NOMINALISTS AND REALISTS.--BRITISH SCHOOLMEN.--SPINOSA.

The result of my system will be, to show, that, so far from the world being

a goddess in petticoats, it is rather the Devil in a strait waistcoat.

* * * * *

The controversy of the Nominalists and Realists was one of the greatest and

most important that ever occupied the human mind. They were both right, and

both wrong. They each maintained opposite poles of the same truth; which

truth neither of them saw, for want of a higher premiss. Duns Scotus was

the head of the Realists; Ockham,[1] his own disciple, of the Nominalists.

Ockham, though certainly very prolix, is a most extraordinary writer.

[Footnote 1:

John Duns Scotus was born in 1274, at Dunstone in the parish of Emildune,

near Alnwick. He was a fellow of Merton College, and Professor of Divinity

at Oxford. After acquiring an uncommon reputation at his own university, he

went to Paris, and thence to Cologne, and there died in 1308, at the early

age of thirty-four years. He was called the Subtle Doctor, and found time

to compose works which now fill twelve volumes in folio. See the Lyons

edition, by Luke Wadding, in 1639.

William Ockham was an Englishman, and died about 1347; but the place and

year of his birth are not clearly ascertained. He was styled the Invincible

Doctor, and wrote bitterly against Pope John XXII. We all remember Butler's

account of these worthies:--

"He knew what's what, and that's as high

As metaphysic wit can fly;

In school divinity as able

As he that hight Irrefragable,

A second Thomas, or at once

To name them all, another _Dunse_;

Profound in all the Nominal

And Real ways beyond them all;

For he a rope of sand could twist

As tough as learned Sorbonist."

HUDIBRAS. Part I. Canto I. v. 149.

The Irrefragable Doctor was Alexander Hales, a native of Gloucestershire,

who died in 1245. Amongst his pupils at Paris, was Fidanza, better known by

the name of Bonaventura, the Seraphic Doctor. The controversy of the

Realists and the Nominalists cannot he explained in a note; but in

substance the original point of dispute may be thus stated. The Realists

held _generally_ with Aristotle, that there were universal _ideas_ or

essences impressed upon matter, and covëal with, and inherent in, their

objects. Plato held that these universal forms existed as exemplars in the

divine mind previously to, and independently of, matter; but both

maintained, under one shape or other, the real existence of universal

forms. On the other hand, Zeno and the old Stoics denied the existence of

these universals, and contended that they were no more than mere tenms and

nominal representatives of their particular objects. The Nominalists were

the followers of Zeno, and held that universal forms are merely modes of

conception, and exist solely in and for the mind. It does not require much

reflection to see how great an influence these different systems might have

upon the enunciation of the higher doctrines of Christianity.--ED.]

* * * * *

It is remarkable, that two thirds of the eminent schoolmen were of British

birth. It was the schoolmen who made the languages of Europe what they now

are. We laugh at the quiddities of those writers now, but, in truth, these

quiddities are just the parts of their language which we have rejected;

whilst we never think of the mass which we have adopted, and have in daily

use.

* * * * *

One of the scholastic definitions of God is this,--_Deus est, cui omne quod

est est esse omne quod est:_ as long a sentence made up of as few words,

and those as oligosyllabic, as any I remember. By the by, that

_oligosyllabic_ is a word happily illustrative of its own meaning, _ex

opposito_.

* * * * *

Spinosa, at the very end of his life, seems to have gained a glimpse of the

truth. In the last letter published in his works, it appears that he began

to suspect his premiss. His _unica substantia_ is, in fact, a mere notion,

--a _subject_ of the mind, and no _object_ at all.

* * * * *

Plato's works are preparatory exercises for the mind. He leads you to see,

that propositions involving in themselves contradictory conceptions, are

nevertheless true; and which, therefore, must belong to a higher logic--

that of ideas. They are contradictory only in the Aristotelian logic, which

is the instrument of the understanding. I have read most of the works of

Plato several times with profound attention, but not all his writings. In

fact, I soon found that I had read Plato by anticipation. He was a

consummate genius.[1]

[Footnote 1:

"This is the test and character of a truth so affirmed (--a truth of the

reason, an Idea)--that in its own proper form it is _inconceivable_. For to

_conceive_, is a function of the understanding, which can he exercised only

on subjects subordinate thereto. And yet to the forms of the understanding

all truth must be reduced, that is to be fixed as an object of reflection,

and to be rendered _expressible_. And here we have a second test and sign

of a truth so affirmed, that it can come forth out of the moulds of the

understanding only in the disguise of two contradictory conceptions, each

of which is partially true, and the conjunction of both conceptions becomes

the representative or _expression_ (--the _exponent_) of a truth beyond

conception and inexpressible. Examples: _before_ Abraham WAS, I AM. God is

a circle, the centre of which is every where, and the circumference no

where. The soul is all in every part." Aids to Reflection, n. 224.n. See

also _Church and State_, p. 12.--ED.]

* * * * *

My mind is in a state of philosophical doubt as to animal magnetism. Von

Spix, the eminent naturalist, makes no doubt of the matter, and talks

coolly of giving doses of it. The torpedo affects a third or external

object, by an exertion of its own will: such a power is not properly

electrical; for electricity acts invariably under the same circumstances. A

steady gaze will make many persons of fair complexions blush deeply.

Account for that. [1]

[Footnote 1:

I find the following remarkable passage in p. 301. vol. i. of the richly

annotated copy of Mr. Southey's Life of Wesley, which Mr. C. bequeathed as

his "darling book and the favourite of his library" to its great and

honoured author and donor:--

"The coincidence throughout of all these Methodist cases with those of the

Magnetists makes me wish for a solution that would apply to all. Now this

sense or appearance of a sense of the distant, both in time and space, is

common to almost all the _magnetic_ patients in Denmark, Germany, France,

and North Italy, to many of whom the same or a similar solution could not

apply. Likewise, many cases have been recorded at the same time, in

different countries, by men who had never heard of each other's names, and

where the simultaneity of publication proves the independence of the

testimony. And among the Magnetisers and Attesters are to be found names of

men, whose competence in respect of integrity and incapability of

intentional falsehood is fully equal to that of Wesley, and their

competence in respect of physio- and psychological insight and attainments

incomparably greater. Who would dream, indeed, of comparing Wesley with a

Cuvier, Hufeland, Blumenbach, Eschenmeyer, Reil, &c.? Were I asked, what

_I_ think, my answer would be,--that the evidence enforces scepticism and a

_non liquet_;--too strong and consentaneous for a candid mind to be

satisfied of its falsehood, or its solvibility on the supposition of

imposture or casual coincidence;--too fugacious and unfixable to support

any theory that supposes the always potential, and, under certain

conditions and circumstances, occasionally active, existence of a

correspondent faculty in the human soul. And nothing less than such an

hypothesis would be adequate to the _satisfactory_ explanation of the

facts;--though that of a _metastasis_ of specific functions of the nervous

energy, taken in conjunction with extreme nervous excitement, _plus_ some

delusion, _plus_ some illusion, _plus_ some imposition, _plus_ some chance

and accidental coincidence, might determine the direction in which the

scepticism should vibrate. Nine years has the subject of Zoo-magnetism been

before me. I have traced it historically, collected a mass of documents in

French, German, Italian, and the Latinists of the sixteenth century, have

never neglected an opportunity of questioning eye-witnesses, _ex. gr._

Tieck, Treviranus, De Prati, Meyer, and others of literary or medical

celebrity, and I remain where I was, and where the first perusal of Klug's

work had left me, without having moved an inch backward or forward. The

reply of Treviranus, the famous botanist, to me, when he was in London, is

worth recording:--'Ich habe gesehen was (ich weiss das) ich nicht würde

geglaubt haben auf _ihren_ erzählung,' &c. 'I have seen what I am certain I

would not have believed on your telling; and in all reason, therefore, I

can neither expect nor wish that you should believe on _mine_.'"--ED.]

_May_ 1. 1830.

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