Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of
baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering
train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying
the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring
rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a
general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal
Wurmser.
In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled
to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely
from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col
de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his
equipment.
These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of
march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the
victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.
But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it
will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to
congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them
from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.