“_After the perplexing and embarrassing scenes you have just had to pass
through, it must give you the most solid joy to see an armament going
out to America.... I congratulate you on this great and glorious event,
to which you have contributed more than any other person._”
“_Silas Deane to Beaumarchais._”
_March 29, 1778._
“_It seems to me that we cannot consistently with our own honor or
self-respect pay off an undisputed debt with a doubtful or disputed
gift._”
_Speech of Mr. Tucker of Virginia, Relative to the Claims of
Beaumarchais, 1824._
Deane’s Recall—Beaumarchais’s Activity in Obtaining for Him
Honorable Escort—Letters to Congress—Reception of
Deane—Preoccupation of Congress at the Moment of His
Return—Arnold and Deane in Philadelphia the Summer of
1778—Deane’s Subsequent Conduct—Letters of Carmichaël and
Beaumarchais—Le Fier Roderigue—Silas Deane Returns to Settle
Accounts—Debate Over the “Lost Million”—True Story of the “Lost
Million”—Mr. Tucker’s Speech—Final Settlement of the Claim of the
Heirs of Beaumarchais.
In accounting for the recall of Deane, Wharton, in the beginning of his
Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 560, says:
“Deane had, or was supposed to have had, a considerable amount of
business patronage which to Arthur Lee’s eye gave too much opportunity
for speculation, and not only did he suppose that Deane made use of this
opportunity for his own benefit, but he himself desired to have the
entire control of the business side of the mission placed in the hands
of his brother William Lee, then, through the influence of Wilkes,
alderman of London. The close connection which existed between Lee in
Paris and the center of the opposition in London was not unknown to the
French Ministry.”
From the first, Vergennes had distrusted Lee, and held him at a
distance. “Having had occasion,” says Loménie (Vol. I, p. 115), “to
study closely the work of the deputation at Passy, I am able to affirm
that Lee never had any credit with the French Government, who, rightly
or wrongly, suspected him of having secret relations with the English
Cabinet.... It is this which perfectly explains his permanent irritation
against his two colleagues.”
Doniol (Vol. I, p. 368) affirms positively, “spies of the foreign office
were in communication with him and he aided them to arrive even to M. de
Vergennes.”
“In his heart,” continues Doniol, “he had an antipathy for France, which
was shared by the majority of his countrymen. He was willing to accept
everything from us, but on condition that no obligation be incurred.”
“It is certainly not too much to say,” says Jared Sparks in his _Life of
Franklin_ (Vol. I, p. 450), “that the divisions and feuds which reigned
for a long time in Congress with respect to the foreign affairs of the
United States are to be ascribed more to Lee’s malign influence than to
all others.”
It was the same that at the most perilous moment of the war, which was
precisely this same winter of 1778, was exerting itself to the utmost of
its power to place a creature of its own at the head of the American
forces. So bitter had party spirit become, that a member from New
England, whose patriotism was undisputed, had allowed himself to write
in a letter which has been preserved: “I would rather that the whole
cause should come to ruin, than that Mr. Washington should triumph.”
Lee succeeded so well in poisoning the minds of Congress with regard to
their commissioner that after much discussion a resolution was passed on
December 8, 1777, recalling Deane. The reason given being the importance
of obtaining information as to the true state of affairs in Europe.
“It was originally proposed,” says Parton (_Life of Franklin_, Vol. I,
p. 250), “to accompany the resolution of recall by a preamble of
censure. But John Jay took the defence of his absent friend and
succeeded in getting the offensive preamble condemning a servant of the
public unheard, stricken out.” “In this case,” continues Parton, “Jay
was warmly his friend and defender, and not on this occasion only, but
whenever he was attacked by Congress.”
Franklin also warmly pleaded his cause by letter. Knowing that Congress
had received unfavorably the foreign officers sent over by Deane, he
wrote as follows:
“I, who am on the spot, and who know the infinite difficulty of
resisting the powerful solicitations of great men, ... I hope that
favorable allowances will be made to my worthy colleague on account of
his situation at that time, as he long since has corrected the mistake
and daily proves himself to my certain knowledge an able, faithful,
active and extremely useful servant of the public.” (Parton, _Life of
Franklin_, Vol. II, p. 350.)
Franklin indeed might well plead for his friend in regard to the
commissioning of officers, since, as has been seen, it was he who was
responsible for the departure of du Coudray for America.
When the news of his recall reached Deane, he was filled with
consternation. It was easy for him to pierce the thin veil of the reason
given. The treatment which he already had received from Congress seemed
the guarantee of further trouble.
He at once communicated his fears to Beaumarchais and his resolution not
to return to America until a satisfactory explanation of the charges
held against him were given. Beaumarchais, however, warmly urged his
complying with the command of Congress, assuring him that his presence
and the positive proof of his integrity which he would bear with him
quickly would dispel the gathering storm.
Deane seems to have been convinced that the wisest course would be to
yield to authority; accordingly, he at once set about his preparations
for the journey. Beaumarchais, equally active, addressed a lengthy
memoir to the ministers.
The memoir is given in full in the Deane papers (Vol. II, p. 399). In
it, with characteristic boldness, he prescribes the rôle necessary for
each minister to play, in order that Deane’s enemies may be outwitted.
Though Beaumarchais was no longer entrusted with the millions which were
being handed over to the Americans, yet from the tone of his memoir
there can be no doubt that he was still an indulged favorite.
“March 13, 1778.
“Secret Memoir to the King’s Ministers, Sent to the Comte de
Vergennes:”
(After explaining clearly the character and ambitions of Lee, his
English connections, his influence in Congress, Beaumarchais
continued:) “To succeed in his design, it was necessary to
dispose of a colleague so formidable as Mr. Deane. This he has
done by rendering him in many respects an object of suspicion to
Congress.
“Having learned that foreign officers demanding commissions were
not received favorably by the American Army, he put the worst
construction upon the conduct of his colleague who sent them,
maintaining that Mr. Deane arbitrarily and in spite of good
advice, was responsible for the sending.... Another reason is the
officious zeal displayed by M. Lee in constantly writing to
Congress that all merchandise, etc., was a present.... Nothing
then is easier than for the adroit Lee to blacken the conduct of
Mr. Deane by representing it as the result of underhand measures
contrived to support demands for money in which he expected to
share; and this explains the silence, more than astonishing, that
Congress has observed in regard to over ten letters of mine full
of details.”
Then he draws a faithful picture of Deane’s situation and speaks of his
having at first formed the determination not to return until charges
should be communicated to him.
“I have, however, urged him to go back to face the storm. ‘Lee,’
I have said, ‘accuses you of having arbitrarily sent officers to
America; your complete defense is in my portfolio. I have in my
possession a cipher letter from this time-serving Lee, urging me
to send engineers and officers to the assistance of America, and
the letter is written before your arrival in France.’”
Then he urged the importance for French interests to have so true and
tried a friend as Mr. Deane back in America.
“I would desire,” he wrote, “a particular mark of distinction,
even the King’s portrait or some such noticeable present to
convince his countrymen that not only was he a creditable and
faithful agent, but that his personality, prudence and action
always have pleased the French Ministry.... I strongly recommend
his being escorted by a fleet.... Once justified before
Congress, his opinion becomes of immense weight and influence....
His enemies will remain dazed and humiliated at their own
failure.... Should the ministry be unable to grant a fleet as he
wishes, he ought at least to have a royal frigate to be furnished
by M. de Sartine. His friend Beaumarchais will with pleasure
undertake the composition of an explanatory and defensive memoir.
He should have a testimonial, laudatory of his conduct, and this
important writing is the province of the Comte de Vergennes.
Finally I believe that there should be accorded to him some
special favor, showing the esteem entertained for him personally
and this would properly come from M. le Comte de Maurepas in the
name of the king. (This seems to have been the only suggestion
not carried out by the ministers.)
“There is not a moment to lose....”
Beaumarchais then recommended that everyone assume a dejected air at the
news of Deane’s recall, so that the enemies of the latter might be
thrown off their guard. “If it is thought advisable, I will even quit
Paris as one driven to despair. My lawsuit at Aix will furnish an
excellent excuse. I suggest in addition that a reliable person accompany
Mr. Deane, to return in the same frigate under order to await his
convenience, bringing back the result of M. Deane’s labors with
Congress....
“Upon the assurance that these considerations be regarded as just, I
will neglect everything else until I have completely vindicated Mr.
Deane.”
If anything could be more curious than the tone of the above memoir, it
is the docility with which each minister filled the rôle mapped out for
him. Not only was the portrait of the King with the personal
testimonials given to Deane, but a fleet was sent out under the popular
Comte d’Estaing to bear him safely to America, and with him the first
minister sent by France to the new world went as his companion, charged
with orders to follow closely his interests in the ensuing combat.
To the president of Congress he bore the following letter from the Comte
de Vergennes:
“Versailles, March 25, 1778.
“Monsieur Deane being about to return to America, I seize this
occasion with pleasure to give my testimony to the zeal, activity
and intelligence with which he has conducted the interests of the
United States and for which it has pleased his Majesty to give
marks of his satisfaction.”
To Deane himself Vergennes wrote the same day:
“March 26, 1778.
“As I am not, Sir, to have the honor of seeing you again before
your departure I pray you to receive here my wishes that your
voyage may be speedy, short, and happy, and that you may find in
your own country the same sentiments which you inspired in
France. You could not, sir, desire anything to be added to that
which I feel for you and which I shall keep as long as I live.
The King, in order to give a personal proof of the satisfaction
which he has had in your conduct, charged me to communicate it to
the Congress of the United States. This is the object of the
letter which Mr. Gérard will give you for Mr. Hancock. He will
also give you a box ornamented with a portrait of the king. You
will not refuse to carry into your country the image of its best
friend.”
On the 23rd of March, Beaumarchais had written to Congress in a letter
in which he set forth the proofs in his possession of the innocence of
Deane.
“These, gentlemen,” he wrote, “were the real motives that
determined us both in sending you the officers. As I have never
treated with any other, as my firm never has transacted business
with any other in France, and as the other commissioners have
been lacking even in common civility towards me, I testify that
if my zeal, my advances of money, and my shipments of supplies
and merchandise have been acceptable to the august Congress,
their gratitude is due to the indefatigable exertions of Mr.
Deane throughout this commercial affair.
“I hope that the honorable Congress, rejecting the insinuations
of others, who are desirous of appropriating for themselves the
credit of the operations, will accept in perfect faith the
present declaration of the man most capable of enlightening them
and who respectfully signs himself and his firm, gentlemen,
yours, etc.
“Caron de Beaumarchais,
“Secretary to the King and Lieutenant-General of the King’s
Hunt, known in America under the title of his firm, Roderigue
Hortalès et Cie.”
Before quitting France, Silas Deane addressed a letter to Beaumarchais,
dated March 29, 1778. Obliged to quit France during the absence of his
friend, he wrote thanking him for his letter to Congress, which he hoped
would throw light upon the vexed question. “It is unhappy,” he said,
“that the short time allowed me to prepare for my voyage will not
admit of our making at least a general settlement of our
accounts.... I hope to return to France early in the fall;
immediately after my return it shall be my first business to
adjust and settle with you the account for your several
expeditions and disbursements.... After the perplexing and
embarrassing scenes you have had to pass through, it must give
you the most solid joy to see an armament going out which will
convince America and the world of the sincere friendship of
France, and their resolution to protect its liberties and its
independence.
“I again congratulate you on this great and glorious event, to
which you have contributed more than any other person....
“I shall improve my first opportunity of writing to you, and rely
on being honored with a continuance of your correspondence and
friendship. Wishing that you ever may be happy and fortunate, I
am, etc.,
“Silas Deane.”
The misgivings which had haunted the American commissioner seemed
entirely to disappear during his voyage, so confident was he of being
able to justify himself before Congress, and if ever commissioner had
the right to look forward with joy to setting foot again on his native
land, that commissioner was Deane. When he had gone out two years
previously he had left his country poor, unrecognized and not yet
decided to declare its independence. By his unhesitating and
indefatigable zeal, aided by that of Beaumarchais, supplies and officers
of priceless value had been sent to its aid, arriving at the moment when
they were most needed.
Mistakes had been made, it is true, but those mistakes were all of a
nature that no man of honor need blush to acknowledge. Far from having
enriched himself during those two years of service, he had spent not
only all his own private savings, but had been obliged to draw very
heavily upon the generosity of his friend, since all the stores brought
with him from America had fallen into the hands of the English. In the
words of Parton, “He was returning now the acknowledged minister of a
victorious nation, the honored guest of a French Admiral, bringing back
a powerful fleet (twelve line of battleships and four frigates) to aid
his country, and accompanied by an ambassador of the King of France!
Well might he write exultingly to the president of Congress, well might
he expect a warm welcome and a hasty adjustment of his claims; as the
proud French vessel was dropping anchor in Delaware Bay, July 10, 1778,
he wrote: ‘I shall embark this afternoon ... and I hope soon to have the
honor of presenting my respects to your Excellency and the Honorable
Congress in person....’
No reply came to him from Congress. No one paid him the smallest
attention. His testimonials were ignored and even the presence of the
French fleet had no power to rouse Congress from a stony indifference.
He was in despair.
“He had brought with him,” said Parton, “only a hundred pounds, not
expecting to be detained in America many weeks. When at last given
audience, he told his story to distrustful and estranged employers. All
the friends of Arthur Lee, all the ancient foes of France, and a large
proportion of the faction who desired to put Horatio Gates into the
place of Washington, were disposed to believe the foul calumnies sent
over by every ship from Paris.”
As a matter of fact the time of his arrival in Philadelphia was not well
suited to a fair consideration of Deane’s claims. The city recently had
been evacuated by the British Army. During the occupation, Toryism had
been rampant and the state was retaliating with indictments for treason.
Disputes over questions of jurisdiction engaged the civil authorities in
quarrels with Arnold, the commander of the garrison, who numbered among
his sympathizers Silas Deane and the mercantile class.
Arnold, after his brilliant exploits at Saratoga, had seen himself
thrust aside at the moment of victory to make way for Gates. Wounded at
Saratoga, and burning for revenge, Arnold was already so much disgusted
with the Continental Congress that he began seriously to wish to see
Great Britain triumph.
Washington had put him in command of the garrison at Philadelphia in
June, 1778. The reigning belle of the Quaker City was at that moment
Miss Margaret Shippen, “the most beautiful and fascinating woman in
America.” She was the daughter of a wealthy merchant, who along with his
whole class, was eager for the war to come to an end through a speedy
adjustment with Great Britain, whose liberal offers, since the surrender
of Burgoyne, seemed more than satisfactory to their moderate patriotism.
No sooner had Arnold entered into his new post than he fell a captive to
the charms of the young woman in question, then under twenty years of
age.
“As no one kept a finer stable of horses, nor gave more costly dinners
than Arnold,” it was natural that he should invite the Tory friends of
the young lady whose hand he hoped to win. Although he was “thirty-five
years of age and a widower with two sons” ... his handsome face, his
gallant bearing and his splendid career, made him acceptable. In the
fall their engagement was publicly announced, while the Tory sentiments
of the commander of the fort of Philadelphia became definitely fixed.
The bitterness of his own grievances against Congress led him to give
ear willingly to the complaints poured out by the exasperated French
commissioner, whose patriotism was also rapidly vanishing in the gulf of
his private wrongs.
It was during this summer of association between Arnold and Deane that
the sentiments of the latter underwent the profound change which induced
a subsequent conduct so disappointing to his dearest friends. Silas
Deane never has been accused of treason to his country, for he was
incapable of such an act as that which rendered Arnold an object of
contempt to our enemies even—but that he was untrue to his own past
cannot be denied. No one in the beginning had been a warmer advocate of
independence or had worked so indefatigably for an alliance with France.
In the end, this was completely reversed. The unfortunate course which
he took to avenge himself for the atrocious wrongs heaped upon him by
the party in Congress then in power led him to exile, where he died
destitute and dishonored. However, “the most bitter reproach,” says
Wharton, “ever heaped upon this loyal patriot was that he had joined
hands in friendship with the traitor Arnold.”
While the condemnation of Lee at the bar of history seems unanimous, it
is unfair to allow the blame of his conduct to rest wholly upon him, for
it must be shared by that party in Congress which was dominant during
most of the existence of the body, and which supported the pretensions
of Lee and shared his antagonisms.
A consideration of the complex causes which led to the ruin of Deane is
in place here, only as these causes relate to his connection with
Beaumarchais. Up to a certain point the credit of the two men is
inseparable, and it must not be forgotten that the same party which
planned Deane’s downfall was also the one that tried to prevent the
alliance with France, and was unwilling to admit any debt of gratitude
to Roderigue Hortalès et Cie.
Gérard de Rayneval, first ambassador of France to America, who
accompanied Deane on the occasion of his recall, attributes the action
of Congress at this time to an “_esprit d’ostracisme_, which,” he says,
“already has begun to make itself felt against those men who, having
rendered important services, are no longer deemed necessary....”
The private secretary of Deane while in France, W. Carmichaël, had
returned to America some time before. Having aided Beaumarchais and
Deane in the shipment of supplies to the new world, there was no one who
understood better the exact nature of the difficulties against which
they had labored, or the real debt of gratitude owed them by America.
Under date of September 3, 1778, he wrote to Beaumarchais from
Philadelphia:
“I have written you twice lately about your affairs, so that I
have the pleasure of repeating that Congress begins to feel its
lack of attention to you and to realize that it was too ready to
believe the base insinuations of others, which I truly believe
would have had no weight if du Coudray had not circulated such
prejudicial reports concerning you.... I have applied myself with
my whole power to convince my compatriots of the injustice and
ingratitude with which you have been treated and this before the
arrival of Deane, and I flatter myself to have had some success.
His efforts have been the same, so that justice, although tardy,
should now prevail. I wish for the honor of my compatriots that
it had never been necessary for us to plead for you.
“M. de Francy is in Virginia and works sincerely and
indefatigably for your interests. I expect him here soon.
“Your nephew spent several weeks with me, but is now commanded
with his general to join the army under the orders of General
Sullivan. He is a brave young man who makes himself loved very
much when he is known; he has all the vivacity of his age and
desires to distinguish himself. General Conway assures me that he
conducted himself like a young hero at the battle of the
Brandywine. I take the liberty of entering into these details
because I know they will delight his mother, since bravery always
has been a powerful recommendation to the fair sex, and she will
be charmed to find so much in her own son.... I do not know
whether I shall be continued in my place as Secretary of the
Embassy at your court, or be employed in some other department.
“Dr. Franklin certainly will be continued at the Court of
Versailles, and an attempt will be made to force the Lees to fall
back into the obscurity from which they have lifted themselves,
but whether this will succeed is doubtful. We have as many
intrigues and cabals here as you and your friends suffer from on
the other continent. And why not? Are we not sovereign states and
are we not friends and allies of Louis XVI?
“I beg you to believe me always, Yours,
“W. Carmichaël.”
The spirit of the letter, as well as the news it brought, must have been
consoling to the heart of Beaumarchais. But in the meantime, he had been
pushing forward his vast commercial enterprises and with his usual vigor
prepared himself for new dangers to which the open alliance with France
exposed his undertaking. He wrote to De Francy:
“I am dispatching the _Zephyr_, so that you may know that I am
ready to put to sea a fleet of more than twelve vessels at whose
head is _le Fier Roderigue_, which you sent back to me and which
arrived safely the first of October. This fleet will carry six
thousand tons, and it is armed absolutely for war. So arrange
yourself in consequence. If my ship, the _Ferragus_, leaves
Rochefort in September, keep it there to join my fleet in
returning. This is an armament which I hold in common with M. de
Montieu.... Allow the ships to remain in port no longer than is
absolutely necessary, for although strong and well armed, our
enemies must not be allowed to interfere with their return.
“They will not arrive until some time in February, as they are to
make a detour to provision our colonies with flour and salt
provisions, of which they are in great need, and the payment of
which, sent to us in bills of exchange upon our treasurers before
the return of the fleet, will enable us to meet the terrible
outlay which this armament costs us.... You will receive by the
_Fier Roderigue_ all my accounts with Congress.... The result is
that Congress will pay for nothing which it does not receive, or
that was destroyed en route. I join the exact account of what I
have received from Congress, in spite of the unjust deputation at
Passy who have disputed every return cargo and who would have
seized upon that of _La Thérèse_ if M. Pelletier, instructed by
me, had not sold it by authority. This perpetual injustice makes
me indignant and has made me take the resolution to have no more
to do with the deputation as long as that rogue Lee is there....
“I have been promised, my dear Francy, your commission of
captain. I hope to be happy enough to send it by _le Fier
Roderigue_, but do not count upon it until you see it in your
hands. You know our country; it is so vast that it is a long way
from the place where things are promised to the place where they
are given. In a word, I have not received it yet, although it has
been promised....
“I have received no other money from the comte de Pulaski than
that which he himself gave me. I send you his exact account. He
should write me but I have heard nothing. I approve of what you
have done for M. de Lafayette. Brave young man that he is. It is
to serve me as I desire, to oblige a man of his character. I have
not yet been paid for the money I advanced to him but I have no
uneasiness about that.
“As for you my dear de Francy, I will write you later what I will
do for you. If you know me, you will expect to be well treated.
Your fate is hence forth attached to mine. I esteem you and love
you and you will not have long to wait for the proof of it.
Remember me often to Baron von Steuben. I congratulate myself
after all I hear of him, for having given so great an officer to
my friends the _free men_, and for having in a way forced him to
follow that noble career. I am not in the least disturbed by the
money I lent him. Never have I made a use of funds the investment
of which gratified me as much as this does, since I have
succeeded in putting a man of honor in his true place. I learn
that he is inspector-general of all the troops; bravo! Tell him
that his glory is the interest on my money and at that title I
have no doubt he will repay me with usury.
“I have received a letter from M. Deane and also one from Mr.
Carmichaël; assure them of my warm esteem. Those two are brave
republicans. They have given me the hope that I may soon embrace
them both in Paris, which will not, however, prevent me from
writing them by the _Fier Roderigue_, who is very proud to find
himself at the head of a small squadron, and who I hope will _ne
se laissera pas couper les moustaches_, on the contrary he
promises to do some cutting for me,
“Adieu, my Francy, I am yours for life,
“Caron de Beaumarchais.”
Silas Deane returned to France in 1781, to settle all his accounts. On
the 6th of April of that year the indebtedness to Beaumarchais by
Congress was fixed by him at 3,600,000 _livres_ after the deduction of
all receipts and comprising the interest promised. This sum, then,
Beaumarchais demanded of Congress.
[Illustration: CÆSAR AUGUSTUS RODNEY
_Attorney General of the U. S._]
Two years passed. Congress paid no attention to the demand. In 1783,
another emissary, Mr. Barclay, arrived from America in the capacity of
consul-general, and with the mission to revise all the accounts rendered
by Silas Deane. Beaumarchais refused to submit to this treatment, but
Mr. Barclay told him Congress would pay nothing until there had been a
new inspection of the accounts. After a year Beaumarchais was forced to
submit.
In revising the statement made by Deane, Mr. Barclay admitted all the
claims, but gratified Congress by lessening commissions, expenses, etc.
Still Congress refused to pay the new and reduced accounts. Soon after
this, an incident arose which determined Congress to postpone payment
indefinitely.
In the fall of 1783, after signing the treaty which ended the war, the
United States wished to borrow six millions from the French Government.
It was decided to grant the request and at the same time to make an
exact recapitulation of all the sums already furnished, whether loaned
or presented.
In the first class were announced eighteen millions; then another loan
of ten millions from Holland, guaranteed by the king of France and of
which he paid the interest; finally the six millions about to be loaned.
This constituted a sum of thirty-four millions which the United States
promised to refund at future times. Finally the King announced as a
gift, the three millions conveyed to the colonists before her treaty of
Alliance in 1778, and six millions given in 1781. It was therefore nine
millions which the king of France relinquished without expecting any
return, and this in addition to the enormous expenditure made in sending
the fleets and armies of France to America. (See _Loménie_ Vol II, p.
186.)
The statement was signed by Franklin and received without comment by
the United States, but three years later, in 1786, Franklin made the
discovery that the king of France stated that three millions had been
given to the cause of independence in America before 1778, whereas he,
Franklin, had received but two millions.
What had become of the other million?
Inquiry was at once made of the United States banker in France, and an
explanation demanded. After much difficulty it was learned that this
million was one delivered by the royal treasurer on the 10th of June,
1776.
“It was,” says M. de Loménie, “precisely the million given to
Beaumarchais, but the reticence of Vergennes showed that an embarrassing
mistake had been made, though unconsciously, by the royal treasurer.”
It was impossible in 1786 for the French government to avow the secret
aid she had given to the colonies before her open recognition of
American Independence. The two millions given to Franklin in 1777
through the banker, Grand, after France had decided upon the policy of
open recognition, but before the act, had never been a secret—but the
million given to Beaumarchais, while really intended to help the
American cause, had been conveyed to him under stress of secrecy at a
time when it was unsafe to submit to writing even the most informal
engagement in regard to it.
Whatever the stipulations made concerning the use of the money, they
were verbal and have never been revealed. Nothing could attest the
profound confidence inspired in the magistracy by Beaumarchais more than
this absence of documents relative to the loan. There can be no doubt
that whatever the arrangement made by Vergennes, he was satisfied with
the account rendered him by Beaumarchais, for we find him coming
repeatedly to the latter’s aid when the failure of Congress to return
cargoes, placed the house of Hortalès and Company in danger of
bankruptcy. The confidence of the minister is also further attested by
his refusal to deliver the receipt for the million, signed by
Beaumarchais, on the 10th of June, 1776, and so become a handle to the
calumny which Congress was directing against him.
To summarize the exposition of that conscientious historian, Loménie:
“Why,” he asks, “did the government insert this million in the list of
those given directly to America? Was it simply a recapitulation of the
accounts of the treasury made without thought of the inconvenience that
might result for Beaumarchais; or did the government really intend
Beaumarchais to render an account of it to the United States?... We have
the right to affirm that the government never intended that he should be
accountable for it to anyone but to the minister.
“By refusing constantly to name the person to whom the million had been
given, the minister said implicitly; ‘I class this million with those
given gratuitously because in effect it was given; but since it was not
given to you, and as the man to whom it was given, engaged himself by
his receipt to render an account of it to me, and not to you, that man
cannot be accountable except to me. If I asked to have the million
returned, you would then have the right to demand it of him who received
it; but since I ask nothing, I am the one to decide whether that
million, gratuitously given by me, shall profit you or the man to whom I
gave it. It was given to aid in a secret operation very useful to you,
but which, by your refusal to acquit and by losses which he has
experienced in his commerce with you, seems to have been more harmful
than fruitful to him.’” (See _Loménie_, Vol. II, p. 190.)
Of all this that was transpiring Beaumarchais knew nothing, nor could he
obtain from Congress any explanation of their reason for totally
ignoring their debt to him. At last his patience at an end, on the 12th
of June, 1787, he wrote to the President of Congress as follows:
“A people become sovereign and powerful may be permitted,
perhaps, to consider gratitude as a virtue of individuals which
is beneath politics; but nothing can dispense a state from being
just, and especially from paying its debts. I dare hope,
Monsieur, that touched by the importance of the affair and by the
force of my reasons, you will be good enough to honor me with an
official report as to the decision of the honorable Congress
either to arrange promptly to liquify my accounts, or else to
choose arbiters in Europe to decide the points debated, those of
insurance and commission as M. Barclay had the honor of proposing
to you in 1785; or else write me candidly that the sovereign
states of America, forgetting my past services, refuse me all
justice: thus I shall adopt the method best suited to my
interests which you have despised, to my honor which you have
wounded, although without losing the profound respect with which
I am of the General Congress and of you, Monsieur le President,
the very humble, etc.
“Caron de Beaumarchais.”
It was at this juncture that Beaumarchais, stung by the reproaches of
his own countrymen, made a ringing vindication of his acts in the cause
of American independence, which will be given in the next chapter.
The reply which Congress made to the letter above quoted, was to appoint
Arthur Lee to examine the accounts.
“The work was soon done,” says Loménie, “_d’un tour de main_. Arthur Lee
pretended to discover that instead of 3,600,000 livres owing
Beaumarchais, he not only had nothing to reclaim but on the other hand
owed 1,800,000 francs to the United States!” The absurdity of this
account could not fail to appear to Congress, and after four years more
of protestations, in 1793 it confided a new examination of the debt to
“that most distinguished American Statesman, Alexander Hamilton,” who
established the sum owing Beaumarchais as 2,280,000 francs, but at the
same time he proposed to suspend payment until the question of the lost
million was settled.
In the meantime the Revolution was advancing upon France with awful
strides. Already the royalistic government had fallen, that government
whose greatest glory was its noble service to the cause of American
independence.
When in 1794 Gouverneur Morris applied to Buchot, then minister of
Foreign affairs for the new French government, there was no one left who
knew or cared for the details that had prevented Vergennes from
producing that famous receipt. At the demand of Congress, therefore, it
was given to Morris.
Armed now with what it chose to consider as proof that Beaumarchais
wilfully had appropriated to himself a million livres intended by the
French Government for it, Congress refused all settlement.
They not only repudiated the payment of the 2,600,000 livres surplus of
the debt honorably acknowledged by Deane, who alone knew the immense
advances that had been made by Beaumarchais to cover the expenses of the
commissioner as well as of the officers whom he had commissioned, but
that august body considered that it might even dispense with paying the
1,800,000 livres surplus over and above the million, out of the sum
accorded by Alexander Hamilton in which he ignored those advances,
together with a part of the commission and interest freely granted by
Congress in the contract already quoted in this volume, and arranged by
the agent of Beaumarchais, Theveneau de Francy, in 1778.
Congress refused all this, arguing that, as M. de Loménie says: “Since
the interest of the million given in 1776 will absorb the difference,
therefore we owe nothing, and will pay nothing.”
The interest on the surplus, as it would have much more than absorbed
the million in question, they, of course, conveniently ignored.
This turn in his affairs with Congress was a crushing blow to
Beaumarchais, but it did not prevent him, during the entire remainder of
his life, pleading with the representatives of the American people to
pay their debt to him.
But at the moment when Congress held triumphantly aloft the receipt for
the 1,000,000 livres, and flaunted it in his face, Beaumarchais was in
no position to defend himself, for the Revolution which had overwhelmed
France had so shattered and ruined his fortune that he was obliged to
take refuge in a garret in Hamburg. Here, devoured by anguish,—unable to
obtain news from home, knowing only that his goods had been confiscated,
that his wife, his daughter, and his sisters had been thrown into
prison, his thoughts turned to the people for whom he had performed such
herculean labors and to them he addressed one last appeal. This was in
April, 1795.
“Congress,” says Loménie, “remained deaf to all his reclamations; not
only it allowed him to die without liquidating the debt, but during the
thirty-six years following his death, all the governments which
succeeded one another in France, and all the ambassadors of those
governments, vainly supported the demand of the heirs of Beaumarchais.”
During the years which follow his death, from 1799 to 1835, “The claims
of the heirs of Beaumarchais” occupy congress after congress of the
United States. In the progress of the suit all the French governments,
from the Empire under Napoleon down to the reign of the “bourgeois
King,” Louis Phillippe, always take the stand of Vergennes. The
following letter from the Duc de Richelieu, dated the 20th of May, 1816,
may be said to express the attitude of the French Government in the
whole matter. He wrote:
“The notes successively presented by the ministers of France are
so particular and positive, that they seem to remove all doubt on
the facts of the subject in dispute, and consequently all
hesitation as to the decision to be given. It was in fact stated
that the French Government had no concern in the commercial
transactions of M. de Beaumarchais with the United States.
“By this declaration it was not only intended to convey the idea
that the government was in no ways interested in the operations
or in his chances of loss or gain, but a positive assurance was
also given that it was wholly unconnected with them; whence it
results that in relation to them France is to be considered
neither as a lender, a surety nor as an intermediate agent. The
whole of these transactions were spontaneous on the part of M. de
Beaumarchais and the right and agency derived from them appertain
exclusively to him....
“The million delivered on the 10th of June immediately reached
its intended destination and a simple authorization of the King,
but a few months subsequent to the payment of the sum, was the
only document which finally placed the expenditure in the regular
train of fiscal settlement.
“I am therefore warranted, Sir, after a fresh examination of the
facts, in presenting the declaration of the above as stated, and
in considering it a matter of certainty that the million paid on
the 10th of June was not applied to the purchase of shipments
made to the United States at that period by M. de
Beaumarchais....
“There is no member of the Government who can be ignorant of the
services rendered by the head of that family to your cause and
the influence produced on its early successes by his ardent zeal,
extensive connections and liberal employment of his whole
fortune.
“Be pleased, Sir, to receive, etc., etc.
Signed “Richelieu.”
This claim, so repeatedly stated before Congress, was taken up and
examined by a succession of committees which seem each to have adopted
the views of the French Government. To the honor of the United States
let it be stated that such men as John Jay and Thomas Jefferson, had
from the first recognized the debt due to Beaumarchais and had urged the
payment of the debt. Later it was James Madison, Cæsar Rodney, William
Pinkney and others, who similarly urged Congress to appropriate the
money to liquidate the claim.
To close this long debate we have selected a few paragraphs taken here
and there from reports of committees, terminating with an extract from a
speech delivered by Mr. Tucker of Virginia, in order to demonstrate
clearly that the enlightened opinion of the most representative
Americans always has stood for the recognition of this claim.... “Only
two points,” the report says, “are to be decided: Did Mr. Beaumarchais
receive from the French Government 1,000,000 livres in behalf of or on
account of the United States? If so, has he, or his representative at
any time accounted with the United States for their expenditure?... On
the face of the instrument itself it appears that Beaumarchais was to
account to Vergennes and not to the United States, for the expenditure
of the money.... This contradicts the idea that he was accountable to us
for its application.... The engagement of Beaumarchais was positive,
express and unqualified to account to Vergennes and to him only for the
money received. The United States are no parties to the instrument;
there is no stipulation to render them any account of the
expenditure.... It is not easy to conceive on what principle he ought
twice to account for the same money.... The French government have
uniformly declared that they furnished no supply of arms or military
stores. Vergennes is full and explicit; he states that all the articles
furnished by Beaumarchais are on his private account, who had settled
with the artillery department for them by giving orders or bills for
their value. This expressly excludes the idea that the million livres in
question were intended to be applied to the payment in advance of the
account of Beaumarchais.... This construction was acquiesced in by our
government in the contract of 1783, when we knew neither the date nor
the person to whom the money was paid....
“ ... The United States allege that the French Government paid this debt
for them. The Government through their ministers declare officially that
they did not. There seems therefore no room for dispute. Considering
that the sum of which the million livres in question made a part, was a
gratuitous grant from the French Government to the United States, and
considering that the declaration of that Government clearly states that
that part of the grant was put into the hands of M. de Beaumarchais as
its agent, not as the agent of the United States, and that it was duly
accounted for by him, to the French Government; considering also the
concurring opinion of two attorneys-general of the United States that
the said debt was not legally sustainable in behalf of the United
States; I recommend the case to the favorable attention of the
legislature whose authority alone can finally decide on it. Signed
“James Madison,
“C. A. Rodney,
“Wm. Pinkney.
“January 31, 1817.”
From the speech of Mr. Tucker of Virginia, 1824:
“Mr. Chairman: It is well known to most of the assembly that in the
first years of the Revolution, M. de Beaumarchais furnished military
supplies and clothing to the amount of several million livres....
“The merits of this claim have hitherto hinged upon the fact whether the
million in question was received by Beaumarchais for the purpose of
supplies or not; ...
“In regard to this there is the solemn declaration of M. de Vergennes
that the king had furnished nothing. Again there can be no doubt that M.
de Beaumarchais must have been held accountable to his government for
the million, for whatever purpose it was put into his hands.... If it
was intended for such services as those for which secret service money
is employed, it is said, and it seems not improbable, that the vouchers
in such cases are destroyed.... But there could be no reason to destroy
them if they related merely to the purchase of supplies....
“On weighing all the considerations there is some preponderance of
testimony that M. de Beaumarchais received the million in dispute for
the purpose of supplies, and if France had been passive on this occasion
or if we had paid any valuable consideration to her for this million I
should think that we were justified in charging M. de Beaumarchais with
that amount. But when it is recollected that we received these supplies
directly from him, having arranged the settlement of the account on our
own terms; that the million that we claim as a credit was paid not by
us, but by France, and that, as an act of bounty; and when France
insists that it was for another purpose; ... it seems to me that we
cannot, consistently with our honor or self respect, pay off an
undisputed debt with a doubtful or disputed gift....
“As an individual, I could never seek to give the bounty of a benefactor
a direction which he objected to, for the purpose of making a discount
from the acknowledged debt of a third person.
“Sirs:—in this matter France is right or she is wrong.... Then the error
consists in claiming our gratitude for 9,000,000 livres instead of
8,000,000 ... which can in no way affect the claim of M. de
Beaumarchais.... The whole present difficulty comes from the mistake of
Dr. Franklin in the treaty of 1783....
“Assuredly if our agent had signed a treaty under a mistake as he
himself states, that mistake should be rectified with the French
Government which should give us a satisfactory explanation or hold us
bound in gratitude for only 8,000,000 livres, neither of which can
affect the claims of M. de Beaumarchais....
“Mr. Chairman: We ought to be consistent with ourselves with regard to
the declaration of the French Government. When M. de Vergennes declared
to our commissioners in September 1778, that the military supplies were
furnished by M. de Beaumarchais, we acquiesced in that assurance and
required no further proof....
“On every ground then, Mr. Chairman, I am free to say, I would vote at
once for the appropriation to the whole amount of this claim ... and I
hope the committee will adopt the resolution for that purpose offered by
the Committee.”
But the government of the United States still refused to listen to
reason. However, in 1835, under pressure of necessity, the United States
having a claim against France which it wished to bring forward, offered
the heirs of Beaumarchais the choice of taking 800,000 francs and
considering the affair closed, or nothing. The heirs chose the former
and so at last ended the long drawn out debate regarding “the lost
million.”