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THE RECORD
OF
A REGIMENT OF THE LINE
BEING
A REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF
THE 1ST BATTALION DEVONSHIRE
REGIMENT DURING THE
BOER WAR
1899-1902
BY
COLONEL M. JACSON
London: HUTCHINSON & CO.
Paternoster Row 1908
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF
LADYSMITH 1
II. SIEGE OF LADYSMITH 30
III. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH,
AND THE ADVANCE NORTH
UNDER. SIR REDVERS BULLER 104
IV. LYDENBURG 149
V. TREKKING IN THE NORTH-EAST TRANSVAAL 176
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
MONUMENT ERECTED TO OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE
DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT WHO FELL ON JANUARY 6TH
ON WAGON HILL, SIEGE OF LADYSMITH. _Frontispiece_
FACE PAGE
EN ROUTE TO LADYSMITH 5
IN THE TRENCHES, LADYSMITH 36
TOWN HALL, LADYSMITH, CLOCK-TOWER DAMAGED BY
SHELL FIRE 44
AFTER A WET NIGHT IN THE TRAVERSES, LADYSMITH 56
THE RAILWAY BRIDGE, WITH CÆSAR'S CAMP IN
DISTANCE, LADYSMITH 62
LIEUT.-COLONEL C.W. PARK 66
NAVAL BATTERY HILL, LADYSMITH }
}
MONUMENT ERECTED TO DEVONS ON WAGON HILL, } 70
ON SPOT WHERE THE CHARGE TOOK PLACE, LADYSMITH }
A PEACEFUL SUNDAY 80
DEVON OFFICERS REMAINING FIT FOR DUTY AT THE
END OF THE SIEGE 102
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WALTER KITCHENER 104
RAILWAY BRIDGE DESTROYED BY BOERS, INGAGANE 108
MAKING BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENT, INGAGANE 110
THE BAGGAGE OF GENERAL BULLER'S ARMY CROSSING
BEGINDERLYN BRIDGE 116
TREKKING WITH GENERAL BULLER 124
DEVONS CROSSING THE SABI RIVER 140
COLONEL C.W. PARK, MISSION CAMP, LYDENBURG 148
WIRE BRIDGE, LYDENBURG 160
MISSION CAMP FORT, LYDENBURG (INTERIOR) 170
REMAINS OF BOER BIG GUN, WATERVAL 180
CROSSING THE STEELPORT RIVER 182
DAWN--AFTER A NIGHT MARCH, TRICHARDTSFONTEIN 200
DEVONS EN ROUTE TO DURBAN 208
MONUMENT ERECTED IN LADYSMITH CEMETERY 218
MAPS
SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
NATAL AND S.E. TRANSVAAL
PREFACE
BY LIEUT.-GENERAL W. KITCHENER
Experience we all know to be a valuable asset, and experience in war is
the most costly of its kind. To enable those coming after us to
reconstruct the picture of war, Regimental Histories have proved of
infinite value. That such a record fills a sentimental want hardly
requires assertion.
My first feelings on being honoured with a request from the Devonshire
Regiment to write a preface to the account of their "Work in South
Africa, 1899-1902," were, I confess, How could I refuse so difficult a
task gracefully? However, on further consideration it seemed to me that
undoubtedly such a preface should be written by some one outside the
corps itself. Onlookers, as the saying goes, often see most of the game,
and, being free from personal bias, can often add something to what
those engrossed in the meshes of life's details can only appreciate from
a narrower point of view.
From this standpoint, and as I was the General under whom the 1st Devons
served longest in South Africa, it seemed obviously my duty to attempt
the task.
The "Work of the 1st Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment" is portrayed
in these pages. It therefore only remains for me to add, for the benefit
of coming generations, what manner of men these were, who by their
dogged devotion to duty helped to overcome the Boer. Associated as one
was with many corps in the close intimacy of veldt life, it was a study
of the deepest interest to note the individuality that characterized
each, and which was often as clearly and as well defined as that of the
men with whom one daily came in contact.
During the many months of our intimate association, and in the varied
situations that presented themselves, I cannot call to mind any single
occasion on which the Devons were ever flurried or even hurried. Their
imperturbability of temper, even under the most trying conditions, could
not be surpassed.
Another characteristic of the corps was its inherent thrift. They were,
in fact, essentially a "self-help" corps. When a flood came and washed
away the bridge leading to the picket line, no sapper was required to
show them how to throw a suspension bridge above the flood from tree to
cliff. It was characteristic of the Regiment that they carried out in
war their peace training, never allowing the atmosphere of excitement to
distort their actions.
If we take Elandslaagte, Wagon Hill, or any of the hundred and one
ticklish night operations in which they took part, this trait will be
ever noteworthy, that they acted as was to be expected of them, and made
no fuss of having done so.
We have all read realistic descriptions of troops on the march in South
Africa, the writer using all his cunning to depict the war-worn dirty
condition of his heroes, seeming to glean satisfaction from their
grease-stained khaki. It must be admitted that the South African War is
responsible for a somewhat changed condition of thought as regards
cleanliness and its relation to smartness. No such abstraction disturbed
the Devons; a Devon man was always clean. Individuals of some corps
could be readily identified by their battered helmets or split boots;
not so the Devons. No helmet badge was necessary for their
identification, and the veriest tyro could not fail to recognize at any
time the crisply washed Indian helmet cover.
It may be open to question whether it is for good or for evil that we
should broaden our views of what goes to make a smart and useful
fighting man, but the regimental system of the Devons was for no
innovation of a careless go-as-you-please style. I thus lay stress on
the individuality of the Devons in South Africa, because it was this
individuality of theirs, born of their regimental system, which enabled
them to claim so full a share in the success of that long-drawn-out
campaign.
No one can quite appreciatively follow the story of the work of the
Devons, unless he realizes the intense feeling of comradeship that
animates these West-country men. To work with Devonshire men is to
realize in the flesh the intensity of the local county loyalty so
graphically depicted by Charles Kingsley in his _Westward Ho!_ and other
novels.
In conclusion, let me add, a more determined crew I never wish to see,
and a better regiment to back his orders a General can never hope to
have.
[Illustration: [Signature - Walter Kitchener]]
DALHOUSIE, _May_, 1906.
PREFACE
BY THE AUTHOR
The story as told is an everyday account and a record of the work of the
men of the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment during the South African
War.
It exemplifies the devotion to duty, the stubbornness in adversity, and
the great fighting qualities of the West-country man, which qualities
existed in the time of Drake, and which still exist.
A repeating of their history of the past, a record of the present, and
an example for the generation to come.
CHAPTER I
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
1899
On returning from the North-West Frontier of India at the close of the
Tirah Expedition, 1897-8, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, which
had served with distinction under the command of Colonel J.H. Yule in
the campaign against the Afridi clans, was ordered to proceed from
Peshawar to Jullunder, at which place it was quartered in 1898 and in
the summer months of 1899, during which time certain companies and
detachments were furnished for duty at Dalhousie, Kasauli, and Ghora
Dakka (Murree Hills), and located during the hot weather at these
places.
Towards the latter end of August, 1899, news from South Africa appeared
ominous, and war seemed likely to break out between England and the
Transvaal.
On the 8th September, 1899, confidential instructions were received from
army head-quarters at Simla ordering the Regiment to get ready to move
at short notice to South Africa, and a few days later further orders
were received to entrain on the 16th September for Bombay _en route_ to
the Transvaal, which country the Regiment was destined not to reach for
some months, and then only after severe fighting.
The companies quartered at Dalhousie and Ghora Dakka with difficulty
joined the head-quarters at Jullunder before the 16th, and the following
marches are worthy of record:--
The Dalhousie detachment marched to Pathankote, a distance of 54-1/4
miles, in two days. Major Curry, who was in command, gave each man a
coolie for his baggage, and ordered the men to get to Duneera the first
day the best way they could. At Duneera they halted for the night, and
the next day pushed on in the same manner to Pathankote, where they
immediately entrained and proceeded to Jullunder.
The Ghora Dakka detachment under Lieutenant Emerson marched to Rawal
Pindi, a distance of fifty-four miles, in two days, and then entrained
for Jullunder.
No men fell out in either party, and considering the time of year and
the intense heat, they were fine performances.
Some officers were on leave in Cashmere, and only arrived at Jullunder
as the Regiment was entraining.
On September 16th, 1899, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, under
the command of Major C.W. Park, left Jullunder by rail for Bombay with a
strength as under:--
25 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 842 sergeants, rank and file.
The following officers accompanied the battalion:--
Major C.W. Park, commanding.
Major M.C. Curry, second in command.
Captain M.G. Jacson.
Captain J.O. Travers.
Captain E.C. Wren.
Captain E.M. Morris.
Lieutenant P.H. Price-Dent.
Lieutenant J.E.I. Masterson.
Lieutenant A.F. Dalzel.
Lieutenant N.Z. Emerson.
Lieutenant G.H.I. Graham.
Lieutenant T.B. Harris.
2nd Lieutenant G.I. Watts.
2nd Lieutenant D.H. Blunt.
2nd Lieutenant H.R. Gunning.
2nd Lieutenant S.T. Hayley.
2nd Lieutenant H.W.F. Twiss.
Captain and Adjutant H.S.L. Ravenshaw.
Captain and Quartermaster H. Honner.
Warrant Officer Sergeant-Major G.E. Mitchell.
The following officers were attached for duty to the battalion:--
Major Burnside, R.A.M.C., in medical charge.
Lieutenant E.G. Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant H.W.R. Cowie, Dorset Regiment.
Lieutenant A.M. Tringham, The Queen's West Surrey Regiment.
Lieutenant J.A. Byrne, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Lieutenant E.E.M. Walker, Somersetshire Light Infantry.
[Illustration: En Route to Ladysmith]
The following officers were absent from the battalion on leave in
England:--
Captain W.B. Lafone.
Captain G.M. Gloster.
Lieutenant H.N. Field.
Colonel J.H. Yule, commanding the battalion, was appointed to the
command of the Indian Infantry Brigade, South Africa, with the temporary
rank of brigadier-general. Major A.G. Spratt was placed in charge of the
depot and details left at Jullunder.
The Regiment arrived without incident on September 21st at Bombay,
having halted, for a few hours only, at the following places:--
On September 17th at Aligarh.
" " 18th at Jhansi.
" " 19th at Hoshangabad.
" " 20th at Deolali.
Embarkation took place immediately on arrival, the transport _Sutlej_
taking five companies, head-quarters, band and drums, under Major C.W.
Park; and the transport _City of London_ taking three companies under
Major M.C. Curry.
On the latter vessel sailed also Sir George White's Staff and the Staff
of the Indian Infantry Brigade.
The _Sutlej_ sailed at noon on September 21st, and it was reported that
the ship was under sealed orders, and that her destination was Delagoa
Bay.
The days on board were occupied in keeping the men fit with physical
drill, free gymnastics, etc., and with instruction in first-aid to the
wounded and the use of the field-dressing and the method of adjusting
it.
On September 28th Agalega Island was sighted, and on the 30th the ship
was off the east coast of Madagascar.
On the 2nd October the S.S. _Purnea_ with the 60th Rifles on board was
spoken, and communication by flag signal established, both vessels
inquiring for news. The _Sutlej_ was the last to leave port, but had
nothing new to communicate.
At 7 a.m. on October 5th, in rough and foggy weather, the _Sutlej_
arrived off the coast of Africa, and the fog lifting about midday, she
ran down the coastline for two hours, and arrived outside the bar at
Durban.
The ships conveying the 60th Rifles and the 53rd Battery arrived an hour
later. The _Sutlej_ waited till 2 p.m. to enter the harbour, and arrived
alongside the quay at 4 p.m., when disembarkation commenced at once in
torrents of rain and heavy wind squalls.
A deputation of the Durban "West of England" Association met the
Regiment on arrival and presented an address.
The first news received on landing was that war had not yet been
declared, but that it was inevitable, that President Kruger had seized
half a million of money on its way from Johannesburg to the Cape, and
that orders had been given by him to shoot any one crossing the
frontier. This may or may not have been true; a good deal of _perfectly
reliable_ information was being circulated about this time.
On the night of October 5th-6th the Regiment left in three trains for
Ladysmith. The rain and cold caused some inconvenience to the men, as
they were packed into open trucks, and obtained neither shelter nor
sleep. They were new to the game then, but they saw the inside of many a
coal truck later.
The journey to Pietermaritzburg was in the nature of a triumphal
procession, for at various points along the line small knots of old men
women and children, waving Union Jacks, cheered the troops most lustily
as the trains passed.
A remark frequently heard was "How glad they are to see us," and it was
evident that these people at least, who were interested and possessed
homes in Natal, had not underrated the power and intentions of the
Transvaal. The Regiment had an enthusiastic reception, as indeed did all
troops passing to the front, flags and handkerchiefs being waved from
every house farm and village. At some stations where a short stop was
made to allow of other trains getting on ahead, tea and refreshments
were given out free, by willing hands, to the soldiers in the trucks.
Trains were running with about 500 to 600 yards distance between them.
On October 6th between 7 and 8 a.m. the trains conveying the Regiment
reached Pietermaritzburg, and here the men had breakfast. Pushing on
again with as little delay as possible and passing Estcourt at about 3
p.m., and Colenso about 4 p.m., Ladysmith was reached at 6 p.m.
Detraining took place at once, and the Regiment marched off to Tin Town,
about two miles distant, where camp was pitched in the dark.
The infantry at this time in Ladysmith consisted of:--
The Gordon Highlanders.
The Devonshire Regiment.
The Gloucester Regiment.
The Liverpool Regiment.
Rumours of war and warlike preparation on the part of the Boers were
continually being circulated, and at daybreak on October 11th the
Transvaal Boers crossed the frontier of Natal 18,000 strong with
fourteen guns.
On October 12th, at 2 p.m., orders were received for the Regiment to
prepare at once to go out as part of a flying column towards Acton
Holmes to check the advance of the Free State Boers, who were reported
to be crossing the Biggarsberg by Vanreenen's Pass; and at 2 a.m. a
force consisting of four regiments of cavalry, four batteries R.A., and
three regiments of infantry (Liverpools, Gordons, and Devons) left
Ladysmith, and after great delay reached Dewdrop at 9 a.m.
The cavalry having been sent on to gain touch, failed however to do so,
and the column returned at once to Ladysmith. The information turned out
to be incorrect.
On the return march the Regiment was joined by Captain W.B. Lafone and
Lieutenants Field and Green, who had arrived from England.
On Sunday, October 15th, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who had arrived
about two days previously, marched out of the Tin Camp Ladysmith to
entrain for Dundee, which place it was reported the Transvaal Boers were
threatening; and on the same day the news was confirmed that the
armoured train at Mafeking had been twice attacked.
It was said that our khaki uniform had completely nonplussed the Boers,
and that they had expected to meet us coming on in red, as in the days
gone by, and that they were consequently rather surprised and annoyed.
The Liverpool Regiment, 18th Hussars, and one battery left Ladysmith by
road for Colenso on October 18th, the Manchester Regiment, the Devons,
and Natal mounted troops covering their march from the direction of
Vanreenen's Pass. Refugees continually coming through into Ladysmith
from Acton Holmes during the day, reported fighting going on between
Boers and Natal Carbineers.
On its return to Ladysmith the same day, the Regiment moved from the Tin
Town Camp and encamped on the football ground under the convent hill,
and towards sunset the whole army marched out of Ladysmith into
strategical positions outside the town. The Regiment at this time was
reserve battalion.
On October 19th the Boers cut the telegraph wire between Dundee and
Ladysmith, and captured near Elandslaagte Station a train containing
forty tons of flour consigned to the force at Dundee, and the following
morning the Devons, Gordons, one battery, 5th Lancers, and some Colonial
mounted infantry, moved out towards Modder Station on the
Ladysmith-Newcastle road.
At about 11 a.m. news was received that a fierce battle was being fought
at Dundee, and that a large force of Free State Boers was advancing
towards Ladysmith from Bester's Station, having crossed the Vanreenen's
Pass. The column was halted about four miles out of Ladysmith, and three
companies of the Devons under Captain Travers were sent to hold Pepworth
Hill on the flank threatened by the Free State Boers. But at 4 p.m. Sir
George White came out and joined the force, and he ordered the column
back into Ladysmith.
He gave an account of the fighting at Dundee, which he had just
received. Dundee Camp was aroused in the morning by shells being pitched
into its midst. The artillery came into action, and the 60th Rifles and
Dublin Fusiliers were then sent to capture the position, which was
occupied by 4000 Boers. This was gallantly carried. Another column of
Boers was then turned on to, and at 1.30 p.m. the enemy broke.
Major-General Penn-Symons was mortally wounded, and Major-General Yule
had taken over command at Dundee.
By next day a detachment of Boers had reached the neighbourhood of
Modder Station and had taken up a position near Elandslaagte.
This detachment consisted of some 650 Boers, with two guns, under the
leadership of General Koch, who was charged with the task of cutting off
the retreat of the forces at Glencoe and Dundee, and who had been sent
forward for that purpose. General Koch had at the same time practically
joined hands with the Free State Boers, who were in the neighbourhood of
Bester's Station on the Ladysmith-Harrismith line.
In order to reoccupy Elandslaagte and to secure General Yule's line of
retreat, Sir George White ordered out a force consisting of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, of which four companies of the Regiment formed a
part, under the command of General French. These companies went out in
the morning by train under Major Curry, and detrained near Modder
Station.
One company and a Maxim gun under Captain Jacson and a squadron 5th
Lancers were sent at 11 a.m. by road to Pepworth Hill to guard the left
flank of General French's force against the Free State Army, which might
seriously threaten General French's communications with Ladysmith.
At 1 p.m. further reinforcements were sent out to General French, and
the three remaining companies of the Regiment were ordered to proceed by
train to Modder Station to join the wing under Major Curry. The seven
companies were then under the command of Major Park.
The Boers occupied two cones of some low hills overlooking Elandslaagte
railway station. General French's artillery came into action on some
high ground 4400 yards distant from the Boer position, and between the
two forces was an open undulating plain affording little or no cover,
and across which the attack had to be delivered.
The Gordon Highlanders and Manchesters were to attack round the Boers'
left flank, whilst the Devons were to make a frontal attack.
From the nature of the position which they had taken up, no commanding
positions affording flanking fire and protection to their flanks were
obtainable by the Boers. These were open and could be easily threatened
by the cavalry and the mounted infantry.
The Boers had two guns in position on one of the two cones, and with
these guns they did good execution, knocking over a limber of one of
French's batteries at the second shot, and practically before his guns
came into action.
General French's force, now considerably augmented, marched off at 2.30
p.m. The 1st Devon Regiment was formed in company column at fifty paces
as a reserve to the Manchester Regiment. After proceeding about a mile
heavy firing was heard on the right front, direction was changed
half-right, and the Regiment was then ordered to form for attack on the
left of the Manchesters, and to take up a front of 500 yards.
Three companies were placed in the firing-line and supports under Major
Park, and four companies in reserve under Major Curry. At about 3.15
p.m. the firing-line reached the top of a low hill, and came in sight of
the enemy's position distant about 4400 yards. Here a halt of a quarter
of an hour was made, and at 3.30 p.m. orders were received by the
Regiment to make a frontal attack on the position, to advance to within
effective rifle range, and to then hold on till a flank attack by the
Manchesters and Gordons came in on the right. The ground between the
Regiment and the position sloped slightly up to the foot of the low
rocky hills, on which the enemy was posted. There was no cover of any
kind, except a few ant-heaps, in the first half of the distance.
The firing-line advanced keeping intervals and covering a front of about
600 yards, the centre being directed on to a conical hill at the back of
the enemy's camp. The reserve followed in column of companies, in single
rank, at fifty paces distance between companies. The enemy's guns opened
on the Regiment at once with shrapnel, but most of the shells went high,
only one striking the reserve companies.
A steady advance to about 1200 to 1300 yards from the position was made,
when, the rifle fire becoming rather heavy, fire was opened by section
volleys. The light was bad, and it was very difficult to see the enemy
or estimate the distances. In a few minutes the supports reinforced, and
the firing-line then pushed on to the foot of the slope, and established
itself in a shallow ditch 800 to 900 yards from the position. Here it
held on, firing sectional volleys, till the flank attack appeared on the
hill, apparently about 500 yards from the position.
An advance by companies from the right was then ordered, and, the
reserve reinforcing, a further 200 yards was gained. Some bugling and
shouting was then heard on the hill. A rush to 350 yards was now made,
and, after a short pause to allow the men to get breath, bayonets were
fixed and the position charged, four companies assaulting the detached
hill on the left, the remaining three companies assaulting the hill on
which the enemy's guns were. F and G Companies were the first to reach
and take possession of the guns, the Gordon Highlanders coming up on the
right shortly afterwards. The companies then moved on down the reverse
slope and opened fire on the retiring enemy. On the detached hill only
five of the enemy were found alive, and they showed a white flag as the
hill was charged.
The Regiment was then re-formed, and held the detached hill during the
night.
During the three hours it was under fire, the battalion kept line and
intervals carefully throughout, and adjusted sights and fired as
steadily as if on parade. It is to the perfect steadiness of the men and
the absence of all crowding that the very small losses from the enemy's
fire, which at all times was heavy, can be attributed.
The battalion's losses were:--
Captain W.B. Lafone, slightly wounded.
2nd Lieutenants Gunning, Hailey, and Green, severely wounded.
Twenty-nine non-commissioned officers and men wounded.
Parties of men were busy during the night collecting the Boer wounded
and taking them down to the laager. Among them was General Koch, who was
badly hit in several places. He died of his wounds a few days afterwards
in Ladysmith.
The losses of the Boers were estimated at 62 killed, 150 wounded, and
184 prisoners.
The force was moved back into Ladysmith early on the 22nd morning, the
infantry by rail, and cavalry by road. The company of the Regiment and
Maxim gun, which had been on Pepworth Hill during the day and the
following night, got back to camp the same afternoon.
The 23rd was given up to rejoicings and congratulations over the
victory, and the two Boer flags which were captured were displayed
outside the officers' mess tent.
The Free State Army had by now come across to the east, and were in the
neighbourhood of Modder Station, and on October 24th a column was again
ordered out with the object of assisting General Yule's force in from
Dundee.
This column consisted of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, Natal
Carbineers, Border Mounted Rifles, Imperial Light Horse, Devons,
Liverpools, Gloucesters, 60th Rifles, and twenty guns, in all about 5500
men.
The enemy was found posted on Tinta Inyoni Mountain, on the summit of
which they brought a gun into action and fired on to the head of Sir G.
White's force, which was in column of route on the road, but without
doing any damage. The action began at 8.30 a.m.
At the commencement of the action the battalion was in reserve, and was
ordered to extend and lie down at the foot of the first slope facing the
enemy's position, and some 300 yards north-west of the railway line,
sending scouts to the crest of the ridge to watch the front. Four
companies were shortly afterwards ordered to advance in attack
formation, forming their own supports, and to place themselves on the
left of the Gloucester Regiment, which was in front of the Regiment at
the time. The Regiment was then on the extreme left of the firing-line.
The four companies of the reserve worked round under cover to a small
nullah about 300 yards on the left and then advanced up it. The
firing-line advanced, under slight rifle fire, across a rocky plateau
till they gained a small ridge overlooking the front, and opened fire by
section volleys on to a ridge about 800 yards in front, from which a
rather heavy fire was coming.
The Maxim gun under Lieutenant Price-Dent came into action in rear of
the left of the line and fired at the enemy to the left front.
The enemy's fire from this ridge was soon silenced, and from that time
the only objective the line had was a few scattered Boers and their
horses on the rear slope of the high hill to the left front, some 2000
yards distant.
The reserve was deployed into two lines of double companies on and below
a small ridge of rocks some 250 yards in rear of the firing-line. At
about 2 p.m. the retirement commenced, and the battalion gradually
followed the Liverpool Regiment and became rearguard. Ladysmith was
reached about 3.30 p.m., after a sixteen-mile march in torrents of rain.
The casualties of the battalion during the day were:--
1 private killed.[1]
25 privates wounded, none dangerously.
[Footnote 1: This private, the first man of the Regiment killed in the
war, was Private Winsor. He was shot dead through the heart by a stray
bullet.]
This action was known as the action of Reitfontein.
On October 26th General Yule's force marched into Ladysmith. They had
had a bad time, having marched in drenching rain, day and night, from
Sunday till Wednesday. The garrison of Ladysmith gave them food on
arrival, the Regiment supplying the Dublin Fusiliers (officers and men)
with refreshments.
On October 27th it was reported that the Boers were nearing Ladysmith
and attempting to surround the place, and a large force was ordered out
by Sir George White to reconnoitre.
This reconnaissance was under the command of Colonel Ian Hamilton, and
his column consisted of three cavalry regiments, three batteries, and
four infantry battalions, to which was added later one infantry
battalion and one battery.
Having advanced beyond the Nek between Lombards Kop and Bulwana, and
having crossed the Modder Spruit on the Helpmakaar road, the Regiment
was sent on outpost duty to the left front, whilst the main body of the
force halted on the bank of the stream.
From the outpost line large bodies of the enemy were observed advancing
over Long Hill. Boers were also seen very busy on the kopjes south of
Long Hill, entrenching.
At 8 p.m. orders were received from the officer commanding the column,
in which it was explained that the force was to make a night march and
attack, the infantry to advance at 2 a.m.
The Boer position as seen by the Regiment on the outpost line was some
three miles in length, and the point of attack was to be the extreme
left of their position, viz. Farquhar's Farm.
In the opinion of some the attack would have succeeded and the evil days
of the siege put back; in the opinion of others the attack could not
possibly have succeeded on account of the length of the Boer position,
which they had had time to strengthen and entrench, and which had not
been definitely reconnoitred.
At midnight fresh orders were received from Sir George White in
Ladysmith. The whole force was ordered to retire and to proceed back at
once into their positions in and about the town.
It was reported that the Boers were in great numbers, some 17,000 under
Joubert, and that they had their big guns with them.
The Regiment commenced their retirement as rearguard to the force at 4
a.m., and reached camp at 6.30 a.m. on October 28th.
October 29th was a Sunday, and except for rumours, which were prolific,
a quiet day was spent.
The Boers were reported to be entrenching themselves a mile and a half
out on the Dundee road, and at the same time the Ladysmith defences were
being prepared, and blasting operations were being carried out for the
construction of military roads.
The battle of Farquhar's Farm was fought on October 30th, 1899.
The whole army was ordered out at 3 a.m.
The battalion formed part of the reserve brigade under Colonel Ian
Hamilton. This reserve brigade took up a position under Limit Hill, and
facing Pepworth Hill from the south.
The plan of the day was to have been as follows, had everything gone as
it was proposed:--
Five regiments of infantry, all the mounted troops, and four batteries
of artillery were to move round the enemy's left up the Helpmakaar road
towards Farquhar's Farm (the direction of the proposed night attack on
the night 27th-28th) to attack and drive in his left.
Two regiments of infantry with one mountain battery were to move off to
the left of the British position to hold the enemy's right (which
comprised the whole of the Free State Army), and prevent him from
getting into Ladysmith.
The main attack was to be made in the centre by Colonel Ian Hamilton's
Brigade by an assault on Pepworth Hill, where the Boer big guns were
located, and which was the key of the position.
The above was the plan; the result and the way in which it was carried
out is told in a few words.
The two infantry battalions and mountain battery, detailed to guard the
left flank, knocked up against the Free State Army under Cronje (which
was seen in the forenoon by the main body of General White's force,
coming over Walker's Hoek) on what is known now as Surprise Hill, and
which place is situated a little above and nearer Ladysmith than
Nicholson's Nek. Cronje attacked them in the dark, scattered the gun
mules which stampeded, and after some hours of hard fighting captured
the lot.
The force on the right, under Sir George White's personal command, ran
prematurely into Joubert's Transvaal Army, which had advanced from its
previous and partly reconnoitred position, and which had formed up ready
to receive them in a position somewhat nearer Ladysmith. It received a
very heavy cross fire from big guns, field guns, machine guns, and
musketry, and was put to confusion, the artillery and the cavalry having
some difficulty in extricating themselves. General White took the
Manchester Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders from Hamilton's Brigade
to cover the retirement, and his force came back into Ladysmith fired
into with wonderful accuracy, at a range of about 7000 yards, by the big
gun on Pepworth. Of the remainder of Hamilton's Brigade, the Rifle
Brigade (which had only arrived in Ladysmith that day) and a half
battalion Devon Regiment were told off to bring up the rear, whilst the
other half battalion of the Devons was left on Limit Hill, two miles
outside Ladysmith, to act as a covering force.
* * * * *
The Naval Brigade under Lambton arrived at Limit Hill with three naval
12-pounders just as the retirement was taking place, and they were at
once ordered back into the town. They returned without coming into
action. As they were retiring down the road past the Piggery by the
Orange Free State Junction Station, a well-aimed shell from Pepworth
Hill upset one of their guns, killing some of the ox-team and a gunner
who was being carried back wounded in an ambulance.
The half battalion of the regiment under Major Curry was ordered to take
up a defensive position on Limit Hill and to stay there for the night.
The Boer force was within 1000 yards, and it was thought probable that
they would follow up their defeated foe. Their patrols were continually
coming to within 300-500 yards of the Devons' outpost line.
As the half battalion was well covered from view, it was deemed
expedient and prudent not to expose their position and weakness by
firing, but rather by lying quiet to trust to the Boer imagination,
allowing them to think there was a larger force in position at Limit
Hill than there really was. This plan was eminently successful, for
except for Boer patrols the position was not threatened.
Orders were received by this half battalion at 9 a.m. on November 2nd to
retire on to Ladysmith. The defenders of Ladysmith being unaware of the
fact that any of their own troops were in front of them, and mistaking
friend for foe, got down on their knees to fire as the companies of the
Devons appeared in sight.
The half battalion which had retired with the rest of the force into
Ladysmith on October 30th received orders at 10 a.m. on the 31st to
strike camp, move off and form part of the garrison of section "A" of
the defences of Ladysmith, under the command of Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.
The second half battalion followed them.