The course actually pursued by Mr. Venizelos in this predicament he
himself explained to the parliament in the speech delivered at the
close of the war against Turkey from which I have already quoted. He
declared to his astonished countrymen that in his desire to reach a
close understanding with Turkey he had arrived at the point where he no
longer demanded a union of Crete with Greece, "knowing it was {47} too
much for the Ottoman Empire." What he did ask for was the recognition
of the right of the Cretan deputies to sit in the Greek chamber, while
Crete itself should remain an autonomous state under the sovereignty of
the Sultan. Nay, Mr. Venizelos was so anxious to prevent war with
Turkey that he made another concession, for which, he frankly
confessed, his political opponents if things had turned out differently
would have impeached him for high treason. He actually proposed, in
return for the recognition of the right of the Cretan deputies to sit
in the Greek chamber, that Greece should pay on behalf of Crete an
annual tribute to the Porte.
Happily for Mr. Venizelos's government the Young Turk party who then
governed the Ottoman Empire rejected all these proposals. Meanwhile
their misgovernment and massacre of Christians in Macedonia were
inflaming the kindred Slav nations and driving them into war against
Turkey. When matters had {48} reached a crisis, the reactionary and
incompetent Young Turk party were forced out of power and a wise and
prudent statesman, the venerable Kiamil Pasha, succeeded to the office
of Grand Vizier. He was all for conciliation and compromise with the
Greek government, whom he had often warned against an alliance with
Bulgaria, and he had in readiness a solution of the Cretan question
which he was certain would be satisfactory to both Greece and Turkey.
But these concessions were now too late. Greece had decided to throw
in her lot with Servia and Bulgaria. And a decree was issued for the
mobilization of the Greek troops.