THE STORY OF TWO PATRIOTS
England possesses, as a rule, a memory of decidedly insular proportions
and proclivities. On the tablets of our country's memory are chalked up
many names which have figured in the history of her own concerns, or at
any rate in concerns with which she has some connection. Perhaps it will
be said that this is inevitable. Perhaps it will be said that this way
Patriotism lies. Perhaps it will be said that our interests as English
citizens and citizenesses are bound to be local, or we could not impress
the seal of our empire upon other nations' memories.
And if it _is_ said, it is no doubt in great measure true. It is
inevitable that we remember, in sharp unblurred outlines, the names and
deeds of our own great men. It is this way that the soil of Patriotism is
kept well manured for fresh crops of doughty deeds. We _are_ bound to
impress our individuality, as a nation, upon other countries; for if we
did not, we could never exist for any length of time as an empire at all.
But when all this is owned up to, there still remains another great
necessity which can never with safety be disregarded. And this is the
cultivation of our--so to speak--_foreign_ memory. We cannot afford to
pamper our insularity. It is true it must exist, but it is equally true
that English interests can never be--at least, _ought_ never to be--the
sum total of our mental investments. Patriotism is a fine thing. It is an
eminently inspiring thing. But it is also a thing that needs to take walks
abroad to keep itself in good mental health. There is a certain sort of
cosmopolitanism without which no nation's life can be complete--nay,
without which it cannot go on at all.
It is the cosmopolitanism of recognizing greatness outside our own
borders. The cosmopolitanism of owning that there are as good fish in
foreign seas as ever there were in the English Channel. The
cosmopolitanism of a human brotherhood, whether it hails from the Sandwich
Islands, from France, from Finland, or from Hungary; which recognizes as a
salient truth, big with vital issues, that, after all is said and done, it
is not the soil which matters, but the man whose feet are upon it now, at
this present day, though by birth he may own natal allegiance to a far
distant shore.
There are two names to-day which are practically forgotten by modern
England. Yet it is only half a century ago that the men who owned them
were making a gallant stir for patriotism's sake.
How many Englishmen to-day remember the story of Kossuth and Pulszky? Yet
fifty years ago their names sounded loudly enough in the political arena.
Fifty years ago they had struck the drum of fame with a boom which
reverberated through many a European country.
Yet here is a curious instance of the uncertainty which attends a nation's
memory in regard to foreign heroes. Some quite unaccountable factor seems
to rule their choice of whose achievements shall be nailed to the door of
their memories, like British trophies of old, and which shall be
completely forgotten. Garibaldi and Kossuth were patriots of the same
decade--one of Italy, the other of Hungary. Yet to-day in England the "red
shirt" of the Italian patriot still casts a flaming glow on the English
memory, while the struggle of Kossuth for his country is almost dead to
us, as far as our remembrance of it is concerned.
Nevertheless in the history of his country, what Kossuth achieved for her
of independence and freedom was in no way less fine than Garibaldi's
exploits.
In Francis Newman's _Reminiscences of Two Wars and Two Exiles_, the story
of the Hungarian reformer and _patriot_ stands out clearly before us. He
gives as his reason for writing it that when, in 1851, Kossuth and
Pulszky, his brother agitator, came to England, he himself became their
close friend. He says: "When ... Kossuth and Pulszky quitted England in
1860, Pulszky told me they were glad to leave behind in _me_ one
Englishman who knew all their secrets and could be trusted to expound
them." He goes on, however, to say that he was never able to be of so much
service to them as Mr. Toulmin Smith, "a constitutional lawyer ... and a
zealot for Hungary."
1848 was the year when the affairs of Hungary were at their most crucial
point. For long the situation had been growing more and more strained
between Austria and Hungary. Austria had been trying her hardest to force
Hungary into entire subservience to herself--to force her to give up her
separate individuality as a nation and become fused into the Austrian
empire. But Hungary made a gallant stand against all these attempts which
aimed at destroying her independence. She had always been a constitutional
monarchy, with power of electing her own kings. Austria had always
practically been considered to be a "foreigner" as far as Hungarian laws
and offices were concerned.
The London Hungarian Committee in 1849 quoted Article X, by Leopold II, of
the House of Hapsburg, in 1790, which definitely stated that "Hungary with
her appanages is a free kingdom, and in regard to her whole legal form of
government (including all the tribunals) independent; that is, entangled
with no other kingdom or people, but having her own peculiar consistence
and constitution; accordingly to be governed by her legitimately crowned
king after her peculiar laws and customs."
This statute, however, was no sooner made than fresh attempts were made to
nullify it. Hungary's needs, as a country, were many. Her taxation
required alteration; her peasants had still feudal burdens to bear,
instead of being freehold proprietors of land. Religious toleration was
not enforced, and free trade was an unknown quantity, for Austria insisted
on the produce of Hungary being sent only to her market. Fresh roads and
bridges and agricultural improvements were imperatively necessary, but the
need was passed by, by Austria.
To every nation, as to every individual, when the hour of worst need
strikes, the hand of the man or woman who brings rescue is upon the latch
of the door. In the present instance Kossuth was in readiness to redeem
his country from the yoke of Austria.
In March, 1848, the Opposition in the Hungarian Diet, with Kossuth at
their head, carried a vote "that the Constitution of Hungary could never
be free from the machinations of the Austrian Cabinet until Constitutional
Government was established in the foreign possessions of the Crown, so as
to restore the legal status of the period at which the Diet freely
conferred the royalty on the House of Hapsburg." This vote paralysed the
Austrian authorities.... The Hungarian Diet immediately claimed for itself
also a responsible ministry.
Prompt measures were now taken by the Hungarians to restore the old status
of the country, and laws were made which conferred upon the peasants
freeholds of land and all other reforms for which they had for so long
been agitating.
The London Hungarian Committee, to whose paper I have before referred,
tells us that before the French Revolution had broken out this Bill had
passed both Houses. "The Austrian Cabinet, seeing their overwhelming
unanimity, felt that resistance was impossible"; consequently this Reform
Bill of April, 1848, was considered by all Hungarian patriots as their
Magna Charta.
Nevertheless it was their fate very shortly after to appreciate the truth
of this hard fact, that it is one thing to make a Charter and another
thing to keep it. Austria had many ways up her sleeve of breaking the
spirit of the letter. First she saw to it that Hungary had no properly
equipped home regiments for her defence, and next she dissolved the
Hungarian Diet, and again tried to fuse Hungary into the Austrian Empire.
Then at last the Hungarians determined at once, by force, to end the
contemptible, practical joke which Austria was engaged in playing off upon
their country. They gathered an army together, but their utmost efforts
could only raise one not half the size of that of their opponents, and
consequently the result of the battle was defeat for themselves. Later on,
when Kossuth had managed to collect more arms and men, battles on a much
larger scale were fought; and after the Austrians had been defeated more
than a dozen times, the whole of their armies were driven ignominiously
out of Hungary. It was after this series of victories that Kossuth was
made his country's governor, and the whole nation declared as one man that
the House of Hapsburg had for ever forfeited any claim to the Crown.
It was now that, had England attempted mediation for Hungary (according to
Francis Newman), "we should have saved Austria from the yoke of Russia,
and have at least _put off_ the Crimean war," because, when Russia had
come to the assistance of Austria in her final difficulties with Hungary,
after she had been driven out of that country, "if England and France had
not fought it, nothing short of an equivalent war must have been fought
against Russia by other Powers ... because the security of _all Europe_ is
endangered by the virtual vassalage of Austria to Russia... for Austria is
now so abhorred in Hungary that she cannot keep her conquest except by
Russian aid." [Footnote: _Reminiscences of Two Wars and Two Exiles._]
In 1848 Kossuth's envoy, Pulszky, was sent to England, and, quite ignorant
of the wheels within wheels which hampered the political movements of Lord
Palmerston, was amazed that he himself found a repulse awaiting him at the
English Minister's hands. Lord Palmerston asserted that the rights or
wrongs of Hungary were practically a dead letter to England, who had never
thought of that country as existing apart from Austria. He considered "a
strong Austria was a European necessity"; but notwithstanding all he said
then and later, the impression made itself felt on men's minds that there
was a "power behind the throne" in all his speeches, and none knew what
that hidden power was. To-day we all know that it was the foreign
counsellorhood of Baron Stockmâr, who advised Prince Albert in those days.
As Newman says: "It is now open to believe that Stockmâr and his Austrian
policy ... sometimes drove Palmerston to despair, and our diplomacy into
heartlessness."
[Illustration: LOUIS KOSSUTH]
This elucidation of the whole puzzle throws fresh light on that attitude
of Lord Palmerston which so completely mystified Kossuth.
"I cannot understand," he said, "what is the policy of Palmerston's
_heart_. He talks one way, yet acts another way--always against the
interests and just rights of Hungary."
Kossuth's next step was to take refuge in Turkey, and here he at once set
to work to learn the language, and succeeded so well that he wrote a
grammar, which was afterwards used in the Turkish schools. It was said to
have been due to Lord Palmerston, by the way, that the Sultan refused to
give him up to Austria and Russia. But at any rate the Sultan seemed to
owe the decision which guided this refusal in large measure to his own
loyalty to those who had sought shelter with him during civil war. At any
rate, Kossuth reported that he certainly said, "I will accept war rather
than give up the Hungarian fugitives." Eventually an American ship
conveyed Kossuth out of Turkey, and he landed at Marseilles. Of course, by
then the monarchy had been overthrown in France, and Louis Napoleon-with
whom Kossuth was later on to be closely connected--was President.
In October, 1851, Kossuth crossed to England. Newman tells us that though
"he was enthusiastically received by the whole nation," yet that "he was
slandered, feared, despised, and disliked by those esteemed highest and
noblest in England." But, at any rate, he was given a hearty welcome in
America, for he did not stay long in England when he saw that those in
authority did not warmly espouse his cause.
It is necessary here to remember that in 1851 Louis Napoleon had stepped
on to the top of the Republic, whom he had previously served as its
President, and had made himself Emperor of the French. It is necessary
also to remember that there was a very general sense of alarm throughout
England as to his plans regarding an invasion. He was thought to be
collecting a fleet destined to attack us. But, later, it was proved that
we had been exciting and disturbing ourselves quite unnecessarily. Louis
Napoleon wanted something of us, it is true. But that something was
alliance.
By this time Kossuth was back in England. One day, Francis Newman says,
"Kossuth called suddenly on me with an English Blue-book in his hand, and
abruptly said: 'We foreigners look to you to explain your own Blue-books.
Please to tell me what does this strange sentence mean?' I read carefully
these words from the despatches of the Western Powers to the admirals of
their fleets in Constantinople: c You must clearly understand that you are
not sent to fight against the Emperor of Russia, but to save the Sultan
from _religious enthusiasm and fatal auxiliaries_'! He pointed out these
last words.... '_Religious enthusiasm_ is the diplomatic phrase for
Turkish patriotism; _fatal auxiliaries_ mean Hungarians.... Because
Austria dreads lest exiled Hungarians fight in the Turkish ranks, and the
object of the Western Powers is to please Austria and not to aid
Turkey.... They are angry with the Turks for defending themselves against
Russia.'" [Footnote: Reminiscences of Two Wars and Two Exiles.]
[Illustration: This certificate is dated the year after Kossuth's first
visit to England, and is in possession of Edward G. Sieveking, Esq. of the
firm of Sieveking, Podmore, and Wright, Gracechurch Street, E.C.]
In 1848-9 the Whigs and Tories in England mistook the whole meaning of the
disturbances which were going forward abroad. Macaulay (whom Newman
quotes) distinctly asserts that in Hungary and Italy "kings were fighting
in the cause of civilization, and nationalities were rising to destroy it
in the cause of anarchy."
Comment on this is, of course, quite needless when one remembers how
misinformed were the English ministers as to the nature of the struggle
for liberty which was then going forward in both countries, and how
treacherously and cruelly the people had been treated by those in
authority over them: and what efforts had been made constantly against
their rights as citizens. In 1854 Kossuth was again doing his best to
rouse interest on behalf of his country in England. He called on Newman to
enquire what would be the best and quickest way of collecting
subscriptions. He wanted for immediate national use £5000. Newman referred
him to a printer who "was a Zealot for Hungary," and who would supply him
with the names of the richest men who had "spoken vigorously for Hungary."
Kossuth proceeded to write out a circular to be sent to these Englishmen,
asking for subscriptions. A little later Newman found out that the result
of this fishing in English waters was £400, and he had wanted £5000 to
enable him to carry out his projects for Hungary!
The following letter from Francis Newman to Professor Martineau (about
whose friendship with him I shall have more to say later) is dated
November, 1854, and concerns his opinions _in re_ the Crimean War:--
"As to the war, while it is always thought rash to have any strong
military convictions, I have always believed that if they would go
straight to Sebastopol early in the season they would take it with little
difficulty. We have been juggled partly by Austria, partly by the too
great age of our military men, partly by clashing counsels of allies. The
fortification of Gallipoli I regarded as stupid infatuation: our old
military men said it was necessary for _safety!_ We lost all our time
while Russia had her hands full on the Danube, we let in Austria to hinder
the Turks pursuing the retreat, we delayed ten weeks longer to make
preparation, and landed, leaving all our preparations behind. This _delay_
has been the mischief.... The climate is now my fear, not the enemy. But I
look on all this as a part of the providential or fatal necessity which
determines that war shall not be decided by regular armies. If we _will_
do things in a 'slow and sure' way, Russia will beat us, for she cares
nothing for the lives of her men; to us it is agony. But to yield is to
make her omnipotent. I expect, therefore, that the harder we fight, and
the poorer our success, the more will Austria show Russian sympathies, and
the more will the Western Powers be forced to call up Poland and
Hungary.... I suppose nothing but severe suffering and vain effort will
reconcile Louis Napoleon or the English aristocracy to the revolution in
Europe, which alone can permanently cripple Russia.
"Ever yours affectionately,
"F. W. Newman."
And in August, 1855, he wrote again:--
"I do not think you see truly the _treachery_ of our Government (I cannot
use a weaker word), nor know truly what Kossuth has always demanded. To my
first question, 'Do you expect us to drive Austria into hostility?' he
replied (probably in November, 1853), 'Certainly not; but I claim that you
shall not _try to hinder_ our fighting our just and necessary battle
against Austria.' This is the turning point. We did try to hinder it,
hoping thereby to seduce Austria to our side. To whisper to Austria the
words 'H. P. I.' would not have been to stir up those countries to
insurrection, but to _compel Austria not to threaten Turkey with her
armies_. Our Government encouraged her in it, and aided her to occupy the
Principalities, forcing the Sultan to take pliable Ministers.... We reap
the bitter fruit, as Kossuth from the beginning told us we should. I,
however, still hope that we shall regain a morally right position, and
that if we fare the worse Hungary may be the better; for _then_ Austria
might have been neutral, now she will be our enemy."
Kossuth suffered greatly in his political aims and endeavours from lack of
funds. Indeed, from his first journey to England until he finally gave up
coming over here, he was terribly hampered by want of money. Newman, too,
was out of pocket owing to his efforts to push forward the Hungarian
cause. I have before me now a letter from Kossuth written in January,
1854, from 21 Alpha Road, Regent's Park, to E. Sieveking and Son, members
of my family, who were keenly interested in Hungarian politics, and who
transacted many business arrangements for Kossuth from time to time while
he was in England. The letter is on behalf of a friend of his, a Mr.
Ernest Poenisch, and is written in German:--
"Honoured Sir,
"Would you not do me the kindness to give a favourable reference about the
honourability [_sic_] of Mr. Ernest G. Poenisch if anyone should happen to
make enquiries of you about him?
"Mr. Ernest Poenisch is a merchant in the city, a German by birth, and was
a merchant of importance, and as he often has commercial business of
importance to look after for me, you will be doing to me myself, a
kindness if you would give him a good reference in a general way, should
opportunity occur.
"Renewing my request to you, I sign myself,
"Respectfully yours,
"L. Kossuth.
"To E. Sieveking and Son."
In June, 1855, Francis Newman writes to Dr. Martineau, in answer to a
letter from him:--
"I do not write in support of the oppressed nations _because_ 'I have
confidence in the stability and morality of a continental democracy,' but
because the _foreign_ kings who now trample nations down _neither have nor
pretend to have_ any right but that of armies; it is a pure avowed robber-
rule, essentially in morals, and all will extol the nations as patriotic
whenever they throw it off. ... Certainly I maintain that Hungary and
Poland are nations; so in fact is Italy: but Austria is only a Court and
Army, not a nation. We have had public relations with Hungary as a nation;
we violated our duty to Hungary in 1848-9; and complain we are still
allowing Austria to get the benefit of our wrong. So also to Poland, I
feel we have grossly neglected our duty, and still neglect it.... We know
that Hungary (Poland, Italy) is in the right; but though called on to say
so, we will not say it; nor even mediate, _for_ it will lead to
republicanism. Again, I call it immoral to argue: 'We know that Austria is
giving Turkey just cause of war; but we must _not allow_ the Sultan to
resent it by declaring war; _for_ it will give the nationalities an
opportunity of throwing off the Austrian yoke.'... Then, my dear friend,
do you forget that I approved of the _French_, and disapproved of the
_Austrian_ alliance?... Not to ally with Louis Napoleon is not to join him
_against the French nation_; while to ally with Francis Joseph was to join
him _against the French nation_, which his armies are trampling down.
Again, we did not catch Louis Napoleon engaged in a scheme with Nicholas
(Emperor of Russia) to dismember Turkey, and bribe Louis Napoleon to join
us by the promise or hint that he should still get his slice of Turkey. We
_have_ done this to Austria, and have used our severe pressure on the
Turkish Government to get Austria admitted into the Principalities.... I
fear this summer will be as deadly to our army as the winter was; my only
comfort will be, that I shall make sure that Austria will the clearer show
her true colours.
"Hoping you are all well, I am,
"Ever yours affectionately,
"F. W. Newman."
[Illustration: FACSIMILE OF LETTER FROM KOSSUTH TO MESSRS. SIEVEKING
JANUARY, 1854]
"Hungary and Poland are nations; so in fact is Italy: but Austria is only
a Court and Army, not a nation." Here is practically the gist of the whole
matter, as far as Francis Newman is concerned. Throughout all his writings
one comes again and again upon this note. "The People! The People!" is his
ever-recurring thought. What are "the People" suffering; what are _their_
needs, their wrongs which call for justice? The People is the living
nation; the Court and the Army may be inevitable adjuncts of a nation's
being, as things at present are constituted; but they are artificial
adjuncts; the People are the very life essence of the Nation, its real
motive power. Let their voice be heard, and the soul of empire at once
springs into being.
In the next letter from Newman to Martineau, 9th June, 1856, from which I
shall quote, it is shown that our Colonial Office was enraged against
Kossuth because he had "mischievously _hindered_ the Austrian Government
from getting troops to put down Italian insurrection." Newman goes on to
show how the treachery of Austria in her dealing with other nations was a
potent fact, and he adds, "Hungary was bound" (according to Kossuth's
views) "to assist Austria against foreign attack, and therefore against the
_King of Sardinia_; but in the interval, before this could come to any
practical result, the intrigues of the Austrian Court with the Serbs were
brought to light; Austrian officers with the Emperor-King's commission in
their pockets were made prisoners from among the Serb ranks, and the
internal danger of Hungary, as well as the treachery of the Court, made it
simply impossible to carry out, or wish to carry out, the Protocol. But
Kossuth was still the King's Minister, and could not say this openly.
Unless he would have taken the first step to civil war, he was bound to
throw a thin veil over it in public speech and action. The measure which
he then promoted was ... that no Hungarian soldier should leave the
country until the internal rebellion was thoroughly subdued. That no
Hungarian regiments should fight against Italians until the Italians had
had from Austria the offer of national institutions and freedom under the
Austrian Crown, putting them on a par with the Hungarians."
Nothing could have been fairer than these conditions, and this was very
shortly recognized when it became known that Latour and the Court were
employing all their energies for long after this date in stirring up the
Serb rebellion. Yet they were shameless enough to complain of Kossuth
having incited the Hungarians to revolt. Writing the next day to Dr.
Martineau, Newman openly avows his belief that "every nation in the world
is grasping and unjust in its foreign policy in exact proportion to its
power, _England not being at all an exception_." The italics are my own.
Have we not proof positive of this before our very eyes to-day? We cannot
look at India and say "no," for by our charter of 1833 we bound ourselves
over to hold India only until the education, which we had made possible
for them, should enable the Indians to take a share in the government of
their own country. But when we look at the India of to-day, we cannot but
plead guilty to not having kept that charter honestly before our eyes.
There is but _one_ office to which natives are admitted on equal terms
with Englishmen to-day!
To go back to the letter:--
"England has no great European army, and cannot _covet_ and subdue any
portion of the European continent. That is no great credit; but in Asia,
where she is strong and her neighbours weak, she is as grasping and unjust
as Russia, Austria, France, or the U.S.... Lord Palmerston had never heard
(or pretended never to have heard) of the peace of Satmar, and that
England was mediator of it between Austria and Hungary. I think it is not
mere knowledge, but higher morality, which is the first need of policy on
_both_ sides the Atlantic."
It is now that Louis Napoleon comes on the scene as regards the beginnings
of his connection with Kossuth. Newman says that it was in 1856 that the
closer friendship between Napoleon and Cavour (Sardinian Minister) had
begun. Not very long after it was borne in on the mind of Cavour that
Kossuth would be an invaluable ally in the plans of future conquest which
they were then preparing.
Louis knowing that Kossuth was in sore need of funds for his political
enterprises, sent a messenger to him to intimate that he would join forces
with him; that _he_ would supply him financially with all he would require
in the way of ready cash. Kossuth was not averse from receiving in good
part Napoleon's advances, though he offered temporary resistance. He saw
clearly that if France were to help Italy, Austria would be weakened,
Newman tells us that when Napoleon announced in 1858 that he was about to
marry Clotilde, daughter of the King of Sardinia, Kossuth at once said to
him: "I have always resisted Napoleon's overtures, but I expect now that I
shall be forced to visit him in Paris, because I now see that he is
resolved upon war against Austria. This Piedmontese marriage is evidently
his pledge also to Italians that he means to drive Austria out of Italy."
Then, in 1859, a few inimical words which Napoleon spoke to the Austrian
ambassador showed very clearly to what quarter the political wind in
France had veered. "War was felt to be intended, and Russia was no longer
a support to Austria behind."
In March, or a little later, Kossuth and Pulszky were invited to Paris,
and were met, very cordially, at the station by Prince Napoleon, cousin to
the Emperor. Later, Louis Napoleon himself spoke with them, and said very
frankly that he had never had any special idea of assisting Hungary, but
that in case he could not settle affairs in Italy, as regarded his war
with Austria, and he should find himself obliged to send his army into
Croatia, he wanted advice with respect to many details regarding this
province, which he knew that Kossuth could give him. Newman was the
recipient of Kossuth's communications concerning this secret interview
with Napoleon. And he told him that besides needing his advice about
Croatia, he wanted him (knowing he had influence in England) "to drive
Lord Derby out of office." I quote Napoleon's words as recorded by Newman.
"The French army is very formidable; but I cannot pretend that in it I
have such superiority to Austria that I may expect easy or certain
success. My only clear superiority is on the sea. As Louis Philippe
before, so have I from the first carefully nursed my fleet. Hereby I
override Austria in the Adriatic--a most critical advantage.... I cannot
be sure but that without declaring war, or giving warning, he (Lord Derby)
may all at once strike a blow which will annihilate my fleet, and then
what could compensate me? If you can find any way of moving discontent
against this ministry, I want you to cripple or eject him."
Newman adds that Kossuth did not tell him what reply he himself gave to
all this.
Everyone knows the sequel to this. After Lord Derby had resigned in March,
Lord Palmerston took office. In May the Austrians were defeated; and this
defeat was followed by more disaster for them, and the end of the whole
matter resolved itself into a peace between Francis Joseph and Louis
Napoleon.
Then it was that the latter proclaimed freedom from Austrian supremacy to
all Italy; and _now_ came the end for which Kossuth had struggled, and
longed, and waited. Napoleon despatched a messenger to him asking what
demands Kossuth wished now to make. His prompt answer was delivered thus
to the envoy:--
"Sir, I have two demands on your master: _First_, he must extract from the
Emperor Francis Joseph an amnesty for every Hungarian or Croatian soldier
who has taken military service under the King of Sardinia. _Secondly_, no
man thus amnestied shall ever be pressed into the Austrian army."
A fortnight went by, and Kossuth heard nothing from the Emperor. Then,
when at last the news came, it was almost too good to be true. Francis
Joseph had agreed to both stipulations.
In August, 1860, Francis Newman, writing from Keswick, touches on the
progress in success made by the Italian patriot, Garibaldi.
"I do not think you can be dissatisfied with Garibaldi's progress. Louis
N. _could_ have stopt [sic] him, and ruined his hopes for ever, by one
word to Austria as soon as Garibaldi landed in Sicily. On the contrary, he
has sternly forbidden Austria to meddle at all in Italy, and has allowed
Cavour to proclaim in Parliament that L. N.'s greatest merit to Italy is
_not_ the great battle of Solferino, _but_ his having avowed in his letter
to the Pope _that priests shall no longer rule in Italy_.... When Hungary
is free, all views will change, and perhaps France also."
Kossuth and Pulszky, who had visited England constantly between the years
1851 and 1860, finally left our shores for good in the latter year,
Kossuth for Italy, for he took no further share in politics, and Pulszky
for Hungary, where he became Finance Minister to Francis Joseph's new
constitutional monarchy.
Before finally leaving England, Kossuth gave to Newman his own "reading"
of the real character of Louis Napoleon. He said: "Louis Napoleon is a man
at whom, on account of his _coup d'état_, [Footnote: Louis Napoleon's raid
on the French citizens, in violation of his promises, in order to make
himself supreme.] I shudder, and it may seem a duty to hate him. Yet I am
bound to say, not only has he been wholly faithful to us, but every time I
have been closeted with him I have come away with a higher opinion, not
only of his talents and sagacity, _but also of his morals_." The italics
are mine. It seems difficult for the outsider to-day quite to sign to this
point of view, when one remembers Louis Napoleon's deception and his
broken honour and cruelty. There is a very enlightening and suggestive
passage in one of Robert Louis Stevenson's books, "To travel happily is
better than to arrive." In Kossuth's case the reverse was true. He
travelled towards his goal unhappily, but he "arrived," and that was a
reward which is not given to every patriot who gives his life to win his
country's freedom.
In _Hungary in 1851_, by Charles Loring Brace, there are many keenly
interesting details about Kossuth. Mr. Brace made a tour in Europe,
chiefly on foot, during the spring of 1851, and met Kossuth in Pesth; his
mother was then living there. "To say that Kossuth is beloved here seems
hardly necessary after what I have seen. He is idolized. Every word and
trait of his character is remembered with an indescribable affection ...";
but they all acknowledged, he added, that he did not possess the necessary
gifts for a revolutionary leader. Still, he moved his countrymen in so
stirring a manner that they would have followed him anywhere. "He
'agitated' the whole land, and there is not a Bauer in the villages or a
Csikos (wild cattle driver) on the prairies, they say, who does not
remember as the day of days the time when he listened to those thrilling
tones ... as they spoke ... of the wrongs of their beloved Fatherland."
This is a short account by a journalist who knew him personally, and was
present at the time, of the manner in which Kossuth was received in
Scotland during his visit to Britain:--
"In travelling from Edinburgh to Perth, Kossuth was received at every
station by vast crowds of people, including many ladies, with vociferous
cheers and waving of hats and handkerchiefs. This was particularly the
case at Stirling, where hundreds crowded up to the carriage in which he
sat to grasp his hand."
One day it was suggested that Kossuth, Colonel Ibaz his aide-de-camp, and
the journalist should go for a drive up Kinnoul Hill, near Perth. "We soon
got into a rough country road winding among the farms. At one place the
carriage came to a stand while a gate had to be opened to allow it to pass
through. At this gate stood a tall, venerable-looking farmer, with long
white hair and beard ... who might have served as a painter's model for an
old Scottish Covenanter. He stood ready to open the gate.... He had, of
course, heard of Kossuth's invitation to lecture in Perth, and at once
divined that the carriage might contain his hero, as all visitors to Perth
ascend the Hill of Kinnoul.... In a very deep and solemn voice he said ...
'I reckon that Loois Koshoot is in this carriage. Am I richt? Whuch is
him?' Kossuth leaned forward and said in a very gracious manner, 'Yes, he
is, good man. I am Louis Kossuth.' Whereupon the venerable man reverently
took off his bonnet, came close up, grasped Kossuth's hand in both his
own, and said, 'God bless you, sir, an' may He prosper you in your great
waurk to free yer kintra frae the rod o' the oppressor. May He strengthen
ye and croon ye wi' victory....'
"Colonel Ihaz was a bronzed, stern-looking officer, perhaps ten years
older than his chief; yet with all his military stiffness and sternness he
was quite capable of relaxing into ordinary human feelings and becoming
quite a facetious old fellow under favourable conditions. He could speak
very little English. He enjoyed the humour of some Scottish stories and
anecdotes I told, and which Kossuth translated for him. He was greatly
pleased and amused when I initiated him into the art and mystery of
concocting a tumbler of whisky toddy as a proper and orthodox finish to
the evening.... He thoroughly appreciated the beverage, smacking his lips
... and exclaiming with gusto, 'Toddo is goot. Toddo _very_ goot.'" He
mentions that Kossuth was keenly interested in Scottish ballads and
stories, etc., and he actually learnt _one_ ballad by heart, "which for
thrilling passion, and power, and sweetness ... were never equalled by
human voice. His appeals ... were addressed exceedingly often to the
religious feelings of his hearers. In fact, this tendency of his is
perhaps one great secret of his power over the people of Hungary--for the
peasantry of that land, beyond that of almost any other, are remarkable
for a simple, reverent piety."
When, after the deliverance of Hungary from the yoke of Austria, Kossuth
was made Governor, Brace says that he considers he belonged, by reason of
his talent for organization and finance, to the highest rank of statesmen.
He had not "the unrelenting, tremendous force of a Cromwell or Napoleon,
or the iron will of a Jackson...." But he has shown that a man "could be a
military Dictator without staining his hands either in the blood of his
rivals or of his friends."
"One of the privates in an Austrian regiment stationed in Vienna, himself
a Hungarian, was overheard by his officer to say 'Eljen Kossuth!' He was
ordered 'five-and-twenty' at once. It appears when a man is flogged in the
Austrian army he is obliged by law to thank the officer. This the
Hungarian refused to do. Another 'five-and-twenty' were given him. Still
he refused. Again another flogging; and the Hungarian, as he rose,
muttered his thanks with the words, 'My back belongs to the Emperor, but
my heart to Kossuth.'"
In regard to Kossuth's manner of delivery in his great public speeches,
Mr. Brace says: "His opening words, they say, were like Hungarian national
airs, always low and plaintive in the utterance.... But gradually his face
lighted up, his voice deepened and swelled with his feeling," and there
came forth tones which thrilled his hearers with a strange rousing power.