One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point
far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously
occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
to take.
If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his
detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient
time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.
It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,
that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.
General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off
the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which
manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his
project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary
he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was
to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of
the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and
dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The
result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,
decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of
Piedmont.
It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who
commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the
battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.
His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,
was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of
the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent
success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by
a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined
armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of
Milan, the other by that of Turin.