On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem

that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such

operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be

hitherto. The rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places

that power higher than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in

the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which the

Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at the last moment

decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place

without opposition, but this was unknown to the Japanese, and their

arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the

formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. The risk was

accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles

identical with those of the British tradition. But, on the other hand,

there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command

of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. Against an

enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of

covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than

they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action,

combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.

* * * * *

APPENDIX

* * * * *

THE

"GREEN PAMPHLET"

* * * * *

WAR COURSE

* * * * *

Strategical Terms

and Definitions

used in

Lectures on Naval History

BY

JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.

* * * * *

NAVAL STRATEGY

Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only

a section of a division of the art of war.

The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.

The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of

war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.

War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics

which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.

OBJECTS.

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be

ulterior or immediate.

Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular

operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary

object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be

regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also

as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by

the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor

Strategy, with primary objects.

This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded

in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1)

to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is

immediately directed.

Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province

the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or

primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2)

Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative

functions of the naval and military forces.

NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the

whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.

It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled

together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view

constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which

depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and

financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is

maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in

war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is

usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every

strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question

of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.

For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of

view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice

versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of

its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither

strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to

be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction

of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the

Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for

fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals

with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces

of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order

to secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet

only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army

only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army

and navy together.

NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or

Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and

that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of

naval operations only.

NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is

subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less

degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision

independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should,

therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any

line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is

strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven

Years War.

NATURE OF OBJECT

The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor

Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for

ourselves.

A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent

his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was

offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His

ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been

assigned to the Japanese Fleet.

NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's

operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly

within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him.

The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective

form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a

rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power.

The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of

war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the

weaker Power.

NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by

apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true.

_The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is

possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a

defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or

abandon the operation.

In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive,

it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or

concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal

in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:--

(1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its

communications.

(2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.

(3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat.

The advantages of Defence are chiefly:--

(1) Proximity to base.

(2) Familiar ground.

(3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack.

NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the

advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving

greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo.

The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or

line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be

neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on

the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all.

The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke.

A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack.

A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive

operations.

The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the

offensive, assume the defensive till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or

securing allies.

Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is

seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire

anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too

weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive,

and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and

permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's;

we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a

preparation.

As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to

intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor

theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a

minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most

important theatre.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION

(A) Counter attacks.

(B) Diversions.

(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes

himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this

form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise

advantage of defence."

(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside

the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention,

and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they

should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be

small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less

likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their

own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they

involve.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities

are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric

attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a

positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy;

whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at

preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the

category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made

in greater force than diversions.

EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,

about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a

diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the

army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was

negative--preventative--defensive.

2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815.

Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of

embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important

and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of

peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to

acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle

(eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War.

Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined

expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists.

Raids = Diversions.

Incursions = Eccentric attacks.

Invasions = True direct offence.

Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal

Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):--

"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.

"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men.

"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men.

NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification

of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek

to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or

interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the

liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the

enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must

agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as

the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them;

_e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the

immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versâ_.

EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the

war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive).

Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was

defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack

and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war

was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This

was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the

Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended

American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet

was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive.

SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object

(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or

unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of

the war."

This depends upon:--

(1) The theatre of the war.

(2) The means at our disposal.

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which

the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an

island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer

definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of

the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one

belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory

we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within

which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the

particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be

defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or

movements may be offensive.

OBJECTIVE

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is

directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get

command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet

will usually be the _objective_.

LINES OF OPERATION

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate

from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the

interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of

operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more

quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a

position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior

Position" are the converse of these.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point

which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in

one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to

each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._,

leading back to the base.

These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and

communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century.

Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways,

&c.

At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal

course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to

be supplied.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of

communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on

communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as

will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent

to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations.

MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet

may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond

to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to

increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of

modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c).

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea

base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the

national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the

"lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of

belligerents' possessions.

N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of

Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced

to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best

method of solving them.

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A

QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND

COMMUNICATION

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the

Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and

communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own

communications and seizing those of the enemy.

PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command

of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the

Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of

political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on

conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's

theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false

analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is

the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as

a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the

"command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the

belligerents are adversely concerned.

COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of

territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime

war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century,

but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior

object of particular operations.

PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows

that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars)

have been threefold.

1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading

neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the

Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and

Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the

alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to

demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining

Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the

second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the

Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as

emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and

military aspects of major strategy.

These functions may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed

(bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in

such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all

parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their

territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications,

is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first

can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.

Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is

mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must

discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time

to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and

military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval

Strategy.)

EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the

unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command

of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we

have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the

command when war breaks out.

VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act

dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his

own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously

with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send

squadrons to sea.

NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do

absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the

undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to

force our will upon him.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to

prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in

one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from

interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of

operation during the period required for gaining the object in view

(_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign).

This condition existed after Togo's first action.

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the

situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his

maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This

condition existed after Tsushima.

3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different

states:--

(a) With us.

(b) With the enemy.

(c) In dispute.

If in dispute, it may be that:--

(1) We have preponderance.

(2) Our enemy has preponderance.

(3) Neither side preponderates.

COMMAND IN DISPUTE

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it

is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and

frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._,

till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of

dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive

actions as a rule when at war with England.

The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is

not essential to all oversea operations_.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one

theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command

sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may

take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.

_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power

to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.

_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able

to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able

to defend its own.

EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three

years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a

decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War

up to Trafalgar.

SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE

PRIMARY OBJECT?

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._,

leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so

much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy

for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of

the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general

command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political

or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such

local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have

obtained a complete decision.

From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an

expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be

substituted "_control of passage and communication_."

The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of

operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we

secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL

1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical

annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:--

(a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful

(containing).

(b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force

available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

BLOCKADE

Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object

may be:--

(d) Blockade.

i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object

being usually to secure local or temporary control.

ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by

occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this

case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.

Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication,

but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line;

in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line

and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.

GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES

In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is

compatible with security from torpedo attack.

In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible

with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.

Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur.

_Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon.

_Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago

simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade

rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended

without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to

run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in

the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of

communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel,

if, indeed, they are not identical.

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the

Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines

of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly

all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it

exerts on Naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval

strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and

confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to

the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the

communications and operations against them in each case.

On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications

at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.

At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we

cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a

position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.

EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our

getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's

coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against

Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out

the enemy's fleet and destroy it.

Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure

communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them

unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702

were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish

trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own

lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief

theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief

operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and

particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's

official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored

unless it threatened our communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could

not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,

is sound and applicable:--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential

to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the

enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to

control the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex

(_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a

blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's

solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol.

II., p. 234).

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective

way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him)

is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of

campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon

fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally,

but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).

Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.

Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way,

that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential

communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue,

Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about

because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade

communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

FINAL NOTE

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne

in mind:--

(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably

find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.

(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the

offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come

to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.

* * * * *

WAR COURSE

* * * * *

Notes on Strategy

* * * * *

PART ONE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be

ulterior or primary.

_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or

movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the

campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular

operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of

its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two

kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with

primary objects.

Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in

relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it

is immediately directed.

Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province

the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary

objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of

the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the

naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with

the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship

which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled

together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant

touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which

depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and

financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is

maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war,

and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually

regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical

problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major

strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versâ_. For a line

of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of

strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versâ_. To

decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its

diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy

or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted

as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's

refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great

during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with

the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals

with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces

of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to

secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet

only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army

only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and

navy together.

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or

Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore

Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only.

Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same

friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders

have often to take a decision independently of the central government or

headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible

ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be

sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically

inexpedient.

Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of

the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and

warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It

was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen

succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it

would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels;

thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount

of harm with the least possible good.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

_Nature of Object_

Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between

_offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be

based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of

Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in

view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for

ourselves.

A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent

his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular

operation is offensive or defensive.

Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the

primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior

objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be

defensive, and _vice versâ_. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the

ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive

(positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was

defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and

destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

_Relation of Offensive to Defensive_

The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective

form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The

Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war,

since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is

another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases

where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his

doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete,

whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally

inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:--

That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications,

and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.

The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:--

Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground,

facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of

organising in advance.

The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however,

real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot

be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover

all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it

is possible to secure an interior position.

_Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive_

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel

strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the

defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to

hit harder.

A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless

it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus,

in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened

an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.

This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare,

since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the

defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the

defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay

aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the

counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a

position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.

The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the

burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not

_acting on the defensive_ at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were

doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is

really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the Dutch_. Being

no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the

defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a

counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get

better terms of peace.

So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may

consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz

calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or

_active defence_. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which

excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea.

The old Elizabethan term _Preventive_ most closely expresses the idea.

The most important function of the defensive is that of covering,

buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however

strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the

use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal

principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the

highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective,

the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using

the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the

forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the

maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.

In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If

not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive

till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or

otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or

securing allies.

It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for

offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the

continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the

enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak

to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and

wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting

us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass

to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we

have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is

no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we

have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of

our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by

our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on

land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and

it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.

_Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention_

(A) Counter attacks.

(B) Diversions.

_Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes

himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this

form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise

advantage of defence."

_Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the

limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention,

and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they

should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be

small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less

likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only

their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that

justifies their use.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities

are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks.

Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive

object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas

diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy

doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater

force than diversions.

Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,

about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion

on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army

employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was

negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against

New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to

obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to

occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which

the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was

positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those

against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years'

War.

This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions,

as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions.

These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric

attacks, and true direct offensive.

LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification

of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is

merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions

or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the

liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow

the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must

agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

PLANS OF WAR

_System of Operations_

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object

(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or

unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of

the war."

Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon--

(1) The theatre of the war.

(2) The various theatres of operation available within it.

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which

the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an

Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer

definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations

necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the

subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one

belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory

we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within

which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the

particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be

defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or

movements may be offensive.

As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of

war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_

and the _objectives_.

_Objective_

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is

directed." Thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get

command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet

will usually be the _objective_.

"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For

purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply

distinguished. _Objective_ is the end of some particular movement or

operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _Object_

is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the

general staff or director of the war. An _objective_ is some definite point

which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part

of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term

of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have

been Rojesvensky's _objective_. It was, strictly speaking, only his

_destination_. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was

the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true

_objective_ before him except Togo's fleet.

An _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. It is a step to the

attainment of that object.

_Lines of Operation_

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate

from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. We are said to hold the

_interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of

operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more

quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a

position is called an _interior position_. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior

Positions" are the converse of these.

_Lines of Communication_

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point

which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in

one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to

each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed,

_i.e._, leading back to the base.

For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines

of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th

century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the

normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the

force to be supplied.

_Maritime Communications_

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet

may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond

to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly

increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of

modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea

base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the

national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the

"lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of

belligerents' possessions.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of

communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on

communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a

consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are

the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of

Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and

this is probably the best method of solving them.

* * * * *

PART TWO

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A

QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND

COMMUNICATION

NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of

the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and

communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own

communications and seizing those of the enemy.

We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means

something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory,

for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We

cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we

exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of

the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of

States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of

communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The

command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the

ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were

approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a

primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular

operations.

History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely

maritime wars) have been threefold:--

1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or

persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the

Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal

to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the

Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to

demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis

XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the

Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern

Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed

in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it

will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate

connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military

aspects of Major Strategy.

These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed

(bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in

such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all

parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's

territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of

all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can

seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from

this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a

question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge

part of its function by direct action against territory before there is

time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and

military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval

Strategy.)

EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the

unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.

Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the

fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as

possible by battle.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command

of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we

have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command

when war breaks out.

Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing,

but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we

seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him.

_Various Conditions of Command_

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act

dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or

defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere

seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send

squadrons to sea.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to

prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in

one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the

enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all

or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining

the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of

a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first

action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions

to Villeneuve in 1805.

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the

situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his

maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This

condition existed after Tsushima.

_Command in Dispute_

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it

is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and

frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._,

till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

_It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of

dispute by seeking a decision._ Hence the French tradition to avoid

decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.

It must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to

all oversea operations_.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be

induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the

local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in

view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to

operate safely elsewhere.

Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to

obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to

defend its own.

EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years

of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by

defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._,

leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so

much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy

for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.

1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical

annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by--

(a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).

(b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force

available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

(d) Blockade.

_Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port_

A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different

operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and

intended to obtain an entirely different result:--

(1) _Close Blockade._--This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from

putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some

purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese

off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the

Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in

Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that

port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of

interference always existed.

This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present

day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft,

the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have

to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick

concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the

blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same

reason.

Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the

enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be

their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from

a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.

This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries

would be informed of its having been established.

(2) _Commercial Blockade._--To prevent floating commerce from entering or

leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful

enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or

leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a

fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it

would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging,

unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging,

would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are

going.

In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to

allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave

for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own

country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and

the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it,

and to back her refusal by force.

All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial

blockade, in accordance with International Agreement.

(3) _Observing a Port._--This, with its subsidiary operations, should be

conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of

observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to

decisive action.

The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers)

would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in

supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the

enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get

dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to

ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is

also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to

make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a

friendly neutral's harbours before being captured.

The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the

enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts

and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any

torpedo craft trying to get to sea.

In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important

that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing

the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to

suppose that his port is being observed.

This operation is not a blockade.

Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take

the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important

part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force

affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere

seriously with the enemy's war plan.

_Concentration_

The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid

action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first

movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's

strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for

rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to

meet all the requirements.

The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of

concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means.

Clausewitz says:--"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong,

at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no

higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together."

The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean

keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so

disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult

than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is

quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point

than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be

to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time

at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as

to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point.

If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of

all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy

undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient

forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand,

if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of

deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of

successfully carrying out some operation by evasion.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of

communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough

understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as

a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they

meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the

great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run

approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical.

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the

Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines

of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly

all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it

exerts on naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval

Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and

confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to

the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the

communications and the operations against them in each case.

On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's

communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing

our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both,

we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a

position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This

was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a

fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's

coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against

Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out

the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the

reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure

communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them

unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of

1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish

trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines

of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of

operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief

operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and

particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the

French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common

communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not

eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,

is sound and applicable--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential

to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the

enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to

_dispute the control of the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex

(_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a

blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes

Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective

way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him)

is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of

campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon

Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally,

but by the operation of strategical law).

Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way,

that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential

communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue,

Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about

because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade

communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne

in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably

find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost.

It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by

merely sitting on the common communications.

Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting

contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into

a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to

dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept

the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was

actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera

without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or

even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent.

Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"Seek out the

enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would

seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and

favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is

only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be

remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to

fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely

to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.

RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH

JANUARY 1909

* * * * *

INDEX

Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, 290, 296

Absolute War, 25, 42-44

Alexandria, 289

Alsace-Lorraine, 51-52, 55

Ambleteuse, 251

Amherst, General Lord, 285

Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 79

Anson, Admiral Lord, 110-12, 118, 189, 290

Antwerp, 69

Armada, Spanish, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255

Articles of War, 176

Austerlitz Campaign, 21, 53

Bacon, Sir Francis, 58

Baltic Fleet, 81, 170, 285, 327

Baltic trade, 263

Barcelona, 286

Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, 118, 142-44, 151, 162-63, 183,

199, 207, 254, 297

Barraille, Admiral, 249-51

Barrington, Admiral Samuel, 146-47

Batz, Isle de, 179, 290

Beachy Head, 218

Belgium, 50-52, 55

Belleisle, Marechal de, 295, 332

Belleisle, 312

Berry, Captain Sir Edward, 238

Biscay, Bay of, 139, 142, 263

Black Sea, 285

Blake, Colonel Robert, 176

Blockade, method of, 102, 121, 183-86, 235, 244, 252, 256-58, 260-62,

269, 272, 284, 341;

ethics of, 39;

tactical and strategic, 97;

insecurity of, 119;

close and open, 97, 184, 187-91, 193-94, 197-201, 205, 207-208, 240,

250, 292, 295-97, 321, 340;

theory of, 142, 163, 169, 175, 202-204, 242, 287-88, 322

Blücher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, 23

Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 189, 252, 320, 328, 339

Boulogne, 251

Brest, 141, 145, 147-48, 162, 179, 189, 193-97, 201-202, 208, 235-36,

248-49, 252-53, 290, 296, 323

Bruix, Admiral, 140

Byng, Admiral Sir George, 163

Cadiz, 134-40, 143, 146, 148, 179, 186, 213, 227, 264, 323

Caemmerer, General von, 76-77

Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, 163, 183

Canada, 54, 56-57, 81, 189, 210, 312, 328, 332

Cape Clear, 272

Caribbean Sea, 144

Carkett, Captain Robert, 4

Cartagena, 264

Channel Islands, 140, 253

Charles II of England, 179

Charles of Austria, 21, 54, 69

Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, 213-14

Chatham, 177, 215, 227

Cherbourg, 253

Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, 296

Cienfuegos, 169, 344

Clausewitz, General Karl von, 79-80, 85, 330-31;

theory, 25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341;

his service, 23-24;

_On War_, 24, 44;

his war plans, 44

Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, 196

Command at sea, theory of, 91-106, 165-66

Commerce prevention, 95

Communications, maritime, 94, 165, 315-16, 335;

common theory of, 100-102, 118

Conflans, Admiral Comte de, 192, 252-53, 320, 339

Copenhagen, 68

Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, 143, 162, 181, 183, 197-200

Coruña, 173

Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 181

Covering squadron, 283, 286-88, 291

Craig's expedition, 67

Crimea, 57, 62, 81, 258, 285-87, 300

Cromwell, 20, 22, 157, 163, 176

Cuba, 57, 103, 168, 313, 332

_Curieux_, 182

Dalny, 229

Dardanelles, 68, 139

Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 23

Deane, Colonel Richard, 176

Declaration of Paris, 96, 267

Dettingen, 246

Dogger Bank, 158

Downs, the, 139-40, 146, 176, 198, 214, 249-50, 253, 263

Drake, Sir Francis, 39, 159-60, 171, 173-74, 227, 244, 291, 301

Dumouriez, General, 254, 257

Dundas, Admiral Sir James, 286, 291

Dungeness, 176, 199

Dunkirk, 225, 237, 244, 246-50, 252-53

Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, 121

Egypt, 237-38, 240

Elliot Islands, 37

Ferrol, 139, 141, 266, 323

Finisterre, Cape, 101, 106, 139-40, 253, 256, 272

Flanders, 171, 246

Frederick the Great, 21-22, 36, 46, 54-55, 63-64, 66-67, 80, 157, 327

Gallipoli, 285

Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, 191, 197-98, 202, 236

Gardner, Admiral Lord, 197-98

Gibraltar, 34, 105, 139, 141, 145-46, 213, 264, 272, 318, 323, 337, 344

Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, 23

Goltz, General von der, 75, 97

Guichen, Admiral Comte de, 146, 223

Hanover, 64, 246

Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 253-57

Havana, 57, 169

Havre, 252-53, 263

Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 104, 189-90, 192, 196, 235, 252-53, 320, 339

Henry VIII, 108-110

Holland, 65, 195

Howe, Admiral Earl, 144, 147-50, 190-191, 194, 204, 206-207

Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, 171, 173-74, 244

Iberian Peninsula, 56, 61-62, 64, 69-71, 105

India, 101

Ireland, 194, 196, 213, 215, 225-26, 240, 253, 255, 257, 263, 282

Jamaica, 142, 144, 149, 182, 207

Jervis, Sir John, 223, 296

Jomini, General Baron de, 28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85

Kamimura, Admiral, 170

Keith, Admiral Lord, 236, 289

Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, 137, 146-48, 150, 192-94, 196, 206, 220,

222-24, 227, 254, 257, 260

Killigrew, Admiral Henry, 213-15, 219, 224

Korea, 34, 57, 79-80, 82-85

Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 75

Kuantung Peninsula, 290

Lagos, 252

La Hogue, 180, 324, 344

Langara, Admiral Don Juan, 148-49

Leghorn, 264

Leith, 263

Liaotung Peninsula, 37, 73, 287, 292

Liao-yang, 82, 85

Light squadrons, 125

Ligonier, General Lord, 70

Limited War, 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87, 313

Lisbon, 68, 173

Lissa, 36, 179, 293

Lizard, the, 150, 256

Louisburg, 285, 287

Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, 285-86

Mack, General, 21

Mahan, Admiral, 131n, 169, 344

Maitland, General, 295

Malta, 139, 264

Manchuria, 79, 82, 258, 290, 313, 318, 329

Maria Theresa, 246

Marlborough, John, Duke of, 64

Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," 93;

"Enemy's coast our frontier," 93;

"Eyes of the fleet," 112, 117, 120-21;

"Fleet in being," 224, 231;

"The sea is all one," 103;

"Seeking out the enemy's fleet," 102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68,

170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45

Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 244, 249

Mediterranean, 95, 101, 108, 113-14, 119, 125, 139-40, 143, 179, 182,

198, 207, 218, 223, 247, 252, 264, 285, 322, 337

Medway, 38, 217

Melville, Lord, 199-200

Middleton. _See_ Barham

Minorca, 34, 145, 330

Moltke, General von, 27, 51, 55, 73-74

Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, 135-37, 157, 176-77

Montecuculi, Prince, 24

Montcalm, General Marquis de, 302

Morbihan, 235, 252-53

Mukden, 83

Napoleon, 43-44, 54, 68, 77, 79, 85, 98, 251, 257-58, 338;

methods, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 46-48, 65, 141, 144, 157, 183, 210, 237-38,

240-41;

views on naval warfare, 56, 143, 179, 181, 191, 236;

his Russian campaign, 47, 52;

on "pygmy combinations," 67;

his conversion, 68-70

Narrow seas, 127, 202

Nelson, Admiral Lord, 119, 125-26, 226, 317, 322, 336;

his influence, 161-63, 217;

his use of cruisers, 113-15, 117;

on defensive fleet operations, 223-24, 227;

on blockade, 184, 186, 198-99, 208;

his strategy, 136, 139, 141-42, 199, 238, 281

New Model Army, 157, 176

Ney, Marshal Michael, 29

Nile, 180

Norris, Admiral Sir John, 237-38, 246, 249, 253, 281

North Sea, 69, 127, 139, 145, 150, 179, 195-96, 199, 207, 225, 263

Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, 216-17

Observation squadrons, 125

Offence, theory of, 31-36, 39-40

Orde, Admiral Sir John, 223

Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, 256

Palermo, 121

Paris, Declaration of, 96, 267

Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 171-73, 241, 243-44

Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 73, 302

Persano, Admiral, 293-94

Philip II, 239

Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 63-64, 84, 300, 327

Plymouth, 171, 173, 190, 214, 220, 248, 256

Pola, 293-94

Port Arthur, 80, 82-85, 170, 202, 204-205, 227-31, 290-92, 322, 340

Portsmouth, 195, 214, 224, 248-49, 253

Portugal, 65, 80, 195, 317, 323, 336

Privateering, 266-68

Prussia, 23, 49-50, 64

Puerto Rico, 168

Quebec, 285, 289, 301-302

Quiberon, 105, 180, 192, 253, 324

Raglan, General Lord, 301

"Real War," 25

Revolution, French, 19, 65

Rochefort, 139, 141, 182, 235, 250, 300, 312, 332

Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., 5, 144, 194

Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, 247-51

Ross, Admiral John, 147, 149

Rupert, Prince, 135-36, 157

Russell, Admiral Edward, 225

Ruyter, Admiral de, 135-37

St. Helena, 277

St. James's fight, 177-78

St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, 179, 194, 196, 272, 288, 290, 296

St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 182

San Domingo, 291, 301

Santa Cruz, Marquess of, 239

Santiago, 169, 322

Sampson, Admiral, 168, 322, 344

Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, 121

Sardinia, 139, 207

Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, 289, 301

Saxe, Marshal, 247-50

Saxony, 54-55, 80

Scilly, 39, 149-50, 255

Sebastopol, 80, 285, 291

Seoul, 82, 85, 290, 303

Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, 23

Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, 213-14, 224, 286

Sicily, 65, 207

Silesia, 46, 55

Skelligs, the, 150

Smyrna convoy, 225

Sole Bay, 38

Spanish Armada, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255

Spithead, 135, 146, 192, 248

Stakelberg, General, 302-303

Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, 125-26

Strategy, naval and maritime, 15;

major and minor, 308-309, 327-28

Tegetthoff, Admiral, 36, 293-94

Texel, the, 139, 146-47, 150, 197

Thames, the, 135-38, 214, 217, 247-48, 268

Theory of war, 15-30, 107-52

Tilbury, 247

Togo, Admiral, 84, 170, 202, 207, 290, 292, 303, 319, 322-24, 338

Torbay, 189-90, 192-93, 207

Torres Vedras, 36, 83

Torrington, Admiral Lord, 214-18, 220, 224, 226

Toulon, 69, 135, 139, 184, 198, 207-208, 213-14, 264, 266, 286, 296,

317-18, 322, 324, 337, 344

Tourville, Admiral Comte de, 213-14, 217, 219-20, 224-26

Trafalgar, 68, 118, 199, 266, 320, 324, 339

Trieste, 139

Tromp, Admiral Martin H., 175-76

Tsushima, 83, 319, 324, 338

Unlimited War, 40-51, 60-71

Ushant, 142-43, 147, 181-82, 192, 223-25, 258, 272

Utrecht, 246

Villeneuve, Admiral, 140, 142-43, 179, 182-83, 186, 197, 206, 223, 266,

338

Vladivostock, 340

Walcheren, 68-69

Warren, Commodore Sir John B., 235

Wars:

Anglo-American (1812), 119, 276;

Anglo-Dutch, 109;

Anglo-Spanish (1588), 109;

American Independence, 92, 118, 190, 193, 210, 221, 226;

Austro-Italian (1866), 36, 179, 293;

Crimean, 258, 285-88;

Franco-German (1870), 71, 79, 333;

Franco-Russian (1812), 47, 49, 51-52;

Russo-Japanese, 34, 38, 44, 51, 78-79, 84, 168, 170, 205, 303, 328-29;

Seven Years', 51, 54, 57, 63, 66, 111, 179, 189-90, 197-98, 209, 312,

320, 327-28, 332, 339;

Spanish-American, 57, 168-69, 313, 332, 344;

Spanish Succession, 34, 317, 323, 336

Wellington, Duke of, 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, 105

West Indies, 95, 140, 142-43, 182, 189-90, 197, 210, 222-23, 225, 247,

252, 255, 266-67, 285, 296

Western Squadron, 42, 181, 193, 252, 263, 266

Wight, Isle of, 136, 214, 249, 253, 257

Wolfe, General, 70, 200, 285, 301-302

Yalu, 85

Yarmouth, 263

Yellow Sea, 340