“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to
place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs
we have in view.”
This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form
the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of
Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders
of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by
securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the
heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,
two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected
himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power
of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move
rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;
otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise
the siege.
When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight
thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received
intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces
to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of
observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little
river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving
rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this
means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing
the operations of the siege.