EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH, AND THE ADVANCE NORTH UNDER SIR
REDVERS BULLER
1900
The first few days following the relief were employed in the sorting and
reading of four months' mails and the opening up of presents. Many
complimentary telegrams were received by the battalion from England.
Major Davies, Captain Bartlett, and Lieutenant Willis, all of whom had
been doing duty with the 2nd Battalion during the relief operations,
joined the battalion on the 7th with some eighty-six men who had been
sent from Jullunder.
The two battalions were together for a few days only, as the 2nd
Battalion after a short rest proceeded with Sir Redvers Buller's force
towards Modder Spruit.
On March 10th the Ladysmith garrison was reorganized, the battalion
being placed in the 7th Brigade with the Gordon Highlanders, the
Manchester Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade. This brigade
was commanded by Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.
Colonel Park, unfortunately struck down with enteric fever on the last
day of the siege, was shortly afterwards invalided to England. In his
absence Major Davies took over command of the battalion, and Major Curry
having been appointed Commandant of Ladysmith, Captain Jacson took over
the duties of Second-in-Command. On March 14th the 7th Brigade marched
to Arcadia, seven miles out of Ladysmith on the Vanreenen's Pass road,
camping on a kopje overlooking Dewdrop Spruit. The men were then
occupied in route marching and generally getting fit.
[Illustration: Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener]
Brigadier-General Walter Kitchener arrived in camp on the 26th March and
took over the command of the 7th Brigade from Colonel Knox, and on April
2nd the battalion, accompanied by General W. Kitchener, marched to
Brakfontein, seventeen miles distant under Spion Kop, stopped there in
camp on the 3rd, when parties of men went off to view the Boer positions
on Spion Kop and Vaal-Krantz, and returned to Arcadia on the 4th.
Innumerable presents were continually arriving from England for the
battalion, and the thanks of all are due especially to Mr. Young of
Torquay for the indefatigable manner in which he worked, and for the
numerous bundles and boxes of presents which he was instrumental in
collecting and dispatching both at this time and also afterwards. All
these presents were highly appreciated.
A draft of 180 men, consisting of reservists, section "D" Militia
Reservists, and recruits joined the battalion on the 7th; amongst these
were 120 married men.
At 11.30 a.m. on April 11th orders were received to move at once into
Ladysmith, which was to be reached at 2 p.m. The reason for the sudden
move was not explained. There was no transport. Out of six wagons, the
complement for a battalion on light field service scale, there were only
two in camp at the time. At Arcadia the battalion, in common with the
rest of the brigade, was allowed tents, and told that it could have
anything it liked to take with it. There was consequently a good deal
more than six carts could carry.
Towards evening, after the tents had been struck, packed, and sent on
ahead, and the battalion was waiting in the open for more wagons, a most
violent thunderstorm came on, lasting about two hours. Ten men of one
company which was holding a work on Rifleman's Ridge, between Arcadia
and Ladysmith, were struck by lightning, none, however, being killed.
The battalion eventually reached camp at Star Hill, just above the iron
bridge outside Ladysmith, at 3 a.m. wet to the skin. It was found that
the tents had arrived. These were pitched and the men turned in. The
greater part of the brigade did not reach Star Hill till the following
day.
On the 13th the Gordons and Devons moved camp to Hyde's Farm under
Surprise Hill, the Devons proceeding next day to a camp under
Thornhill's Kopje, throwing out picquets on that hill and also on
another kopje further out towards Nicholson's Nek known as Devon Kopje.
From this time till May 15th the battalion remained quietly encamped
under Thornhill's Kopje. Route marching and field days occupied the men
most mornings, hockey and football most afternoons. The men suffered a
good deal at first from jaundice, which was chiefly the result of
over-eating after their long abstinence, but they got fit and recovered
their strength gradually; it was, however, fully six weeks to two months
before they were really ready to take the field.
In the meantime General Buller had turned the Biggarsberg, and the Boers
had fallen back on Laing's Nek.
The 7th Brigade now formed part of the 4th Division under the command of
Major-General Neville Lyttleton, and on May 16th the Regiment was
ordered to proceed north to Modder's Spruit. Here it remained till the
20th, on which day it continued its march to Elandslaagte, and encamped
near the railway station. On the 23rd, having handed in all tents and
excess baggage, the Regiment marched to Sunday's River, where it joined
up with the divisional head-quarters, and on the following day formed
the rear-guard on the march to Black Craig Farm. Here the division
encamped in the heart of the Biggarsberg.
Halting at Kalabis on the 25th, the division reached Ingagane on the
26th.
[Illustration: Railway Bridge Destroyed by Boers, Ingagane]
The brigade was now split up and placed on the line of communications,
and it was thought probable that the Regiment would see no more fighting
and that the war would soon be brought to a conclusion. Of the four
regiments in the brigade, the Manchester Regiment had been left behind
to garrison Jonono's Kop and the railway line near Elandslaagte, the
Devons were left to garrison Ingagane on the railway, and the Rifle
Brigade was at Newcastle and between that place and Ingogo at the foot
of the Laing's Nek pass. The Gordon Highlanders were at Ingogo and
guarded the railway line still further north.
The Regiment itself was also split up. A detachment of one company under
Captain Travers (increased afterwards to two companies) proceeded to
occupy Dannhauser, and two companies under Captain Bartlett were ordered
to Rooi Pint on the high ground between Ingagane and Newcastle. A
battery of artillery was also stationed at this place.
The remaining companies of the Regiment, including a 9th or K company
which had been created shortly after the siege, were posted on the low
hill overlooking Ingagane railway station.
On June 4th the 1st Cavalry Brigade arrived to form part of the garrison
of Ingagane. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Burn
Murdoch, who was in charge of the line of communication
Newcastle-Dannhauser.
At Ingagane Hill the Regiment found itself again employed in building
stone walls. Entrenchments against attack were considered necessary, for
it was thought probable that the Boers would attempt to break through
from the north-east of the Free State on the west and cross into Utrecht
and Vryheid districts. The real danger, however, lay on the east, for
the Vryheid district long remained a Boer stronghold, and parties of
Boers frequently raided to the Blood River in the immediate
neighbourhood of Dannhauser.
It was owing to this that on June 15th a second company was sent to
reinforce Captain Travers at Dannhauser. The hill selected by Captain
Travers for defence overlooked Dannhauser railway station, and commanded
a large extent of ground to the east of the post. This hill was very
strongly fortified, and the works on it, designed and built by Captain
Travers and his men, were perhaps the best works for protection against
musketry fire constructed by the Regiment during the war.
[Illustration: Making Barbed-Wire Entanglement, Ingagane]
News was received daily that thousands of Boers with dozens of guns were
on the eastern flank, with every intention of raiding, cutting the line,
and attacking Dannhauser. Dundee also, according to the newspapers and
the evidence of native scouts, was in deadly peril from attack by Chris.
Botha. It was, perhaps, on account of these rumours that a column was
formed to reconnoitre Utrecht. In conjunction with another column which
moved out from Ingogo, three companies of the Regiment, with the Royal
Dragoons and the 5th Dragoon Guards and two field guns, moved out on the
afternoon of July 1st from Ingagane and camped at Tundega Farm. On the
following morning Tundega Hill was occupied by the infantry whilst the
cavalry reconnoitred over the Buffalo River to Utrecht, which was
distant twenty miles. This place was found occupied by about four
hundred Boers, and after some skirmishing and a good deal of firing the
cavalry returned with a loss of one Royal Dragoon taken prisoner. Next
morning the force returned to Ingagane. The operations were supposed to
have been very successful.
By the end of July the Regiment had quite recovered tone and vigour, and
was well and fit for any work, and on August 2nd, 1900, orders were
received to pack up and proceed by rail the following day to Zandspruit.
On the afternoon of the 3rd the Regiment entrained in coal trucks for
the north. Majuba and Laing's Nek were passed next morning at dawn, and
at 7.30 a.m. Zandspruit was reached.
The strength of the battalion was now 938 of all ranks. All tents and
excess baggage had been returned to store, and on the 6th the Regiment
marched to Meerzicht, where the remainder of General Lyttleton's 4th
Division was found in bivouac. The 4th Division was now complete and
ready to march north with Sir Redvers Buller.
General Buller's force moved out from Meerzicht on August 7th. For some
days previously the Boers had been occupying in force some high ground
known as Rooi Kopjes, a few miles north of Meerzicht, and the Gordon
Highlanders had already twice been slightly engaged with them. The 7th
Brigade advanced out of their camp in attack formation, the Gordons
leading the advance, the Devons in support. Their objective was the Rooi
Kopjes. These were found unoccupied, and, having gained the summit, the
7th Brigade were ordered to make a sweep round to the right.
The new objective was the high ground above Amersfoort. General Buller's
line now occupied some five miles of front. A very high wind was
blowing, and it was not for some time that the Head-quarter Staff, who
at the time were with the 7th Brigade, knew that the artillery of the
8th Brigade, which had marched direct on Amersfoort, were in action,
firing at some Boer guns mounted on the Amersfoort Hills. The Boers were
strongly entrenched on these hills to the number of about 3000 to 4000
with fourteen guns under Chris. Botha and D. Joubert. The 7th Brigade
advanced across a large undulating plain, the Devons leading. The
Gordons had been sent round to the left to support Dundonald's Mounted
Brigade, who had been checked by some fifty Boers. About 6000 yards from
the position Boer shells began to fall among the companies of the
leading battalion. One half battalion under Major Davies thereupon
opened out and advanced, while the other half battalion was sent to the
left under Captain Jacson, with orders to proceed as rapidly as possible
to the assistance of the Gordon Highlanders, who, it was reported, were
being heavily threatened by the Boers on the extreme left. With the
exception of some shell fire the main advance was continued unopposed.
The left half battalion of the Regiment had to make a very long detour,
and on its arrival to the assistance of the Gordons it was found that
the Boer force, which was threatening the left flank, was simply
Dundonald's mounted troops drawing up stationary behind some rising
ground.
After a stiff climb the summit of the Amersfoort Hills was reached just
before dark.
It was found that the Boers had evacuated their position, on their left
flank and rear being threatened by the 8th Brigade. The leading
battalion of this brigade, the 60th Rifles, came under some heavy
musketry fire from the houses in the town, and after several casualties,
which included four officers, Major Campbell, commanding the 60th,
threatened to burn the town if the firing was not discontinued. The
firing then ceased, and the Boers retired to the hills north of the
town.
The Boers had set fire to the long dry grass in every direction, and it
was chiefly by the light of these fires that regiments, companies, and
parties of mounted men found their way off the hill on a pitch-dark
night.
No orders had been circulated as to where the force was to halt and
bivouac for the night, and from every direction various bodies of men
groped their way in the dark towards the town, in the hopes that when
once there some orders might be obtained. It was late when the half
battalion under Captain Jacson found its bivouac and joined hands again
with that of Major Davies just outside the town. One company came in
later, having unfortunately lost its way in the dark.
Some of the leading wagons of the transport, which had been sent along
the direct road from Meerzicht to Amersfoort, broke down in a bad drift,
thus blocking the remainder. No wagons arrived in Amersfoort that night,
and the men after their long tramp, a continuous march without a halt
from 7.30 a.m. till about 8.30 at night, were without greatcoats or
blankets. The night was bitterly cold, with a hard frost. Gangs of men
went down to the town and brought back wood. Soon fires began to light
up in the Devons' and Gordons' bivouacs, which were adjoining, and for
the remainder of the night groups of men sat round them trying to keep
warm. The four companies of the Regiment on outpost duty suffered very
severely, as they were without fires, none being allowed in the outpost
line.
The force halted at Amersfoort on the following day, owing firstly to
the fog which enveloped everything, and secondly to allow of the baggage
train coming up. This began to arrive at 10 a.m., having been detained
at the drift the whole night.
During the fog a few Boers came down from the high ground above the
river and fired into the horses watering, at very close range. They
failed, however, to do any damage.
On August 9th the army continued its advance. On leaving Amersfoort, a
bad drift with a steep climb of half a mile on the further side was met
with, and the baggage was formed into two columns. This was assisted up
the hill by two companies of the Regiment, Sir Redvers Buller personally
superintending. Klippaal Drift was reached late in the afternoon after a
difficult march of ten miles.
General Buller's army was now on the high veldt in winter time. The cold
was intense, especially at night, when there were several degrees of
frost. Owing to the intense cold, two men of the Rifle Brigade died from
exposure during the night.
[Illustration: The Baggage of General Buller's Army Crossing Beginderlyn
Bridge]
On the following day the force continued its march to Beginderlyn
Bridge. This was found intact, and there was no opposition, and the
march was resumed on the 11th as far as Kleinfontein. On August 12th
Ermelo was occupied, and a few of the leading Boers belonging to the
place surrendered.
So far, and until Twyfelaar was reached, Buller's army received little
or no opposition from the Boers. Chris. Botha, who had occupied
Amersfoort, had retired east after evacuating that place, and was
marching parallel to the British force and at a distance of about ten
miles on its right flank. They were evidently watching Buller, probably
thinking that he would turn east towards Piet Retief, where almost all
their stock, sheep, and cattle had been driven, the mountainous and
difficult country there being suitable for its concealment and
protection.
The main body of the Boers was concentrated between Belfast and
Machadodorp, north-east of Twyfelaar, in a country eminently suited for
what was considered their final effort. The valley of the Komati River
was exceedingly difficult country for the British army to operate over.
The Boers to the end of the war were very fond of this country, and it
was there, or in the vicinity towards Lake Chrissie, that several
engagements took place later on, during the guerilla stage of the war,
not always in favour of the British.
The town of Ermelo, which the Regiment was destined to see again on
several future occasions, was left on August 13th, on the evening of
which day the force reached Klipfontein. The Regiment, being rear-guard,
did not reach its bivouac till after dark. Witbank was reached the
following day, and communication was opened up with General French's
column, fifteen miles to the north-west. Carolina could be seen eight
miles away to the north-east.
The force marched next day to Twyfelaar, and here a halt was made till
August 21st, in order to allow of Lord Roberts's army, which was
advancing east from Pretoria along the Lorenzo Marques railway, joining
hands with General Buller's army.
The rear-guard of the force was attacked by the Boers on August 21st on
its march from Twyfelaar to Van Wycks Vlei. The Gordon Highlanders lost
nine killed and eight wounded, and the Liverpool Mounted Infantry eight
killed.
On the following morning a force consisting of Devons, Manchesters,
Gordons, South African Light Horse, one field battery, and the
howitzers, advanced from Van Wycks Vlei under General W. Kitchener, for
the purpose of reconnoitring and driving some Boers off the hills east
of General Buller's camp, so that the road for the next day's march
might be cleared of the enemy. A large number of Boers was seen in the
direction of Carolina, and it was supposed that Chris. Botha's force was
opposed to the column. The Manchester Regiment led the advance,
supported by the Devon Regiment. The former, on crossing a nek to a low
underlying hill, came under a heavy rifle fire from the Boers below and
across the valley, and lost two killed and nine wounded. The force
returned to camp at 6 p.m.
On the following day Buller's army advanced to Geluk, some five or six
miles, the battalion with the Gordons and mounted troops of Dundonald's
Brigade, acting as rear-guard. A very difficult spruit, with steep
sides, was crossed, and the high hills on the further side occupied.
These had been held by the Boers in strength, but they had retired on
Buller's approach. As soon as the infantry of the rear-guard had arrived
in camp, the mounted troops of the rear-guard were attacked rather
sharply, but they managed to hold their own and to beat off the Boers.
Two companies of the Liverpool Regiment, who formed part of the advance
guard, fell into an ambush and lost considerably, leaving, it was
reported, some eighty men either killed, wounded, or prisoners in the
hands of the Boers. Shortly after arrival in camp, five companies of the
Regiment were sent out on outpost duty, taking up a short line and
entrenching--two companies were entrenched in front and furnished
sentries, with three companies entrenched in rear in support.
On August 24th and 25th the force stood fast, exchanging occasional big
gun and musketry fire with the Boers. Information was received that Lord
Roberts had entered Belfast on the 24th, thus practically joining hands
with Sir Redvers Buller.
The position taken up by the Boers already referred to, an immensely
powerful one, straddled the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway east of Belfast and
west of Machadodorp. Botha had taken up a front of some fifty miles in
length, and his force numbered about 5000 men. His right rested on the
broken mountainous country of Elandskloof to the north, and his left on
the mountains overlooking the Komati to the south. His centre was at
Bergendal Farm and the rugged and precipitous hills in the rear of the
farm, through which wound the railway and road, his line of retreat,
quite concealed from the fire and view of the British force. On the
extreme left a big gun with two or three smaller pieces were mounted,
but these were useless to give much support to the centre, as they were
too distant. The line of retreat to Komati Poort, which, from the nature
of the country, could not be threatened except by an extended movement
round the north or south, lay along the Belfast-Machadodorp road and the
railway line.
Briefly, the course of the two days' battle may be described as
follows:--
While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the position north
of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry division still further
north to threaten the Boer line of retreat towards Pilgrim's Rest, and
their right flank. Buller attacked the Boers' left with the intention of
driving it in and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat.
He on the first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the
two forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the
morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and
Dundonald's mounted brigade to watch the Boers' left, moved across their
front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and made an attack
at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight this was carried, and
the Boers retired all along their line in the direction of Machadodorp.
It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the Regiment.
On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller's force was put in motion.
The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about half a mile
from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies under Captain
Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their right flank,
losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this ridge of high ground
with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the Boers posted there off
the hills. The advance guard companies then continued their march with
orders to make Bergendal Farm their point, but not to go beyond it.
When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it was found
that General Buller's main body had changed direction to the right and
had gone east. On retracing their steps, the companies with great
difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of Buller's force. Sir Redvers
was now attacking the Boer left within a mile or two of his former
camping ground. A message was then received stating that the Regiment
was at that time a left flank guard to Buller's army, and that the
former advance guard companies were to join the remainder of the
Regiment.
The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were sangared
on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in front of and below
the high ridge over which his force had to advance. Buller made his
dispositions behind this high ridge. The reverse slope was completely
raked by the Boer fire, and no cover except that afforded by some
ant-hills was obtainable. The dropping bullets followed the form and
slope of the hill, so that neither front nor rear was secure.
[Illustration: Trekking with General Buller; 5-Inch Guns on the March]
As soon as the Regiment was formed up, an order was sent to advance.
Captain Emerson with fifteen men extended, rushed down the forward slope
under a heavy fire, and took cover behind some ant-hills. The moment the
men showed over the crest line they were met by a hail of bullets, and
further advance was impossible.
Later, another order was sent to advance, but owing to the want of cover
it was found impossible for the line to make headway in the face of the
fire brought to bear upon it. It was not until the Howitzer Battery was
brought into action late in the day, to cover the retirement of the
advanced companies, that Captain Emerson and his men were able to get
back. This they did under a very heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns.
One company under Lieutenant Harris, which had been moved off to the
right, had advanced and got into an exposed place. The men took cover
behind ant-hills, and remained there for the rest of the day. Three
companies had been moved to the neighbourhood of the guns. These came
under shell fire from the Boer guns and had some casualties, amongst
whom was Colour-Sergeant Burchell, who was shot through the shoulder.
Under General Buller's direct supervision one company was ordered
forward. Immediately their four scouts showed over the crest line a
storm of bullets met them, and they were all hit. The four scouts were
found dead on the second day afterwards by the Liverpool Mounted
Infantry.
Dusk found the companies posted as under: Three companies extended on
the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in support on the
rear side of the hill. One company was extended on the ridge in the
centre, whilst three companies were near the guns, three-quarters of a
mile away on the right. One man was killed and one wounded just at dark
by unaimed fire and by the last shots fired. The companies on the ridge
retired to the crest of the hill after dark and took up an entrenched
outpost line for the night. Rations were then issued for the following
day. It was a pitch-black night, and two cooks' orderlies who had gone
to fetch their company's tea and sugar rations from their wagon, missed
their way in the dark when returning, and walked into the Boer position,
distant only a few hundred yards, and were made prisoners. These two men
were the first prisoners of war lost to the battalion up to this date;
and with the exception of one other prisoner, who was temporarily in the
hands of the Boers in the Badfontein valley in the following year, they
were the only men of the battalion taken prisoners during the war. The
casualties of the battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2
prisoners.
Early the following morning the 7th Brigade, with the exception of the
Manchester Regiment, moved off to the left, the Rifle Brigade, whose
turn it was to lead, being in front. The guns accompanied the brigade.
There was little or no opposition till the scouts came under fire from
Bergendal Kopje, or Drie Kraal as it was otherwise known. This rocky
kopje was strongly fortified and held by the Boers. A Field Battery
opened fire on to the kopje at about 3000 yards' range from some rising
ground. Shortly afterwards the remaining guns--5-inch, 4.7's, naval
12-pounders, in all to the number of about thirty-nine--commenced
pouring shells on to this one spot in the Boer position. This shelling
continued for about three hours.
Very early in the morning a train had been seen coming out from
Machadodorp with reinforcements. These, it was ascertained, were the
Johannesburg Police, to the number of about eighty, and they formed the
garrison of the kopje, about a hundred more being in the farm behind the
kopje. This kopje was a small hill covered with large boulders. The
rocks had been connected with large stones to form sangars, behind which
the garrison found cover. A pompom was included in the armament of the
position, which measured about eighty yards by forty yards only. It fell
away abruptly in the rear, the farm and outbuildings lying very close
under the steep rear side of the hill.
The English shells fell with terrible accuracy into the sangars, and
there was an almost continuous explosion on the hill. Yet the Boers kept
up their fire till the Rifle Brigade were within ten yards of them, and
their pompom was in action, although partly jammed and firing single
shots, till the very end. This pompom was bravely served by one man, the
remainder of the gun team having been either killed or wounded. It is
not known whether this plucky fellow survived or not.
General Walter Kitchener, who was commanding the infantry attack,
decided to attack with the Rifle Brigade along the ridge which ended in
the kopje, which was slightly above the level of the ridge. At the same
time he ordered the Inniskilling Fusiliers to attack over the low ground
on the Rifle Brigade's right, whilst the Gordon Highlanders and the
Devonshire Regiment were held in support.
The Rifle Brigade started from the foot of the hills under which they
had taken cover, and which was about 1200 yards from the Boer position,
and almost immediately came under heavy musketry fire, being much
exposed on the high open ridge.
They, however, continued their advance in perfect order and eventually
rushed the kopje, the British shells dropping and the Boers firing till
the assault had been delivered. The Inniskillings advanced across the
low ground underneath the Rifle Brigade. Their advance was slightly
delayed, and their delivery of the assault was consequently later than
that of the Rifle Brigade. Captain Emerson with one company of the
Regiment which had been told off as escort to the Maxim guns, advanced
with the leading company of the Inniskillings.
The whole Boer position was evacuated as soon as their line had been
penetrated by the capture of the Bergendal Kopje.
The casualties amongst the Rifle Brigade were severe, owing to the much
exposed ground over which it was necessary for the attack to be
delivered, and to the fact that, as the extended lines converged on to
the small kopje, the men naturally became crowded and formed a better
mark for the Boer rifles. They lost two officers and fourteen men killed
and five officers and fifty men wounded, of whom two officers died of
their wounds the following day. The Regiment had one man wounded.
The position was soon made good, although the Boers held on tenaciously
to a long rocky ridge in their rear to which they had retired, till
nightfall. The force bivouacked for the night near the farm.
This action was known officially as the battle of Belfast.
A quiet night was passed, and next morning, August 28th, the force
occupied Machadodorp with slight opposition. The Boers were seen
retreating up the road leading to Lydenburg, and on the high ground
above the town they brought two big guns into action.
The Gordon Highlanders, in support of Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, were
sent on through the town and occupied the high ground on the far side,
and the Boers retired before them.
The Boers had made a very hurried retirement. In Machadodorp on the
evening of the day of the fight, guns and cartloads of ammunition were
parked in the big open space in the centre of the town. These were moved
off very hurriedly on the approach of the British force, and the guns
had only reached the top of the hills on the further side of Machadodorp
when General Buller's infantry came in view. General Buller brought some
long-range guns into action and shelled them as they ascended the hill,
but without result.
From lack of efficient pursuit after the battle the evening before, and
a too cautious advance in the morning, an opportunity to do the Boer
forces considerable damage was apparently lost. A wagon containing
pompom ammunition was captured by Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, but the
pompom itself got away, notwithstanding the very slight opposition
offered by the Boers.
The following day General Buller's forces reached Helvetia Farm, where
General French's column and General Pole Carew's division joined up.
With the object of releasing the prisoners who had been sent by the
Boers from Pretoria to Noitgedacht down the railway line towards Komati
Poort, General Buller's force now turned eastwards and marched along the
heights on the north side of the railway. On the first day out from
Helvetia his cavalry saw some 2000 released English prisoners marching
up the line towards Waterval Onder from the direction of Noitgedacht,
and having been unable to obtain touch with the Boers, the force
retraced their steps, and encamped some six miles from Helvetia at
Vluchtfontein, and at this place a halt was made on the following day.
From here General Buller turned north, and on September 1st, advancing
up the Lydenburg road, reached Badfontein on the Crocodile River. Here
the army bivouacked for the night, and an advance was made up the
Badfontein valley next morning, but coming into contact with the Boers
who were holding the northern end of the valley, his further progress
was checked. The Boer position extended along the high hills which
straddled the road in a semicircular position some eight miles from
Badfontein.
The Regiment formed the infantry advance guard of the army, and on
reaching what was then named Redvers' Kopje and afterwards known as
Devon Kopje, came under shell fire from three big guns which the Boers
had brought into action on the hills above. At this place the Regiment
stopped for the day, taking cover from shell fire behind the large
boulders of rocks of which the kopje was composed. The remainder of Sir
Redvers Buller's force returned to its old encampment of the previous
night.
The two mounted brigades and one battery R.H.A., which had advanced to
the foot of the hills occupied by the Boers, returned to camp at dusk.
As soon as it was dark, four companies of the Regiment were left on
Devon Kopje as an advanced post, whilst the remainder of the Regiment
retired to the rear of the hill and bivouacked. The kopje was entrenched
and everything made comfortable for the following day. All the baggage
wagons were sent back to the main camp during the night.
September 3rd, 4th, and 5th were spent quietly in position, the Boers on
the 5th firing over the heads of the Regiment into the brigade camp, but
doing very little damage. On the evening of the 5th a hill to the east
was shelled, and after some opposition from the Boers, when Strathcona's
Horse had some casualties, the hill was occupied by the 60th Rifles and
the Leicester Regiment. A battery of artillery was then hauled up the
steep incline to the top.
On the 6th, General Ian Hamilton having brought up reinforcements
consisting of a brigade, from Belfast by way of Dullstrom, thus turning
the Boers' right, General Buller advanced the following day and found
that the Boers had evacuated their position. But, in ignorance of this
retirement, great preparations were made for a big fight.
The Devonshire Regiment headed the advance of the infantry. It was
divided into two half battalions, one half battalion under Major Davies
proceeding up the road in support of the mounted troops, whilst five
companies under Captain Jacson were sent more to the left to attack the
large farm at the foot of the hill, with orders "to proceed as far as
possible without severe loss." These manoeuvres having been accomplished
in safety without a shot being fired, the force reached the top and
bivouacked some two miles further on for the night. Owing to the
steepness of the road the baggage did not arrive till after midnight.
Lydenburg was occupied next day without opposition, the Boers having
retired to a position on Paardeplaats, a range of high and irregular
hills five miles distant from and overlooking Lydenburg on the
Mauchberg-Spitzkop road. From this position the Boers shelled the
baggage, bursting shrapnel over it as it defiled into the open in front
of the town. The train formed up and halted under cover behind a hill,
and came into camp at dusk.
The following morning, September 8th, Sir Redvers Buller decided to
attack the Boer position on Paardeplaats, and for this purpose he
detailed General Walter Kitchener's brigade to advance up the spurs of
the hills against the Boers' right, whilst General Ian Hamilton's
brigade was to turn the Boers' left, the attack being covered by the
artillery which proceeded up the main road in the centre.
General Kitchener's brigade moved out from Lydenburg on to the
race-course. The battalion being the leading regiment deployed and
advanced towards a hill jutting out into the plain, with the mounted
brigade of General Dundonald working round the left. This hill was
afterwards known to the Regiment as Ben Tor. As the Regiment deployed
into the open it came under shrapnel fire from two big guns posted on
Paardeplaats. The Regiment was, however, extended, and had only one man
wounded.
The Gordon Highlanders, who were in support, marched across the Boers'
front, in rear of the extended Devons, in column of companies. Several
shells burst amongst them, and one shell, bursting thirty feet above
graze, took their volunteer company end on and killed and wounded
fifteen.
With Dundonald's men on their left flank, four companies of the Regiment
under Captain Jacson advanced up the spurs without opposition, whilst
Major Davies, in command of the remaining companies, climbed the spurs
on Jacson's right. Little or no opposition was met with on this flank.
Jacson's companies were reinforced by four companies of the Gordon
Highlanders and the 60th Rifles, and at 4 p.m., when nearing the summit,
a thick mist came on, and the flanking brigade halted. Meanwhile Davies,
with two of his companies, had reached the top of the hill and was
proceeding down the far side when the fog lifted. It was then
ascertained that the Boers, under cover of the fog, had left the
position to which they had clung with great determination, and had
retired. The position had been turned by Ian Hamilton's right flank
attack.
The thick mist saved the Boers, who would otherwise undoubtedly have
lost their big guns in their retirement.
Just before dark the companies of the Regiment, which had become
scattered, were collected, and Captain Jacson received an order to
return with these to the old camp on the far side of Lydenburg; seven
companies were thus taken down the hills over very rough country to the
old camp, a distance of nearly six miles. On arrival there a message was
received which stated that the army was encamped half-way up the hill
towards Paardeplaats. The seven companies then returned, and finally
reached camp very late. They had been marching and climbing incessantly
from 7.30 a.m. till 10 p.m.
The brigades had by this time become rather intermingled. Of General
Kitchener's brigade the Manchester Regiment had been left behind at
Witklip, at the north end of the Badfontein valley. A garrison had also
been left at Lydenburg under General Howard, consisting of the Rifle
Brigade and Leicesters, with General Brocklehurst's Cavalry Brigade.
The Devonshire Regiment was now left behind at Paardeplaats, while
General Buller's force, consisting of the Gordon Highlanders and the
60th Rifles, with Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, two Field Batteries, and
the 5-inch guns, advanced on the 9th, the day following the capture of
Paardeplaats, in the direction of the Mauchberg.
The country was extremely difficult, and the Boer guns and pompoms well
served, and considerable opposition was met with in the advance.
General Buller's force reached the Mauchberg that evening and proceeded
on the following day to Devil's Knuckles, down the steep Mauchberg road
(known as Hell's Gate), where the two Boer big guns again narrowly
escaped capture, and so on to Spitzkop, just north of Nelspruit on the
Pretoria-Lorenzo Marques railway.
On the 10th four companies and two guns under Captain Jacson were
ordered to the Mauchberg. The companies got off by midday, and after a
stiff climb occupied the mountain just before dark. The top of the
Mauchberg, 8720 feet high, was found to be very extended, and the
garrison was much split up. Company forts were erected on the main
features, and the place was held till the 20th, mostly in thick fog and
rain.
The Mauchberg post was the terminus of the telegraph line, communication
thence with General Buller's head-quarters being continued by visual
signalling. The mountain was intersected by deep kloofs and ravines,
into most of which the Boers had collected their families and supplies,
in the hope that neither would be found. These were all disclosed from
the summit of the mountain, which commanded a view of a great extent of
country. General Buller succeeded in collecting a large amount of stores
from these "caches."
The families of Boers who surrendered with their stock were sent into
Lydenburg, together with any prisoners that had been taken.
On the 11th two of the Mauchberg companies with the two guns were
ordered to proceed to Devil's Knuckles, to supply picquets for
Dundonald's Mounted Brigade which was stationed there, and on September
20th the companies of the Regiment stationed at Paardeplaats marched to
the Mauchberg, being relieved at the former place by the Leicesters, the
remaining two Mauchberg companies proceeding to Devil's Knuckles.
On the 21st the Regiment was again united and marched with Dundonald's
Brigade down the Sabi Valley, reaching Sabi Drift that evening, where
the force bivouacked. The column under General Dundonald remained at
Sabi Drift till the 26th awaiting the arrival of General Buller, who was
returning from Spitzkop.
[Illustration: Devons Crossing the Sabi River]
A story is told anent the positions out of which General Buller's
infantry had turned the Boers, which goes to show the estimation in
which the British infantry were held by their opponents. The words are
those of General Botha, and were told to an officer of the Head-quarter
Staff. "I shall give it up," he said. "I have taken up position after
position which I considered impregnable; I have always been turned off
by your infantry, who come along in great lines in their dirty clothes
with bags on their backs. Nothing can stop them. I shall give it up."
On September 25th the remainder of General Buller's force marched into
Sabi Drift, and on the 26th the army, united again, advanced north for
Pilgrim's Rest. Burgher's Nek and Mac-Mac diggings were reached about
noon on that day.
The pass over Burgher's Nek was held by the Boers under Gravett, Botha
and the State treasure with a small escort having crossed only a few
hours before, whilst a portion of their army under Viljoen retired at
the same time to the north towards Pietersburg.
The infantry of the advance guard was composed of four companies of the
Regiment under Captain Jacson. On reaching the foot of the pass the
mounted troops were checked and the artillery came into action. The
position occupied by the Boers was formidable--a long stretch of high
rugged hills, with the forward slope ending precipitously. The pass lay
over a Nek between two high shoulders of hills. The Boers, exceedingly
well posted, occupied the hills on either side of the Nek, taking cover
behind the immense boulders on the summit.
After the artillery had been bombarding the south side of the Nek for
some considerable time, the mounted infantry were sent forward to occupy
the hill known as Grass Kop, but were unable to proceed. In the
meantime, the four companies of the advance guard had been moved off to
the left and nearer to the hills. They now got the order to attack and
occupy the hill. Whilst these companies moved off under cover of the
undulating ground to the foot of the hills, two companies with the Maxim
gun took up a position in rear to cover the advance, firing with a range
of 1700 yards at the top of the hill. Most of the artillery came into
action at the same time and at the same objective. The foot of the hill
was reached by the attacking force with two casualties. One company was
then directed to the left to attack round the flank, and the ascent of
the precipitous side of the hill was commenced. Crawling up a goat's
track in single file, on hands and knees, through dense bush, the first
portion of the ascent was accomplished, and the little force formed up
under a spur to get breath before debouching into the open for the final
rush to the top. After a short halt the advance was continued to the
summit, the companies on their way coming under a smart shell fire from
their own guns (happily without casualties), which were bursting
shrapnel with wonderful precision between the two leading companies.
Just before reaching the top the flanking company, coming in from the
left with a well-timed advance, joined the general advance to the
summit. It was found that the Boers had retired, and fire was brought to
bear on them as they descended the rear slope of the hill. The high hill
on the left of the pass was then occupied, and the Nek over which the
road passed cleared of Boers.
A heliograph message from Sir Redvers Buller was received on the summit,
"Well done Devons!" and in Lord Roberts' official dispatch for the day
it was notified that General Buller had occupied Burgher's Nek, and that
"the pass had been turned by a half battalion of the Devonshire
Regiment, well led by Captain Jacson."
The four companies bivouacked on the top. Efforts were made by those
down below to get food and blankets up to them, but owing to the
steepness and difficulties of the climb and the darkness, it was found
impossible.
The head-quarter companies of the Regiment were engaged on outpost duty
at the foot of the pass, where the army had bivouacked, almost all the
men being on duty.
On the following day the march was resumed, the head-quarter companies
of the Regiment being rear-guard to the force. The companies on the hill
were relieved by two companies of the Regiment under Captain Wren. The
road was extremely bad and crossed by many drifts, which caused
considerable delay, and it was not till the early hours of morning that
the rear-guard companies got into camp. The bivouac was formed amongst
the hills, some five miles from Pilgrim's Rest, which had been occupied
the previous day by Strathcona's Horse.
On the 28th the march was continued through Pilgrim's Rest to the foot
of Morgenzon Hill, the mounted troops surprising the Boers on the summit
and putting them to flight.
The baggage was safely brought up the six miles of steep hill on the
following day. The road, which was the old coaching highway Pilgrim's
Rest-Lydenburg, was found in excellent condition, but it was heavy work
for the oxen, and all wagons were double spanned. The force camped on
the summit, and halted there on the 30th.
A good number of Boers were reported in the vicinity to the west and
north, but they did not make their presence felt and Sunday was spent
quietly.
On October 1st Morgenzon was left and the march continued towards
Kruger's Post and Lydenburg. It was a long, dusty road through narrow
valleys. Opposition was encountered at the bifurcation of the
Lydenburg-Morgenzon and Lydenburg-Ohrigstadt roads, which, however, was
soon overcome, the Boers retiring to the hills out of reach of the guns,
and Kruger's Post was reached at 2 p.m.
Shortly after the Regiment had settled itself in its bivouac a Boer big
gun opened on to it from a hill about 6000 yards distant, and not very
far from the road. This gun also shelled the wagons as they came into
camp, necessitating their halting under cover and coming in later. In
the evening, about 6.30, the Boers brought another gun into action on a
hill due west of the camp, and shelled the cavalry and infantry bivouacs
for one and a half hours in the dark. After several shells had pitched
into their midst the Regiment moved out and formed up into two long
lines and entrenched.
It was whilst marching out to take up this position in the dark that a
shell emptied itself into the head of one company, killing Lieutenant
Cumin and severely wounding Captain Luxmoore and one man. The South
African Light Horse and Strathcona's Horse had a number of casualties
amongst their men and horses.
The Boers by a skilful manoeuvre had kept their guns concealed, ready to
be brought into action as soon as General Buller's army had settled
itself quietly in its bivouac. They expended some cartloads of
ammunition in this manner without interference. In the early hours of
the following morning a band of volunteers ascended the hill to capture
the guns. They had both been withdrawn and were not traced.
On the morning of October 2nd Buller's army reached Lydenburg without
further opposition. Lieutenant Cumin was buried in the evening in
Lydenburg cemetery.
On Saturday, October 6th, Sir Redvers Buller bade farewell to his army.
The troops lined the streets and roads and gave him a hearty send-off.
He was immensely popular with the men and they were sorry to see him go.
General W. Kitchener took over command of the Lydenburg district and its
garrison, on Sir Redvers Buller's departure.
On the writer asking Sir Redvers on the eve of the day of his departure
which was his best army--the one he commanded into Ladysmith or the one
with which he trekked north--he replied, "The army I went north with was
the best. I watched the Devons pass me at Burgher's Nek and it struck me
how wonderfully well they looked. I considered they were ready for
anything I asked them to do; but," he added, "they surprised me with the
pace they went up the hill at Burgher's Nek."