barbarian tribes, their horsemen in first line found
ever-increasing need for protection against projectiles. But the greater
the weight of armour carried, the greater the demands upon the endurance
of the horse. Then, as the weight-carrying breed was expensive and, with
the decay of the Roman Empire, corruption and peculation spread, a limit
was soon placed on the multiplication of charging cavalry, and it became
necessary to fall back on the indigenous pony, which could only carry a
rider from place to place, not charge. Thus there was a gradual
levelling down of the mounted arms, the heavy cavalry becoming too heavy
to gallop and the light not good enough for united action. Against such
opponents, the lighter and better mounted tribesmen of Asia found their
task easy. They cut off the supplies of the marching infantry, filled up
or destroyed the wells, &c., and thus demonstrated the strategic
necessity of superior mobility.
With the decay of civilization discipline also disappeared, and, as
discipline consists essentially in the spirit of self-sacrifice for the
good of the community, its opposite, self-preservation, became the
guiding principle. This in turn led to the increase of armour carried,
and thence to the demand for heavier horses, and this demand working
through several centuries led ultimately to the breeding of the great
weight-carrying animals on whose existence that of medieval chivalry
depended. These horses, however, being very costly and practically
useless for general purposes, could only become the property of the
wealthy, who were too independent to feel the need of combination, and
preferred to live on the spoliation and taxation of the weak. This
spoliation eventually impelled the weaker men to combine, and at first
their combination took the form of the construction of fortified places,
against which mounted men were powerless. On the other hand, expense put
a limit to the area which fortifications could enclose, and this again
limited the supplies for the garrison. Horsemen sweeping the country for
miles around had no difficulty in feeding themselves, and the surrender
of all beleaguered places through starvation was ultimately inevitable,
unless food could be introduced from allied towns in the vicinity. It
was of no use to introduce fighting men only into a place which
primarily required food (cf. Lucknow, 1857) to protract its resistance.
Hence some means had to be found to surround the supply-convoys with a
physically impenetrable shield, and eighteen-foot pikes in the hands of
powerful disciplined soldiers met the requirements. Against eight to ten
ranks of such men the best cavalry in the world, relying only on their
swords, were helpless, and for the time (towards the close of the 15th
century) infantry remained masters of the field on the continent of
Europe.
England meanwhile had developed on lines of her own. Thanks to her
longbowmen and the military genius of her leaders, she might have
retained indefinitely the command of the continent had it not been for
the invention of gunpowder, which, though readily accepted by the
English for sieges in France, proved the ultimate cause of their
undoing. It was the French who developed the use of siege artillery most
rapidly, and their cavalry were not slow to take the hint; unlike the
longbow and the crossbow, the pistol could be used effectively from
horseback, and presently the knights and their retainers, having the
deepest purses, provided themselves with long pistols in addition to
their lances and swords. These weapons sent a bullet through any armour
which a foot-soldier could conveniently carry, or his commander afford,
and if anything went wrong with their mechanism (which was complicated
and uncertain) the speed of his horse soon carried the rider out of
danger. A new form of attack against infantry, introduced by the French
at Cerisoles, 1544, thus developed itself. A troop or squadron, formed
in from twelve to sixteen ranks, trotted up to within pistol shot of the
angle of the square to be attacked and halted; then each rank in
succession cantered off man by man to the left, discharging his pistol
at the square as he passed, and riding back to his place behind the
column to reload. This could be prolonged indefinitely, and against such
tactics the infantry were powerless. The stakes carried by English
archers to check the direct charge of horsemen became useless, as did
also _chevaux de frise_, though the latter (which originated in the 14th
century) continued to be employed by the Austrians against the
swiftly-charging Turks till the close of the 17th century. Thus it
became necessary to devise some new impediment which, whilst remaining
mobile, would also give cover and an advantage in the final hand-to-hand
shock. The problem was solved in Bohemia, Poland and Moravia (Hussite
wars, about 1420), where, distances being great and the country open,
greater mobility and capacity in the convoys became essential. Great
trains of wagons were placed in charge of an infantry escort, of which a
part had become possessed of firearms, and these moved across country in
as many as twelve parallel lines drilled to form _laagers_, as nowadays
in South Africa. Again the cavalry proved helpless, and for nearly a
century in central Europe the word "_Wagenburg_" (wagon-fortress) became
synonymous with "army." Then an unfortunate inspiration came to the
wagon-men. A large gun was relatively cheaper to manufacture, and more
effective than a small one. To keep their assailants at a distance, they
mounted wall-pieces of about one-inch bore on their wagons. For a moment
the balance inclined in their favour, but the cavalry were quick to see
their advantage in this new idea, and they immediately followed suit.
They, too, mounted guns on wheels, and, as their mobility gave them
choice of position, they were able to concentrate their fire against any
side of the laager, and again ultimate surrender was the only way out of
the defenders' dilemma.
The interesting problem thus raised was never finally solved, for the
scene of action now shifted to western Europe, to the valley of the Po,
and more particularly to the Netherlands, where fortresses were closer
together and the clayey nature of the Rhine delta had already made paved
roads necessary. Then, the _Wagenburg_ being no longer needed for the
short transits between one fortified town and another, the infantry
reasserted themselves. Firearms having been much improved in the
interval the spearmen (pikemen) had already (about 1515) learnt to
protect themselves by musketeers trained to take advantage of cover and
ground somewhat in the same fashion as the modern skirmisher. These
musketeers kept light guns at a distance from their pikemen, but dared
not venture far out, as their fire was altogether inadequate to stop a
rush of horsemen; when the latter threatened to intervene, they had to
run for safety to the squares of pikemen, whom they assisted in turn by
keeping the cavalry beyond pistol range. Hence the horsemen had to fall
back upon more powerful guns, and these, being slow and requiring more
train, could be most economically protected by infantry (see also
ARTILLERY).
17th-century progress.
Thus about the close of the 16th century western armies differentiated
themselves out into the still existing three types--cavalry, artillery
and infantry. Moreover, each type was subdivided, the cavalry becoming
heavy, medium and dragoons. At this period there was nothing to disturb
the equilibrium of two contending forces except the characters of their
respective leaders. The mercenary element had triumphed everywhere over
the feudal levies. The moral qualities of all were on the same
indifferent level, and battles in the open followed one recognized
course. Neither army being able to outmarch the other, both drew up
masses of pikes in parallel lines. The musketeers covered the deployment
of the heavy guns on either side, the cavalry drew up on the wings and a
strictly parallel fight ensued, for in the absence of a common cause for
which men were willing to die, plunder was the ruling motive, and all
control and discipline melted in the excitement of the contest.
It is to the growth of Protestantism that cavalry owes its next great
forward leap. To sweep the battlefield, it was absolutely essential that
men should be ready to subordinate selfish considerations to the triumph
of their cause. The Roman Catholicism of the day gave many loopholes for
the evasion of clear duty, but from these the reformed faith was free,
and it is to the reawakened sense of duty that Gustavus Adolphus
appealed. This alone rendered combination amongst his subordinate
leaders possible, and on this power of combination all his victories
depended. Other cavalry soldiers, once let loose in the charge, could
never be trusted to return to the field, the prospective plunder of the
enemy's baggage being too strong a temptation; but the king's men could
be depended on, and once brought back in formed bodies, they rode over
the enemy's skirmishers and captured his batteries. Then the equilibrium
of force was destroyed, and all arms combined made short work of the
opposing infantry alone (Breitenfeld, 1631). But the Swedish king
perished with his work half done, and matters reverted to their former
condition until the appearance of Cromwell, another great leader capable
of animating his men with the spirit of devotion, again rendered the
cavalry arm supreme. The essence of his success lay in this, that his
men were ready everywhere and always to lay down their lives for their
common cause. Whether scouting 70 m. to the front of their army, or
fighting dismounted to delay the enemy at defiles or to storm fortified
strongholds, or charging home on the battlefield, their will power,
focused on, and in turn dependent on, the personality of their great
leader, dominated all human instincts of fear, rapacity or selfishness.
It is true that they had not to ride against the modern rifle, but it is
equally true that there was no quick-firing artillery to carry terror
through the enemy's army, and it was against masses of spearmen and
musketeers, not then subjected to bursting shells or the lash of
shrapnel and rifle bullets, that the final charges had always to be
ridden home.
Each succeeding decade thereafter has seen a steady diminution in the
ultimate power of resistance of the infantry, and a corresponding
increase in the power of fire preparation at the disposal of the supreme
leader; and the chances of cavalry have fluctuated with the genius of
that leader in the employment of the means at his disposal, and the
topographical conditions existing within each theatre of war. During the
campaigns in Flanders, with its multiplicity of fortresses and clayey
soil, cavalry rapidly degenerated into mounted infantry, throwing aside
sword and lance-proof armour, and adopting long muskets and heavier
ammunition. Presently they abandoned the charge at a gallop and reverted
to an approach at the trot, and if (as at Blenheim) their influence
proved decisive on the field of battle, this was because the conditions
were common to both combatants, and the personal influence of "Corporal
John," as his soldiers called Marlborough, ensured greater steadiness
and better co-operation.
Frederick II.; reform of the Prussian cavalry.
When Frederick II. became king of Prussia (1740), he found his cavalry
almost at the nadir of efficiency; even his cuirassiers drilled
principally on foot. "They can manoeuvre," on foot, "with the same
precision as my grenadiers, but unfortunately they are equally slow."
His enemies the Austrians, thanks to their wars against the Turks who
always charged at a gallop, had maintained greater dash and mobility,
and at Mollwitz the Prussians only escaped disaster by the astounding
rapidity of their infantry fire. In disgust the king then wrote, "Die
Cavallerie is nicht einmal werth dasz sie der Teufel weck holet," and he
immediately set about their reform with his usual energy and
thoroughness. Three years after Mollwitz, the result of his exertions
was apparent in the greatly increased importance the arm acquired on the
battlefield, and the charge of the Bayreuth dragoons at Hohenfriedberg
(June 4, 1745), who with 1500 horses rode over and dispersed 20 Austrian
battalions, bringing in 2500 prisoners and 67 colours, will always rank
as one of the most brilliant feats in military history.[1] The following
years of peace (1745-1756) were devoted to the methodical preparation of
the cavalry to meet the requirements that Frederick's methods of war
would make upon them, and it is to this period that the student should
devote special attention. From the very outbreak of the Seven Years' War
(1756) this training asserted its influence, and Rossbach (1757) and
Zorndorf (1758) are the principal examples of what cavalry handled in
masses can effect. At Rossbach General v. Seydlitz, at the head of 38
squadrons, practically began and ended the destruction of the French
army, and at Zorndorf he saved the day for the Prussians by a series of
the most brilliant charges, which successively destroyed the Russian
right wing and centre. These battles so conclusively demonstrated the
superiority of the Prussian cavalry that their enemies completely
altered their tactical procedure. They now utilized their enormous
numerical superiority by working in two separate armies, each almost as
strong as the whole Prussian force. When the latter moved against
either, the one threatened immediately threw up heavy entrenchments,
against which cavalry were, of course, ineffective, whilst the other
pursued its march. When Frederick, having more or less beaten his
immediate opponent, began to threaten the other army it entrenched
likewise. Against these methods the Prussian army soon wore itself out,
and though from time to time the cavalry locally distinguished itself,
no further opportunities for great decisive blows presented themselves.
The increased demands made upon the mobility of the Prussian horsemen
naturally resulted in the gradual rejection of everything which was not
essential to their striking power. The long muskets and bayonets were
laid aside, but the cuirass was retained for the melee, and by the close
of the great struggle the various branches of the arm had differentiated
themselves out into the types still adhered to, heavy cavalry, dragoons,
hussars, whose equipment as regards essentials thenceforward hardly
varied up to the latter years of the 19th century. The only striking
difference lies in the entire rejection of the lance in the armament of
the charging squadrons, and the reason is characteristic of the
principles of the day. The Prussian cavalry had realized that success
was decided, not primarily by actual collision, but by the moral effect
of the appearance of an absolutely closed wall of horsemen approaching
the adversary at full speed. If the necessary degree of cohesion was
attained, the other side was morally beaten before collision took place,
and either turned to flight, or met the shock with so little resolution
that it was ridden over without difficulty. In the former case any
weapon was good enough to kill a flying enemy; in the latter, in the
melee which then ensued, the crush in the ranks of the victors was still
so great that the lance was a hindrance rather than a help.
In the years succeeding the war the efficiency of the Prussian cavalry
sank very rapidly, the initial cause being the death of Seydlitz at the
early age of fifty-two. His personality had alone dominated the
discontent, lethargy and hopelessness created by ruthless financial
economies. When he was gone, as always in the absence of a great leader,
men adapted their lives to the line of least resistance. In thirty years
the wreck was complete, and within the splendid squadrons which had been
accustomed to manoeuvre with perfect precision at the highest speed,
there were (as F.A. von der Marwitz in his _Nachlass_ clearly shows) not
more than seven thoroughly trained men and horses to each, the remainder
being trained for little longer and receiving less attention than is the
case with modern 2nd line or auxiliary cavalry.
Cavalry in the revolutionary wars.
For the generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution,
Frederick the Great's army, and especially his cavalry, had become the
model for all Europe, but the mainspring of the excellence of his
squadrons was everywhere overlooked. Seydlitz had manoeuvred great
masses of horsemen, therefore every one else must have great masses
also; but no nation grasped the secret, viz. the unconditional obedience
of the horse to its rider, on which his success had depended. Neither
was it possible under the prevailing social conditions to secure the old
stamp of horse, or the former attention to detail on the part of men and
officers. In France, owing to the agricultural decay of the country,
suitable remounts for charging cavalry were almost unobtainable, and as
this particular branch of the army was almost exclusively commanded by
the aristocracy it suffered most in the early days of the Revolution.
The hussars, being chiefly recruited and officered by Alsatians and
Germans from the Rhine provinces, retained their individuality and
traditions much longer than the dragoons and cuirassiers, and, to the
very close of the great wars, we find them always ready to charge at a
gallop; but the unsteadiness and poor horsemanship of the other branches
was so great that up to 1812, the year of their destruction, they always
charged at a trot only, considering that the advantage of superior
cohesion thus gained more than balanced the loss of momentum due to the
slower pace.
Generally, the growth of the French cavalry service followed the
universal law. The best big horses went to the heavy charging cavalry,
viz. the cuirassiers, the best light horses to the hussars, and the
dragoons received the remainder, for in principle they were only
infantry placed on horseback for convenience of locomotion, and were not
primarily intended for combined mounted action. Fortunately for them,
their principal adversaries, the Austrians, had altogether failed to
grasp the lesson of the Seven Years' War. Writing in 1780 Colonel Mack,
a very capable officer, said, "Even in 1769, the cavalry could not ride,
could not manage to control their horses. Not a single squadron could
keep its dressing at a gallop, and before they had gone fifty yards at
least ten out of forty horses in the first rank would break out to the
front," and though the veteran field marshal Lacy issued new
regulations, their spirit seems always to have escaped the executive
officers. The British cavalry was almost worse off, for economy had
reduced its squadrons to mere skeletons, and the traditional British
style of horsemanship, radically different from that in vogue in France,
made their training for combined action even more difficult than
elsewhere. Hence the history of cavalry during the earlier campaigns of
the Revolution is marked by no decisive triumphs, the results are always
inadequate when judged by the magnitude of the forces employed, and only
the brilliant exploit of the 15th Light Dragoons (now Hussars) at
Villers en Couche (April 24, 1794) deserves to be cited as an instance
of the extraordinary influence which even a few horsemen can exercise
over a demoralized or untrained mob of infantry.
Up to the campaign of Poland (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS) French victories
were won chiefly by the brilliant infantry fighting, cavalry only
intervening (as at Jena) to charge a beaten enemy and complete his
destruction by pursuit. But after the terrible waste of life in the
winter of 1806-7, and the appalling losses in battle, Napoleon
introduced a new form of attack. The case-shot preparation of his
artillery (see ARTILLERY) sowed confusion and terror in the enemy's
ranks, and the opportunity was used by masses of cavalry. Henceforward
this method dominated the Napoleonic tactics and strategy. The essential
difference between this system and the Frederician lies in this, that
with the artillery available in the former period it was not possible to
say in advance at what point the intervention of cavalry would be
necessary, hence the need for speed and precision of manoeuvre to ensure
their arrival at the right time and place. Napoleon now selected
beforehand the point he meant to overwhelm and could bring his cavalry
masses within striking distance at leisure. Once placed, it was only
necessary to induce them to run away in the required direction to
overwhelm everything by sheer weight of men and horses. This method
failed at Waterloo because the ground was too heavy, the slope of it
against the charge, and the whole condition of the horses too low for
the exertion demanded of them.
The British cavalry from 1793 to 1815 suffered from the same causes
which at the beginning of the 20th century brought about its breakdown
in the South African War. Over-sea transport brought the horses to land
in poor condition, and it was rarely possible to afford them sufficient
time to recover and become accustomed to the change in forage, the
conditions of the particular theatre of operations, &c., before they had
to be led against the enemy--hence a heavy casualty roll and the
introduction into the ranks of raw unbroken horses which interfered with
the precision of manoeuvre of the remainder. Their losses (about 13% per
annum) were small as compared with those of South Africa, but this is
mainly accounted for by the fact that, operations being generally in the
northern hemisphere, the change of climate was never so severe.
Tactically, they suffered, like the Austrians and Prussians, from the
absence of any conception of the Napoleonic strategy amongst their
principal leaders. As it was not known where the great blow was to fall,
they were distributed along the whole line, and thus became habituated
to the idea of operating in relatively small bodies. This is the worst
school for the cavalry soldier, because it is only when working in
masses of forty to sixty squadrons that the cumulative consequences of
small errors of detail become so apparent as to convince all ranks of
the necessity of conforming accurately to established prescriptions.
Nevertheless, they still retained the practice of charging at a gallop,
and as a whole were by far the most efficient body of horsemen who
survived at the close of the great wars.
Later 19th century.
In the reaction that then ensued all over Europe, cavalry practically
ceased to exist. The financial and agricultural exhaustion of all
countries, and of Prussia in particular, was so complete that money was
nowhere to be found for the great concentrations and manoeuvre practices
which are more essential to the efficiency of the cavalry than to that
of the other arms. Hence a whole generation of officers grew up in
ignorance of the fundamental principles which govern the employment of
their arm. It was not till 1848 that the Prussians began again to unite
whole cavalry divisions for drill and manoeuvre, and the soldiers of the
older generation had not yet passed away when the campaigns of 1866 and
1870 brought up again the realities of the battle-field. Meanwhile the
introduction of long-range artillery and small arms had entirely
destroyed the tactical relation of the three arms on which the
Napoleonic tactics and strategy had been based, and the idea gained
ground that the battle-field would no longer afford the same
opportunities to cavalry as before. The experiences gained by the
Americans in the Civil War helped to confirm this preconception. If in
battles waged between infantries armed only with muzzle-loading rifles,
cavalry could find no opportunity to repeat past exploits, it was argued
that its chances could not fail to be still further reduced by the
breech-loader. But this reasoning ignored the principal factors of
former successes. The mounted men in America failed not as a consequence
of the armament they encountered, but because the war brought out no
Napoleon to create by his skill the opportunity for decisive cavalry
action, and to mass his men beforehand in confident anticipation. The
same reasoning applies to the European campaigns of 1866 and 1870, and
the results obtained by the arm were so small, in proportion to the
numbers of squadrons available and to their cost of maintenance as
compared with the other arms, that a strong reaction set in everywhere
against the existing institutions, and the re-creation of the dragoon,
under the new name of mounted rifleman, was advocated in the hope of
obtaining a cheap and efficient substitute for the cavalryman.
Later events in South Africa and in Manchuria again brought this
question prominently to the front, but the essential difference between
the old and new schools of thought has not been generally realized. The
"mounted rifle" adherents base their arguments on the greatly increased
efficiency of the rifle itself. The "cavalry" school, on the other hand,
maintains that, the weapons themselves being everywhere substantially
equal in efficiency, the advantage rests with the side which can create
the most favourable conditions for their employment, and that,
fundamentally, superior mobility will always confer upon its possessor
the choice of the circumstances under which he will elect to engage.
Where the two sides are nearly equally matched in mobility, neither side
can afford the time to dismount, for the other will utilize that time to
manoeuvre into a position which gives him a relative superiority for
whichever form of attack he may elect to adopt, and this relative
superiority will always more than suffice to eliminate any advantage in
accuracy of fire that his opponent may have obtained by devoting his
principal attention to training his men on the range instead of on the
mounted manoeuvre ground.
Finally, the "cavalry" school reasons that in no single campaign since
Napoleon's time have the conditions governing encounters been normal.
Either the roadless and barren nature of the country has precluded of
itself the rapid marching which forms the basis of all modern strategy,
as in America, Turkey, South Africa and Manchuria, or the relative power
of the infantry and artillery weapons, as in Bohemia (1866) and in
France (1870), has rendered wholly impossible the creation of the great
tactical opportunity characteristic of Napoleon's later method, for
there then existed no means of overwhelming the enemy with a sufficient
hail of projectiles to render the penetration of the cavalry feasible.
The latest improvement in artillery, viz. the perfected shrapnel and the
quick-firing guns, have, however, enormously facilitated the attainment
of this primary fire superiority, and, moreover, it has simplified the
procedure to such a degree that Napoleon is no longer needed to direct.
The battles of the future will thus, in civilized countries, revert to
the Napoleonic type, and the side which possesses the most highly
trained and mobile force of cavalry will enjoy a greater relative
superiority over its adversary than at any period since the days of
Frederick.
The whole experience of the past thus goes to show that no nation in
peace has ever yet succeeded in maintaining a highly trained cavalry
sufficiently numerous to meet all the demands of a great war. Hence at
the outbreak of hostilities there has always been a demand for some kind
of supplementary force which can relieve the regular squadrons of those
duties of observation and exploration which wear down the horses most
rapidly and thus render the squadrons ineffective for their culminating
duty on the battle-field. This demand has been met by the enrolment of
men willing to fight and rendered mobile by mounts of an inferior
description, and the greater the urgency the greater has been the
tendency to give them arms which they can quickly learn to use. To make
a man an expert swordsman or lancer has always taken years, but he can
be taught to use a musket or rifle sufficiently for his immediate
purpose in a very short time. Hence, to begin with, arms of this
description have invariably been issued to him. But once these bodies
have been formed, and they have come into collision with trained
cavalry, the advantages of mobility, combined with the power of shock,
have become so apparent to all, that insensibly the "dragoon" has
developed into the cavalry soldier, the rate of this evolution being
conditioned by the nature of the country in which the fighting took
place.
This evolution is best seen in the American Civil War. The men of the
mounted forces engaged had been trained to the use of the rifle from
childhood, while the vast majority had never seen a sword, hence the
formation of "mounted rifles"; and these "mounted rifles" developed
precisely in accordance with the nature of their surroundings. In
districts of virgin forests and marshland they remained "mounted
rifles," in the open prairie country of the west they became cavalry
pure and simple, though for want of time they never rivalled the
precision of manoeuvre and endurance of modern Prussian or Austrian
horse. In South Africa the same sequence was followed, and had the Boer
War lasted longer it is certain that such Boer leaders as de Wet and de
la Rey would have reverted to cavalry tactics of shock and cold steel at
the earliest possible opportunity.
Therefore when we find, extending over a cycle of ages, the same causes
producing the same effects, the natural conclusion is that the evolution
of the cavalry arm is subject to a universal law which persists in spite
of all changes of armament.
_Employment of Cavalry._--It is a fundamental axiom of all military
action that the officer commanding the cavalry of any force comprising
the three arms of the service is in the strictest sense an executive
officer under the officer commanding that particular force as a whole.
The latter again is himself responsible to the political power he
represents. When intricate political problems are at stake, it may be,
and generally is, quite impracticable that any subordinate can share the
secret knowledge of the power to which he owes his allegiance.
The essence of the value of the cavalry soldier's services lies in this,
that the demand is never made upon him in its supremest form until the
instinct of the real commander realizes that the time has come. Whether
it be to cover a retreat, and by the loss of hundreds to save the lives
of tens of thousands, or to complete a victory with commensurate results
in the opposite direction, the obligation remains the same--to stake the
last man and horse in the attainment of the immediate object in view,
the defeat of the enemy. This at once places the leader of cavalry in
face of his principal problem. It is a matter of experience that the
broader the front on which he can deliver a charge, the greater the
chances of success. However strong the bonds of discipline may be, the
line is ultimately, and at a certain nervous tension, only a number of
men on horses, acting and reacting on one another in various ways. When
therefore, of two lines, moving to meet one another at speed, one sees
itself overlapped to either hand, the men in the line thus overlapped
invariably and inevitably tend to open outwards, so as at least to meet
their enemy on an equal frontage. Hence every cavalry commander tries
to strike at the flank of his enemy, and the latter manoeuvres to meet
him, and if both have equal mobility, local collision must ensue on an
equal and parallel front. Therefore both strive to put every available
man and horse in their first line, and if men and horses were
invulnerable such a line would sweep over the ground like a scythe and
nothing could withstand it. Since, however, bullets kill at a distance,
and inequalities and unforeseen difficulties of the ground may throw
hundreds of horses and riders, a working compromise has to be found to
meet eventualities, and, other things being equal, victory inclines to
the leader who best measures the risks and uncertainties of his
undertaking, and keeps in hand a sufficient reserve to meet all chances.
Thus there has arisen a saying, which is sometimes regarded as
axiomatic, that in cavalry encounters the last closed reserve always
wins. The truth is really that he who has best judged the situation and
the men on both sides finds himself in possession of the last reserve at
the critical moment. The next point is, how to ensure the presence of
this reserve, and what is the critical moment. The battle-field is the
critical moment in each phase of every campaign--not the mere chance
locality on which a combat takes place, but the decisive arena on which
the strategic consequences of all pre-existing conditions of national
cohesion, national organization and of civilization are focussed. It is
indeed the judgment-seat of nature, on which the right of the race to
survive in the struggle for existence is weighed and measured in the
most impartial scales.
Before, however, the final decision of the battle-field can be attained,
a whole series of subordinate decisions have to be fought out, success
in each of which conditions the result of the next series of encounters.
Every commanding officer of cavalry thus finds himself successively
called on to win a victory locally at any cost, and the question of
economy of force does not concern him at all. Hence the same fundamental
rules apply to all cavalry combats, of whatever magnitude, and condition
the whole of cavalry tactics. Broadly speaking, if two cavalries of
approximately equal mobility manoeuvre against each other in open
country, neither side can afford the loss of time that dismounting to
fight on foot entails. Hence, assuming that at the outset of a campaign
each side aims at securing a decisive success, both seek out an open
plain and a mounted charge, sword in hand, for the decision. When the
speed and skill of the combatants are approximately equal, collision
ensues simultaneously along parallel fronts, and the threat of the
overlapping line is the principal factor in the decision. The better the
individual training of man and horse the less will be the chances of
unsteadiness or local failures in execution, and the less the need of
reserves; hence the force which feels itself the most perfect in the
individual efficiency of both man and horse (on which therefore the
whole ultimately depends) can afford to keep fewer men in reserve and
can thus increase the width of its first line for the direct collision.
Careful preparation in peace is therefore the first guarantee of success
in action. This means that cavalry, unlike infantry, cannot be expanded
by the absorption of reserve men and horses on the outbreak of
hostilities, but must be maintained at war strength in peace, ready to
take the field at a moment's notice, and this is actually the standard
of readiness attained on the continent of Europe at the present day.
Further, uniformity of speed is the essential condition for the
execution of closed charges, and this obviously cannot be assured if big
men on little horses and small men on big horses are indiscriminately
mixed up in the same units. Horses and men have therefore been sorted
out everywhere into three categories, _light_, _medium_ and _heavy_, and
in periods when war was practically chronic, suitable duties have been
allotted to each. It is clear, on purely mechanical grounds, that the
greater the velocity of motion at the moment of collision the greater
will be the chances of success, and this greater speed will be on the
side of the bigger horses as a consequence of their longer stride. On
the other hand, these horses, by reason of their greater weight, are
used up much more rapidly than small ones. Hence, to ensure the greater
speed at the moment of contact, it is necessary to save them as much as
possible to keep them fresh for the shock only, and this has been the
practice of all great cavalry leaders all over the world, and has only
been departed from under special circumstances, as by the Germans in
France in 1870, when their cavalry practically rode everywhere
unopposed.
Collisions, however, must be expected by every body of troops large or
small; hence each regiment--ultimately each squadron--endeavours to save
its horses as far as this is compatible with the attainment of the
special object in view, and this has led everywhere and always to a
demand for some intermediate arm, less expensive to raise and maintain
than cavalry proper, and able to cover the ground with sufficient
rapidity and collect the information necessary to ensure the proper
direction of the cavalry commands. Originally this intermediate force
received the designation of dragoons; but since under pressure of
circumstances during long periods of war these invariably improved
themselves into cavalry and became permanent units in the army
organization, fresh names have had to be invented for them, of which
Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles are the latest, and every
improvement in firearms has led to an increased demand for their
services.
It is now relatively easy to trace out the considerations which should
govern the employment of his cavalry by the officer commanding a force
of the three arms. Assuming for purposes of illustration an army
numerically weak in cavalry, what course will best ensure the presence
of the greatest number of sabres at the decisive point, i.e. on the
battle-field? To push out cavalry screens far to the front will be to
court destruction, nor is the information they obtain of much real
service unless the means to act upon it at once is at hand. This can
only be supplied economically by the use of strong advanced guards of
infantry, and such supplementary security and information as these may
require will be best supplied by mounted infantry, the sacrifice of whom
will disturb least the fighting integrity of the whole army.
Imagine an army of 300,000 men advancing by five parallel roads on a
front of 50 m., each column (60,000 men, 2 army corps) being covered by
a strong advance guard, coming in contact with a similarly constituted
army moving in an opposite direction. A series of engagements will
ensue, in each of which the object of the local commander will be to
paralyse his opponent's will-power by a most vigorous attack, so that
his superior officer following him on the same road will be free to act
as he chooses. The front of the two armies will now be defined by a line
of combats localized each about a comparatively small area, and between
them will be wide gaps which it will be the chief business of the
directing minds on either side to close by other troops as soon as
possible. Generally the call will be made upon the artillery for this
purpose, since they can cover the required distances far more rapidly
than infantry. Now, as artillery is powerless when limbered up and
always very vulnerable on the flanks of the long lines, a strong cavalry
escort will have to be assigned to them which, trotting forward to
screen the march, will either come in contact with the enemy's cavalry
advancing with a similar object, or themselves find an opportunity to
catch the enemy's guns at a disadvantage. These are opportunities for
the cavalry, and if necessary it must sacrifice itself to turn them to
the best account. The whole course of the battle depends on success or
failure in the early formation of great lines of guns, for ultimately
the victor in the artillery duel finds himself in command of the
necessary balance of guns which are needed to prepare the way for his
final decisive infantry attack. If this latter succeeds, then any
mounted men who can gallop and shoot will suffice for pursuit. If it
fails, no cavalry, however gallant, has any hope of definitely restoring
the combat, for against victorious infantry, cavalry, now as in the
past, can but gain a little time. This time may indeed be worth the
price at which it can be bought, but it will always be more economical
to concentrate all efforts to prevent the emergency arising.
After the Franco-German War much was written about the possibility of
vast cavalry encounters to be fought far in advance of the main armies,
for the purpose of obtaining information, and ideas were freely mooted
of wide-flung raids traversing the enemy's communications, breaking up
his depots, reserve formations, &c. But riper consideration has
relegated these suggestions to the background, for it is now evident
that such expeditions involve the dissemination of force, not its
concentration. Austria and France for example would scarcely throw their
numerically inferior cavalry against the Germans, and nothing would suit
them better than that the latter should hurl their squadrons against the
frontier guards, advanced posts, and, generally, against unbeaten
infantry; nor indeed would the Germans stultify their whole strategic
teaching by weakening themselves for the decisive struggle. It follows
therefore that cavalry reconnaissance duties will be strictly local and
tactical, and that arrangements will be made for procuring strategical
information by wireless telegraphy, balloons, motor cars, bicycles, &c.,
and that on the whole that nation will be best served in war which has
provided in peace a nucleus of mounted infantry capable of rapid
expansion to fill the gap which history shows always to have existed
between the infantry and the cavalry. Such troops need not be organized
in large bodies, for their mission is to act by "slimness," not by
violence. They must be the old "verlorene Haufe" (_anglice_, "forlorn
hope") of former days, men whose individual bravery and decision is of
the highest order. But they can never become a "decision-compelling
arm," though by their devotion they may well hope to obtain the grand
opportunity for their cavalry, and share with them in harvesting the
fruits of victory.
The great cavalry encounters of forty to sixty squadrons on either side,
which it has been shown must arise from the necessity of screening or
preventing the formation of the all-important artillery lines, will take
their form mainly from the topographical conditions of the district, and
since on a front of 60 to 100 m. these may vary indefinitely, cavalry
must be trained, as indeed it always has been, to fight either on foot
or on horseback as occasion requires. In either case, thoroughness of
preparation in horsemanship (which, be it observed, includes
horsemastership) is the first essential, for in the end victory will
rest with the side which can put in the right place with the greatest
rapidity the greatest number of sabres or rifles. In the case of rifles
there is a greater margin of time available and an initial failure is
not irremediable, but the underlying principle is the same in either
case; and since it is impossible to foretell exactly the conditions of
the collision, all alike, according to the class to which they belong,
must be brought up to the highest standard, for this alone guarantees
the smooth and rhythmical motion required for covering long distances
with the least expenditure of physical and nervous strength on the part
both of horse and rider. As a consequence of successes gained in these
preliminary encounters, opportunities will subsequently arise for the
balance of fresh or rallied squadrons in hand to ride home upon masses
of infantry disorganized and demoralized by the combined fire of
infantry and artillery, and such opportunities are likely to be much
more numerous at the outbreak of future wars than they have been in the
past, because the enormous gain in range and rapidity of fire enables a
far greater weight of metal to be concentrated on any chosen area within
a given time. It cannot be too often reiterated that cavalry never has
ridden over unshaken infantry of average quality by reason of its
momentum alone, but that every successful cavalry charge has always owed
its issue to a previously acquired moral superiority which has prevented
the infantry from making adequate use of their means of defence. Nor
will such charges entail greater losses than in the past, for, great
though the increase of range of modern infantry weapons has been, the
speed and endurance of cavalry has increased in a yet higher ratio;
whereas in Napoleon's days, with an extreme range for musketry of 1000
yds., cavalry were expected only to trot 800 yds. and gallop for 200,
nowadays with an extreme infantry range of under 4000 yds., the cavalry
are trained to trot for 8000 yds. and gallop for 2000.
Neither the experiences in South Africa nor those in Manchuria seriously
influenced the views of the leading cavalry experts as above outlined,
for the conditions of both cases were entirely abnormal. No nation in
western Europe can afford to mount the whole of its able-bodied
manhood, nor, with the restricted area of its possessions, could repeat
the Boer tactics with useful effect; in Manchuria, the theatre of
operation was so far roadless, and the motives of both combatants so
distinct from any conceivable as a basis for European strategy, that
time was always available to construct entrenchments and obstacles
physically insuperable to mounted arms. In western Europe, with its
extreme development of communications, such tactics are impracticable,
and under the system of compulsory service which is in force in all
nations, an early decision must be sought at any cost. This motive
imposes a rapid-marching campaign in the Napoleonic style, and in such
warfare there is neither time nor energy available for the erection of
extemporised fortresses. Victory must therefore fall to the side that
can develop the greatest fire power in the shortest time. The greatest
factor of fire power is the long artillery lines, and as cavalry is the
one arm which by its mobility can hamper or prevent the formation of
such lines, on its success in this task all else must depend. Hence both
sides will concentrate every available horse and man for this special
purpose, and on the issue of the collisions this mutual concentration
must entail will hang the fate of the battle, and ultimately of the
nation. But the cavalry which will succeed in this task will be the one
in which the spirit of duty burns brightest, and the oath of allegiance,
renewed daily on the cross of the sword, is held in the highest esteem.
_Organization._--The existing organization of cavalry throughout the
civilized world is an instance of the "survival of the fittest" in an
extreme form. The execution of the many manoeuvres with the speed and
precision which condition success is only possible by a force in which,
as Frederick the Great said, "every horse and trooper has been finished
with the same care that a watchmaker bestows upon each wheel of the
watch mechanism." Uniformity of excellence is in fact the keystone of
success, and this is only attainable where the mass is subdivided into
groups, each of which requires superintendence enough to absorb the
whole energy of an average commander. Thus it has been found by ages of
experiment that an average officer, with the assistance of certain
subordinates to whom he delegates as much or as little responsibility as
he pleases, finds his time fully occupied by the care of about one
hundred and fifty men and horses, each individual of which he must
understand intimately, in character, physical strength and temper, for
horse and man must be matched with the utmost care and judgment if the
best that each is capable of is to be attained. The fundamental secret
of the exceptional efficiency attained by the Prussian cavalry lies in
the fact that they were the first to realize what the above implies.
After the close of the Napoleonic Wars they made their squadron
commanders responsible, not only for the training of the combatants of
their unit, but also for the breaking in of remounts and the elementary
teaching of recruits as well, and in this manner they obtained an
intimate knowledge of their material which is almost unattainable by
British officers owing to the conditions entailed by foreign service and
frequent changes of garrisons.
Further, to obtain the maximum celerity of manoeuvre with the minimum
exertion of the horses, the squadron requires to be subdivided into
smaller units, generally known as _troops_, and experience has shown
that with 128 sabres in the ranks (the average strength on parade, after
deducting sick and young horses, and the N.C. officers required as troop
guides, &c.) four troops best satisfy all conditions; as, with this
number, the squadron will, under all circumstances of ground and
surroundings, make any change of formation in less time and with greater
accuracy than with any other number of subdivisions. The size of the
unit next above the squadron, the _regiment_, is again fixed by the
number of subordinates that an average commander can control, and the
universal experience of all arms has settled this as not less than four
and not more than eight. Experiments with eight and even ten squadrons
have been tried both in Austria and Prussia, but only exceptional men
have succeeded in controlling such large bodies effectively, and in the
end the normal has been fixed at four or five squadrons in quarters, and
three or four in the field. Of these, the larger number is undoubtedly
preferable, for, with the work of the quartermaster and the adjutant to
supervise, in addition, the regimental commander is economically applied
to the best advantage. The essential point, however, is that the officer
commanding the regiment does not interfere in details, but commands his
four squadron commanders, his quartermaster, and his adjutant, and holds
them absolutely responsible for results.
There is no unity of practice in the constitution of larger units.
Brigades vary according to circumstances from two regiments to four, and
the composition of divisions fluctuates similarly. The custom in the
German cavalry has been to form brigades of two regiments and divisions
of three brigades, but this practice arose primarily from the system of
recruiting and has no tactical advantage. The territory assigned to each
army corps provides men and horses for two regiments of cuirassiers or
lancers (classed as heavy in Germany), two of dragoons, and two of
hussars, and since it is clearly essential to ensure uniformity of speed
and endurance within those units most likely to have to work together,
it was impossible to mix the different classes. But the views now
current as to the tactical employment of cavalry contemplate the
employment not only of divisions but of whole cavalry corps, forty to
sixty squadrons strong, and these may be called on to fulfil the most
various missions. The farthest and swiftest reconnaissances are the
province of light cavalry, i.e. hussars, the most obstinate attack and
defence of localities the task of dragoons, and the decisive charges on
the battle-field essentially the duty of the heavy cavalry. It seems
probable then that the brigade will become the highest unit the
composition of which is fixed in peace, and that divisions and corps
will be put together by brigades of uniform composition, and assigned to
the several sections of the theatre of war in which each is likely to
find the most suitable field for its special character. This was the
case in the Frederician and Napoleonic epochs, when efficiency and
experience in the field far outweighed considerations of administration
and convenience in quarters.
Hitherto, horse artillery in Europe has always formed an integral
portion of the divisional organization, but the system has never worked
well, and in view of the technical evolution of artillery material is no
longer considered desirable. As it is always possible to assign one or
more batteries to any particular brigade whose line of march will bring
it across villages, defiles, &c. (where the support of its fire will be
essential), and on the battle-field itself responsibility for the guns
is likely to prove more of a hindrance than a help to the cavalry
commander, it is probable that horse artillery will revert to the
inspection of its own technical officers, and that the sole tie which
will be retained between it and the cavalry will be in the batteries
being informed as to the cavalry units they are likely to serve with in
war, so that the officers may make themselves acquainted with the
idiosyncrasies of their future commanders. The same course will be
pursued with the engineers and technical troops required for the
cavalry, but it seems probable that, in accordance with a suggestion
made by Moltke after the 1866 campaign, the supply columns for one or
more cavalry corps will be held ready in peace, and specially organized
to attain the highest possible mobility which modern technical progress
can ensure.
The general causes which have led to the differentiation of cavalry into
the three types--hussars, dragoons and heavy--have already been dealt
with. Obviously big men on little horses cannot manoeuvre side by side
with light men on big horses. Also, since uniformity of excellence
within the unit is the prime condition of efficiency, and the greatest
personal dexterity is required for the management of sword or lance on
horseback, a further sorting out became necessary, and the best light
weights were put on the best light horses and called hussars, the best
heavy weights on the best heavy horses and called lancers, the average
of either type becoming dragoons and cuirassiers. In England, the lance
not being indigenous and the conditions of foreign service making
adherence to a logical system impossible, lancers are medium cavalry,
but the difference of weights carried and type of horses is too small to
render these distinctions of practical moment. In Germany, where every
suitable horse finds its place in the ranks and men have no right of
individual selection, the distinctions are still maintained, and there
is a very marked difference between the weights carried and the types of
men and horses in each branch, though the dead weight which it is still
considered necessary to carry in cavalries likely to manoeuvre in large
masses hardly varies with the weight of the man or size of the horse.
Where small units only are required to march and scout, the kit can be
reduced to a minimum, everything superfluous for the moment being
carried on hired transport, as in South Africa. But when 10,000 horsemen
have to move by a single road all transport must be left miles to the
rear, and greater mobility for the whole is attained by carrying upon
the horse itself the essentials for a period of some weeks. Still, even
allowing for this, it is impossible to account for the extraordinary
load that is still considered necessary. In India, the British lancer,
averaging 11 st. per man, could turn out in marching order at 17 st. 8
lb. (less forage nets). In Germany, the hussar, averaging 10 st. 6 lb.,
rode at 18 st., also without forage, and the cuirassier at 21 st. to 22
st. Cavalry equipment is, in fact, far too heavy, for in the interests
of the budgets of the departments which supply saddlery, harness, &c.,
everything is made so as to last for many years. Cavalry saddles fifty
years old frequently remain in good condition, but the losses in
horse-flesh this excessive solidity entails are ignored. The remount
accounts are kept separately, and few realize that in war it is cheaper
to replace a horse than a saddle. In any case, the armament alone of the
cavalry soldier makes great demands on the horses. His sword and
scabbard weigh about 4 lb., carbine or rifle 7 lb. to 9 lb., 120 rounds
of ammunition with pouches and belts about 12 lb., lance about 5 lb.,
and two days' forage and hay at the lowest 40 lb., or a gross total of
70 lb. or 5 st., which with 11 st. for the man brings the total to 16
st.; add to this the lightest possible saddle, bridle, cloak and
blanket, and 17 st. 8 lb. is approximately the irreducible minimum. It
may be imagined what care and management of the horses is required to
enable them under such loads to manoeuvre in masses at a trot, and
gallop for distances of 5 m. and upwards without a moment for
dismounting.
_Reconnaissance and Scouting._--After 1870 public opinion, misled by the
performances of the "ubiquitous Uhlan" and disappointed by the absence
of great cavalry charges on the field of battle, came somewhat hastily
to the conclusion that the day of "shock tactics" was past and the
future of cavalry lay in acting as the eyes and ears of the following
armies. But, as often happens, the fact was overlooked that the German
cavalry screen was entirely unopposed in its reconnoitring expeditions,
and it was not till long afterwards that it became apparent how very
little these far-flung reconnaissances had contributed to the total
success.
It has been calculated by German cavalry experts that not 1% of the
reports sent in by the scouts during the advance from the Saar to the
Meuse, August 1870, were of appreciable importance to the headquarters,
and that before the orders based upon this evidence reached the front,
events frequently anticipated them. Generally the conviction has
asserted itself, that it is impossible to train the short-service
soldiers of civilized nations sufficiently to render their reports worth
the trouble of collating, and if a few cases of natural aptitude do
exist nothing can ensure that these particular men should be
sufficiently well mounted to transmit their information with sufficient
celerity to be of importance. It is of little value to a commander to
know that the enemy was at a given spot forty-eight hours previously,
unless the sender of the report has a sufficient force at his disposal
to compel the enemy to remain there; in other words, to attack and hold
him. Cavalry and horse artillery alone, however, cannot economically
exert this holding power, for, whatever their effect against worn-out
men at the close of a great battle, against fresh infantry they are
relatively powerless. Hence, it is probable that we shall see a revival
of the strategic advanced guard of all arms, as in the Napoleonic days,
which will not only reconnoitre, but fix the enemy until the army itself
can execute the manoeuvre designed to effect his destruction. The
general situation of the enemy's masses will, in western Europe,
always be sufficiently fixed by the trend of his railway communications,
checked by reports of spies, newspapers, &c., for, with neutral
frontiers everywhere within a few hours' ride for a motor cyclist,
anything approaching the secrecy of the Japanese in Manchuria is quite
unattainable, and, once the great masses begin to move, the only
"shadowing" which holds out any hope of usefulness is that undertaken by
very small selected parties of officers, perfectly mounted, daring
riders, and accustomed to cover distances of 100 m. and upwards. These
will be supported by motor cars and advanced feelers from the field
telegraphs, though probably the motor car would carry the eye-witness to
his destination in less time than it would take to draft and signal a
complete report.