Chapter LXXXI.

Our noble opponent, however, not observing how many philosophers there

are who admit the existence of Providence, and who hold that Providence

created all things for the sake of rational beings, overturns as far as

he can those doctrines which are of use in showing the harmony that

prevails in these matters between Christianity and philosophy; nor does

he see how great is the injury done to religion from accepting the

statement that before God there is no difference between a man and an

ant or a bee, but proceeds to add, that “if men appear to be superior to

irrational animals on this account, that they have built cities, and

make use of a political constitution, and forms of government, and

sovereignties,[788] this is to say nothing to the purpose, for ants and

bees do the same. Bees, indeed, have a sovereign, who has followers and

attendants; and there occur among them wars and victories, and

slaughterings of the vanquished,[789] and cities and suburbs, and a

succession of labours, and judgments passed upon the idle and the

wicked; for the drones are driven away and punished.” Now here he did

not observe the difference that exists between what is done after reason

and consideration, and what is the result of an irrational nature, and

is purely mechanical. For the origin of these things is not explained by

the existence of any rational principle in those who make them, because

they do not possess any such principle; but the most ancient Being, who

is also the Son of God, and the King of all things that exist, has

created an irrational nature, which, as being irrational, acts as a help

to those who are deemed worthy of reason. Cities, accordingly, were

established among men, with many arts and well-arranged laws; while

constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties among men are either

such as are properly so termed, and which exemplify certain virtuous

tendencies and workings, or they are those which are improperly so

called, and which were devised, so far as could be done, in imitation of

the former: for it was by contemplating these that the most successful

legislators established the best constitutions, and governments, and

sovereignties. None of these things, however, can be found among

irrational animals, although Celsus may transfer rational names, and

arrangements which belong to rational beings, as cities and

constitutions, and rulers and sovereignties, even to ants and bees; in

respect to which matters, however, ants and bees merit no approval,

because they do not act from reflection. But we ought to admire the

divine nature, which extended even to irrational animals the capacity,

as it were, of imitating rational beings, perhaps with a view of putting

rational beings to shame; so that by looking upon ants, for instance,

they might become more industrious and more thrifty in the management of

their goods; while, by considering the bees, they might place themselves

in subjection to their Ruler, and take their respective parts in those

constitutional duties which are of use in ensuring the safety of cities.

Footnote 788:

ἡγεμονίαις.

Footnote 789:

τῶν ἡττημένων αἱρέσεις. “Nota αἱρέσεις hoc loco sumi pro

internecionibus, cædibus. Haud scio an alibi reperiatur pari

significatu. Forte etiam scribendum καθαιρέσεις.”—RUÆUS.

The writings of Origen, Vol. 2 (of 2) · 第 81 / 104 章