CHAPTER XIII

SOME LEGISLATIVE REFORMS SUGGESTED BY LECTURE AND ARTICLE

Fifty years ago Newman was cutting and polishing his diamond scheme of

legislative decentralization till its facets flashed to the lighted

intellects of the world a thousand messages--a thousand clear-cut

suggestions for the welfare of his country and the betterment of its

legislation, as he firmly believed. He was never tired of urging it on the

notice of his fellow men, never tired of pleading for it as a solution of

many social difficulties, as a setting of many dislocations of our local

systems. Perhaps there was no more earnest apostle of decentralization

than was Francis Newman. But at the same time, to be fair to him, it

should be said that, first, he threw light upon the old paths, and,

secondly, showed where modern obstructions lay which seemed to him to

hinder true progress. At all costs the fact must be kept well in view, he

believed, that the paths were made for the men, not the men for the paths

--a fact which is not always so well remembered as it should be to-day.

Fifty years ago he published an article in _Fraser's Magazine_ on

"Functions of an Upper House of Parliament." Eight years later he gave a

brilliant lecture [Footnote: In the Athenaeum, Manchester.] on

"Reorganizations of English Institutions." In this last he touched only

briefly upon the former subject because of a notice by the metaphysical

railings of his lecture that he was "to keep to the path," and not speak

trenchantly on the question of the Upper House, because it would not have

found an appreciative audience there!

To begin, however, first upon the article which came out in 1867. He

affirmed that the House of Lords does, by its veto, exercise a very

powerful, though unseen, influence over the administration of the country.

He insisted on the urgent need of its becoming "a real, supreme, judicial

court for maintaining the rights of the princes of India, and an

authoritative expounder of the treaties which have passed between us and

them." It will be seen why this step is called for when we recall the fact

that in 1833 the Home Government signed a treaty in which it was

definitely agreed that the professions in India should be open to the

natives--a promise which has never been kept.

Newman goes on to say, "Until India can have its own Parliament, it needs

to find in England such protection as only our own Upper House can give

it." He places before us the possibility of economizing the time--to-day

so terribly overcrowded--of the House of Commons by letting domestic

legislation, "which is in no immediate relation to executive necessities,"

proceed from the Upper House. That in that House it could be so adapted

and so regulated, that when it came back finally to the House of Commons

no otherwise inevitable delay need occur. Thus "the Commons would have for

their chief business Bills connected with immediate administrative

exigencies, _and private Bills would be cast upon local legislatures_" (a

measure for which he was, as we know, constantly pleading). He reminds us

that the Roman executive was successful and prompt in the methods at which

they aimed, _because_ "the Senate guided and controlled it, _prescribed

the policy and required the execution_."

In his "Reorganization of English Institutions" he insists very strongly

on the great need of such a scheme of decentralization as the formation of

Provincial Chambers--in other words, the dividing the country into local

government centres which should send delegates, chosen delegates of tried

men, "virtually its ambassadors to Parliament, with instructions and a

proper salary, for a three years' term; but reserving the power to recall

any delegate earlier by a two-thirds vote, and to replace him, like an

ambassador, by a successor." Now, here comes in Newman's proposed drastic

change--a change which, in the opinion of those of us who have seen at

close focus the evils of our present system of canvassing for votes, could

not be condemned as a change for the worse.

For each delegate sent up to Parliament "would be elected without

candidacy and without expense ... confusion and intrigue would be

lessened.... There would be no convulsive interruptions of public

business." Many questions very naturally rise in our minds when we fairly

face this plan. Newman feels so confident, besides, that it would "settle

our harassing Irish difficulties."

The "old institutions of the shires are known only to students of ancient

law," says Mr. Toulmin Smith, one of the greatest authorities of his

country's old records, documents, etc. "They have been overridden by

justices of the peace, county lieutenants, and other functionaries....

From this general decay of local institutions centralization has grown

up."

From this "decay of local institutions," Newman points to what he

designates as the "Trades' Union"--the Cabinet (the "Secret Diplomacy"),

which has, he declares, superseded the old Privy Council.

"Since William III became king, parliaments of Scotland and Ireland have

been annihilated, and no subsidiary organs have replaced them.... Our

population is four times as great as William III knew it; yet the people

are more than ever divorced from the soil and cramped into town...." Now,

"Parliament is too busy for domestic local reforms; it has to control the

action of the whole Executive Government, Central and Local.... It has

sole right to direct public taxation.... It has to control the action of

the ministry towards foreign Powers.... It has a similar function towards

colonies ... and the Army and the Navy.... It is responsible for all

India" (population then two hundred and forty millions).... "It is the

only court of appeal to Indian princes who believe themselves wronged" (by

the king's representatives).... "No other authority can repeal bad laws,

or enact new laws for the general public." But were we to _return_ to the

"legislative courts of our shires," Newman protests, which existed before

our present systems of Parliament, all the inevitable delays and

congestions which now occur to prevent the dealing with and passing of

imperatively necessary reforms would be done away with _in toto_.

Long ago Lord Russell said that for any great measure a ministry needs "a

popular gale to carry the ship of State over the bar." "Hence all our

reforms, working against a stiff current, sail over the bar fifty or one

hundred years too late."

This, then, briefly stated, was Francis Newman's plan of dealing with the

accumulation of business, etc., which beset the House of Commons as

matters stand at present.

The whole of Great Britain, he urged, should be divided in provincial

chambers for local legislation. He proposed ten for England, four for

Ireland, two for Scotland, and one for Wales.

These local powers "must be to the central like planets round a sun....

All unforeseen business would fall to the central power, which in all

cases would undertake: public defence, communications with foreign Powers,

principal highways, shores and harbours, Crown lands, national money and

weights, and national taxes.... Our impending Church and State question

will be solved in this island, with least convulsion, if local variety of

sentiment be allowed free play." [Footnote: Perhaps then we should be rid

of the anomaly which allows a Prime Minister, of whatever religious

denomination, to choose Bishops for the Anglican Church.] Newman proceeds

thus to describe further his suggestions with regard to the working of the

provincial courts: "Each electoral district to send one member to the

Provincial Chamber; household franchise, of course, would be the rule, and

I trust women householders would not be arbitrarily excluded." They would

deal directly, and on the spot, with local pauperism in the provincial

courts. That, in itself, would be one great gain. For pauperism cannot

effectively be dealt with except by local legislation. Some system such as

Ruskin's, with powerful local legislation, could not fail to end the

trouble which is at the present moment making a tremendous drain on the

pockets of the law-abiding citizen of this country, in that system of

workhouses, which besides being subversive of the very idea of home-life

amongst our poor, degrades the non-worker, and rankles as a lasting shame

in the hearts of those whom misfortune alone has driven to that last

resource of the unfortunate. Were one able to follow the example set us,

among cities, by Leipsic (where the word pauperism is absolutely non-

existent), we should have effectually turned the corner out of the ill-

kept vagrant road into which Henry VIII first led us, when "pauperism"

began to be a sore in the midst of England's healthy body of citizens.

Now, it is a self-evident fact that "pauperism," which is a living drag on

our social wheel, can _not_ be dealt with other than by rigorous local

government. Cases could then be dealt with personally; the whole area

would not be too gigantic for this; but, of course, it is a moral

impossibility to generalize in dealing with this subject.

After all, this is not, as Francis Newman insists, a new departure in any

way. He points to other countries to show that as a fact, centralization

has been gradually establishing itself in England, though in other times

decentralization was a very potent force in our midst, and a success.

In 1875, Newman quotes the following countries as regards their local

legislatures: "Look ... at Switzerland. Environed by ambitious neighbours

far superior in power, her institutions have well stood the severe trial

of time. She has her Central Diet and Ministry, vigorous enough; but also

in her several cantons she has local legislatures, each with well-trained

soldiers, simply because every man is bound to learn the use of arms, as

Englishmen used to be; therefore they need no standing army.... Italy also

has local legislatures which belonged to independent States--Sicily,

Naples, Piedmont, Tuscany, and so on--besides her National Parliament....

In Hungary notoriously the national spirit has been maintained for three

centuries and a half ... solely by the independent energy of the local

institutions.... The seven united provinces of Holland similarly prove the

vitality of freedom and good order when free local power is combined with

a strong centre.... And on a far greater scale we have... an illustrious

example in the United States--a mighty monarchy and a mighty republic....

The American Union started in that advanced stage. It is a cluster of some

thirty-seven States, each with its own legislature, for all which, and for

the outlying territories, the Federal Parliament also legislates. Contrast

their condition with ours. Only of late has their population outrun ours.

They have thirty-eight legislative systems: we have one only. Surely our

system is a barbarous simplicity. France ... goes beyond us. Nay, our

Indian centralization is worse still. No virtue, no wisdom in rulers can

make up when the defect of organs lays on them enormous duties."

Finally, Newman urges for provincial chambers that they should be on the

"scale of petty kingdoms," and not of mere town populations. "All parts

and ranks of the local community are then forced to take interest in local

concerns. Each province becomes a normal school for Parliament, and a

ladder by which all high talent of poor men may rise."

SHOULD NOT THE CONSENT OF THE NATION BE OBTAINED BEFORE MAKING WAR?

This was a question constantly in Newman's mind. That, and the answer.

Everyone is doubtless aware that he wrote a very great deal upon the

subject, and spoke a great deal also. In the third volume of the

_Miscellanies_ he has four or five articles on this great question. The

first was printed in 1859, the second in 1860, the third 1871, and the

fourth 1877. Then in "Europe of the Near Future" (1871) he treats it at

greater scope, chiefly in regard to the Franco-German War. In

"Deliberations before War" (1859) Newman takes the two points of view from

which the question of war is as a rule regarded--the Moral and the

International. The first considers if a war is a just one or no, and

considers the prosecutor of an unjust war as neither more nor less than a

robber. The International (or second) "looks only to the ostensible marks

which make a war 'lawful'--that is to say, 'regular.'" As Newman very

rightly says, however, there is a third point of view, which he calls the

"National." I shall quote his words regarding this third view. "Inasmuch

as the whole nation is implicated in a war, when once it is undertaken--

inasmuch as we all have the same national disgrace if it is unjust, the

same suffering if it is tedious, the same loss if it is expensive--it is

an obvious principle of justice ... that every side of the nation should

be heard to plead against it by its legitimate representatives."

I cannot forbear saying that at the present moment of writing this last is

impossible, for those who often suffer most from a war--at any rate

longest--are the women, and there is no legitimate representation for this

large body of the community. Thus, even if the men of the nation could

"plead against" a war, the women would have no voice.

Newman urges that there are many among us who firmly believe that a time

is coming when no destructive weapons will be made, and "universal peace

shall reign." He believes himself, he says, that "a time will come when

men will look back in wonder and pity on our present barbarism, a time at

which to begin a war--unless previously justified by the verdict of an

impartial tribunal, bound in honour to overlook what is partially

expedient to their own nation or party--will be esteemed a high and

dreadful crime." These are strong words, but they are not too strong, for,

looked at by any thoughtful man or woman, war is an anomaly. It proves

nothing by reason; it simply acts by brute force, and by sheer superior

strength the victor, at the sword's point, drives defeat down the throat

of the defeated. But the arbitrary destruction of thousands of men on each

side who slay each other at the word of command (often for no reason that

concerns their own welfare, but only on account of some political

quarrel), is, from the point of view of civilization, of morality, of

humanity, without reasonable defence. It throws civilization, land

development, education back incalculably. Indeed, when one regards the

matter _au fond_, one sees that nothing could hinder the _true_

civilization, the _true_ humanity, more than does war. It _is_ barbaric;

there is no other word for it. It _is_ the great flaw that runs throughout

the whole garment of humanity.

Newman reminds us that it is only within very recent years "that the

atrocious system of paying _head money_ to soldiers and sailors for the

numbers they kill, was abolished by us."

John Stuart Mill very rightly said "that our force ought to be as strong

as possible for defence and as weak as might be for offence," only that it

is so very difficult sometimes to tell which is which.

In the _Ethics of War_, Newman argues that "there is nothing more

fundamental to civilized warfare than that no war shall be commenced

without a previous statement of grievances, and demand of redress--a

demand made to the Sovereign himself; and that _only after_ he has refused

redress, and when in consequence war has been solemnly declared, with its

motives and aim, shall hostilities be begun. In dealing with great Powers

we anxiously observe these forms.... But it is our Asiatic wars which have

brought out the formidable fact that the Cabinets claim to discard the

authority of Parliament altogether.... There is no more fundamental

principle of freedom ... than that no nation shall be dragged into a war

by its executive, against its will and judgment.... Nay, if even a

majority of every class in the nation desired war, yet they have no right

to enter into it without first hearing what the minority has to say on the

other side. This is the essential meaning of deliberative institutions."

Mr. Toulmin Smith, whose weighty words bring to bear on the subject the

witness of an England of medieval days, says that in the fourteenth

century it was a positive rule that "_consent_ of the Great Council, and

afterwards _of the Parliament_, _was necessary_ to a war or to a treaty."

In his _Parliamentary Remembrances_ he gives many precedents, both from

the histories of England and Scotland, showing that no peace was made, no

war was made, without Parliament being summoned. Henry V, he says, would

not enter "matters of foreign embroilment" (war with France, for instance)

without the consent of Parliament; and when the French king wished for

peace, Henry replied that peace needed to "be allowed, accepted, and

approved by the three Estates of each kingdom." The same process was gone

through with regard to the French king and his Estates of France. Newman

quotes Rome, whose citizens went through a long formality before making

any war, the King and Senate "consulting the College of Heralds for

erudite instructions as to minute ceremonies. For perhaps four centuries

the discipline of the army was admirable; its decline began from the day

when a general (Gen. Manlius) first took upon himself to make war at his

own judgment, trusting to obtain a bill of indemnity."

Livy tries to force on us the belief that the Romans were never

aggressive; that they only conquered the world in self-defence. And it is

true that here would come in difficulties in the way of carrying out John

Stuart Mill's _obiter dictum_ as regards wars of defence and of offence,

for many plausible reasons have been constantly brought forward for

aggressive wars: to take one only, it is not always easy to say what is

"defence" and what "offence." One may see some other country assuming a

warlike attitude towards ourselves, and it might very possibly be allowed

to come within the bounds of the word "defence" if we were prepared to

strike the initial blow before our enemy--to all intents and purposes,

save for the actual throwing of the glove--were fully prepared as to

armaments, etc. It is well known how earnestly Richard Cobden, the

Manchester Apostle of Free Trade, was one of the most prominent champions

of peace; he who, for championing the cause of the Abolition of corn

duties for the sake of his poorer countrymen, when he and others pushed

forward the "Anti-Corn Law League" (which was passed in 1846), lost all

his own private funds, and his business was ruined, simply because his

time was _all_ given not to his own affairs, but to the service of his

country. Mr. Cobden, as Newman reminds us, "was entirely convinced that

European wars could be stopped by a general agreement to abide by

arbitration." Indeed, he prevailed on the Ministers of his day so far

that, when the Russian War ended in 1856, "Lord Clarendon, in the name of

England, initiated some important clauses, of which one avowed that the

Powers who signed the treaty would never thenceforward undertake war

without first attempting to stay and supersede it by arbitration. England,

France, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey all signed this treaty, yet in a very

few years the solemn promise proved itself to be mere wind." He goes on

say, "When passions are at work, superior might, not unarmed arbitration,

is needed to control them."

Cobden always declared that no one need fear Russia's strength because of

her climate, her vast wildernesses, her frozen seas, her great

unwieldiness. It is seen, therefore, that the sort of arbitration planned

out by Cobden did not work. It must, according to Newman, be an armed one.

It is clear that it is not possible to agree _in toto_ with the Quaker

method of opposing war, and the most thoughtful Quakers will hardly urge

it perhaps to-day. War, for defence of one's country, is a present

necessity. What, then, are Francis Newman's proposed remedies? For in the

beginning of this chapter I stated that he, very definitely, had his

answer to the great question as regards the nation: its veto or agreement,

whenever war is proposed. First of all, before giving these however, let

us look for a moment at the plan pursued in such case in modern England.

This plan he always set himself against with all the force of personal

conviction: "It is the singular disgrace of modern England to have allowed

the solemn responsibility of war to be tampered with by the arbitrary

judgment of executive officers: ... this same nation permits war to be

made; lives by the twenty thousand or fifty thousand to be sacrificed ...

at the secret advice of a Cabinet, _all of one party, acting collectively

for party objects_, no one outside knowing how each has voted.... The

orders to make or not to make war went out direct from the Board of

Control--that is, really from the Ministry in Downing Street. Two, or even

one resolute man had power to make war without check.... If Earl Grey is

right, and a Cabinet must be a _party_, this is a decisive, irrefragable

reason why a Cabinet must _never_ exercise the function of deciding on

Peace or War. The recent [Footnote: He is writing in 1859.] overthrow of

the East India Company has swept away all the shams which have hidden from

England that the Ministry in Downing Street worked the Indian puppet....

Parliament should claim that public debate shall precede all voluntary

hostilities, small or great ... to protest in the most solemn way that

henceforth no blow in war shall be struck until the voice of Parliament

has permitted and commanded it."

Then, in Newman's article "On the War Power," he goes on to say: "In

regard to the difficulties as regards arbitration, and also as regards the

voice of the people being made a _sine quâ non_, whenever a proposal for

war emanates from the powers that be: When an evil is undeniable, serious,

unjust in principle ... (referring to secret diplomacy), a remedy must

exist. Where there is a will there is a way: nay, many ways."

Then he declares that these (following) measures have commended themselves

to him. The full discussion in Parliament by representatives of the

people; the determination that nothing shall be settled by secret

diplomacy as regards war until the whole matter has been thoroughly

threshed out. In more than a few ways, _Vox populi, vox Dei_ is still

true.

Next he puts before us the advisability of an _armed_ arbitration.

"If we look to a great central European Power as having for one of its

functions to repress wars and enforce arbitration, it is evident that a

large increase of force is necessary beyond all that is at present in

prospect. If wars voluntarily taken up for noble objects must be sustained

out of spare energy, much more does the place of that Power which is to

forbid wars require a great superfluity of energy. To be able to do this

within the limits of a great federation is in itself a mighty

achievement." [Footnote: Europe in the Near Future, F. W. Newman.] And

again: "Apparently the only way in which European wars can be suppressed

is by the successive agglomeration of free men, living under and retaining

their separate institutions, into powers which have no interest in war,

but much interest in peace; until unions reach such a magnitude as to be

able to forbid wars of cupidity, and offer a high tribunal for the redress

of international grievances.... If all parts of a mighty union have their

proportionate weight in questions of war and peace, no partial and vicious

expediency can actuate them in common. Justice alone is the universal good

which can unite their desires and efforts, or make them collectively

willing to undergo sacrifice.... The wider the federation, the more benign

its aspect on the whole world without, especially if the populations

absorbed into it are heterogeneous in character, in pursuit, and in

cultivation.... A federation resting on strict justice, conceding local

freedom, but suppressing local wars and uniting its military force for

national defence, is economic of military expenditure in time of peace in

proportion to the magnitude of the populations federated."

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