The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear
to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful
commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:
1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and
scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which
may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;
or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him
from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the
command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions
of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that
_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an
enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it
is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.
After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied
ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,
we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose
ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.
Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain
firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be
elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good
and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow
of military operations.
2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the
enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by
long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a
decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable
passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to
avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;
to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds
that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and
roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the
places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make
_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress
and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that
of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him
with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must
retire into the fortresses.
3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,
should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural
positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being
fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a
general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who
marches to the attack.
A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his
troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon
the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.
If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,
the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to
envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.
If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or
infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during
the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made
upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.
If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his
right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be
reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other
wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly
forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground
admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he
is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his
movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him
time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into
action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and
baggage.
4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of
battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army
is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be
accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front
of the column of march should be diminished or increased according
to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always
proceeds by the main road.
When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery
upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.
It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and
when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should
be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite
bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,
and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should
entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is
prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order
to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive
movement.
The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best
roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.
If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment
should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the
whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed
from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of
all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name
a secret.
From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in
the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be
apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of
the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.
In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march
by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out
of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.
When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place
that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of
the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,
and ready to overthrow all before you.
When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is
desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,
you bring your real attack to bear upon another.
Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the
original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon
the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have
gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a
detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by
a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of
the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself
in its new position.
5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or
less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly
country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and
supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in
order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to
cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,
such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken
also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a
free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent
the troops from mutually succoring each other.
When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied
with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be
within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of
communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an
enemy’s fortress in your rear.
When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best
secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be
selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility
of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the
troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other
mutual support.
The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by
constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the
cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the
motions of the enemy.
6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,
or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also
when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent
a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,
when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to
secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or
pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some
misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.
If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either
by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,
and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and
forcing him to action.
The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided
or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended
from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you
are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting
reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or
when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his
position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.
To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the
means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected
by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having
recourse when necessary to the aid of art.
The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and
care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and
throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the
different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from
penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to
employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of
a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and
placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
to conquer or die.
At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should
advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with
courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously
placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to
fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never
to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and
even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may
rally.
When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle
should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,
night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are
exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an
orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.
During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence
he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be
informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different
divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more
complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the
enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they
are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him
instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if
he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
best possible order.
7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared
for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh
troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men
against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his
army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,
and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into
position.
8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be
engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you
are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open
ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior
in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious
and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
be selected to occupy and fortify.
9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we
should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created
is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on
those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
enemy.
10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be
departed from:
To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to
fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your
army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to
undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who
yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy
and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve
as a central point for the support of your future movements; to
guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers
and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by
getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and
of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that
conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory
is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.