CHAPTER VII

CONTINENTAL CONDITIONS

The larger proportion of the arguments advanced in the Press or in

public in favour of a restoration of our own canal system is derived

from the statements which are unceasingly being made as to what our

neighbours on the Continent of Europe are doing.

Almost every writer or speaker on the subject brings forward the same

stock of facts and figures as to the large sums of money that are

being expended on waterways in Continental countries; the contention

advanced being, in effect, that because such and such things are done

on the Continent of Europe, therefore they ought to be done here. In

the "Engineering Supplement" of _The Times_, for instance--to give only

one example out of many--there appeared early in 1906 two articles on

"Belgian Canals and Waterways" by an engineering contributor who wrote,

among other things, that, in view of "the well-directed efforts now

being made with the object of effecting the regeneration of the British

canal system, the study of Belgian canals and other navigable waterways

possesses distinct interest"; and declared, in concluding his account

thereof, that "if the necessary powers, money, and concentrated effort

were available, there is little doubt that equally satisfactory results

could be obtained in Great Britain." Is this really the case? Could

we possibly hope to do all that can be done either in Belgium or in

Continental countries generally, even if we had the said powers and

money, and showed the same concentrated effort? For my part I do not

think we could, and these are my reasons for thinking so:--

Taking geographical considerations first, a glance at the map of Europe

will show that, apart from their national requirements, enterprises,

and facilities, Germany, Belgium, and Holland are the gateways to vast

expanses producing, or receiving, very large quantities of merchandise

and raw materials, much of which is eminently suitable for water

transport on long journeys that have absolutely no parallel in this

country. In the case of Belgium, a good idea of the general position

may be gained from some remarks made by the British Consul-General at

Antwerp, Sir E. Cecil Hertslet, in a report ("Miscellaneous Series,"

604) on "Canals and other Navigable Waterways of Belgium," issued by

the Foreign Office in 1904. Referring to the position of Antwerp he

wrote:--

"In order to form a clear idea of the great utility of the canal

system of Belgium, it is from its heart, from the great port of

Antwerp, as a centre, that the survey must be taken.... Antwerp

holds a leading position among the great ports of the world, and

this is due, not only to her splendid geographical situation at the

centre of the ocean highways of commerce, but, also, and perhaps more

particularly, to her practically unique position as a distributing

centre for a large portion of North-Eastern Europe."

Thus the canals and waterways of Belgium do not serve merely local,

domestic, or national purposes, but represent the first or final links

in a network of water communications by means of which merchandise

can be taken to, or brought from, in bulk, "a large portion of

North-Eastern Europe." Much of this traffic, again, can just as well

pass through one Continental country, on its way to or from the coast,

as through another. In fact, some of the most productive of German

industrial centres are much nearer to Antwerp or Rotterdam than they

are to Hamburg or Bremen. Hence the extremely keen rivalry between

Continental countries having ports on the North Sea for the capture

of these great volumes of trans-Continental traffic, and hence, also,

their low transport rates, and, to a certain extent, their large

expenditure on waterways.

Comparing these with British conditions, we must bear in mind the

fact that we dwell in a group of islands, and not in a country which

forms part of a Continent. We have, therefore, no such transit

traffic available for "through" barges as that which is handled on

the Continent. Traffic originating in Liverpool, and destined say,

for Austria, would not be put in a canal boat which would first go to

Goole, or Hull, then cross the North Sea in the same boat to Holland

or Belgium, and so on to its destination. Nor would traffic in bulk

from the United States for the Continent--or even for any of our East

Coast ports--be taken by boat across England. It would go round by sea.

Traffic, again, originating in Birmingham, might be taken to a port

by boat. But it would there require transhipment into an ocean-going

vessel, just as the commodities received from abroad would have to be

transferred to a canal boat--unless Birmingham could be converted into

a sea-port.

If Belgium and Holland, especially, had had no chance of getting more

than local, as distinct from through or transit traffic--if, in other

words, they had been islands like our own, with the same geographical

limitations as ourselves, and with no trans-Continental traffic to

handle, is there the slightest probability that they would have spent

anything like the same amount of money on the development of their

waterways as they have actually done? In the particular circumstances

of their position they have acted wisely; but it does not necessarily

follow that we, in wholly different circumstances, have acted foolishly

in not following their example.

It might further be noted, in this connection, that while in the

case of Belgium all the waterways in, or leading into, the country

converge to the one great port of Antwerp, in England we have great

ports, competing more or less the one with the other, all round our

coasts, and the conferring of special advantages on one by the State

would probably be followed by like demands on the part of all the

others. As for communication between our different ports, this is

maintained so effectively by coasting vessels (the competition of which

already powerfully influences railway rates) that heavy expenditure on

canal improvement could hardly be justified on this account. However

effectively the Thames might be joined to the Mersey, or the Humber

to the Severn, by canal, the vast bulk of port-to-port traffic would

probably still go by sea.

Then there are great differences between the physical conditions of

Great Britain and those parts of the Continent of Europe where the

improvement of waterways has undergone the greatest expansion. Portions

of Holland--as everybody knows--are below the level of the sea, and

the remainder are not much above it. A large part of Belgium is flat;

so is most of Northern Germany. In fact there is practically a level

plain right away from the shores of the North Sea to the steppes of

Russia. Canal construction in these conditions is a comparatively

simple and a comparatively inexpensive matter; though where such

conditions do not exist to the same extent--as in the south of Germany,

for example--the building of canals becomes a very different problem.

This fact is well recognised by Herr Franz Ulrich in his book on

"Staffeltarife und Wasserstrassen," where he argues that the building

of canals is practicable only in districts favoured by Nature, and that

hilly and backward country is thus unavoidably handicapped.

Much, again, of the work done on the Continent has been a matter either

of linking up great rivers or of canalising these for navigation

purposes. We have in England no such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser,

the Elbe, and the Oder, but the very essence of the German scheme of

waterways is to connect these and other rivers by canals, a through

route by water being thus provided from the North Sea to the borders

of Russia. Further south there is already a small canal, the Ludwigs

Canal, connecting the Rhine and the Danube, and this canal--as distinct

from those in the northern plains--certainly does rise to an elevation

of 600 feet from the River Main to its summit level. A scheme has now

been projected for establishing a better connection between the Rhine

and the Danube by a ship canal following the route either of the Main

or of the Neckar. In describing these two powerful streams Professor

Meiklejohn says, in his "New Geography":--

"The two greatest rivers of Europe--greatest from almost every point

of view--are the Danube and the Rhine. The Danube is the largest river

in Europe in respect of its volume of water; it is the only large

European river that flows due east; and it is therefore the great

highway to the East for South Germany, for Austria, for Hungary, and

for the younger nations in its valley. It flows through more lands,

races, and languages than any other European river. The Rhine is the

great water-highway for Western Europe; and it carries the traffic and

the travellers of many countries and peoples. Both streams give life

to the whole Continent; they join many countries and the most varied

interests; while the streams of France exist only for France itself.

The Danube runs parallel with the mighty ranges of the Alps; the Rhine

saws its way through the secondary highlands which lie between the

Alps and the Netherlands."

The construction of this proposed link would give direct water

communication between the North Sea and the Black Sea, a distance, as

the crow flies, and not counting river windings, of about 1,300 miles.

Such an achievement as this would put entirely in the shade even the

present possible voyage, by canal and river, of 300 miles from Antwerp

to Strasburg.

What are our conditions in Great Britain, as against all these?

In place of the "great lowland plain" in which most of the Continental

canal work we hear so much about has been done, we possess an

undulating country whose physical conditions are well indicated by

the canal sections given opposite this page. Such differences of

level as those that are there shown must be overcome by locks, lifts,

or inclined planes, together with occasional tunnels or viaducts.

In the result the construction of canals is necessarily much more

costly in Great Britain than on the aforesaid "great lowland plain"

of Continental Europe, and dimensions readily obtainable there become

practically impossible here on account alike of the prohibitive cost

of construction and the difficulties that would arise in respect to

water supply. A canal connecting the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe, in

Germany, is hardly likely to run short of water, and the same may be

said of the canals in Holland, and of those in the lowlands of Belgium.

This is a very different matter from having to pump water from low

levels to high levels, to fill reservoirs for canal purposes, as must

be done on the Birmingham and other canals, or from taking a fortnight

to accomplish the journey from Hull to Nottingham as once happened

owing to insufficiency of water.

[Illustration: SOME TYPICAL BRITISH CANALS.

[_To face page 98._

]

There is, also, that very important consideration, from a transport

standpoint, of the "length of haul." Assuming, for the sake of argument

(1) that the commercial conditions were the same in Great Britain as

they are on the Continent; (2) that our country, also, consisted of

a "great lowland plain"; and (3) that we, as well, had great natural

waterways, like the Rhine, yielding an abundant water supply;--assuming

all this, it would still be impossible, in the circumscribed dimensions

of our isles, to get a "length of haul" in any way approaching the

barge-journeys that are regularly made between, say, North Sea ports

and various centres in Germany.

The geographical differences in general between Great Britain and

Continental countries were thus summed up by Mr W. H. Wheeler in the

discussion on Mr Saner's paper at the Institution of Civil Engineers:--

"There really did not seem to be any justification for Government

interference with the canals. England was in an entirely different

situation from Continental countries. She was a sea-girt nation, with

no less than eight first-class ports on a coast-line of 1,820 miles.

Communication between these by coasting steamers was, therefore,

easy, and could be accomplished in much less time and at less cost

than by canal. There was no large manufacturing town in England that

was more than about 80 miles in a direct line from a first-class

seaport; and taking the country south of the Firth of Forth, there

were only 42-1/2 square miles to each mile of coast. France, on the

other hand, had only two first-class ports, one in the north and the

other in the extreme south, over a coast-line of 1,360 miles. Its

capital was 100 miles from the nearest seaport, and the towns in

the centre of the country were 250 to 300 miles from either Havre

or Marseilles. For every mile of coast-line there were 162 square

miles of country. Belgium had one large seaport and only 50 miles of

coast-line, with 227 square miles of country to every square mile.

Germany had only two first-class ports, both situated on its northern

coast; Frankfort and Berlin were distant from those ports about 250

miles, and for every mile of coast-line there were 231 square miles

of country. The necessity of an extended system of inland waterways

for the distribution of produce and materials was, therefore, far more

important in those countries than it was in England."

Passing from commercial and geographical to political conditions, we

find that in Germany the State owns or controls alike railways and

waterways. Prussia bought up most of the former, partly with the idea

of safeguarding the protective policy of the country (endangered by

the low rates charged on imports by independent railway companies),

and partly in order that the Government could secure, in the profits

on railway operation, a source of income independent of Parliamentary

votes. So well has the latter aim been achieved that a contribution

to the Exchequer of from £10,000,000 to £15,000,000 a year has been

obtained, and, rather than allow this source of income to be checked

by heavy expenditure, the Prussian Government have refrained from

carrying out such widenings and improvements of their State system of

railways as a British or an American railway company would certainly

have adopted in like circumstances, and have left the traders to find

relief in the waterways instead. The increased traffic the waterways

of Germany are actually getting is mainly traffic which has either

been diverted from the railways, or would have been handled by the

railways in other countries in the natural course of their expansion.

Whatever may be the case with the waterways, the railways of Prussia,

especially, are comparatively unprogressive, and, instead of developing

through traffic at competitive rates, they are reverting more and more

to the original position of railways as feeders to the waterways. They

get a short haul from place of origin to the waterway, and another

short haul, perhaps, from waterway again to final destination; but the

greater part of the journey is done by water.

These conditions represent one very material factor in the substantial

expansion of water-borne traffic in Germany--and most of that traffic,

be it remembered, has been on great rivers rather than on artificial

canals. The latter are certainly being increased in number, especially,

as I have said, where they connect the rivers; and the Government are

the more inclined that the waterways should be developed because then

there will be less need for spending money on the railways, and for

any interference with the "revenue-producing machine" which those

railways represent.

In France the railways owned and operated by the State are only a

comparatively small section of the whole; but successive Governments

have advanced immense sums for railway construction, and the State

guarantees the dividends of the companies; while in France as in

Germany railway rates are controlled absolutely by the State. In

neither country is there free competition between rail and water

transport. If there were, the railways would probably secure a

much greater proportion of the traffic than they do. Still another

consideration to be borne in mind is that although each country has

spent great sums of money--at the cost of the general taxpayer--on the

provision of canals or the improvement of waterways, no tolls are,

with few exceptions, imposed on the traders. The canal charges include

nothing but actual cost of carriage, whereas British railway rates may

cover various other services, in addition, and have to be fixed on a

scale that will allow of a great variety of charges and obligations

being met. Not only, both in Germany and France, may the waterway be

constructed and improved by the State, but the State also meets the

annual expenditure on dredging, lighting, superintendence and the

maintenance of inland harbours. Here we have further reasons for the

growth of the water-borne traffic on the Continent.

Where the State, as railway owner or railway subsidiser, spends money

also on canals, it competes only, to a certain extent, with itself;

but this would be a very different position from State-owned or

State-supported canals in this country competing with privately-owned

railways.[9]

If then, as I maintain is the case, there is absolutely no basis for

fair comparison between Continental and British conditions--whether

commercial, geographical, or political--we are left to conclude that

the question of reviving British canals must be judged and decided

strictly from a British standpoint, and subject to the limitations of

British policy, circumstances, and possibilities.

British Canals: Is their resuscitation practicable? · 第 7 / 10 章