In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen
Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all
the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,
who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days
in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,
indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,
having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend
themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.
Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,
but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,
and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his
victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have
been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune
balanced his imprudence.
Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in
bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good
ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy
so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his
arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment
of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there
is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads
him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_
change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in
presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”
It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to
gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert
tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous
bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.