UNDER MARTIAL LAW
It may be useful, or at any rate of interest, before I lay my pen aside,
to refer to several things which, at the time they occurred, caused
torrents of ink to flow both in England and in South Africa.
The most important, perhaps, was the application of martial law in Cape
Colony. I must repeat that I hold no brief for England. My affection and
admiration for her does not go to the extent of remaining absolutely blind
to faults she has made in the past, and perhaps is making in the present.
I will not deny that martial law, which, unfortunately, is a necessity in
wartime, was sometimes applied with severity in South Africa. But the
odium rests principally on the loyalists; their spiteful information in
many cases induced British officers to treat as rebels people who had
never even dreamt of rebellion.
It must not be forgotten that those to whom was entrusted the application
of martial law had perforce to rely on local residents, whom they could
not possibly suspect of using these officers to satisfy private
animosities of further private interests. These British officers had never
been used to see suspicion reign as master, or to watch a perfectly
conscious twisting of the truth in order to condemn, or even destroy,
innocent people. A young and probably inexperienced officer sent into a
small place like Aliwal North or Uitenhage, for instance, found himself
obliged to rely for information as to the loyalty of the inhabitants on
some adventurer who, through capitalist influence, had obtained an
executive post of some kind. How can one wonder, therefore, that many
regrettable incidents occurred and were immediately made capital of by the
Bond party further to embitter the feelings of the Dutch Colonists?
Many illegal acts were performed under martial law; of some a mention was
made in the Cape Town Parliament; these, therefore, do not admit of doubt.
For instance, as Mr. Neethling said in the Legislative Council, a man of
seventy was sent down from Paarl to Beaufort West without being allowed to
say good-bye to his wife, who was left behind without means of support.
Their house was searched for papers, but without result, and the man--a
member of the Afrikander Bond--was sent back, after eighteen months'
deportation, without any charge having been made against him. He was an
auctioneer and shipping agent, and during his absence his business was
annexed by a rival. One British Colonial, who held office at Stellenbosch,
said to one family, without even making an inquiry as to their conduct,
"You are rebels and I will take your mules"--which was done. The mules
were afterwards sold to the Commissariat Department by the man who had
commandeered them. Is it a matter of astonishment, therefore, that many
people felt sore and bitter at all that they had undergone and were going
through?
The administration of martial law in the country districts was absolutely
deplorable; but when one examines minutely the circumstances of the cases
of injustice about which one could have no doubt, it always emerged that
these never proceeded from British officers, who, on the contrary,
wherever they found themselves in command, invariably acted with humanity.
The great mistake of the military authorities was that they had far too
much confidence in the Volunteer Corps and those members of it who were
only anxious to make money out of existing circumstances. Unfortunately,
certain officers in command of the different corps were extreme Jingoes,
and this distorted their whole outlook. People said at the time of the war
that some districts of Cape Colony had been turned into hells; some
things, in truth, called for strong comment. No words could be energetic
enough to describe the manner in which martial law had been
administered--in the district of Graaf Reinet, for instance. The
commandants--this justice must be rendered to them--generally meant well,
but, unfortunately, they were assisted by men of less stable character as
intelligence officers. These, in their turn, unwisely without due inquiry,
engaged subordinates, upon whom they relied for their information. Graaf
Reinet people had had to put up with something akin to the Spanish
Inquisition. Men there were afraid to speak for fear of espionage, the
most innocent remarks were distorted by spies recruited from an uncertain
section of the community. A cattle inspector was deported without trial;
in consequence, the Secretary for Agriculture decided not to employ him
again; at Graaf Reinet a Colonial intelligence officer constantly declared
in public that it was his intention to drive the people into rebellion;
and so instances could be multiplied.
The rebellion was not due to martial law. In Graaf Reinet the prison was
frequently so crowded, often by men who did not in the least know why,
that no more sleeping accommodation could be found in it. People were in
durance vile because they would not join the town guard or defence force.
So overcrowded the prison became that many persons contracted disease
during their incarceration.
For these sad occurrences the Cape Government was not initially to blame;
more than once they had remonstrated with the local military authorities,
but reports concerning their conduct were not allowed to reach the ears of
Lord Roberts or of Lord Kitchener. Very often a Hottentot informed against
respectable citizens to the intelligence officer, and by virtue of that
they were imprisoned as long as the military authorities deemed fit. When
released, a man would sometimes find that his house had been sacked and
his most valuable property carried away. Persons were deported at an
hour's notice without reasons being given, and thereafter scouts took
possession of their farms and plundered and destroyed everything. Four
wagon-loads of men, women and children were deported from their homes at
Beaufort West. In vain did they ask what they had done. Everybody of the
name of Van Zyl in the district of Graaf Reinet was deported! not a single
person was left on their farms except those who had driven them out of
them. And after these had done their work the victims were told, "Now you
can return home." Some had to walk back many miles to their farms, to find
only ruin left. Many white people were imprisoned on the mere evidence of
coloured persons, the reputation for veracity of whom was well known all
over South Africa, and whose evidence against a white man would never have
been admitted in any court of law previous to the war.
In Uitenhage the same kind of thing occurred. It was sufficient for a Boer
column to pass near the farm of an Afrikander for the latter to be taken
to prison without the slightest investigation. No one knew where the fines
paid went, and certainly a good many of those which were imposed by the
commanders of the scouts and volunteer corps never reached the coffers of
the Government.
At Cradock, Somerset East, Graaf Reinet and Middelburg people were
compelled to eradicate prickly pears and do other hard labour simply
because they had remained quietly at home, according to the proclamation
issued by Sir Alfred Milner, and refused to join a volunteer corps of some
sort or other. Many magistrates, acting on instructions, forced guiltless
people to walk a four to six hours' drive under the pretence of subduing
their spirits.
One case especially was of such a flagrant nature that it illustrates how
far the malice of these so-called loyalists went and the harm which their
conduct did to the British Government. The act which I am going to relate
would never have been committed by any genuine English officer, no matter
under what provocation. There is also a detail which must be noticed: by a
strange coincidence all the victims of oppression were, with but few
exceptions, men of means, whom, therefore, it was worth while to plunder.
The story is that a certain Mr. Schoeman, a man of wealth and position
residing on Vlakteplaats, a farm in the division of Oudtshoorn, received,
on August 28th, 1901, a message through his son from the military scouts
who were stationed at De Jaeger's farm in the neighbourhood, instructing
him to hand over his horses to their care. No written order from the
Commandant was exhibited to Mr. Schoeman, either at that time or on his
request, nor was any evidence adduced at his trial later on to prove that
such an order had really been given by an officer administering martial
law in the district. Nevertheless, Mr. Schoeman obeyed the order, and on
the same afternoon sent his horses, three in number, to De Jaeger. The
scouts refused to take his horses, and told them to bring them on the
following morning, Thursday, August 29th. This Schoeman did; on coming to
the place with them he found that the scouts had left, and was obliged to
take the animals again back to his farm. On the afternoon of that same day
he received a message from the scouts, and in reply told them to come and
see him. He had meanwhile, for safety's sake, sent two horses to be
concealed away from his stable, and kept one, a stallion, at the
homestead.
The next day, Friday, Boers appeared early in the afternoon. They took the
stallion, and the following day they returned and asked where the other
horses were. Mr. Schoeman declined to give any information, but they
discovered and seized them. Immediately after the Boers had left, Mr.
Schoeman dispatched one of his farm boys named Barry to De Jaeger, the
nearest military post, to report the occurrence. The scouts had, however,
disappeared, and he learned from De Jaeger that before leaving they had
received a report of the presence of the Boers. On the return of Barry,
Mr. Schoeman endeavoured to obtain another messenger. Owing to the state
of the country, which was infested with the enemy, his efforts proved
unavailing.
During the next week Mr. Schoeman, with a considerable number of his
neighbours, was ordered to Oudtshoorn. On his arrival he was arrested,
without any charge or warrant, and confined for some three months, bail
being refused. No preliminary examination was held as provided in the
instructions on martial law issued May 1st, 1901. On Sunday, December 1st,
it was notified to Mr. Schoeman that he would be tried on the following
day, and the charges were for the first time communicated to him. On
December 2nd the court assembled and Mr. Schoeman was charged with three
offences:
1. For not having handed his horses over to the proper military
authorities, whereby they fell into the hands of the enemy.
2. For having been on friendly terms with the enemy.
3. For having failed to report the presence of the enemy.
He was found guilty on the first and last charges and not guilty on the
second count, being sentenced to six months' hard labour and to pay a fine
of £500, or to suffer a further term of twelve months' hard labour in lieu
of the fine. The sentence was confirmed, the fine was paid by Mr.
Schoeman, and he underwent the imprisonment for one month with hard labour
and for five months without hard labour, which was remitted upon order
from Lord Kitchener, who, without even being fully instructed as to the
circumstances of the case, of his own accord lightened the terrible
sentence passed upon Mr. Schoeman.
Later on Mr. Schoeman was cleared of the calumnies that had been the cause
of his suffering. In this case, as in many others, the victim was the
object of the private vengeance of a man who had had a grudge against him,
and repaid it in that abominable manner.
One of the worst mistakes among the many committed during the South
African War was to allow residents to be invested with what was nothing
less than unlimited authority over their fellow-citizens. The British
Government, which was made responsible for these acts, would never have
given its sanction to any one of them; mostly, it was unaware of the
original facts. The English military authorities dealt in absolute good
faith, which makes the more shameful the conduct of those who wilfully led
them into error. Their one fault was not to realise that certain
individuals were not fit to administer martial law. In one particular
district the man in authority seemed to have as the single aim of his life
the punishment of anyone with Dutch sympathies or of Dutch blood. It was
useless to appeal to him, because whenever a complaint was brought by an
inhabitant of the district he simply refused to listen to it, and poured a
torrent of abuse at the head of the bringer. One of his most notorious
actions was the treatment which, by his orders, was inflicted on an old
man who enjoyed the general esteem of both the English and the Dutch
community, a former member of the House of Assembly. His house was
searched, the floors were taken up, and the whole garden was dug out of
recognition in a search for documents that might have proved that his son,
or himself, or any other member of his family had been in correspondence
with the two Republics. All this kind of thing was done on hearsay
evidence, behind which lay personal motives. Had the settlement of the
country been left entirely in the hands of Lord Kitchener, nothing
approaching what I have related could have occurred. Unfortunately for all
concerned, this was precisely the thing which the Rhodesian and other
interests opposed. Much of the loyalty, about which such a fuss was made
at the Cape, was loyalty to the sovereign in the pocket, and not loyalty
to the Sovereign on the throne. This concern for wealth was seen in many
aspects of life in South Africa, and occasionally invaded drastically the
realm of social well-being. A case in point was the opposition by the
financial interests to a tax on brandy. In South Africa drunkenness was
one of the worst evils, especially among the coloured race, yet the
restrictive influence of a tax was withheld. The underlying motive was
nothing but the desire to avoid the tax on diamonds, which every
reasonable person claimed and considered to be a source of revenue of
which the Government had no right to deprive itself. While Rhodes lived
the legislation introduced and maintained by his powerful personality
revealed the policy of compromise which he always pursued. He was
eminently practical and businesslike. He said to the members of the Bond,
"Don't you tax diamonds and I won't tax dop," as the Cape brandy is
called. The compact was made and kept in his lifetime.
When Rhodes was dead and a big democratic British element had come into
the country after the war, those in power began wondering how it was that
diamonds, which kept in luxury people who did not live in the country and
consequently had no interest whatever in its prosperity, were not taxed.
The Ministry presided over by Sir Gordon Sprigg shared this feeling, and
in consequence found itself suddenly forsaken by its adherents of the day
before, and the Rhodesian Press in full cry against the Government. Sir
Gordon Sprigg was stigmatised as a tool of the Bond and as disloyal to the
Empire after the fifty years he had worked for it, with rare
disinterestedness and great integrity. Nevertheless, the Ministry declared
that, as there existed an absolute necessity for finding new resources to
liquidate the expenses contingent on the war, it would propose a tax on
diamonds and another one on dop.
The exasperation of the Rhodesian party, which was thus roused, was the
principal reason why the agitation for the suspension of the Constitution
in Cape Colony was started and pursued so vigorously in spite of the small
chance it had to succeed. His support of this agitation may be called the
death-bed effort of Rhodes. When he was no longer alive to lend them his
strong hand, the Rhodesian party was bound to disperse. They tried in vain
to continue his policy, but all their efforts to do so failed, because
there was nothing really tangible for them to work upon.
With Cecil Rhodes came to an end also what can be called the romantic
period of the history of South Africa, that period during which fortunes
were made and lost in a few days; when new lands were discovered and
conquered with a facility and a recklessness that reminded one of the
Middle Ages. The war established an equilibrium which but for it would
have taken years to be reached. It sealed the past and heralded the dawn
of a new day when civilisation was to assert itself, to brush away many
abuses, much cruelty and more injustice. The race hatred which the
personality of Rhodes had done so much to keep alive, collapsed very
quickly after his death, and as time went on the work done with such
unselfishness and such quiet resolution by Sir Alfred Milner began to bear
fruit. It came gradually to be understood that the future would justify
his aims.
[Illustration: THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN GORDON SPRIGG]
The war was one of those colossal crises which shake the foundations of a
country and change the feelings of a whole generation of men and women in
regard to each other. Whilst it lasted it roused the worst passions and
showed up the worst aspects of the character of the people who played a
part in it; but once it was over the false fabric upon which the
animosities of the day before had been built fell. A serious and more
enlightened appreciation of the events that had brought about the
cataclysm which had cleared the air took the place of the furious outburst
of hatred that had preceded it. People began to realise that it was not
possible, on a continent where Europeans constituted but a small minority,
that they could give the coloured races a terrible example of disunion and
strife and still maintain dominance. Both the English and Dutch had at
last recognised the necessity for working together at the great task of a
Federation of the South African States, which would allow the whole of the
vast Southern Continent to develop itself on a plane of higher progress
under the protection of the British flag. This Union was conceived many,
many years earlier by Cecil Rhodes. It was his great spirit that thought
of making into one great nation the agglomeration of small nationalities,
white and black, that lay over the veldt and impenetrable forests of South
and Central Africa. For a long space of years Cecil Rhodes was South
Africa.
So long as Rhodes lived it would have been impossible for South Africa
to escape the influence of his brain, which was always plotting and
planning for the future whilst forgetting more often than was healthy or
wise the preoccupations of the present. After the Queen's flag had been
hoisted at Pretoria, Cecil Rhodes alive would have proved an anomaly in
South Africa. Cecil Rhodes dead would still retain his position as a
dreamer and a thinker, a man who always pushed forward without heeding the
obstacles, forgetful of aught else but the end he was pursuing, the
country which he loved so well, and, what he cared for even more, his own
ambition. Men like Rhodes--with all their mistakes to mar their dazzling
successes--cannot be replaced; it is just as difficult to take up their
work as it is to fill the gap caused by their disappearance.
CONCLUSION
I have come to the end of what I intended at first to be a book of
recollections but which has resolved itself into one of impressions. A
more competent pen than mine will one day write the inner history of this
South African War, which by an anomaly of destiny had quite different
results from those expected. So many things have occurred since it
happened that the whole sequence of events, including the war, is now
looked upon by many people as a simple incident in a long story.
In reality the episode was something more than that. It was a
manifestation of the great strength of the British Empire and of the
wonderful spirit of vitality which has carried England triumphantly
through crises that would have wrecked any other nation. The incidents
which followed the war proved the generosity that lies at the bottom of
the English character and the grandeur that comes out of it in those grave
moments when the welfare of a nation appears to be at stake and its rulers
are unable to apply to a succession of evils and dangers the right remedy
to bring about peace and contentment. No other nations possess this
remarkable and distinctive feature. England very wisely refused to notice
the bitterness which still persisted in the early days after the
conclusion of peace, and devoted her energies to the one immense and
immediate work of Federation.
The colossal work of Union had been conceived in the shape which it was
eventually to assume by Sir Alfred Milner, who, after having laid the
foundations, was patriot enough to allow others to achieve its
consummation, because he feared the unjust estimate of his character,
disseminated by interested persons, might compromise the desired object
and far-reaching possibilities of an enterprise which the most sanguine
had never imagined could be accomplished within so short a space of time.
He had toiled courageously toward the founding of a new State where the
rights of every white as well as of every coloured man should be respected
and taken into account, and where it would be impossible for a handful of
rich men by the mere power of riches to control the lives and consciences
of others.
The time of Sir Alfred Milner's administration was the transitory period
between the primitive and the civilised that no nation escapes, and this
period Sir Alfred used in working toward the establishment of a strong and
wise government. Whether the one which started its course of existence on
the day when the Federation of South Africa became an accomplished fact
was strong and wise it is not for me to say. At least it was a patriotic
government, one which worked sincerely at the abolition of the race hatred
which the war had not entirely killed, and also one which recognised that
after all it was the principle of Imperial government that alone could
bring back prosperity and security to unfortunate and bleeding South
Africa.
The war gave to the Empire the loyal support and co-operation of the Dutch
population at the Cape and also in the Transvaal, and the fidelity with
which General Botha fulfilled his duty toward the Mother Country in the
difficult moments of 1914 proved the strong link forged in 1902 between
the British Empire and South Africa. Now that years have passed it is
possible to look with a less passionate eye upon the past and upon the men
who took a leading part in the events which gave to the British Empire
another fair dominion. They appear to us as they really were, and we can
more justly accord them their proper valuation. The personality of Cecil
Rhodes will always remain a great one; his merits and his defects will be
reduced to their proper relative proportions, and the atmosphere of
adulation or antagonism which, as the occasion suited, was poured upon
him, be dissipated by time's clarifying influences. His real work
consisted in the opening of new sources of wealth and new spheres of
activity to a whole multitude of his fellow-countrymen, and of giving his
native land an extension of its dominions in regions it had never
penetrated before Cecil Rhodes' enterprising spirit of adventure and of
conquest sent him into the wilderness of Africa to open a new and
radiating centre of activity and development for his country. The
conception of the Cape to Cairo Railway was one of those projects for
which his country will ever remain grateful.
Yes! Rhodes was a great Englishman in spite of his faults, and perhaps on
account of his faults. Beside the genius of a Darwin or of a Pasteur, the
talent of a Shakespeare or of a Milton, the science of a Newton or of a
Lister, his figure seems a small one indeed, and it is absurd to raise him
to the same level as these truly wonderful men. The fact that the activity
of Cecil Rhodes lay in quite a different direction does not, however,
diminish the real importance of the work which he did, nor of the services
which he rendered to his country. The mistake is to judge him as a
universal genius. His genius had a particular bent; it was always directed
toward one point and one only, that of material advantages to be acquired
for the nation to which he belonged and of which he was so proud to be the
son. Without him South Africa would possibly have been lost for the
British Empire, which owes him most certainly a great debt in that
respect.
The years which have gone by since his death have proved that in many
things Rhodes had been absolutely mistaken. Always he was an attractive,
and at times even a lovable, personality; a noble character marred by
small acts, a generous man and an unscrupulous foe; violent in temper,
unjust in his view of facts that displeased him, understanding chiefly his
personal interests, true to those whom he considered his friends, but
implacable toward the people whom he himself had wronged. He was a living
enigma to which no one had ever found a solution; because he presented
constantly new and unexpected sides that appeared suddenly and shattered
the conclusion to which one had previously arrived.
In Europe Rhodes would not only have been impossible, but he would never
have found the opportunity to give full rein to his faculties of
organisation and of conquest. He knew no obstacles and would admit none in
his way; he was of the type of Pizarro and of Fernando Cortez, with fewer
prejudices, far more knowledge, and that clear sense of civilisation which
only an Englishman born and bred amid the traditions of liberty can
possess. But he was lacking in the fine political conception of government
which Sir Alfred Milner possessed, and whilst refusing to admit the
thought of compromise in matters where a little yielding to the wishes and
desires of others might have secured him considerable advantage, he yet
allowed himself to become entangled in intrigues which he denied as soon
as he perceived that they could not be successful, but for which the world
always condemned and never forgave, and even in some cases despised him.
Notwithstanding the great brilliance of his intelligence and the strength
of his mind, Cecil Rhodes will always be found inferior to the present
Viscount Milner as a statesman. Rhodes could not and would not wait.
Milner spent his whole existence in waiting, and waited so successfully
that he lived to see the realisation of the plans which he had made and
which so many, even among his friends, had declared to be quite impossible
for him to realise. Milner, about whose tact and mental greatness so many
false notions existed in South Africa as well as elsewhere, had been the
one man who had seen clearly the consequences of the war. As he told me
one day when we were talking about the regrettable race-hatred which lent
such animosity to the struggle: "It will cease sooner than one thinks."
The wise administrator, who had studied human nature so closely as he had
done politics, had based his judgments on the knowledge which he had
acquired of the spirit of colonisation which makes Great Britain so
superior to any other nation in the world, and his belief that her
marvellous spirit of adaptation was bound to make itself felt in South
Africa as it had elsewhere. Sir Alfred Milner knew that as time went on
the Afrikanders would realise that their erstwhile enemies had given them
the position to which they had always aspired, a position which entitled
them to take a place among the other great nations of the world. He knew,
too, that their natural spirit of pride and of vanity would make them
cherish the Empire that had allowed them to realise their ambitions of the
past. Until the war they had been proud of their gold and of their
diamonds; after the war they would be proud of their country. And by the
consciousness which would gradually come to them of the advantages which
their Federation under the British flag had brought to them they would
become also ardent British patriots--blessing the day when, in a passing
fit of insanity, goaded into it by people who had never seen clearly the
situation, President Kruger had declared war on England.
INDEX
Africa, South, charm of, 22
conquest of, 1
drunkenness in, 223
English colonists, 14
prior to Boer War, 6
Union of (_see_ Union)
Afrikander Bond, 86, 99
and Rhodes, 73, 82, 84
and Sir A. Milner, 134
Afrikander party compel Rhodes' resignation, 50
Aliwal North concentration camp, 182
America's response to concentration camp appeal, 165
B
Barkly West, Rhodes elected for, 28
Barnato, Barney, 24, 137
his awe of Rhodes, 60
Beit, Alfred, 24
Bender, Rev. Dr., Chief Rabbi of Cape Town, 194
Bloemfontein, concentration camp at, 182, 184
Bloemfontein Conference, the, 13, 16, 140
failure of, 67, 104
Boer War, concentration camps, 157 _et seq._
not a war of annihilation, 3
prime cause of, 128, 137, 139, 178
Rhodes' prophecy, 67
Boers, the, mistrust of England after the Raid, 200
pre-war hygienic conditions of, 160 (_Cf. also_ Dutch)
Botha, General, 83
imperialism of, xii, 229
British Empire, South Africa added to, 3
British Government, the, a missed opportunity, 41
and Boer concentration camps, 162
British South Africa Company, constitution of, 44
(_See also_ Chartered Company)
Brooke-Hunt, Miss, in Pretoria, 186
Buller, Sir Redvers, and siege of Kimberley, 94, 95
C
Cape Colony, diamond fields, 3
loyalty to England, 129
martial law in, 214 _et seq._
mutiny of Dutch in, 8
overcrowded prisons, 217
Rhodes as Premier, 30, 43, 44
Sir Gordon Sprigg as Premier, 99, 121
Cape to Cairo Railway, 81, 124, 229
Cape Town, influx of refugees, 191 _et seq._
Chamberlain, Joseph, 104
policy of, 133
Chartered Company of South Africa, 25, 26, 78, 80
sinister rumours, 45
Concentration camps, 141, 142, 157
hygienic conditions of, 160
inner organisation, 173
Miss Hobhouse's charges, and Mrs. Henry Fawcett's reply to, 165, 181
necessity for, 161
rations, 171
Cronje, General, 94
D
De Beers Consolidated Mines, 24, 80, 112
power of Company, 114
Delagoa Bay, 91
Dop tax, the, 223
Dutch, the, and Dr. Jameson, 149
and Sir A. Milner, 151
enmity with English, 11
mutiny in Cape Colony, 8
popularity of Rhodes with, 30, 43, 73
reconciliation with English, 129 (_Cf. also_ Boers)
E
Eckstein, F., 97, 197
England acquires the Transvaal, 1
the question of concentration camps, 159
English, the
as colonists, 14, 15
enmity with the Dutch, 11
reconciliation with the Dutch, 129
F
Fawcett, Mrs. Henry, reply to Miss Hobhouse, 181
Frenchman, a, and a Johannesburg mining property, 64
G
Glen Grey Act, the, 126
Graaf Reinet, martial law in, 216
Green Point (Cape Town) concentration camp, 170
Groote Schuur, the house and gardens, 153
H
Hammond, John Hays, 138
Hely-Hutchinson, Sir W.F., 99
Hobhouse, Miss, pamphlet on concentration camps, 165 _et seq._
Hofmeyr, Mr., 38, 43, 83, 84, 86, 135, 150, 155
popularity of, 136
I
I.D.B. Act, the, unwisdom of, 113
Imperial Commission report on concentration camps, 166
J
Jameson, Dr., affection for Rhodes, 72, 148
becomes Prime Minister, 73
death of, 148 (note)
enters Transvaal territory, 47 (_see_ Jameson Raid)
political aspirations of, 56
Progressive leader, 72
relations with Rhodes after the raid, 54
rumours of his forthcoming raid, 45
the Dutch and, 149
Jameson Raid, the, 9, 30
a colossal blunder, 200
aftermath of, 69
its aim, 53
tacitly encouraged by Rhodes, 51, 67
Jews, Polish, plight of, 193
Jingoes, the, 69, 107, 130, 135, 142, 163, 216
Joel, S., 24
Johannesburg, a shady operation in, 63
flight from, 191
goldfields of, 24
K
Kekewich, Colonel, entrusted with defence of Kimberley, 94
Kimberley, diamond mines in, 17, 24, 87
relief of, 116
Rhodes' purchase of plots in, 21
Rhodes' secret negotiations, 76
siege of, 75, 83, 94
the I.D.B. Act in operation, 113
Kitchener, Lord, and Boer concentration camps, 159
intervenes in the Schoeman case, 221
Rhodes and, 147
Koopman, Mrs. van, author's admiration for, 48
disillusionment of, 47, 74, 146
her alarm at raid rumours, 45
intimacy with Rhodes, 40
Rhodes denies raid projected, 46
under police supervision, 48
Kruger, President, 30, 53, 198
and Mrs. van Koopman, 40
candid criticisms of Rhodes, 92, 93
death sentence for Reformers, 51
"refreshers" for, 197
Rhodes attempts alliance with, 90
Rhodes' _bête-noire_, 150
Rhodes' duplicity, 74
warned against Sir A. Milner, 104
L
Ladysmith, relief of, 116
Lobengula, King, 36
and Rhodesia, 25
Cecil Rhodes and, 19
his son becomes one of Rhodes' gardeners, 37
Loyalists and concentration camps, 174
M
Mafeking concentration camp, 186
Majuba, defeat of British at, 73
Martial law in Cape Colony, 214 _et seq._
"Martyrdom of Man" (Reade's), its influence on Rhodes, 126
Matabele Rebellion, the, Rhodes' courage in, 43
Matabeleland, 19
acquired by the Chartered Company, 26, 90, 112
Matoppo Hills, an historic meeting, 43
Rhodes' burial-place, 72
Maxwell, Lady, an appeal by, 164
Merriman, Mr., 134, 150
severs relations with Rhodes, 73
Methuen, Lord, mandate to Rhodes, 95
Milner, Sir (Viscount) Alfred, 4, 58
a hint to Rhodes, 147
and the Boers, 12, 85, 132
and Rhodes, 74, 140, 148
and the De Beers Company, 115
appointed Governor of Cape Colony, 8, 85
dignified speech, 134
efforts for peace, 156
his great object, 86
influence of, 104
misunderstood and misjudged 7, 12, 85, 104, 107, 108, 180, 228
overruled from Whitehall, 135
policy of conciliation, 130
reports from Rhodes on defence of Kimberley, 94
Rhodes' distrust of, 13, 75
the refugees and, 210
the South African League, 90
transferred to Johannesburg, 99
N
Napoleon, Pius VII. on, 35
Neethling, Mr., and martial law in Cape Colony, 215
O
Orange Free State, flight of the populace, 158
illusions of the Dutch in, 176
resources of, 8
P
Pius VII., Pope, on Napoleon, 35
Polish Jews, plight of, 193
Pretoria, British flag hoisted at, 226
Rhodes tabooed at, 211
Rhodes visits Kruger at, 91
soldiers' institutes at, 186
R
Radziwill, Princess Catherine, and Rhodes, 110, 146
and Rhodes' suspicions of Sir A. Milner, 107
conversations with Sir A. Milner, 106, 232
Rhodes' characteristic note to, 59
talks with Rhodes on Reade's "Martyrdom of Man," 127
visits concentration camps, 163
Rand, the, Downing Street and, 179
Dutch illusions as to Britain's intentions, 177
flight from, 191 _et seq._
gold fields of, 90
magnates of, 137 _el seq._, 197
Reade, Winwood, influence of his
"Martyrdom of Man" on Rhodes, 126
Rhodes, Cecil, agitates for suspension of constitution, 118, 155, 213, 224
beginning of his fortune, 21
created a Privy Councillor, 43
death, 129, 153, 224
end of his political career, 47, 50, 57, 73
enters political life, 28
patriotism of, 10,17, 31, 76, 82, 152, 230
Rhodes, Herbert (brother of Cecil Rhodes), 20
Rhodesia, annexation of, 24, 25, 28, 35, 36, 78
exploitation of, 198
question of its mineral wealth, 177
Rhodes as "King" of, 122
Roberts, Lord, complimentary lunch to, 134
Rhodes' abuse of, 147
Rowntree, Mr., and the concentration camps, 187
Russia, Wallace's work on, 126
S
Sandringham, Rhodes at, 126
Sargent, E.B., 183
Sauer, Mr., 86, 117, 134, 150, 155,
and Rhodes, 73
leader of Bond party, 100
Schoeman, Mr., illegal arrest of, and Lord Kitchener's
intervention, 200, 201
Schoeman, Mr., and Loyalists, 219
Schreiner, Mr., 38, 86, 133, 150
confidence in Rhodes, 32
indignation with Rhodes, 50, 73
questions Rhodes, 45
Rhodes and, 23, 74
Schreiner, Olive, on annexation of Rhodesia, 36
Rhodes and, 33
Simonstown, camp for prisoners of war at, 172
Smuts, General, Imperialism of, xii
Sonnenberg, Mr., and Rhodes, 26
South Africa (_see_ Africa, South)
South African League, 86, 88, 97, 99
a petition to Sir Gordon Sprigg, 99, 102
and Sir A. Milner, 90
Southern Cross, the, 22
Sprigg, Sir Gordon, and the South African League, 99
diamond and dop taxes, 224
Premier of Cape Colony, 99, 121, 132
Stead, W.T., admiration of Rhodes, 212
and Sir A. Milner, 209
Steyn, President, and Mrs. van Koopman, 40
T
Transvaal, the, flight of Boer inhabitants, 158
gold mines, 1, 3, 17
loyalty to England, 129
object of Jameson Raid, 53
racial qualifications, 137
Transvaal Republic, intrigues in, 1
U
Uitenhage, martial law in, 218
Uitlanders, the, and concentration camps, 163
quarrel with, 30
their part in the Boer War, 16, 97, 137, 139
Union of South Africa, 228
an accomplished fact, 131, 228
magnates' views, 207
organisation of, 2
Sir A. Milner's part in constitution, 14
united effort for, 225
W
Wall, David de, 99, 101, 146
Wales, Prince of (Edward VII.), 126
Wallace, Mackenzie, meets Rhodes, 126
Wernher, Beit and Company, 97, 197
Wet, De, 83
_Westminster Gazette,_ Mrs. Fawcett's reply to Miss Hobhouse in, 181