[April-June: 1842.]
The Halt at Jellalabad—Positions of Pollock and Nott—Lord
Ellenborough—Opening Measures of his Administration—Departure for
Allahabad—His Indecision—The Withdrawal Orders—Their Effects—The
“Missing Letter”—Negotiations for the Release of the Prisoners.
Pollock and Nott were now eager to advance. On both sides of
Afghanistan a junction had been effected which enabled the two generals
to maintain a bold front in the face of the enemy, to over-awe the
surrounding country, and to inspire with new hopes and new courage the
hearts of those whom the failures of Wild and England had filled with
despondency and alarm. The English in India never doubted that the
conduct of operations in Afghanistan was now in the hands of men equal
to the duty which had been entrusted to them. They had full confidence
in Pollock and Nott. There were now two fine forces of all arms,
European and Native, in good health and good spirits, eager to advance
on Caubul, and sure to carry victory before them. It seemed that the
tide had now begun to turn in our favour. As the hot weather came on,
the spirits of the Anglo-Indian community rose with the mercury in the
thermometer; everybody said that we had seen the worst; and everybody
looked for the speedy lustration of the national honour, which had been
so hideously defiled.
But as the confidence of the public in the generals and their armies
rose, the confidence of the public in the man upon whom had now
devolved the great duty of shaping the counsels of the generals, and
directing the movements of the armies, began rapidly to decline. On the
28th of February, Lord Ellenborough had landed at Calcutta and taken
the oaths of office. The guns on the saluting battery of Fort William
roared forth their welcome to the new Governor-General, and drowned
the voices of those who were assembling in the Town-Hall to do honour
to the departing ruler. The first intelligence of the disasters that
had overtaken our arms in the countries beyond the Indus, had been
telegraphed to him from Fort St. George, when, standing on the deck of
the _Cambrian_ in the Madras Roads, he looked out upon the white surf,
the low beach, and the dazzling houses of the southern presidency. He
arrived, therefore, at the seat of the Supreme Government with little
to learn beyond the measures which his predecessor had sanctioned for
the extrication of the emperiled affairs of the British-Indian Empire
from the thicket of difficulty that surrounded them.
What those measures were it is unnecessary to repeat. In the last
letter written by Lord Auckland’s administration to the Secret
Committee—it bears date February 19, 1842—the Governor-General in
Council said: “Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khybur
Pass, and have been convinced that from the difficulties at present
opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could
not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the
Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our
directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive,
and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-General Pollock will have
anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the
same objects.” And on the 24th of the same month—in one of the last
public documents of any importance written under the instruction
of Lord Auckland—in a letter to General Pollock, that officer is
distinctly informed that “the great present object of your proceedings
at Peshawur is, beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad,
that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may
be admissible with the several parties who may acquire power in the
northern portion of Afghanistan, of committing yourself permanently
with none of these parties, but also of declaring positively against
none of them, while you are collecting the most accurate information
of their relative strength and purposes for report to the government,
and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power for
procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond
the Khybur Pass.”[162] These were the parting instructions of the old
Governor-General. Lord Ellenborough found matters in this state when he
assumed the reins of office; and every one was now eager to ascertain
what measures the new ruler would adopt.
The first public document of any importance to which he attached his
name was a letter to the Commander-in-Chief. It was a letter from
the Governor-General in Council, dated the 15th of March. It was a
calm and able review of all the circumstances attending our position
beyond the Indus, and was as free from feebleness and indecision on
the one side, as it was from haste and intemperance on the other.
Lord Ellenborough at once decided that the conduct of Shah Soojah
was, at least, suspicious,[163] and that the British Government was
no longer compelled “to peril its armies, and with its armies the
Indian Empire,” in support of the tripartite treaty. Therefore, he
said, “Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon
military considerations, and hence, in the first instance, regard to
the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at
Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Candahar; to the security of our
troops, now in the field, from all unnecessary risk; and finally, to
the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of
some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it
appear to them, and to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have
the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and
violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan,
not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because
we are satisfied that the King we have set up has not, as we were
erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he
has been placed.” Here, in a few sentences, was mapped out the policy
recommended by such men as Mr. Robertson and Mr. Clerk, the policy
which Pollock and Nott were eager to reduce to action, and which, with
few exceptions, the entire community of British India were clamorously
expressing their desire to see brought into vigorous effect.
This letter to the Commander-in-Chief was written in Calcutta; and it
bears the signatures of the different members of the Supreme Council
of India—of Mr. Wilberforce Bird, of General Casement, and of Mr. H.
T. Prinsep. Nothing like it was ever written afterwards. On the 6th
of April Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta. It seemed desirable that he
should be nearer to the frontier—nearer to the Commander-in-Chief.
The movement, at all events, indicated an intention to act with
promptitude and energy. Already had the new Governor-General startled
the sober, slow-going functionaries of Calcutta by his restless,
and, as they thought, obtrusive activity. He seemed resolved to
see everything for himself—to do everything for himself. Almost
everything had been done wrongly by others; and now he was going to
do it rightly himself. All this created a great convulsion in the
government offices; but out of doors, and especially in military
circles, men said that the new Governor-General was a statesman of
the right stamp—bold, vigorous, decided, thoroughly in earnest, no
fearer of responsibility—quick to conceive, prompt to execute—just
the man to meet with bold comprehensive measures such a crisis as
had now arisen. A few sober-minded men of the old school shook their
heads, and faltered out expressions of alarm lest the vigour of the new
Governor-General should swell into extravagance, and energy get the
better of discretion. But no one ever doubted that the leading ideas
in the Governor-General’s mind were the chastisement of the offending
Afghans and the lustration of our national honour.
After a day or two spent at Barrackpore, Lord Ellenborough put himself
into a palanquin, and proceeded to Allahabad. Halting at Benares, he
addressed the Secret Committee on the 21st of April. Much stirring
intelligence had met him as he advanced. Good and evil were blended
together in the tidings that reached him between Calcutta and Benares.
Pollock had entered the Khybur Pass and forced his way to Ali-Musjid.
Sale had defeated Akbar Khan in a general action on the plains of
Jellalabad. But England had been beaten back at Hykulzye, and withdrawn
his brigade to Quettah. All these things the Governor-General now
reported to the Secret Committee, in a despatch which can by no means
be regarded as a model of historical truth. Writing again on the
following day to the home authorities, he stated that he had “by no
means altered his deliberate opinion that it is expedient to withdraw
the troops under Major-General Pollock and those under Major-General
Nott, at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they
may have certain and easy communication with India.” He had already
written to General Nott, instructing him to take immediate measures to
withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzye and evacuate Candahar. “You
will evacuate,” wrote the Chief Secretary, “the city of Candahar....
You will proceed to take up a position at Quettah, until the season
may enable you to retire upon Sukkur. The object of the above-directed
measure is to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur at the earliest
period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you
to take up a new position there. The manner of effecting this now
necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.”[164] And so
the Governor-General, who in Calcutta had determined to “re-establish
our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive
blow upon the Afghans,” could now hardly write a sentence suggestive of
anything else but withdrawal and evacuation.
How it happened that, within the space of little more than a month,
so great a change had come over the counsels of the Governor-General,
it would be difficult to determine, if he himself had not furnished
the necessary explanation. “The severe check,” he wrote to the
Commander-in-Chief, “experienced by Brigadier England’s small corps
on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was unexpected—and of
which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the
results—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of
movement and of action which were possessed by General Nott, as to
render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety
of that officer’s corps, by withdrawing it, at the earliest practicable
period, from its advanced position into nearer communication with
India.”
On this same 19th of April, the Governor-General addressed another
letter to the Commander-in-Chief, relating to the position of General
Pollock. “The only question,” wrote the Chief Secretary, “will be, in
which position will Major-General Pollock’s force remain during the
hot months, with most security to itself, and with the least pressure
upon the health of the troops? its ultimate retirement within the
Indus being a point determined upon, because the reasons for our first
crossing the Indus have ceased to exist.” The Commander-in-Chief was
then directed to issue his own instructions to General Pollock; and
another letter was immediately afterwards addressed to him (the third
despatched to Sir Jasper Nicolls on this prolific 19th of April), in
which, after speaking of the withdrawal orders addressed to Pollock
and Nott, the Governor-General goes on to say: “It will, however,
likewise be for consideration whether our troops, having been redeemed
from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Afghanistan,
and it may be still hoped not without the infliction of some severe
blow upon the Afghan army, it would be justifiable again to push
them forward for no other object than that of revenging our losses,
and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military
character.”
It was Lord Ellenborough’s often-declared opinion that “India was won
by the sword, and must be maintained by the sword.” In his despatch of
the 15th of March he had written: “In war, reputation is strength.”
And yet we now find him questioning the expediency of undertaking
operations beyond the Indus with “no other object than that of
re-establishing our military character.” If we hold India by the sword,
and reputation is strength, a statesman need hardly look for any object
beyond the establishment of that reputation, which is the strength by
which alone our empire in India is maintained.
But England’s miscarriage at Hykulzye had not only driven all the
forward feeling out of Lord Ellenborough, but had blunted his logical
acumen and deadened all his feelings of compassion. He seems to have
forgotten that at this time there was a party of English prisoners in
the hands of the Afghans—that the generals who had commanded our army
at Caubul—the widow of the murdered Envoy—the brave-hearted wife of
the commander of the illustrious garrison of Jellalabad—the man who
had rescued Herat from the grasp of the Persian, and done the only
thing that had yet been done to roll back from the gates of India the
tide of Western invasion—with many more brave officers and tender
women, were captives in the rude fortresses of the Afghan Sirdars. The
Governor-General seems to have forgotten that there were prisoners to
be rescued; and he doubted the expediency of undertaking operations
merely for the re-establishment of our military reputation—although
upon that reputation, in his own opinion, our tenure of India depended.
The request conveyed to Sir Jasper Nicolls in the government letter
of the 19th of April met with prompt compliance; and on the 29th, the
Commander-in-Chief, who was then at Simlah, instructed General Pollock
to withdraw every British soldier from Jellalabad to Peshawur. “The
only circumstances,” he added, “which can authorise delay in obeying
this order, are: 1st. That you have brought a negotiation for the
release of the prisoners lately confined at Budeeabad to such a point
that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing. 2ndly.
That you may have attached a lightly equipped force to rescue them.
3rdly. That the enemy at Caubul may be moving a force to attack you.
In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops
have descended into the plain below Jugdulluck with that intent, it
would be most advisable to inflict such a blow upon them as to make
them long remember your parting effort.” Of these instructions the
Governor-General “entirely approved;” and on the 6th of May the Chief
Secretary wrote to General Pollock, saying: “They are in accordance
with the general principles laid down by his Lordship for your
guidance, and you will execute them to the best of your ability, having
regard always to the health of your troops and to the efficiency of
your army.”
In the interval, however, between the 19th of April and the 6th of May,
the Governor-General having somewhat shaken off the uneasy sensation
which the disaster at Hykulzye seems to have engendered in his mind,
and having arrived at the conclusion that the phantoms which had so
intimidated him had not struck terror into the brave heart of General
Pollock, had written to the General, anticipating the possibility of
his having advanced upon Caubul.
“The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan,” wrote the Chief
Secretary, on the 28th of April, “appears to be such, according to
the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his Lordship
cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the
absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field,
by the divisions amongst the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire
you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again
the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters,
to advance upon and occupy the city of Caubul. If that event should
have occurred, you will understand that it will in no respect vary
the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy
now to be pursued. The Governor-General will adhere to the opinion
that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army under your
command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within
the Khybur Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications
with India.” Why Lord Ellenborough should have entertained a belief
even of the possibility of Pollock advancing upon Caubul, in the face
of positive instructions to the contrary and a known deficiency of
carriage, it is not easy to conjecture. Probably Lord Ellenborough
himself could not have explained the source of this extraordinary
buoyancy of expectation, for six days afterwards he declared that he
had been led to expect “that you (Pollock) will have already decided
upon withdrawing your troops within the Khybur Pass, into a position
wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if
considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not
have induced you to defer that movement.” The idea of the advance upon
Caubul seems only to have been a temporary apprehension arising out
of a not erroneous estimate of the military aspirations of General
Pollock; and it very soon passed away. But it had one important result.
It called forth from the General the following soldierly letter:
TO T. H. MADDOCK, ESQ., SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, ETC.
Jellalabad, May 13, 1842.
SIR.
I had the honour to forward with my letter No. 32, dated
12th instant, a copy of a letter from his Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief. I have now the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter, dated 28th ultimo, which adverts to the present
aspect of affairs in Afghanistan, and the probability of my having
advanced towards Caubul; stating also, that in such an event, the
views of the Governor-General as to the withdrawal of the troops
will not be altered; and further, that whatever measures I may
adopt I must have especial regard to the health of the troops. I
trust that I am not wrong in considering this letter as leaving to
me discretionary powers, and, coming as it does from the supreme
power in India, I venture to delay, for some days, acting up to the
instructions communicated in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief’s
letter, dated 29th ult.
I regret much that a want of carriage-cattle has detained me here; if
it had not been so, I should now be several marches in advance, and I
am quite certain that such a move would have been highly beneficial.
Affairs at Caubul are, at the present moment, in a very unsettled
state; but a few days must decide in favour of one of the parties.
Mahomed Akbar is at Caubul, exerting all his influence to overpower
the Prince. He is without means; and if he cannot, within a very
short period obtain the ascendancy, he must give up the contest, in
which case I have no doubt I shall hear from him again. With regard
to our withdrawal at the present moment, I fear that it would have
the very worst effect—it would be construed into a defeat, and our
character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of
the world.
It is true that the garrison of Jellalabad has been saved, which it
would not have been, had a force not been sent to its relief. But
the relief of that garrison is only one object; there still remain
others which we cannot disregard—I allude to the release of the
prisoners. I expect about nineteen Europeans from Budeeabad in a
few days. The letters which have passed about other prisoners have
already been forwarded for the information of his Lordship. If, while
these communications were in progress, I were to retire, it would
be supposed that a panic had seized us. I therefore think that our
remaining in this vicinity (or perhaps a few marches in advance) is
essential to uphold the character of the British nation; and in like
manner General Nott might hold his post; at all events till a more
favourable season.
I have no reason, yet, to complain that the troops are more unhealthy
than they were at Agra. If I am to march to Peshawur, the climate is
certainly not preferable; and here I can in one or two marches find a
better climate, and I should be able to dictate better terms than I
could at Peshawur.
I cannot imagine any force being sent from Caubul which I could not
successfully oppose. But the advance on Caubul would require that
General Nott should act in concert and advance also. I therefore
cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire, which,
without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty
in doing. I have less hesitation in thus expressing my opinion,
because I could not under any circumstances, move in less than
eighteen or twenty days; and your reply might reach me by express in
about twenty-two days. The difference in point of time is not very
material, but the importance of the subject is sufficient to justify
the delay of a few days. In the mean time, I shall endeavour to
procure carriage-cattle as fast as I can, to move either forward or
backward, as I may be directed; or, if left to my discretion, as I
may think judicious. Under any circumstances, I should not advocate
the delay of the troops either at Candahar or on this side beyond the
month of November; and in this arrangement advertence must be had to
the safety of the Khybur, which I consider the Sikhs would gladly
hold if they were allowed to take possession of Jellalabad.
I have the honour to be, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK, Major-Gen.[165]
Unwilling to return to the provinces without striking a signal blow at
the Afghans, and doing something great to re-establish the military
reputation of Great Britain in the countries beyond the Indus, Pollock
grasped eagerly at the faintest indication of willingness on the
part of the Governor-General to place any discretionary power in his
hands; and expressed his eagerness to traverse, with a victorious
army, the scene of our recent humiliation. If he had had carriage he
would have advanced at once; but the want of cattle paralysed the
movements of the force, and kept Pollock inactive in the neighbourhood
of Jellalabad. In one respect this want was a gain and an advantage.
Mindful both of the honour of his country, and of the safety of his
captive countrymen and countrywomen, Pollock adroitly turned the
scarcity of carriage to good account, by declaring that he had not the
means of retiring to Peshawur. Thus gaining time for something to be
written down in the chapter of accidents, he continued to maintain his
advanced position, and exerted himself to secure by negotiation the
release of the prisoners from the hands of Akbar Khan.[166]
In the mean while, the announcement of the Governor-General’s
determination to withdraw the troops from their advanced positions
had reached Candahar. Nott had always consistently declared that he
would not yield an inch of ground without the instructions of the
Supreme Government, but that, fortified by such instructions, he was
prepared to move either in one direction or the other—to abandon
all the posts in Western Afghanistan, or to march victoriously on
the capital. He had his own opinions on the subject of withdrawal;
but the obedience of the soldier was paramount over all his words
and actions; and when he received the instructions of which mention
has been made, he wrote to the Chief Secretary on the 17th of May:
“These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of
his Lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit
of.” And again he wrote on the 21st to the same functionary: “I shall
not lose a moment in making all necessary arrangements for carrying
into effect the orders I have received, without turning to the right
or to the left, by the idle propositions and wild speculations daily
and hourly heaped upon me from all parts of Afghanistan and Sindh,
by persons who are, or fancy themselves to be, representatives of
government West of the Indus. I know that it is my duty and their duty
implicitly and zealously to carry into effect every order received,
without inquiring into the reasons for the measures adopted, whatever
our own opinions or wishes may be, and without troubling government
with unnecessary references.”[167] But it was plain that he read the
orders of the Supreme Government not without acute mortification. He
yielded in effect a prompt assent; but in spirit it was a grudging
one. The orders for the evacuation of Candahar took Nott and Rawlinson
by surprise, and filled them with as much pain as astonishment. What
was really felt by the Candahar authorities is not to be learnt from
the published papers; but in the following letter written by Rawlinson
to Outram on the 18th of May, not only are the real feelings of the
military and political chiefs clearly revealed, but the probable
effects of the evacuation of Candahar sketched out, with a free hand
by the latter:
The peremptory order to retire has come upon us like a thunder-clap.
No one at Candahar is aware of such an order having been received,
except the General and myself, and we must preserve a profound
secrecy as long as possible. The withdrawal of the garrison from
Kelat-i-Ghilzye and the destruction of the fortifications at that
place must, I fancy, however, expose our policy, and our situation
will then be one of considerable embarrassment.
General Nott intends, I believe, to order all the carriage at Quettah
to be sent on to Candahar. A regiment is to escort the camels laden
with grain to Killah Abdoolah, where the troops will remain in charge
of the depôt, and from whence a regiment or two regiments detached
from this will bring on the camels empty to Candahar. It must be our
object to collect carriage, on the pretext of an advance on Caubul;
but how long the secret can be kept, it is impossible to say. When our
intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have the whole
country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such as we can
violently lay hands on.
If the worst comes to the worst, we must abandon all baggage and
stores, and be content to march with sufficient food to convey us to
Quettah, for which I believe the carriage now available will suffice.
It will be quite impossible to destroy the works of Candahar, as
directed in the government letter: the worst that can be done is to
blow up the gateways. I have hardly yet had time to reflect fully
upon the effects, immediate and prospective, of our abrupt departure.
There is no man at present on whom I can cast my eyes in all Candahar
as likely to succeed to power. Sufder Jung will be a mere puppet
of course, and will be liable to deposition at any moment. Should
the Barukzyes triumph at Caubul, and should we no longer oppose the
return of Kohundil, he will be the most likely chief to succeed;
but the natural consequence of his return, and of our determined
non-interference with the affairs in this quarter, will be of course
to render Persian influence paramount at Herat and Candahar; and, with
the prospect of a Russian fleet at Astrabad and a Persian army at
Merve, it is by no means impossible that the designs which threatened
us in 1838 may at last be directly accomplished. Strong measures
of intimidation, both against Russia and Persia, will be our best
protection.[168]
But, however great may have been the mortification which Nott and
Rawlinson were now condemned to experience, the orders of the Supreme
Government were so explicit, that the General believed it to be his
duty at once to begin to carry them into effect. A brigade had already
been equipped for the relief of Khelat-i-Ghilzye and the rescue of
the Ghuznee prisoners. It was now despatched, on the 19th of May, to
bring off the garrison, and to destroy the works of the former place.
Colonel Wymer commanded the force. It consisted of those three noble
Sepoy regiments with which he had before done such good service;[169]
her Majesty’s 40th Regiment, Leslie’s troop of Horse Artillery, four
guns of Blood’s battery, the Bombay cavalry details, and the Shah’s 1st
Regiment of Horse. Some troopers of Haldane’s cavalry, some details of
Bengal artillery, and of the Madras sappers, completed the components
of the force.
Thus, in the later weeks of May, Pollock was holding his post at
Jellalabad, eager to receive authority to march upon Caubul, and
rejoicing in the pretext of a scarcity of carriage for delaying the
withdrawal of his force; Nott, eager, too, for a forward movement,
but unable to perceive in the instructions of government the least
indication of an intention to place any discretionary power in his
hands, was taking measures to secure, with all promptitude, the
accomplishment of their wishes; and the Governor-General, from
Allahabad, was writing strong letters to the Generals, impressing upon
them the necessity of maintaining a discreet silence regarding the
intentions of government and the future movements of the troops.
There was nothing, in truth, more desirable than this. The intentions
of the Governor-General were of such a character as to render these
revelations, in the existing state of things, dangerous, if not fatal,
to the interests of Great Britain in the countries beyond the Indus.
But official secrets are not easily kept in a country where so many
copies of every public letter are forwarded to different authorities,
in distant parts of the country; where so many clerks are employed
to copy, and so many staff-officers allowed to read them. Before the
end of May it was known, not only in General Pollock’s camp, but in
all the cantonments of India, that the armies were to be withdrawn.
The secret had welled out from the bureau of the Commander-in-Chief;
and bets were made at the mess-tables of Jellalabad regarding the
probable date of the withdrawal of the troops. No man knew better
than Pollock the danger of such revelations,[170] and he did his
best to counteract the evil tendency of the reports which were now
the common gossip of his camp, and were soon likely to be current
in all the Afghan bazaars. “I have taken steps,” he wrote to the
Commander-in-Chief, “to prevent any great mischief resulting, by
ordering the deputy-quarter-master-general a few miles in advance, to
mark out a new encamping ground; and I shall have such inquiries made
among the natives about bringing supplies there, that will make them
believe that I shall move forward.”
And Pollock still hoped that something might arise to wring from the
Governor-General an order to march upon the Afghan capital. But the
letters he received from Lord Ellenborough and Sir Jasper Nicolls were
calculated not only to discourage but to embarrass him. There was no
possibility of misunderstanding the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief;
but the Governor-General, whilst imperatively directing the speediest
possible withdrawal of Pollock’s army, was every now and then throwing
out a hint that a forward movement for the chastisement of the Afghans
would not be ungrateful to him. And whilst the Governor-General was
obviously intending to place some discretionary power in the General’s
hands, the Commander-in-Chief was writing to assure him that the
orders of the Supreme Government all tended towards an immediate and
unconditional withdrawal.
The letter of the 13th of May elicited no answer; but a letter written
a week afterwards,[171] in which Pollock pointed out the evils and
difficulties of an immediate withdrawal to Peshawur, found the
Governor-General in one of his more forward and chivalrous moods.
Pollock, in this letter of the 20th of May, had said: “I shall be glad
if any letter from government may authorise my remaining till October
or November;” and now, on the 1st of June, the Governor-General,
through the Chief Secretary, replied: “It would be desirable,
undoubtedly, that before finally quitting Afghanistan, you should have
an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy; and since circumstances
seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Governor-General
earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a
position in which you may strike such a blow effectually.” And again,
in the same letter: “It will be for your consideration whether your
large army, one half of which would beat, in open field, everything
that could be brought against it in Afghanistan, should remain entirely
inactive during the period which must now apparently elapse before it
can finally retire. Although you may not have, or soon be able to
procure the means of moving your whole army, you may possibly be able
to move a part of it rapidly against some portion of the enemy’s force
incautiously exposed, and of giving it a severe blow.” This was, at all
events, something gained. And the gain was a sudden one. Only three
days before, the Governor-General, in a letter to Pollock, had resented
the presumption of Mr. Clerk in drawing from a former letter an
inference in favour of the continued occupation of Jellalabad, in the
event of negotiations being on foot for the release of the prisoners,
and had expressed a strong opinion that no negotiations had yet been
entered upon of a nature to impede the backward movement of the force.
The letter of the 1st of June was, therefore, doubly welcome. Pollock
had now received a constructive permission to remain at Jellalabad
until October;[172] and, as every effort was to be made in the interval
to collect carriage-cattle in the provinces of Hindostan, ostensibly
for the purpose of his withdrawal from Afghanistan, he determined
to lose no opportunity of turning those means of withdrawal to the
best possible account. If there were carriage to enable him to fall
back upon Peshawur, there would be carriage to enable him to advance
upon Caubul, for the mistake of hiring cattle, with local limitations
affixed to the engagements, was not to be perpetuated. So General
Pollock looked forward with confidence to the coming autumn, as to a
time when a vigorous and decisive blow might be struck at the nation
which had humbled the pride and defiled the honour of the conquerors
of Hindostan.
Patiently, therefore, biding his time, Pollock turned the halt at
Jellalabad to the best possible account, by endeavouring to obtain
by negotiation the ransom of the British prisoners. What those
negotiations were, and what was their result, should be stated in
this place. It was on the evening of the 25th of April that some
excitement was created in Pollock’s camp at Jellalabad, by rumours,
presently confirmed, of the arrival of Captain Colin Mackenzie, one
of the prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan, with a letter from
Major Pottinger, and overtures from the Sirdar. Pottinger’s letter
briefly shadowed forth the terms on which Akbar Khan and his Ghilzye
confederates were prepared to release the prisoners—but the language
employed was rather that of inquiry than dictation. “The Sirdar,”
wrote Pottinger, “wishes to know, in the first place, if we will
consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an agent
with a small body of men to act with whomever the confederates may
elect as chief, in which case they propose to be guided by the wishes
of the two factions in Caubul, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed
Khan. _Secondly_—They propose, that if the British Government have
determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, that the
prisoners at present in Afghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed
Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the
sword. _Thirdly_—In the event of neither of these propositions being
approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves
individually; whether we, in the event of their submission, will
confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their
pay, or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.”[173]
To this General Pollock replied, that “kindness and good treatment of
our prisoners would meet with due consideration at the hands of the
British Government, and the release of them much more so; that if money
were a consideration, he was prepared to pay into the hands of any one
the Sirdar might depute to receive it the sum of two lakhs of rupees,
whenever the prisoners might be delivered into his hands;” and that
Mahomed Shah Khan and his brothers would be “suffered to enjoy the
advantages arising from their hereditary dominions.”[174]
With this letter Mackenzie left Jellalabad on the evening of the
28th of April. He had been instructed by the Sirdar to ascertain, if
possible, from General Pollock whether there was any chance of the
British Government admitting him to terms, on his own account, if he
would detach himself from the national cause, and exert his influence
to advance our interests in Afghanistan. But upon this Pollock could
express no definite opinion. “His position,” wrote the General to the
Supreme Government, “is evidently different from the others. That
he was the murderer of the Envoy there cannot be a question, and he
evidently feels his guilt to be an insuperable bar to any terms from
us; but he also feels that he has possession of the persons of our
countrymen, and that circumstance seems to hold out to him a hope that
his proffers of submission will meet with a favourable reception.”[175]
The reply of General Pollock to the overtures of Akbar Khan
disappointed the Sirdar; and Captain Mackenzie was again despatched
to Jellalabad. This time he was the bearer of a string of proposals
far more extravagant than those which had been conveyed by him on his
first mission. The requests of the Barukzye chief, as set forth in
Pottinger’s letter to the General, were—
1stly. That a written promise of amnesty be given to himself, Mohamed
Shah Khan, and the latter’s family, for all past acts up to the date
of delivery. 2ndly. That neither he nor any of the above-mentioned
family shall be sent out of the Caubul and Jellalabad districts
against their wishes. 3rdly. That they may not be obliged to pay their
respects to you in our camp till they be assured against any danger.
4thly. If we merely intend to revenge ourselves on the enemy, and then
leave the country, he trusts its government will be conferred on him.
5thly. He wants a jaghire to support his family, and he names two
lakhs as adequate. 6thly. He wants eight lakhs of rupees as a present
to start him with. (His great fear, as it is of all Afghans, is of
being removed from his country.) He also asks for his own women, who
are in his father’s _harem-serai_. They have asked for the money,
if it is paid, to be given to Sir-Bolund Khan, who will remain as
a hostage till the prisoners are delivered, or that you pay it to
Hindoos, who can empower their agents in Caubul to pay it on delivery
of the prisoners.[176]
To these proposals Pollock replied:
With regard to the first, it follows as a matter of course that,
whenever we agree to any terms, amnesty for the past will result.
The second request, about residing at Caubul and Jellalabad, is out of
place now; it must depend upon contingencies, and be discussed only
after other and more important points have been agreed upon.
With reference to the third request, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar may
be assured that I would guarantee his personal safety whenever he
may visit my camp; but his doing so would require some preliminary
arrangement, unless he voluntarily claims our protection, in which
case I could immediately arrange for his safety, and appeal to the
government on his behalf.
The fourth request refers to matters entirely depending on future
results, and which are known to God alone. It would therefore be vain
to speculate on them at this stage of our negotiation.
With regard to the fifth and sixth requests, I have already told
you that I suppose the Sirdar rests his claim to any present on his
delivering up the prisoners, which, as I have before stated, will be
the best evidence of good faith, and a sincere wish for favourable
terms with the British Government. I have accordingly already
mentioned the sum of two lakhs of rupees. The Sirdar Mahomed Akbar
must recollect that he is desirous of obtaining the females of his own
family. The British Government will not require any money to be paid
on their account; and I hereby guarantee that, on all the prisoners
being delivered over to me, I will write to India for the women of
the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar, and I have no doubt that my request will be
complied with.
As to the payment of the money for the prisoners now with, or in the
power of Mahomet Akbar, it shall be made to any person the Sirdar may
appoint to receive it, or it shall be paid to Hindoos who can give
bills on Caubul. The good faith and honour of the British nation is
not doubted, and I therefore hereby pledge myself to pay the two lakhs
of rupees on account of government whenever the prisoners are made
over to me.[177]
Mackenzie took his departure with these replies. There was stirring
work, at this time, for Akbar Khan at Caubul; and the negotiations
had no result. But the visits of the British officer to Jellalabad had
not been without their uses. Mackenzie had been the bearer of much
information of the deepest interest, and had placed many valuable
documents in the hands of General Pollock. The General had laid before
him a string of questions relative to the causes and progress of the
insurrection at Caubul, the answers to which, in the existing state of
information even in the best-informed quarters, threw a flood of light
upon many dark points of recent history. And whilst in official places
many important revelations were made, all through the general camp
there transpired, in time, from the same source, much that was eagerly
sought, eagerly discussed when found, and eagerly transmitted to every
cantonment in India, where the fate of the captives in the hands of
Akbar Khan was a matter of the liveliest concernment, and a source of
the most painful alarm.[178]