THE THEORY OF NON-ATMAN OR NON-EGO.
{140}
/If/ I am requested to formulate the ground-principles of the
philosophy of Mahâyâna Buddhism, and, indeed, of all the schools of
Buddhism, I would suggest the following:
(1) All is momentary (_sarvam kṣanikam_).
(2) All is empty (_sarvam çûnyam_).
(3) All is without self (_sarvam anâtmam_).
(4) All is such as it is (_sarvam tathâtvam_).
These four tenets, as it were, are so closely interrelated that, stand
or fall, they all inevitably share one and the same fate together.
Whatever different views the various schools of Buddhism may hold on
points of minor importance, they all concur at least on these four
principal propositions.
Of these four propositions, the first, the second, and the fourth have
been elucidated above, more or less explicitly. If the existence of a
relative world is the work of ignorance and as such has no final
reality, it must be considered illusory and empty; though it does not
necessarily follow that on this account our life is not worth living.
We must not {141} confuse the moral value of existence with the
ontological problem of its phenomenality. It all depends on our
subjective attitude whether or not our world and life become full of
significance. When the illusiveness or phenomenality of individual
existences is granted and we use the world accordingly, that is, “as
not abusing it,” we escape the error and curse of egoism and take
things as they are presented to us, as reflecting the Dharma of
Suchness. We no more cling to forms of particularity as something
ultimate and absolutely real and as that in which lies the essence of
our life. We take them for such as they are, and recognise their
reality only in so far as they are considered a partial realisation of
Suchness, and do not go any further. Suchness, indeed, lies not hidden
_behind_ them, but exists immanently _in_ them. Things are empty and
illusory so long as they are particular things and are not thought of
in reference to the All that is Suchness and Reality.
From this, it logically follows that in this world of relativity all
is momentary, that nothing is permanent, so far as isolated, particular
existences are concerned. Even independently of the statement made
above, the doctrine of universal impermanency is an almost self-evident
truth experienced everywhere, and does not require any special
demonstration to prove its validity. The desire for immortality which
is so conspicuous and persistent in all the stages of development of
the religious consciousness that the very desire has been thought to
be the essence of all {142} religious systems, is the most conclusive
proof that things on this earth are in a constant flux of becoming,
and that there is nothing permanent or stationary in our individual
existences; if otherwise, people would never have sought for
immortality.
If this be granted as a fact of our everyday experience, we naturally
ask: “Why are things so changeable? Why is life so fleeting? What is
it that makes things so mutable and transitory?” To this, the
Buddhist’s answer is: Because the universe is a resultant product of
many efficient forces that are acting according to different
karmas;--the destiny of those forces being that no one force or no one
set of forces can constantly be predominant over all the others, but
that when one has exhausted its potential karma, it is replaced by
another that has been steadily coming forward in the meantime. Hence
the universal cadence of birth and death, of the spring and the fall,
of the tide and the ebb, of integration and disintegration. Where
there is attraction, there is repulsion; where there is the
centripetal force, there is the centrifugal force. Because it is the
law of karma that at the very moment of birth the arms of death are
around the neck of life. The universe is nothing but a grand rhythmic
manifestation of certain forces working in conformity to their
predetermined laws; or, to use Buddhist terminology, this _lokadhâtu_
(material world) consists in a concatenation of _hetus_ (causes) and
_pratyayas_ (conditions) regulated by their karma. {143} If this were
not so, there would be either a certain fixed state of things in which
perfect equilibrium would be maintained, or an inexpressible confusion
of things of which no knowledge or experience would be possible. In
the former case, we should have universal stagnation and eternal
death; in the latter case, there would be no universe, no life,
nothing but absolute chaos. Therefore, so long as we have the world
before us, in which all the possible varieties of particularisation
are manifested it cannot be otherwise than in a state of constant
vicissitudes and therefore of universal transitoriness.
Now, the Buddhist argument for the theory of non-ego is this: If
individual existences are due to relations obtaining between diverse
forces, which act sometimes in unison with and sometimes in opposition
to one another as predetermined by their karma, they cannot be said to
have any transcendental agency behind them, which is a permanent unity
and absolute dictator. In other words, there is no âtman or ego-soul
behind our mental activities, and no thing-in-itself (_svabhâva_), so
to speak, behind each particular form of existence. This is called the
Buddhist theory of non-âtman or non-ego.
_Âtman._
Buddhists use the term “âtman” in two senses: first, in the sense of
personal ego,[65] and secondly, in {144} that of thing-in-itself,
perhaps, with a slight modification of its commonly accepted meaning.
Let us use the term “âtman” here in its first sense as equivalent to
_bhûtâtman_, for we are going first to treat of the doctrine of
non-ego, and later of that of no-thing-in-itself.
Âtman is usually translated “life,” “ego,” or “soul,”[66] and is a
technical term used both by Vedanta philosophers and Buddhists. But we
have to note at the beginning that they do not use the term in the
same sense. When the Vedanta philosophy, especially the later one,
speaks of âtman as our inmost self which is identical with the
universal Brahma, it is used in its most abstract metaphysical sense
and does not mean the soul whatever, as the latter is {145} commonly
understood by vulgar minds. On the other hand, Buddhists understand by
âtman this vulgar, materialistic conception of the soul (_bhûtâtman_)
and positively denies its existence as such. If we, for convenience’
sake, distinguish between phenomenal and noumenal in our notion of ego
or soul, the âtman of Buddhism is the phenomenal ego, namely, a
concrete agent that is supposed to do the acting, thinking, and
feeling; while the âtman of Vedantists is the noumenal ego as the
_raison d’être_ of our psychical life. The one is in fact material,
however ethereal it might be conceived. The other is a highly
metaphysical conception transcending the reach of human discursive
knowledge. The latter may be identified with Paramâtman and the former
with Jîvâtman. Paramâtman is a universal soul from which, according to
Vedantism, emanates this world of phenomena, and in a certain sense it
may be said to correspond to the Tathâgata-garbha of Buddhism.
Jîvâtman is the ego-soul as it is conceived by ignorant people as an
independent entity directing all the mental activities. It is this
latter âtman that was found to be void by Buddha when he arose from
his long meditation, declaring:
“Many a life to transmigrate,
Long quest, no rest, hath been my fate,
Tent-designer[67] inquisitive for:
Painful birth from state to state.
{146}
“Tent-designer! I know thee now;
Never again to build art thou:
Quite out are all thy joyful fires,
Rafter broken and roof-tree gone,
Gain eternity--dead desires.”[68]
_Buddha’s First Line of Inquiry._
Buddhism finds the source of all evils and sufferings in the vulgar
material conception of the ego-soul, and concentrates its entire
ethical force upon the destruction of the ego-centric notions and
desires. The Buddha seems, since the beginning of his wandering life,
to have conceived the idea that the way of salvation must lie somehow
in the removal of this egoistic prejudice, for so long as we are not
liberated from its curse we are liable to become the prey of the three
venomous passions: covetousness, infatuation, and anger, and to suffer
the misery of birth and death and disease and old age. Thus, when he
received his first instructions from the Sâmkhya philosopher, Arada,
he was not satisfied, because he did not teach how to abandon this
ego-soul itself. The Buddha argued: “I consider that the embodied
ego-soul, though freed from the evolvent-evolutes,[69] {147} is still
subject to the condition of birth and has the condition of a seed. The
seed may remain dormant so long as it is deprived of the opportunity
of coming into contact with the requisite conditions of quickening and
being quickened, but since its germinating power has not been
destroyed, it will surely develop all its potentialities as soon as it
is brought into that necessary contact. Even though the ego-soul free
from entanglement [i.e. from the bondage of Prakṛti] is declared to
be liberated, yet, so long as the ego-soul remains, there can be no
absolute abandonment of it, there can be no real abandonment of
egoism.”[70]
The Buddha then proceeds to indicate the path through which he reached
his final conclusion and declares: “There is no real separation of the
qualities and their subject; for fire cannot be conceived apart from
its heat and form.” When this argument is logically carried out, it
leads nowhere but to the Buddhist doctrine of non-âtman, that says:
The existence of an ego-soul cannot be conceived apart from sensation,
perception, imagination, intelligence, volition, etc., and, therefore,
it is absurd to think that there is an independent individual
soul-agent which makes our consciousness its workshop.
To imagine that an object can be abstracted from its qualities, not
only logically but in reality, that there is some unknown quantity
that is in {148} possession of such and such characteristic marks
(_lakṣana_) whereby it makes itself perceivable by our senses, says
Buddhism, is wrong and unwarranted by reason. Fire cannot be conceived
apart from its form and heat; waves cannot be conceived apart from the
water and its commotion; the wheel cannot exist outside of its rim,
spokes, axle, etc. All things, thus, are made of _hetus_ and
_pratyayas_, of causes and conditions, of qualities and attributes;
and it is impossible for our pudgala or âtman or ego or soul to be
any exception to this universal condition of things.
Let me in this connection state an interesting incident in the history
of Chinese Buddhism. Hui-K’e, the second patriarch of the Dhyâna sect
in China, was troubled with this ego-problem before his conversion. He
was at first a faithful Confucian, but Confucianism did not satisfy
all his spiritual wants. His soul was wavering between agnosticism and
scepticism, and consequently he felt an unspeakable anguish in his
inmost heart. When he learned of the arrival of Bodhidharma in his
country, he hastened to his monastery and implored him to give him
some spiritual advice. But Bodhidharma did not utter a word, being
seemingly absorbed in his deep meditation. Hui-K’e, however, was
determined to obtain from him some religious instructions at all
hazards. So it is reported that he was standing at the same spot seven
days and nights, when he at last cut off his left arm with the sword
he was carrying (being {149} a military officer) and placed it before
Dharma, saying: “This arm is a token of my sincere desire to be
instructed in the Holy Doctrine. My soul is troubled and annoyed; pray
let your grace show me the way to pacify it.” Dharma quietly arose
from his meditation and said: “Where is your soul? Bring it here and I
will have it pacified.” Hui-K’e replied: “I have been searching for it
all these years, but I have never succeeded in laying a hand on it.”
Dharma then exclaimed: “There, I have your soul pacified!” At this, it
is said, a flash of spiritual enlightenment went across the mind of
Hui-K’e, and his “soul” was pacified once for all.
_The Skandhas._
When the five skandhas are combined according to their previous karma
and present a temporal existence in the form of a sentient being,
vulgar minds imagine that they have here an individual entity
sustained by an immortal ego-substratum. In fact, the material body
(_rûpakâya_) alone is not what makes the ego-soul, nor the sensation
(_vedanâ_), nor the deeds (_sanskâra_), nor the consciousness
(_vijñâna_), nor the conception (_samjñâ_); but only when they are
all combined in a certain form they make a sentient being. Yet this
combination is not the work of a certain independent entity, which,
according to its own will, combines the five skandhas in one form and
then hides itself in it. The combination of the constituent {150}
elements, Buddhism declares, is achieved by themselves after their
karma. When a certain number of atoms of hydrogen and of oxygen are
brought together, they attract each other on their own accord or owing
to their own karma, and the result is water. The ego of water, so to
speak, did not will to bring the two elements and make itself out of
them. Even so is it with the existence of a sentient being, and there
is no need of hypostasising a fabulous ego-monster behind the
combination of the five skandhas.
Skandha (_khanda_ in Pâli) literally means “aggregate” or
“agglomeration”, and, according to the Chinese exegetists, it is
called so, because our personal existence is an aggregate of the five
constituent elements of being, because it comes to take a definite
individual form when the skandhas are brought together according to
their previous karma. The first of the five aggregates is matter
(_rûpa_), whose essential quality is thought to consist in resistance.
The material part of our existence in the five sense-organs called
_indryas_: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and the body. The second skandha
is called sensation or sense-impression (_vedanâ_), which results from
the contact of the six vijñânas (senses) with the viṣaya (external
world). The third is called _samjñâ_ which corresponds to our
conception. It is the psychic power by which we are enabled to form
the abstract images of particular objects. The fourth is _sanskâra_
which may be rendered action or deed. Our intelligent consciousness,
{151} responding to impressions received which are either agreeable or
disagreeable or indifferent, acts accordingly; and these acts bear
fruit in the coming generations.
Sanskâra, the fourth constituent of being, comprises two categories,
mental (_caitta_) and non-mental (_cittaviprayukta_). And the mental
is subdivided into six: fundamental (_mahâbhûmi_), good (_kuçala_),
tormenting (_kleça_), evil (_akuçala_), tormenting minor (_upakleça_),
and indefinite (_aniyata_). It may be interesting to enumerate what
all these sankâras are, as they shed light on the practical ethics of
Buddhism.
There are ten fundamental sanskâras belonging to the category of
mental or psychic activities: 1. cetanâ (mentation), 2. sparça
(contact), 3. chanda (desire), 4. mati (understanding), 5. smṛti
(recollection), 6. manaskara (concentration), 7. adhimokṣa (unfettered
intelligence), 8. samâdhi (meditation). The ten good sanskâras are: 1.
çraddhâ (faith), 2. vîrya (energy), 3. upekṣa (complacency), 4. hrî
(modesty), 5. apatrapâ (shame), 6 alobha (non-covetousness), 7. adveṣa
(freedom from hatred), 8. ahimsa (gentleness of heart), 9. praçradbhi
(mental repose), 10. apramâda (attentiveness).
The six tormenting sanskâras are as follows: 1. moha (folly), 2.
pramâda (wantonness), 3. kâusidya (indolence), 4. açrâddhya
(scepticism), 5. styāna (slothfulness), 6. âuddhatpa (unsteadiness).
The two minor evil sanskâras are: 1. ahrîkatâ, state of not being
modest, or arrogance, or self-assertiveness, {152} and 2. anapatrapa,
being lost to shame, or to be without conscience.
The ten minor tormenting sanskâras are: 1. krodha (anger), 2. mrakṣa
(secretiveness), 3. mâtsarya (niggardliness), 4. îrṣya (envy). 5.
pradâça (uneasiness), 6. vihimsâ (noxiousness), 7. upanâha (malignity),
8. mâyâ (trickiness), 9. çâthya (dishonesty), 10. mada (arrogance).
The eight indefinite sanskâras are: 1. kâukṛtya (repentance), 2.
middha (sleep), 3. vitarka (inquiry), 4. vicâra (investigation), 5.
râga (excitement), 6. pratigha (wrath), 7. mâna (self-reliance), 8.
vicikitsâ (doubting).
The second grand category of sanskâra which is not included under
“mental” or “psychic,” comprises fourteen items as follows: 1. prâpti
(attainment), 2. aprâpti (non-attainment), 3. sabhâgatâ (grouping),
4 asanjñika (unconsciousness), 5. asanjñisamâpatti (unconscious
absorption in religious meditation), 6. nirodhasamâpatti
(annihilation-trance of a heretic), 7. jîvita (vitality), 8. jâti
(birth), 9. sthiti (existing), 10. jarâ (decadence), 11. anityatâ
(transitoriness), 12. nâmakâya (name), 13. padakâya (phrase), 14.
vyañjanakâya (sentence).
Now, to return to the main problem. The fifth skandha is called
_vijñâna_, commonly rendered consciousness, which, however, is not
quite correct. The vijñâna is intelligence or mentality, it is the
psychic power of discrimination, and in many cases it can be
translated by sense. There are, according to Hînayânists, six
vijñânas or senses: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual,
and cogitative; according {153} to Mahâyânism there are eight
vijñânas: the manovijñâna and the âlayavijñâna, being added to the
above six. This psychological phase of Mahâyâna philosophy is
principally worked out by the Yogâcâra school, whose leading thinkers
are Asanga and Vasubandhu.
_King Milinda and Nâgasena._
Buddhist literature, Northern as well as Southern, abounds with
expositions of the doctrine of non-ego, as it is one of the most
important foundation-stones on which the magnificent temple of
Buddhism is built. The dialogue[71] between King Milinda and
Nâgasena, among many others, is very interesting for various reasons
and full of suggestive thoughts, and we have the following discussion
of theirs concerning the problem of ego abstracted from the Dialogue.
At their first meeting the King asks Nâgasena, “How is your Reverence
known, and what is your name?”
To this the monk-philosopher replies: “I am known as Nâgasena, and it
is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although
parents give such a name as Nâgasena, or Sûrasena, Vîrasena, or
Sîhasena, yet this Nâgasena and so on--is only a generally understood
term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent self
involved in the matter.”
Being greatly surprised by this answer, the King {154} volleys upon
Nâgasena a series of questions as follows:
“If there be no permanent self involved in the matter, who is it, pray,
who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging
and necessaries for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such things when
given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who
devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of
the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arhatship? And who is it who
destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his own?
who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies,
who drinks strong drink, who in a word commits any one of the five
sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life? If that be
so, there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor
cause of good or evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor result of good
or evil karma. If we are to think that were a man to kill you there
would be no murder,[72] then it follows that there are no real
masters or teachers in your Order, that your ordinations are void. You
tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing
you as Nâgasena. Now, what is that Nâgasena? Do you mean to say that
the hair is Nâgasena?”
This last query being denied by the Buddhist sage, the King asks: “Or
is it the nails, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the
marrow, the kidneys, {155} the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the
spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the smaller intestines, the
faeces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat,
the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates
the joints, the urine, or the brain or any or all of these, that is
Nâgasena?
“Is it the material form that is Nâgasena, or the sensations, or the
ideas, or the confections (deeds), or the consciousness, that is
Nâgasena?”
To all these questions, the King, having received a uniform denial,
exclaims in excitement: “Then, thus, ask as I may, I can discover no
Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena
that we see before us?[73] It is a falsehood that your Reverence has
spoken, an untruth?”
Nâgasena does not give any direct answer, but quietly proposes some
counter-questions to the King. Ascertaining that he came in a carriage
to the Buddhist philosopher, he asks: “Is it the wheel, or the
framework, or the ropes, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad,
that are the chariot?”
To this, the king says, “No,” and continues: “It is on account of its
having all these things that it {156} comes under the generally
understood term, the designation in common use, of ‘chariot.’”
“Very good,” says Nâgasena, “Your Majesty has rightly grasped the
meaning of ‘chariot.’ And just even so it is on account of all these
things you questioned me about the thirty-two kinds of organic matter
in a human body, and the five skandhas (constituent elements of being)
that I come under the generally-understood term, the designation in
common use, of ‘Nâgasena.’”
Then, the sage quotes in way of confirmation a passage from the
_Samyutta Nikâya_: “Just as it is by the condition precedent of the
co-existence of its various parts that the word ‘chariot’ is used,
just so it is that when the skandhas are there we talk of a ‘being.’”
* * *
To further illustrate the theory of non-âtman from earlier Buddhist
literature, let me quote the following from the _Jâtaka Tales_ (No.
244):
The Bodhisattva said to a pilgrim. “Will you have a drink of
Ganges-water fragrant with the scent of the forest?”
The pilgrim tried to catch him in his words: “What is the Ganges? Is
the sand the Ganges? Is the water the Ganges? Is the hither bank the
Ganges? Is the further bank the Ganges?”
But the Bodhisattva retorted, “If you except the {157} water, the
sand, the hither bank, and the further bank, where can you find any
Ganges?”
Following this argument we might say, “Where is the ego-soul, except
imagination, volition, intellection, desire, aspiration, etc.?”
_Ananda’s Attempts to Locate the Soul._
In the _Surangama Sutra_[74], Buddha exposes the absurdity of the
hypothesis of an individual concrete soul-substance by subverting
Ândanda’s seven successive attempts to determine its whereabouts.
Most people who firmly believe in personal immortality, will see how
vague and chimerical and logically untenable is their notion of the
soul, when it is critically examined as in the following case. Ânanda’s
conception of the soul is somewhat puerile, but I doubt whether even
in our enlightened age the belief {158} entertained by the multitude
is any better than his.
When questioned by the Buddha as to the locality of the soul, Ânanda
asserts that it resides within the body. Thereupon, the Buddha says:
“If your intelligent soul resides within your corporeal body, how is
it that it does not see your inside first? To illustrate, what we see
first in this lecture hall is the interior and it is only when the
windows are thrown open that we are able to see the outside garden and
woods. It is impossible for us who are sitting in the hall to see the
outside only and not to see the inside. Reasoning in a similar way,
why does not the soul that is considered to be within the body see the
internal organs first such as the stomach, heart, veins etc.? If
however it does not see the inside, surely it cannot be said to reside
within the body.”
Ânanda now proposes to solve the problem by locating the soul outside
the body. He says that the soul is like a candle-light placed without
this hall. Where the light shines everything is visible, but within
the room there are no candles burning, and therefore here prevails
nothing but darkness. This explains the incapacity of the soul to see
the inside of the body. But the Buddha argues that “it is impossible
for the soul to be outside. If so, what the soul feels may not be felt
by the body, and what the body feels may not be felt by the soul, as
there is no relationship between the two. The fact, however, is that
when you, Ânanda, see my hand thus stretched, you are conscious that
you have the perception of {159} it. As far as there is a
correspondence between the soul and the body, the soul cannot be said
to be residing outside the body.”
The third hypothesis assumed by Ânanda is that the soul hides itself
just behind the sense-organs. Suppose a man put a pair of lenses over
his eyes. Cannot he see the outside world through them? The reason why
it cannot see the inside is that it resides within the sense-organs.
But says the Buddha: “When we have a lens over an eye, we perceive
this lens as well as the outside world. If the soul is hidden behind
the sense-organ, why does it not see the sense-organ itself? As it
does not in fact, it cannot be residing in the place you mention.”
Ananda proposes another theory. “Within, we have the stomach, liver,
heart, etc.: without, we have so many orifices. Where the internal
organs are, there is darkness; but where we have openings, there is
light. Close the eyes and the soul sees the darkness inside. Open the
eyes and it sees the brightness outside. What do you say to this
theory?”
The Buddha says: “If you take the darkness you see when the eyes are
closed for your inside, do you consider this darkness as something
confronting your soul, or not? In the first case, wherever there
prevails a darkness, that must be thought to be your interior organs.
In the latter case, seeing is impossible, for seeing presupposes the
existence of subject and object. Besides this, there is another
difficulty. Granting {160} your supposition that the eye could turn
itself inward or outward and see the darkness of the interior or the
brightness of the external world, it could also see your own face when
the eye is opened. If it could not do so, it must be said to be
incapable of turning the sight inward.”
The fifth assumption as made by Ânanda is that the soul is the essence
of understanding or intelligence, which is not within, nor without,
nor in the middle, but which comes into actual existence as soon as it
confronts the objective world, for it is taught by the Buddha that the
world exists on account of the mind and the mind on account of the
world.
To this the Buddha replies: “According to your argument, the soul must
be said to exist before it comes in contact with the world; otherwise,
the contact cannot have any sense. The soul, then, exists as an
individual presence, not after nor at the time of a contact with the
external world, but assuredly before the contact. Granting this, we
come back again to the old difficulties: Does the soul come out of
your inside, or does it come in from the outside? In case of the first
alternative, the soul must be able to see its own face.”
Ânanda interrupts: “Seeing is done by the eyes, and the soul has
nothing to do with it.”
The Buddha objects: “If so, a dead man has eyes just as perfect as a
living man.[75] He must be able {161} to see things, but if he sees
at all, he cannot be dead. Well, if your intelligent soul has a
concrete existence, should it be thought simple or compound? Should it
be thought of as filling the body or being present only in a particular
spot? If it is a simple unit, when one of your limbs is touched, all
the four will at once be conscious of the touch, which really means no
touch. If the soul is a compound body, how can it distinguish itself
from another soul? If it is filling the body all over, there will be
no localisation of sensation, as must be the case according to the
first supposition of a simple soul-unit. Finally, if it occupies only
a particular part of the body, you may experience certain feelings on
that spot only, and all the other parts will remain perfectly
anesthetic. All these hypotheses are against the actual facts of our
experience and cannot be logically maintained.”
For the sixth time, Ânanda ventures to untie the Gordian knot of the
soul-problem. “As the soul cannot be located neither within nor
without, it must be somewhere in the middle.” But the Buddha again
refutes this, saying: “This ‘middle’ is extremely indefinite. Should
it be located as a point in space or somewhere on the body? If it is
on the surface of the body, {162} it is not the middle; if it is in
the body, it is then within. If it is said to occupy a point in space,
how should that point be indicated? Without an indication, a point is
no point; and if an indication is needed, it can be fixed anywhere
arbitrarily, and then there will be no end of confusion.”
Ânanda interposes and says that he does not mean this kind of “middle.”
The eye and the color conditioning each other, there comes to exist
visual perception. The eye has the faculty to discriminate, and the
color-world has no sensibility; but the perception takes place in
their “middle,” that is, in their interaction; and then it is said that
there exists a soul.
Says the Buddha: “If the soul, as you say, exists in the relation
between the sense-organs (_indṛya_) and their respective sense-objects
(_viṣaya_), should we consider the soul as uniting and partaking the
natures of these two incongruous things, viṣaya and indṛya? If the
soul partakes something of each, it has no characteristics of its own.
If it unites the two natures, the distinction between subject and
object exists no more. ‘In the middle’ is an empty word; that is to
say, to conceive the soul as the relation between the indryas and the
viṣayas is to make it an airy nothing.”
The seventh and final hypothesis offered by Ânanda is that the soul
is the state of non-attachment, and that, therefore, it has no
particular locality in which it abides. But this is also mercilessly
attacked by the Buddha who declares: “Attachment presupposes the
existence of beings to which a mind-may be attached. {163} Now, should
we consider these things (_dharmas_) such as the world, space, land,
water, birds, beasts, etc. as existing or not existing? If the
external world does not exist, we cannot speak about non-attachment,
as there is nothing to attach from the first. If the external world
really is, how can we manage not to come in contact with it? When we
say that things are devoid of all characteristic marks, it amounts to
the declaration that they are non-existent. But they are not
non-existent, they must have certain characteristics that distinguish
themselves. Now, the external world has certainly some marks
(_lakṣana_) and it must by all means be considered as existing. There
then is no room for your theory of non-attachment.”
At this, Ânanda surrenders and the Buddha discloses his theory of
Dharmakâya, which we shall expound at some length in the chapter
specially devoted to it.
* * *
By way of a summary of the above, let me remark that the Buddhists do
not deny the existence of the so-called empirical ego in
contradistinction to the noumenal ego, which latter can be considered
to correspond to the Buddhist âtman. Vasubandhu in his treatise on
the Yogâcâra’s idealistic philosophy declares that the existence of
âtman and dharma is only hypothetical, provisional, apparent, and not
in any sense real and ultimate. To express this in modern terms, the
soul and the world, or subject and object, have only relative
existence, and no absolute reality can {164} be ascribed to them.
Psychologically speaking, every one of us has an ego or soul which
means the unity of consciousness; and physically, this world of
phenomena is real either as a manifestation of one energy or as a
composite of atoms or electrons, as is considered by physicists.
To confine ourselves to the psychological question, what Buddhism most
emphatically insists on is the non-existence of a concrete,
individual, irreducible soul-substance, whose immortality is so much
coveted by most unenlightened people. Individuation is only relative
and not absolute. Buddhism knows how far the principle could safely
and consistently be carried out, and its followers will not forget
where to stop and destroy the wall, almost adamantine to some
religionists, of individualism. Absolute individualism, as the
Buddhists understand it, incapacitates us to follow the natural flow
of sympathy; to bathe in the eternal sunshine of divinity which not
only surrounds but penetrates us; to escape the curse of individual
immortality which is strangely so much sought after by some people; to
trace this mundane life to its fountainhead of which it drinks so
freely, yet quite unknowingly; to rise rejuvenated from the consuming
fire of Kâla (Chronos). To think that there is a mysterious something
behind the empirical ego and that this something comes out triumphantly
after the fashion of the immortal phœnix from the funeral pyre of
corporeality, is not Buddhistic.
What I would remark here in connection with this {165} problem of the
soul, is its relation to that of Âlayavijñâna, of which it is said
that the Buddha was very reluctant to talk, on account of its being
easily confounded with the notion of the ego. The Âlaya, as was
explained, is a sort of universal soul from which our individual
empirical souls are considered to have evolved. The Manas which is the
first offspring of the Âlaya is endowed with the faculty of
discrimination, and from the wrongful use of this faculty there arises
in the Manas the conception of the Âlaya as the ego,--the real
concrete soul-substratum.
The Âlaya, however, is not a particular phenomenon, for it is a state
of Suchness in its evolutionary disposition and has nothing in it yet
to suggest its concrete individuality. When the Manas finds out its
error and lifts the veil of Ignorance from the body of the Âlaya, it
soon becomes convinced of the ultimate nature of the soul, so called.
For the soul is not individual, but supra-individual.
_Âtman and the “Old Man.”_
When the Buddhists exclaim: “Put away your egoism, for the ego is an
empty notion, a mere word without reality,” some of our Christian
readers may think that if there is no ego, what will become of our
personality or individuality? Though this point will become clearer as
we proceed, let us remark here that what Buddhism understands by ego
or âtman may be considered to correspond in many respects to the
Christian notion of “flesh” or the {166} “old man,” which is the
source of all our sinful acts. Says Paul: “I am crucified with Christ;
nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life
which I live now in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God,
who loved me and gave himself for me.” (Gal. ii, 20.) When this
passage is interpreted by the Buddhists, the “I” that was annihilated
through crucifixion, is our false notion of an ego-soul (_âtman_);
and the “I” that is living through the grace of God is the Bodhi, a
reflex in us of the Dharmakâya.
When Christians put the spirit and the flesh in contrast and advise us
to “walk in the spirit” and not to “fulfil the lust of the flesh,” it
must be said that they understand by the flesh our concrete, material
existence whose characteristic is predominantly individual, and by the
spirit, that which transcends particularity and egoism; for “love,
joy, peace, long-suffering, faith, meekness, temperance,” and suchlike
virtues are possible only when our egocentric, âtman-made desires are
utterly abnegated. Buddhism is more intellectual than Christianity or
Judaism and prefers philosophical terms which are better understood
than popular language which leads often to confusion. Compared with
the Buddhists’ conception of âtman, the “flesh” lacks in perspicuity
and exactitude, not to speak of its dualistic tendency which is
extremely offensive to the Buddhists.
{167}
_The Vedantic Conception._
Though the doctrine of non-âtman is pre-eminently Buddhistic, other
Hindu philosophers did not neglect to acknowledge its importance in
our religious life. Having grown in the same soil under similar
circumstances, the following passage which is taken from the
_Yogavâsistha_ (which is supposed to be a Vedantic work, Upaçama P.,
ch. LII, 31, 44) sounds almost like Buddhistic:
“I am absolute, I am the light of intelligence, I am free from the
defilement of egoism. O thou that art unreal! I am not bound by thee,
the seed of egoism.”[76]
The author then argues: Where shall we consider the ego-soul, so
called, to be residing in this body of flesh and bones? and what does
it look like? We move our limbs, but the movement is due to the vital
airs (_vâta_). We think, but consciousness is a manifestation of the
great mind (_mahâcitta_). We cease to exist, but extinction belongs
to the body (_kâya_). Now, take apart what we imagine to constitute
our personal existence. The flesh is one thing, the blood is another,
and so on with mentation (_bodha_) and vitality (_spanda_). The ear
hears, the tongue tastes, the eye sees, the mind {168} thinks, but
what and where is that which we call “ego”?
Then comes the conclusion: “In reality, there is no such thing as the
ego-soul, nor is there any mine and thine, nor imagination. All this
is nothing but the manifestation of the universal soul which is the
light of pure intelligence.”[77]
_Nâgârjuna on the Soul._
In conclusion, let me quote some passage bearing on the subject from
Nâgârjuna’s _Discourse on the Middle Path_ (chapter 9):[78] “Some
say that there are seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., because there is
something which exists even prior to those [manifestations]. For how
could seeing, etc. come from that which does not exist? Therefore, it
must be admitted that that being [i.e. soul] existed prior to those
[manifestations].
“But [this hypothesis of the prior (_pûrva_) or independent existence
of the soul is wrong, because] how could that being be known if it
existed prior to seeing, feeling, etc.? If that being could exist
without seeing, etc., the latter too could surely exist without that
being. But how could a thing which could not be known by any sign
exist before it is known? How could _this_ exist without _that_, and
how could {169} _that_ exist without _this_? [Are not all things
relative and conditioning one another?]
“If that being called soul could not exist prior to all manifestations
such as seeing, etc., how could it exist prior to each of them taken
individually?
“If it is the same soul that sees, hears, feels, etc., it must be
assumed that the soul exists prior to each of these manifestations.
This, however, is not warranted by facts. [Because in that case one
must be able to hear with the eyes, see with the ears, as one soul is
considered to direct all these diverse faculties at its will.]
“If, on the other hand, the hearer is one, and the seer is another,
the feeler must be still another. Then, there will be hearing, seeing,
etc. simultaneously,--which leads to the assumption of a plurality of
souls.[79] [This too is against experience.]
“Further, the soul does not exist in the element (_bhûta_) on which
seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. depend. [To use modern expression, the
soul does not exist in the nerves which respond to the external
stimuli.]
“If seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. have no soul that exists prior to
them, they too have no existence as such. For how could _that_ exist
without _this_, and _this_ without _that_? Subject and object are
mutually conditioned. The soul as it is has no independent, individual
reality whatever. Therefore, the hypothesis that contends for the
existence of an ego-soul prior {170} to simultaneous with, or posterior
to, seeing, etc., is to be abandoned as fruitless, for the ego-soul
existeth not.”
_Non-âtman-ness of Things._
The word “âtman” is used by the Buddhists not only psychologically in
the sense of soul, self, or ego, but also ontologically in the sense
of substance or thing-in-itself or thinginess; and its existence in
this capacity is also strongly denied by them. For the same reason
that the existence of an individual ego-soul is untenable, they reject
the hypothesis of the permanent existence of an individual object as
such. As there is no transcendent agent in our soul-life, so there is
no real, eternal existence of individuals as individuals, but a system
of different attributes, which, when the force of karma is exhausted,
ceases to subsist. Individual existences cannot be real by their
inherent nature, but they are illusory, and will never remain permanent
as such; for they are constantly becoming, and have no selfhood though
they may so appear to our particularising senses on account of our
subjective ignorance. They are in reality cûnya and anâtman, they are
empty and void of âtman.
_Svabhâva._
The term “svabhâva” (self-essence or noumenon) is sometimes used by
the Mahâyânists in place of âtman, and they would say that all dharmas
have no self-essence, {171} _sarvam dharmam niḥsvabhâvam_, which is to
say, that all things in their phenomenal aspect are devoid of
individual selves, that it is only due to our ignorance that we believe
in the thinginess of things, whereas there is no such thing as svabhâva
or âtman or noumenon which resides in them. Svabhâva and âtman are thus
habitually used by Buddhists as quite synonymous.
What do they exactly understand by “svabhâva” whose existence is
denied in a particular object as perceived by our senses? This has
never been explicitly defined by the Mahâyânists, but they seem to
understand by svabhâva something concrete, individual, yet independent,
unconditional, and not subject to the law of causation
(_pratyayasamutpâda_). It, therefore, stands in opposition to
çûnyatâ, emptiness, as well as to conditionality. Inasmuch as all
beings are transient and empty in their inherent being, they cannot
logically be said to be in possession of self-essence which defies the
law of causation. All things are mutually conditioning and limiting,
and apart from their relativity they are non-existent and cannot be
known by us. Therefore, says Nâgârjuna, “If substance be different
from attribute, it is then beyond comprehension.”[80] For “a jag is
not to be known independent of matter et cetera, and matter in turn is
not to be known independent of ether et cetera.”[81] {172} As there
is no subject without object, so there is no substance without
attribute; for one is the condition for the other. Does self-essence
then exist in causation? No, “whatever is subject to conditionality,
is by its very nature tranquil and empty.” (_Pratîtya yad yad bhavati,
tat tac çântam svabhâvataḥ._) Whatever owes its existence to a
combination of causes and conditions is without self-essence, and
therefore it is tranquil (_çânta_), it is empty, it is unreal (_asat_),
and the ultimate nature of this universal emptiness is not within the
sphere of intellectual demonstrability, for the human understanding is
not capable of transcending its inherent limitations.
Says Pingalaka, a commentator of Nâgârjuna: “The cloth exists on
account of the thread; the matting is possible on account of the
rattan. If the thread had its own fixed, unchangeable self-essence, it
could not be made out of the flax. If the cloth had its own fixed,
unchangeable self-essence, it could not be made from the thread. But
as in point of fact the cloth comes from the thread and the thread
from the flax, it must be said that the thread as well as the cloth
had no fixed, unchangeable self-essence. It is just like the relation
that obtains between the burning and the burned. They are brought
together under certain conditions, and thus there takes place a
phenomenon called burning. The burning and the burned, each has no
reality of its own. For when one is absent the other is put out of
existence. It is so with all things in this world, they are all empty,
{173} without self, without absolute existence, they are like the
will-o’-the-wisp.”[82]
_The Real Significance of Emptiness._
From these statements it will be apparent that the emptiness of things
(_çûnyatâ_) does not mean nothingness, as is sometimes interpreted
by some critics, but it simply means conditionality or transitoriness
of all phenomenal existences, it is a synonym for aniyata or pratîtya.
Therefore, emptiness, according to the Buddhists, signifies,
negatively, the absence of particularity, the non-existence of
individuals as such, and positively, the ever-changing state of the
phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of
causes and effects. It must never be understood in the sense of
annihilation or absolute nothingness, for nihilism is as much
condemned by Buddhism as naïve realism. “The Buddha proclaimed
emptiness as a remedy for all doctrinal controversies, but those who
in turn cling to emptiness are beyond treatment.” A medicine is
indispensable as long as there is a disease to heal, but it turns
poisonous when applied after the restoration of perfect health. To
make this point completely clear, let me quote the following from
Nâgârjuna’s _Mâdhyamika Çâstra_ (Chap. XXIV). “[Some one may object to
the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, declaring:] If all is void
(_çûnya_) and {174} there is neither creation nor destruction, then it
must be concluded that even the Fourfold Noble Truth does not exist.
If the Fourfold Noble Truth does not exist, the recognition of
Suffering, the stoppage of Accumulation, the attainment of Cessation,
and the advancement of Discipline,--all must be said to be
unrealisable. If they are altogether unrealisable, there cannot be any
of the four states of saintliness; and without these states there
cannot be anybody who will aspire for them. If there are no wise men,
the Sangha is then impossible. Further, as there is no Fourfold Noble
Truth, there is no Good Law (_saddharma_); and as there is neither
Good Law nor Sangha, the existence of Buddha himself must be an
impossibility. Those who talk of emptiness, therefore, must be said to
negate the Triple Treasure (_triratna_) altogether. Emptiness not only
destroys the law of causation and the general principle of retribution
(_phalasadbhâvam_), but utterly annihilates the possibility of a
phenomenal world.”
“[To this it is to be remarked that]
“Only he is annoyed over such scepticism who understands not the true
significance and interpretation of emptiness (_çûnyatâ_).
“The Buddha’s teaching rests on the discrimination of two kinds of
truth (_satya_): absolute and relative. Those who do not have any
adequate knowledge of them are unable to grasp the deep and subtle
meaning of Buddhism. [The essence of being, dharmata, is beyond verbal
definition or intellectual comprehension, {175} for there is neither
birth nor death in it, and it is even like unto Nirvâna. The nature
of Suchness, tattva, is fundamentally free from conditionality, it is
tranquil, it distances all phenomenal frivolities, it discriminates
not, nor is it particularised].[83]
“But if not for relative truth, absolute truth is unattainable, and
when absolute truth is not attained, Nirvâna is not to be gained.
“The dull-headed who do not perceive the truth rightfully go to
self-destruction, for they are like an awkward magician whose trick
entangles himself, or like an unskilled snake-catcher who gets himself
hurt. The World-honored One knew well the abstruseness of the Doctrine
which is beyond the mental capacity of the multitudes and was inclined
not to disclose it before them.
“The objection that Buddhism onesidedly adheres to emptiness and
thereby exposes itself to grave errors, entirely misses the mark; for
there are no errors in emptiness. Why? Because it is on account of
emptiness that all things are at all possible, and without emptiness
all things will come to naught. Those who deny emptiness and find
fault with it, are like a horseman who forgets that he is on
horseback.
“If they think that things exist because of their self-essence
(_svabhâva_), [and not because of their emptiness,] they thereby make
things come out of causelessness (_ahetupratyaya_), they destroy those
{176} relations that exist between the acting and the act and the
acted; and they also destroy the conditions that make up the law of
birth and death.
“All is declared empty because there is nothing that is not a product
of universal causation (_pratyayasamutpâda_). This law of causation,
however, is merely provisional, though herein lies the middle path.
“As thus there is not an object (_dharma_) which is not conditioned
(_pratîtya_), so there is nothing that is not empty.
“If all is not empty, then there is no death nor birth, and withal
disappears the Fourfold Noble Truth.
“How could there be Suffering, if not for the law of causation?
Impermanence is suffering. But with self-essence there will be no
impermanence. [So long as impermanence is the condition of life,
self-essence which is a causeless existence, is out of question.]
Suppose Suffering is self-existent, then it could not come from
Accumulation, which in turn becomes impossible when emptiness is not
admitted. Again, when Suffering is self-existent, then there could be
no Cessation, for with the hypothesis of self-essence Cessation
becomes a meaningless term. Again, when Suffering is self-existent,
then there will be no Path. But as we can actually walk on the Path,
the hypothesis of self-essence is to be abandoned.
“If there is neither Suffering nor Cessation, it must be said that the
Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering is also non-existent.
“If there is really self-essence, Suffering could not {177} be
recognised now, as it had not been recognised, for self-essence as
such must remain forever the same. [That is to say, enlightened minds,
through the teaching of Buddha, now recognise the existence of
Suffering, though they did not recognise it when they were still
uninitiated. If things were all in a fixed, self-determining state on
account of their self-essence, it would be impossible for those
enlightened men to discover what they had never observed before. The
recognition of the Fourfold Noble Truth is only possible when this
phenomenal world is in a state of constant becoming, that is, when it
is empty as it really is.]
“As it is with the recognition of Suffering, so it is with the
stoppage of Accumulation, the attainment of Cessation, the realisation
of Path as well as with the four states of saintliness.
“If, on account of self-essence, the four states of saintliness were
unattainable before, how could they be realised now, still upholding
the hypothesis of self-essence? [But we can attain to saintliness as a
matter of fact, for there are many holy men who through their
spiritual discipline have emerged from their former life of ignorance
and darkness. If everything had its own self-essence which makes it
impossible to transform from one state to another, how could a person
desire to ascend, if he ever so desire, higher and higher on the scale
of existence?]
“If there were no four states of saintliness (_catvâri phalâni_), then
there would be no aspirants for it. {178} And if there were no eight
wise men (_puruṣapuñgala_), there could exist no Sangha.
“Again, when there could not be the Fourfold Noble Truth, the Law
would be impossible, and without the Sangha and the Law how could the
Buddha exist? You might say: ‘A Buddha does not exist on account of
wisdom (_Bodhi_), nor does wisdom exist on account of the Buddha.’ But
if a man did not have Buddha-essence [that is, Bodhi] he could not
hope to attain to Buddhahood, however strenuously he might exert
himself in the ways of Bodhisattva.
“Further, if all is not empty but has self-essence, [i.e. if all is in
a fixed, unchangeable state of sameness], how could there be any
doing? How could there be good and evil? If you maintain that there is
an effect (_phala_) which does not come from a cause good or evil,
[which is the practical conclusion of the hypothesis of self-essence],
then it means that retribution is independent of our deed, good or
evil. [But is this justified by our experience?]
“If it must then be admitted that our deed good or evil becomes the
cause of retribution, retribution must be said to come from our deed,
good or evil; then how could we say there is no emptiness?
“When you negate the doctrine of emptiness, the law of universal
causation, you negate the possibility of this phenomenal world. When
the doctrine of emptiness is negated, there remains nothing that ought
to be done; and a thing is called done which is not yet accomplished;
and he is said to be a doer who has {179} not done anything whatever.
If there were such a thing as self-essence, the multitudinousness of
things must be regarded as uncreated and imperishable and eternally
existing which is tantamount to eternal nothingness.
“If there were no emptiness there would be no attainment of what has
not yet been attained, nor would there be the annihilation of pain,
nor the extinction of all the passions (_sarvakleça_).
“Therefore, it is taught by the Buddha that those who recognise the
law of universal causation, recognise the Buddha as well as Suffering,
Accumulation, Cessation, and the Path.”
* * *
The Mahâyânistic doctrines thus formulated and transmitted down to
the present days are: There is no such thing as the ego; mentation is
produced by the co-ordination of various vijñânas or senses.
Individual existences have no selfhood or self-essence or reality, for
they are but an aggregate of certain qualities sustained by efficient
karma. The world of particulars is the work of Ignorance as declared
by Buddha in his Formula of Dependence (Twelve Nidânas). When this
veil of Mâya is uplifted, the universal light of Dharmakâya shines in
all its magnificence. Individual existences then as such lose their
significance and become sublimated and ennobled in the oneness of
Dharmakâya. Egoistic prejudices are forever vanquished, and the aim of
our lives is no more the {180} gratification of selfish cravings, but
the glorification of Dharma as it works its own way through the
multitudinousness of things. The self does not stand any more in a
state of isolation (which is an illusion), it is absorbed in the
universal body of Dharma, it recognises itself in other selves animate
as well as inanimate, and all things are in Nirvâna. When we reach
this state of ideal enlightenment, we are said to have realised the
Buddhist life.