After Celsus has finished speaking of the bees, in order to depreciate
(as far as he can) the cities, and constitutions, and governments, and
sovereignties not only of us Christians, but of all mankind, as well as
the wars which men undertake on behalf of their native countries, he
proceeds, by way of digression, to pass a eulogy upon the ants, in order
that, while praising them, he may compare the measures which men take to
secure their subsistence with those adopted by these insects,[790] and
so evince his contempt for the forethought which makes provision for
winter, as being nothing higher than the irrational providence of the
ants, as he regards it. Now might not some of the more simple-minded,
and such as know not how to look into the nature of all things, be
turned away (so far, at least, as Celsus could accomplish it) from
helping those who are weighed down with the burdens [of life], and from
sharing their toils, when he says of the ants, that “they help one
another with their loads, when they see one of their number toiling
under them?” For he who needs to be disciplined by the word, but who
does not at all understand[791] its voice, will say: “Since, then, there
is no difference between us and the ants, even when we help those who
are weary with bearing their heavy burdens, why should we continue to do
so to no purpose?” And would not the ants, as being irrational
creatures, be greatly puffed up, and think highly of themselves, because
their works were compared to those of men? while men, on the other hand,
who by means of their reason are enabled to hear how their
philanthropy[792] towards others is contemned, would be injured, so far
as could be effected by Celsus and his arguments: for he does not
perceive that, while he wishes to turn away from Christianity those who
read his treatise, he turns away also the sympathy of those who are not
Christians from those who bear the heaviest burdens [of life]. Whereas,
had he been a philosopher, who was capable of perceiving the good which
men may do each other, he ought, in addition to not removing along with
Christianity the blessings which are found amongst men, to have lent his
aid to co-operate (if he had it in his power) with those principles of
excellence which are common to Christianity and the rest of mankind.
Moreover, even if the ants set apart in a place by themselves those
grains which sprout forth, that they may not swell into bud, but may
continue throughout the year as their food, this is not to be deemed as
evidence of the existence of _reason_ among ants, but as the work of the
universal mother, Nature, which adorned even irrational animals, so that
even the most insignificant is not omitted, but bears traces of the
reason implanted in it by nature. Unless, indeed, by these assertions
Celsus means obscurely to intimate (for in many instances he would like
to adopt Platonic ideas) that all souls are of the same species, and
that there is no difference between that of a man and those of ants and
bees, which is the act of one who would bring down the soul from the
vault of heaven, and cause it to enter not only a human body, but that
of an animal. Christians, however, will not yield their assent to such
opinions: for they have been instructed before now that the human soul
was created in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for
a nature fashioned in the divine image to have its [original] features
altogether obliterated, and to assume others, formed after I know not
what likeness of irrational animals.
Footnote 790:
παραβάλῃ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς μύρμηκας. “Verba: τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς
μύρμηκας addititia videntur et recidenda.”—RUÆUS.
Footnote 791:
ἐπαΐων.
Footnote 792:
τὸ κοινωνικόν.