I do not understand how Celsus should deem it of advantage, in writing a
treatise against us, to adopt an opinion which requires at least much
plausible reasoning to make it appear, as far as he can do so, that “the
course of mortal things is the same from beginning to end, and that the
same things must always, according to the appointed cycles, recur in the
past, present, and future.” Now, if this be true, our free-will is
annihilated.[749] For if, in the revolution of mortal things, the same
events must perpetually occur in the past, present, and future,
according to the appointed cycles, it is clear that, of necessity,
Socrates will always be a philosopher, and be condemned for introducing
strange gods and for corrupting the youth. And Anytus and Melitus must
always be his accusers, and the council of the Areopagus must ever
condemn him to death by hemlock. And in the same way, according to the
appointed cycles, Phalaris must always play the tyrant, and Alexander of
Pheræ commit the same acts of cruelty, and those condemned to the
[torture of the brazen] bull of Phalaris continually pour forth their
wailings from it. But if these things be granted, I do not see how our
free-will can be preserved, or how praise or blame can be administered
with propriety. We may say further to Celsus, in answer to such a view,
that “if the course of mortal things be always the same from beginning
to end, and if, according to the appointed cycles, the same events must
always occur in the past, present, and future,” then, according to the
appointed cycles, Moses must again come forth from Egypt with the Jewish
people, and Jesus again come to dwell in human life, and perform the
same actions which, [according to this view], he has done not once, but
countless times, as the periods have revolved. Nay, Christians too will
be the same in the appointed cycles; and Celsus will again write this
treatise of his, which he has done innumerable times before!
Footnote 749:
τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀνῄρηται.