“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything
to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.
But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to
custom, with possession of the field.”
It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian
army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the
following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.
General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction
of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired
to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,
equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely
broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
of route.
By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its
victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.
It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army
with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality
between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment
whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure
his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided
his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and
addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said
he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”
The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of
victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,
panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting
itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives
were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the
mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,
in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.
Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the
battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.
The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon
Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a
large sheet of water.
Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon
the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one
under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,
following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate
command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,
changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel
the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,
in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had
been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin
him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian
general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.
Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this
unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of
the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after
the battle occupied Torgau.
Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he
heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately
commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and
forty-five pieces of cannon.
After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst
of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon
everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.
General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the
centre of his own country.
The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,
after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay
down their arms.
Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss
of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of
_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The
courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those
of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an
army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a
rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness
with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_
of his army.