NOTE.

In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General

Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult

by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the

forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to

accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way

by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of

the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,

if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to

contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from

the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only

direct communication of the army with its base of operation.

The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in

the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,

who hastened to concentrate his forces.

The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during

the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French

army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last

was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the

mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled

only by the difficulty of the country.

The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,

in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had

the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were

opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.

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