SOME CRITICISMS ANSWERED
Professor Adams ends the first chapter of his delightfully witty
“Herbartian Psychology” with a challenge to all educational thinkers to
come out of their caves and defend their idols. Throughout the book,
there is many a side-thrust at Froebel, all of a more or less disparaging
nature, in spite of the humorous twinkle which has a fairly permanent
abode in the eye of the writer.
Some of the accusations are tolerably sweeping, for example, that
Froebelianism “as a psychology is simply non-existent”; that Froebel
has failed to correlate theory and practice; that although in “The
Education of Man” “we have beautiful, if obscurely expressed, truths
about education,” yet the Kindergarten cannot be evolved from it, in fact
“between the two there is a great gulf fixed, a gulf that Froebel has not
bridged.”
But the main contention is that Froebel disapproves in theory of any
interference with the natural course of development. The Froebelian
teacher is thus, according to Professor Adams, reduced to the position
of a “humble under-gardener” who merely watches with interest and
admiration, and education becomes “a general paralysis.”
Mr. Graham Wallas, whose objections to Froebel, or at least to
Froebelianism[48], as he understands it, are well known, bases these on
the ground that because he was a pre-Darwinian evolutionist, Froebel
was bound to overrate the importance of the innate as a factor in
development, and to undervalue the other factor of environment.
Professor O’Shea disposes of Froebel in one sentence and in much the same
way, as an advocate of what he calls “the doctrine of Unfoldment,” where
“everything is inner and self-relating,” as opposed to the conception
gained from Biology, which “implies that the business of a human being is
to get properly related to the world--religious, social and physical--of
which he is an integral part.”
If Froebel really believed that development is entirely from within, as
stated by Professor O’Shea, or if he failed to realize the importance of
the surroundings, as Mr. Graham Wallas expresses it, he would naturally
disapprove of any interference, as Professor Adams says he does. The
Froebelian, being thus reduced to passive watching, the mere provision
of a Kindergarten would be an interference with the surroundings and
a contradiction in practice of the theory of non-interference. If
non-interference is really the theory propounded in “The Education of
Man,” there certainly is a gulf between it and the Kindergarten, a gulf
it would be difficult to bridge.
But Froebelians are not prepared to admit the premises of any of these
critics. It seems to many of us that these and all similar criticisms
are due to misunderstanding. This is sometimes clearly due to careless
reading, and consequent want of attention to the context, but even
where this is not the case, misunderstandings occur. Few, of late
years, have made any real study of Froebel’s writings as a whole, such
as is necessary to get at his real meaning, which is often obscured
by prolixities and repetitions, and sometimes hidden among apparent
trivialities.
Professor O’Shea, for example, does not seem to be aware to what extent
Froebel, like himself, derived his educational aim and principles
from biology. He has probably never realized the deep interest taken
by Froebel in the then all-absorbing question of natural development.
Clearly he has no idea that Froebel has given expression to a conception
of education, practically identical with that given above which he
himself draws from biology,[49] and sets in contrast with the one he
unjustly attributes to Froebel.
There is no doubt whatever that Froebel laid much stress on what is
innate. In his generation, he tells us the child was looked upon “as a
piece of wax, or lump of clay, which man can mould into what he pleases.”
Because Froebel was a student of biology he knew better. He knew, as
we have seen, that human beings have instincts, innate tendencies or
dispositions differing from those of the lower animals chiefly in their
indefiniteness. We are not so afraid of the word “innate” nowadays,
when both innate ideas and innate faculties are safely buried, and that
Froebel had no dealings with these has been amply shown.
But that this stress on innate tendencies implies that the child is to
unfold from within, the educator standing by passive[50], or that Froebel
imagined that the developing process could go on with little or no
reference to the environment, is quite another matter.
Few of Froebel’s critics have taken the trouble to look up the original
German before pronouncing condemnation, and this explains part of the
injustice that has been done to him. The passage upon which much, perhaps
most, of the adverse criticism is based is the one in which Froebel
applies to education the term “leidend,” translated “passive” in both the
English, or, rather, American editions of “The Education of Man.” The
translation of “leidend” as “passive” is not a happy one. Moreover, the
translators have endeavoured to help the reader by dividing the text into
numbered sections, a proceeding which though often helpful, sometimes
tends to break the continuity of Froebel’s thought. This effect is
heightened in Hailmann’s translation by the interpolated notes, however
valuable as some of these are in themselves. This passage, however, opens
with “_therefore_,” and those who take exception to it ought to have
considered the preceding argument. Fair criticism looks back to see why
and under what circumstances education is to be “passive or following,”
as opposed to “dictating and limiting.”
In the first place, absolutely passive education is a contradiction in
terms. Froebel begins by stating that:
“Education consists in leading man as a thinking, intelligent
being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure, conscious
and free representation of the law of his being, and in
teaching him ways and means thereto.”
He defines the _Theory of Education_ as “the system of directions derived
from the knowledge and study of that law to guide human beings in the
apprehension of their life-work”; and the _Practice of Education_ as
“the self-active application of this knowledge in the direct development
and cultivation of rational beings towards the attainment of their
destiny.”
To go on from this to say, on the next page but one, that the educator is
to do nothing, to stand aside and be truly passive, would be absurd.
That our word “passive” is not the equivalent of Froebel’s word
“leidend,” is easily proved, for in another passage where Froebel does
mean “passive” he couples “leidend” with “inactive,” and puts passive
in a bracket beside it. The passage runs: “wo das Kind äusserlich als
unthätig, leidend (passiv) erscheint.” In the passage under discussion
“passiv” does not appear at all, and “leidend” is coupled, not with
“inactive,” but with “following,” and is contrasted with “dictating,
limiting and interfering.”[51]
A few lines further we read how the gardener may even destroy the vine
“if he fail _in his work_ passively and attentively to follow the nature
of the plant.” He cannot surely “work” and be inactively passive at the
same time.
A more correct translation of “leidend” here would perhaps be “tolerant”
or “suffering” in its old sense of “permitting,” “bearing with,” or
having patience with.
As to immediate context, Froebel has just stated that education ought “to
lift man to a knowledge of himself and mankind, to a knowledge of God
and Nature, and to the pure and consecrated life conditioned thereby.”
“But,” he goes on, “education must be founded on what is essential or
innermost, and though the real nature of things can only be known by
outer manifestations, yet it behoves the educator to be very careful
how he judges, for the child that appears good outwardly, is often not
really good, i.e. does not will the good from his own determination, or
from love, respect for or recognition of it,” while “the outwardly rough
self-willed child often has within him a vigorous struggle to do what
seems to him right.” Judging from outer manifestations furnishes constant
occasion for false judgments concerning the motives of children, for
endless misunderstanding between parent and child, and for unreasonable
demands made upon children.
And here comes the force of the conjunction: “_Therefore_,” says Froebel,
“education, instruction and training in their fundamental principles
must necessarily be tolerant, following, not dictating, not limiting or
defining, not interfering.”
What is it, then, that Froebel is telling us to follow almost passively,
interfering, in our ignorance, as little as possible? Simply the natural
order of development, the natural instincts of childhood, which in this
very passage he is arguing are as trustworthy as those of other young
animals. Here, as everywhere, man can only control Nature _by following_,
by obeying her laws.
“As the duckling hastens to the pond and the chicken scratches
the ground, so will the human being, still young, still, as it
were, in the process of creation, though as unconsciously as
any Nature product, yet definitely and surely desire what is
best for him. We give plants and animals time and space and
freedom to develop, but the young human being is to man a piece
of wax, a lump of clay, from which he can mould what he will. O
man, who roamest through garden and field, through meadow and
grove, why dost thou close thy mind to the silent teaching of
Nature?”--_E., p. 8._
Surely we have here a plea to “suffer (leiden) little children,” to
bear with the little one, still, as Froebel describes him, “still, as
it were, in the process of creation,” nay, more, a plea for the actual
recognition and fostering of these instinctive tendencies which Professor
Dewey calls “the foundation-stones of educational method,” rather than
a recommendation to “gratify every youthful impulse,” or to stand aside
altogether. For the context, the whole, is not yet complete.
Froebel goes on to say that if we are certain of any tendency to
unhealthy development we are to interfere with full severity (so tritt
geradezubestimmende, fordernde Erziehungsweise in ihrer ganzen Strenge
ein).
And now comes a sentence apparently quite overlooked by Mr. Graham
Wallas, who blames Froebel for underestimating the environment. In the
mean-time, until we are sure that our interference is justifiable,
“nothing is left for us to do but to bring the child into relations and
surroundings in all respects adapted to him.”[52]--_E., p. 11._
In many other passages Froebel shows plainly that he had no thought of
the “gratifying of every youthful impulse” in the sense of individual
caprice.
In his plea for monetary help to establish Kindergartens and training
establishments connected with them, he complains that in existing
institutions children are either “repressed and their energies crippled,
_or else we are confronted with the wild and uncontrollable character
which results when children are uncared for and are left altogether to
their own impulses_.”--_L., p. 159._
“Life has no room for wilfulness and whims,” he says in his Mother Songs;
“Boyhood is the age of Discipline” he states in “The Education of Man.”
But, as he himself sums up this discussion:
“All true education is double-sided, prescribing and following,
active and passive, positive yet giving scope, firm and
yielding.… Between educator and pupil should rule invisibly a
third something to which both are equally subject. The third
something is the right, the best … the child, the pupil has a
very keen apprehension whether what father or teacher requests
is personal and arbitrary or the expression of general law and
necessity.”--_E., p. 14._
The proof of whether or not the educator has succeeded in rightly
adjusting the claims of freedom and authority, Froebel expresses in words
recalling Kant’s, “When the ‘Thou Shalt’ of the Law becomes the ‘I will’
of the doer, then we are free.”
“In good education, in genuine instruction, in true teaching,
necessity must and will call forth freedom, law will call forth
self-determination, and outer compulsion inner free-will.
“Where necessity produces bondage, where law brings fraud
and crime, and outer compulsion causes slavery, there every
effect of education is destroyed. There oppression destroys and
debases, severity and harshness bring obstinacy and deceit, and
the burden is more than can be borne.”--_E., p. 14._
To emphasize the fact that Froebel did realize the importance of
environment, and to anticipate the criticism that this shortened
rendering is an interpretation in the light of modern educational
theories, of Froebel’s somewhat cumbrous phrases, we can turn to a
passage in his later writing, part of which has been quoted elsewhere:
“Through the child’s efforts to repel that which is contrary to
the needs of his life, indignation and discontent are awakened;
and on the other hand, from the fact that his normal desires
are ungratified, they become inordinate and mischievous. How
may parents avoid these evil results? Most satisfactorily
through a threefold yet single glance at life. Let them look
into themselves, and their own course of development and its
requirements, let them recall their own earliest years, then
later stages of development, and look deeply into their present
life. Next, let them look equally deeply into the life of
the child and what he must require for his present stage of
development. Having scrutinized what the child needs, _let them
scrutinize his environment_, and first observe what it offers
and does not offer for the fulfilment of such requirements.
Let them utilize all offered possibilities of meeting normal
needs; and when such needs cannot be met, let them recognize
this fact, and show the child plainly the impossibility of
their fulfilment. Finally, let them clearly recognize whatever
_in the child’s environment_ tends to awaken antagonism and
discontent, remove it if it be removable, and admit its defect
if it be not removable.”[53]--_P., p. 167._
It is, of course, true that Froebel was pre-Darwinian in time, but it is
equally true that he was post-Darwinian in many of his beliefs.
To find out whether or not his educational doctrines are really based
on false or exploded theories of development, as the Criticism of Mr.
Graham Wallas implies, we must gather together from Froebel’s various
writings, his most important references to the subject.
The key-note to his interest in it lies probably in the yearning for
unity and union in all relations, which was a part of his individuality.
This may have dated back to the time when, a puzzled little mortal of
eight or nine years old, he was most unwisely allowed to hear his father
exhorting and rebuking his parishioners. It seemed to the boy that most
of the trouble arose from the fact that human beings, and human beings
alone, so far as he knew, were divided into two sexes, and he felt that
he would have arranged matters differently. Comfort came to him when his
older brother, by showing him the male and female flower of the hazel,
gave him some idea of a great law of Nature. Strange comfort, too, it
seems, for a boy not yet ten years old!
The late Mr. Ebenezer Cooke pointed out long ago[54] that Mr. Graham
Wallas had not only overshot the mark in saying that “Darwin transferred
the cause of development from within to without,” but that he had himself
failed to draw any distinction between the facts of development, as
seen in the individual, and the theory of the origin or development
of species, which we associate with the names of Darwin and Wallace.
Mr. Cooke pointed to Froebel’s connection with Batch, the founder of a
Natural History Society, of which Goethe was a member, as showing that
he was in direct touch with those who were working out the theory of
development of the individual.
Froebel himself refers to this Natural History Society in his
Autobiography, saying that “students,” of whom he was one, “who had
shown living interest and done active work in Natural Science,” were
invited to become members, and that this awoke within him “a yearning
towards higher scientific knowledge.” At this time Froebel was but a
youth of seventeen, with no idea that education was to be his life work.
Three years later, he meets a private tutor, “a young man quite out of
the common, with actively inquiring mind,” who was “especially fond of
making comprehensive schemes of education.” The year after this we find
him reading what he can of anthropology and history, and saying of his
reading: “It taught me of man in his broad historical relations and set
before me the general life of my kind as one great whole.”
One year more, and while he is looking for a situation with an
architect--in spite of uneasy communing with himself as to how
architecture was to be used “for the culture and ennoblement of
mankind”--Grüner claps him on the shoulder with “Give up architecture, it
is not your vocation at all! Become a teacher.”
It is perhaps because Froebel passed thus from interest in biology to
interest in education that at this time he gives to his own question,
What is the purpose of education?--almost the identical answer that
Professor O’Shea puts into the mouth of his biologist[55], and which he
sets in opposition to Froebel’s supposed opinions:
“In answering the question, What is the purpose of education?
I relied at that time on the following observations: Man lives
in a world of objects, which influence him and which he desires
to influence; therefore he ought to know these objects in
their nature, in their conditions and in their relations with
each other and with mankind.… I sought, to the extent of such
powers as I consciously possessed at that time, to make clear
to myself the meaning of all things through man, his relations
with himself, and with the external world … it seemed to me
that everything which should or could be required for human
education must be necessarily conditioned and given, by virtue
of the very nature of the necessary course of his development,
in man’s own being and in the relations amidst which he is set.
A man, it seemed to me, would be well educated when he had been
trained to care for these relationships and to acknowledge
them, to master them and to survey them.”--_A., p. 69._
In the very beginning, then, of his educational career, Froebel
emphasized rather than overlooked “the relationships amidst which man is
set,” but he was to learn more yet about development.
Six years later he is back at a university, and “just at this time,” he
says, “those great discoveries of the French and English philosophers
became generally known through which the great manifold external world
was seen to form a comprehensive outer world.”
The English writer may have been Erasmus Darwin. The French writer was
no doubt Lamarck, to whom belongs “the immortal glory of having for the
first time worked out the theory of Descent as an independent scientific
theory of the first order and as the philosophical foundation of the
whole science of Biology.”
From some such source, at any rate, Froebel must have gained
“the key-note of development,” viz., that it is always from the
undifferentiated to the differentiated. We have already seen that he
applied this to mental development and so gained his modern conception
of the earliest infant consciousness, “an undifferentiated unorganized
unity.”
In “The Education of Man” he speaks of
“the all-pervading law of Nature according to which the general
gives rise to the particular,”--_E., p. 167._
and in the Mother Songs he says:
“Whether we are looking at a seed or an egg, whether we
are watching feeling or thought, what is definite proceeds
everywhere from what is indefinite.”--_M., p. 121._
Or, again:
“In the child as in the grain of seed, there begins a
development proceeding towards complexity.”--_P., p. 172._
Such quotations fully exonerate Froebel from belief in any
“pre-formation” theory, whether physical or mental, as indeed Mr. Cooke
made abundantly plain.
It is in one of his later papers[56] that Froebel generalizes and states
very plainly how everything is developed under the influence of its
environment.
“Taking Nature as our guide, let us endeavour to find the
essential nature of material objects and the conditions under
which this develops, for the process of development shows the
essence of the developing object.
“_Firstly_, each thing and each object manifesting existence
and life, develops itself in accordance with the highest and
simplest, the general laws of life. Thus everything manifests
these laws and their primeval cause.
“_Secondly_, each thing and each object in Nature develops
itself according to its own individuality and the laws of its
being.
“_Thirdly_, everything in Nature develops itself under the
collective influence of all things. If any object seems to be
withdrawn from this collective influence, such withdrawal is
only mediate.…
“In Nature, and in everything, all things develop as members
of the world-whole, the universal life, as members of a whole,
each perfect in its kind, because each, while standing in
the centre of the collective influence streaming upwards and
inwards--nay, in a certain sense, as the receiver, yielding
itself to this influence--yet also acts (as assimilative and
formative) and develops itself, faithful to the indwelling
laws of life universal and particular. We must see clearly the
conditions of perfect development in Nature, and then employ
them in human life. Thus only can we help man to attain,
upon the plane of human development--which means spiritual
development--a degree of perfection corresponding to that which
the forms and types of Nature show upon the plane of physical
development.”--_P., p. 196._
When child development is in question, far from minimising, as he is
supposed to do, the importance of environment, parents and teachers are
told:
“We must hold fast for consideration in life this fact, that
in the spontaneous occupation and playing of the child, not
the germ only, but the growing point of his life also, is
formed _in union with his surroundings, and under their silent
unremarked influence_ (im Vereine mit der Umgebung und unter
deren stillen unbemerkten Einwirkung).”--_P., p. 108._
Or, again:
“As the new-born child, like a ripe grain of seed dropped from
the mother plant has life in itself, and as it spontaneously
develops life _in progressive connection with the common
life whole_; so activity and action are the first phenomena
of his awakening life. This activity bears the impress of
what is innermost, it is an inner activity whose purpose is
manifestation of the inner through the outer, and, as leading
up to this, devoted to consideration of and working with the
outer to penetrating the outer and overcoming hindrances as
such.”--_P., p. 23._
This account surely makes plain, that whatever Froebel may have believed
with regard to the origin of species, he in no way believed that
development in general was a one-sided process, in which the environment
went for nothing.
In his “Criticism,” Mr. Graham Wallas remarked: “Whoever divorced his
educational system from his philosophy, would have seemed to Froebel to
have taken all force and meaning out of his work.” This is most true, and
it approaches absurdity to attribute so limited a view to a man imbued as
Froebel was with the philosophical doctrine of the reconciliation of the
opposites.[57] That all development was the result of a harmony between
opposites was one of his cardinal doctrines.
“We are living in an age,” he writes, “when we are consciously under a
law of development acting by the reconciliation of opposites.”
Mr. Hailmann gives a long footnote where Froebel is quoted as comparing
his idea of the law of connection or unification with the ideas of Fichte
and Hegel, and saying:
“It is both of these, and yet has nothing in common with either
of them; it is the law which the contemplation of Nature has
taught me.… And where do we find absolute contrasts that have
not somewhere and somehow a connection? In action and reaction
the contrasts that we see everywhere give rise to the motions
in the universe as they do in the smallest organism. This
implies for all development a struggle which however sooner
or later will find its adjustment; and this adjustment is the
connection of contrasts.”--_E., p. 42._
What Froebel knew of Hegel’s philosophy was probably gained from
discussions among his friends, for in the hearing of Madame von
Marenholz, he said, “I do not know how Hegel formulates and applies this
law, for I have had no time for the study of his system,” and he went
on to say of “the philosophical systems of others” that “most of them
belong to a theory of the world that is passing away, whose one-sidedness
becomes more apparent every day” (Reminiscences, 225). Ebers, too, speaks
of Froebel’s ideas as opposed to those of Hegel.
Even Mr. Graham Wallas allows that Froebel’s casual references to the
development of species are “surprisingly modern.” No orthodox views as
to the exact date of the creation of the world keep him from accepting
the newly discovered testimony of the rocks as to “the remains of
perished ages.” Ardent as his religious convictions were, they had a
philosophic width unusual indeed in his day. The Garden of Eden is to
him a parable, repeated “in the experience of every child from the time
of his appearance on earth to the time when he consciously (by the help
of names) beholds himself in beautiful Nature spread out before him.” In
each child he sees “repeated at a later period, the deed which marks the
beginning of moral and human emancipation, of the dawn of reason.”
He refers calmly to
“the fall, or, since the result is the same, the ascent of
the mind of man, from simple, uniform, emotional development,
into the development of externally analytic and critical
reason.”--_E., p. 194._
Not Stanley Hall himself insists more that the development of the
individual shall follow the development of the race, and this in 1826,
two years before Baer, and four years before Comte, to whom Herbert
Spencer attributed the doctrine. “Humanity,” he says, “lives only in its
continuous development.”
“Each successive generation and each successive individual
human being, inasmuch as he would understand the past and
present, must pass through all preceding phases of human
development and culture, and this should not be done in the way
of dead imitation or mere copying, but in the way of living
spontaneous self-activity.”--_E., p. 18._
There is certainly no ground for assuming that Froebel held any such
pre-Darwinian views as a special creation of each species, for there
is no point on which he insists more emphatically than that in Nature
development is continuously progressive.
“In God’s world, just because it is God’s world, by Him
created, one thing constant is expressed to which we give the
name of unbroken progression of development in all and through
all.”[58]--_M., p. 154._
“God neither ingrafts nor inoculates, He develops the most
trivial and imperfect things in continuously ascending
series and in accordance with eternal self-grounded and
self-developing laws.”--_E., p. 328._
Mr. Winch makes merry over Froebel’s sentence:
“As Man and Nature have one origin, they must be subject to the
same laws,”
and remarks that “this conception is almost completely given up.… Our
view now rather is one in which God and Nature are at strife, in which
the ethical interest overcomes Nature.…”
But Froebel is far ahead of this. The great law to him is the Law of
Development to which Man and Nature, which includes Man, are subject. The
ethical interest is not, as Mr. Winch intimates, something transcending
Nature, but is itself evolved. Morality, Froebel distinctly tells us, is
“rooted” in Instinct, and “human development means spiritual development.”
Professor O’Shea says of the doctrine of Unfoldment which he attributes
to Froebel that it “regards man on his spiritual side as an entity set
apart from everything in the universe.”[59]
Froebel, however, writes:
“Difficult, very difficult, would it be to define where the
purely physical ends and the purely intellectual begins. It
is precisely on account of this close welding or flowing into
one another of the Physical and Psychical, the bodily and
mental, the material and spiritual, the vital (des Vitalen)
and intellectual, instinct and morality; it is because of
this rooting of the higher in the lower that the training
and ennobling of the senses, such as smell and taste, are so
important.”--_M., p. 183._
“Training and ennobling,” these words bring us back to the educational
doctrines Froebel based upon what he knew of development, physical and
mental, from whatever source he may have gained his information.
“From the beginning of the Darwinian reconstruction of the moral
sciences,” says Mr. Graham Wallas, “it was absurd, while speaking
of ‘environment,’ to ignore the fact that the deliberate care and
contrivance of the parent must form a large part of the environment of
the child.” Undoubtedly.
But it was because Froebel exalted “the deliberate care and contrivance
of the parent” that he wrote “The Education of Man,” to tell his
generation how best to care and contrive. It was because he realized
that this deliberate care and contrivance must begin from the very first
that he wrote his Mother Songs. He tells the mother here that “if she is
wise, in all she does a noble meaning lies”; that she must “do nothing
aimlessly or she’ll create a child she cannot educate.” He tells her that
it is “by watching what makes the child’s eyes bright, that she will know
how best to give delight,” and that she must “seek to strengthen power
and mind in all things.”
In very truth the Kindergarten itself, with all its imperfections, is
nothing more nor less than an attempt to supply that very environment
which its founder is supposed to undervalue--an attempt to foster,
by providing suitable conditions, those innate tendencies or natural
activities, to which Froebel attached infinite importance.
This is why the discovery of the name Kindergarten gave Froebel the
pleasure expressed in his cry, “Eureka, I have it! Kindergarten shall be
its name.” The original designation contained the actual words “through
the culture of the instinct for activity, inquiry and creation, inherent
in man,” but this original title spreads over several lines of print.
“Garden” to Froebel expresses just what he wanted, “As in a garden under
God’s favour, and _by the care of a skilled, intelligent gardener_,
growing plants are cultivated in accordance with Nature’s laws, so here,
in our child-garden, shall the noblest of all growing things, _men_
(that is, children, the germs and shoots of humanity), be cultivated in
accordance with the laws of their own being, of God and of Nature.”--_L.,
p. 161._
This is why he urges on his pupil, Ida Seele, to retain the name in spite
of the prejudices it aroused. It is to her that he writes:
“Is there really such importance underlying the mere name of
a system?--some one might ask. Yes, there is: … It is true
that any one carefully watching your teaching would observe
a new spirit … you would strike him as personally capable,
nay, as extremely capable, but you would fail to strike him
as priestess of the idea, and of the struggle towards the
realization of the idea--education by development--the destined
means of raising the whole human race. For, after all, what do
we mean by ‘Kindergarten’?… No man can acquire fresh knowledge
beyond the measure which his own mental strength and stage
of development fits him to receive. But little children have
no development at all.… Infant schools are nothing but a
contradiction of child nature. Little children ought not to be
_schooled_ and taught, they merely need to be developed. It is
the pressing need of our age, and only the idea of a garden can
serve to show us symbolically the proper treatment of children.
This idea lies in the very name of a Kindergarten. … How much
better had you been able to call your work by its proper name,
and to make evident by that expression, the real nature of the
new spirit you have introduced.”--_L., p. 290._
There is no gulf between the Kindergarten, and “The Education of Man,”
with its appeal to educators to follow instead of interfering with
Nature’s methods, to foster instead of repressing the “instincts of
activity and of construction,” to foster play, which though “merely
natural life,” yet holds “the seed leaves of all later life.”
Froebel’s gardener is “skilled and intelligent,” and a skilled gardener
is supposed to have scientific knowledge of his plants, of the conditions
of soil, exposure, etc., best suited to them. Professor Adams says that
“to call a child a plant does not advance matters much, and it certainly
does not account for the use of the cubes, spheres and such like.” This,
however, it does most certainly if these cubes and spheres are the right
food material for the child’s mind, as Froebel at any rate believed.
All the employments of the Kindergarten, all the varied materials,
the sand and clay, the pencil and paint brush, the building blocks,
cardboard, sawdust, moss, nut-shells, etc., for constructive or
“representative” play are definitely mentioned and definitely commended
in “The Education of Man.” They are commended because they are the
employments and the material which children everywhere find for
themselves; because Froebel had sufficient knowledge of biology to know
that instinctive action must somehow benefit the individual and the race;
and also because he had psychological insight enough to see that by such
activities children gain not merely skill, but clear ideas and “firmness
of will.”
Professor Adams writes: “Not Philosophy, but common sense, experience
and loving observation, have led Froebel and his followers to adopt
certain apparatus and certain methods, which are excellent in themselves,
and which in capable hands produce admirable results. For this he
deserves all the honour that has been heaped upon him--but he has not
explained John.”
True enough, Froebel has not explained, at least, he has not entirely
explained that charming John, the Professor’s own creation and type
of all our children. Who has? Still, by his efforts as a pioneer in
genetic psychology--the result of his belief that “only by the study
of development in ourselves and others, can we learn to understand the
child”--and by the two sketches so full of insight into child-life and
into boy life, which he has given us in “The Education of Man,” surely
Froebel has done at least his share even in explaining John.
No doubt he learnt much from “loving observation.” Nor does he undervalue
it, but, in his case, the observation was induced by the Philosophy, as
well as by the love. For, as he tells us, “it is a necessary part of
me to be irresistibly driven to search out the ultimate cause of every
fact in life, to discover its roots.” He learned much from watching both
mothers and children, but he says:
“What natural mother wit and human common sense left to
themselves, have been doing by chance and piece-meal, ought now
to be brought forward by a thoughtful mind, its foundation,
connections and deeper meaning recognized, that it may be
improved upon by clever and kindly thought.”--_M., p. 147._
An education which “follows” needs shown by the child, which “follows”
the laws of development, physical and mental, as far as these can be
discovered from history, from introspection, and from observation
of children in general and of “each individual child,” that is the
“patiently following” education which Froebel puts before us as an ideal.
“For,” he says:
“By the full application of the latter method of education, the
prescribing and interfering, we should wholly lose the sure,
steady and progressive development of mankind, which is the
ultimate aim and object of all education.”--_E., p. 10._
NOTE.--The foregoing chapter was written some years ago, but in
1912 there appeared a fresh criticism of Froebel and his work
in many ways more adequate than certain others. It appeared
as an Introduction to a new translation of “The Education of
Man” and of some of Froebel’s lesser writings, by Dr. Fletcher
and Professor Welton. In this introduction, important points
are granted, for example, that Froebel had “grasped the vital
principle that all true development, and consequently all true
education, is a self-directed process--that purpose is the
key-note of human culture and advance. It was the emphasis
which he laid upon this which makes Froebel one of the princes
of education and gives him an enduring place in the history
of thought.” Or again, that Froebel’s teaching is “not the
negation of all human constraint,” but that he sees clearly
that “constraint is necessary to train the will to resist
impulse and follow purpose”; that with Froebel “Discipline must
direct instinctive impulse, not simply oppose and thwart it.”
Unfortunately, however, the writers of the book do not seem to
have grasped the idea of the Kindergarten as an Institution
which had this very end in view, and the second part of the
book which is called “The Kindergarten,” never mentions its
essential features. So we have the familiar statement that
between the Kindergarten and “The Education of Man” a gulf is
fixed, a statement which has been already discussed. And we are
also told that Froebel attracts us “by his very vagueness.”
But Keilhau and Helba and the real Kindergarten are none of
them vague. That Froebel attributed too much importance to his
Gifts and occupations most of us will readily allow, but that
the forms of expression set forth in the Helba plan are to be
regarded as merely additions to the Gifts is impossible seeing
that the plan for Helba is dated 1829. Besides, all such work
had already been very much in evidence at Keilhau (See _p. v_,
Preface), and the Gifts and Occupations were an attempt to
provide in a similar manner for children very much younger, and
as materials are only such as children find for themselves. We
claim that Froebel himself is the best interpreter of his own
invention, the Kindergarten, and we are content to abide by his
own definition of it: _An Institution for the cultivation of
the life of mankind through fostering the impulse to activity,
investigation and construction in the child; an institution
for the self-instruction, for self-education of mankind
through play, that is creative self-activity and spontaneous
self-instruction_.
APPENDIX I
ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD “ACTIVITY”
Professor Stout is particularly definite in his use of the word
“activity,” and as he agrees with Mr. Bradley, from whom he quotes “that
the current use of the word activity in the literature of philosophy is
a scandal,” it may be well to inquire here whether Froebel used the word
loosely or with some degree of definiteness.
Professor Stout considers the word “activity” specially appropriate to
cases “in which the return of a causal process upon itself is especially
prominent or important.” He quotes from Mr. Bradley again that “Activity
seems to be self-caused change. A transition that begins with, and comes
out of the thing itself is the process where we feel that it is active.”
“Thus,” Mr. Stout comments, “the life and growth of organisms are
specially appropriate examples of activity; for such processes are in a
large measure immanent or self-determining.”
The first point that suggests itself is that in the majority of cases,
Froebel may perhaps be said to have avoided the difficulty by his
constant reference not only to activity but to “self-activity,” a word
associated with the name of Froebel closely as his very shadow.
In the second place, we do find Froebel very markedly referring to the
self-determining activity of organisms, in a passage where he is trying
to show that all instruction should start from the child’s own desire
and power of will. He says that the mother--grounding her instruction
in her child’s desire to write to the absent father--acts like the
sun, “whose warmth awakens in every grain of seed, life, impulse,
power, self-activity, self-determination” (die Triebe, die Kraft, die
Selbstthätigkeit und Selbstbestimmung).[60]
It is Froebel’s peculiarity that he brings his philosophical conceptions
into the veriest details, and so even in speaking of how the mother may
make a ball represent a springing kitten, etc., and saying that to the
child the ball is “the uniting object,” yet, he says, considering the
plays as proceeding from the child (vom Kinde aus), “all activity, though
mediated (vermittelt) by the ball, proceeds definitely from the child,
and though going through the ball, refers back again to the child, who is
himself a unit.”
There is a particular passage which suggests that there existed a special
definite idea in Froebel’s mind in regard to the word “activity,” and it
is one which presents a difficulty to an ordinary and unphilosophical
mind, though a possible light is thrown upon it by Mr. Bradley’s
definition. In this passage activity (Thätigkeit) is very distinctly
given as something higher than impulse (Triebe).
The working of the primeval Cause, “the uniting,” is called, Froebel
says, “according to the different stages in development, Force, Impulse,
Life, Life-impulse, Activity” (Wirken, Trieb, Leben, Lebenstrieb,
Thätigkeit).
This placing of activity so high in the scale is at least no accident,
and conscious self-determination is constantly attributed to man as “the
most perfect earthly being,” and to man alone.
Mr. Stout proceeds to examine the conception of self-determining process,
with special reference to changes within the sphere of an individual
consciousness, taking as the most convenient point of departure, such
illustrative analogies as come from the physical world, and beginning
with the simplest form of self-determination, the law of inertia.[61]
“Conscious life,” he says, “is always in some degree self-sustaining,
this indeed is an indispensable part of the connotation of all such words
as activity, endeavour, conation, effort, striving, will, attention.
All such terms imply that the process to which they refer, tends by its
intrinsic nature in a certain direction, or toward a certain end.”
Now the word “endeavour” or “effort” (Streben) is a word Froebel
constantly uses in speaking of a child’s activity, and he does more than
merely “imply” that this process “tends in a certain direction, or toward
a certain end” when he affirms that “In every activity, in every deed of
man, and of the smallest child, an aim is expressed.”
Professor Stout goes on to say that in conscious states we can always
distinguish between determination from within and from without, and
“it is a point of vital significance that this distinction coincides
with that between mental activity and mental passivity.”[62] With
mental passivity Froebel has but few dealings, if indeed he has any.
There is one passage in which he uses the word passive (passiv); this,
however, merely states that the child, in accommodating himself to his
surroundings, may outwardly appear inactive or passive, but only in
order to have more scope for his inner activity (wo es äusserlich als
unthätig, leidend [passiv] erscheint … um so seiner innern Thätigkeit
mehr Spielraum zu verschaffen).
From what he does say there is little doubt but that Froebel would
willingly have subscribed to Professor Stout’s dictum, “that to be
mentally active is identical with being mentally alive or awake,[63]
though in degree the activity may shade off gradually from that
“involving a sense of strain, to that of almost passivity.” But just as
Professor Stout rejects the idea of purely passive consciousness, so,
too, does he reject “pure” mental activity. “It is impossible to find
any bit of mental process which is determined purely from within.”[64]…
“At the same time it is equally true that no change within is entirely
determined from without.”[65] Mr. Stout does not say that pure
activity--a purely self-determined process--cannot exist, for “we should,
by parity of reasoning, be bound to reject the second law of motion.”[66]
“But it rests,” he says, “with the advocates of pure activity, if there
are such, to adduce a case of it, and until such a case is brought
forward we must assume that there is none.… No portion of matter can be,
even for a moment, outside the sphere of influence of other portions.”
We have seen that Mr. O’Shea practically accuses Froebel of being an
“advocate of pure activity,”[67] nor is he the only one of Froebel’s
critics who does so. If, however, it be considered an accident that
Froebel should in one passage put “conscious self-determination” at the
highest point of life development, and in another passage give this place
to “activity” which Mr. Bradley and Mr. Stout tell us is to be regarded
as self-determined, is it also an accident that in the very same passage
Froebel should state that “everything in Nature develops and forms itself
under the total collective influence of all other things”?
If these correspondences are not accidental, then it must be allowed in
the first place that Froebel attached a fairly definite meaning to the
word “activity,” including self-determination in its connotation; and in
the second place that the grounds on which he is charged with being a
believer in “pure activity” are very insufficient. When Mr. Stout says
that even if it is allowable “as an illustrative hypothesis” to regard
the physical universe as an internally complete system,[68] it is clear
that “the stream of individual consciousness is no such self-contained
unit,” but “the merest fragment of universal reality, as its correlated
brain process is the merest fragment of the material world[69]”; is
this anything but a statement of that unity, on which Froebel insists
in season and out of season--which appears on almost every page of
his writings, so that the word has become the veriest “cant” of the
half-trained Kindergarten teacher[70].
The philosophic conception of unity, the belief that there is no
separation in either world, physical or psychical, or between either
world, was always present to Froebel’s mind. “In Nature,” he writes,
“every phenomenon has its sufficient foundation and its necessary
consequence.” But as every philosopher would say, so Froebel said,
“Separation is permitted for the observing, thinking and comparing
intellect, and the outwardly representing life, and is indeed required by
it, but must by no means on that account be permitted to appear in the
mind which is intended to grasp and constantly to retain in its original
inner union, that which is outwardly apparently separated by the thinking
intellect, the reason and the life.”[71] So Professor Münsterberg,
writing as a professed scientist, says, “Science is to me, not a mass
of disconnected information, … but the certainty that nothing can exist
outside the gigantic mechanism of causes and effects, but Science is not
and cannot be, and ought never to try to be, an expression of ultimate
reality.”[72]
It would never have dawned on Froebel, nor would it have appealed to
him, to separate his philosophy from his science, but there is no
more contradiction in Froebel’s “self-activity” which is influenced
from without, than there is in Professor Stout when he speaks of
self-determination as included in the connotation of “activity,” and adds
that until a case of “pure activity” is brought forward, we must assume
that there is none.
Of all his “means of play,” Froebel says:
“In order, therefore, on the one hand to introduce the child
to the handling of his play material, we gave him the ball, …
but each of these means of play summons the child in return
to self-activity, to free self-activity; to movement, to
free independent movement” (zur Selbsthätigkeit, zur freien
Selbsthätigkeit; zur Bewegung, zur freien, inabhängigen
Bewegung).[73]
APPENDIX II
COMPARISON OF PLAYS NOTED BY FROEBEL WITH THE ENUMERATION GIVEN BY GROOS
Much that is given in Groos’ more elaborate classification can also be
found in Froebel’s suggestions, particularly where younger children are
concerned. For plays coming under the heading of Playful Activity of the
Sensory Apparatus, Froebel has a parallel for every kind except that of
Temperature, and for this Groos has not himself found anything that can
fairly be called play.
For Sensations of Contact there is the Kicking Play, and Taste and Smell
are also represented in the Mother Play book. For Hearing play we have
the wooden ball, “a plaything for the child liable to produce noise by
its movement,” as well as the Tic-tac and Finger Piano plays, and for
receptive play, the mother is told to speak, rhythmically if possible,
or to sing with every play. For Sensations of Brightness we have “Mother
you want to foster this delight in all things that are sparkling clear
and bright” of the “Fish in the Brook,” as well as “The Lightbird,” which
Froebel has “found over and over again in all grades of the culture that
makes up social life in village and in town.”
Sensations of colour are well provided for. In “The Two Windows” we have:
“See the beautiful coloured circles and rays, just like rainbow and
dew-drops, see how beautifully the colours play through each other.”
Colour is a feature in Gift I, in beadwork, in the tablets, in paper
folding, cutting and plaiting, and besides these there are crayons and
paints, and frequent reference is made to the child’s pleasure in the
colour of flowers.
Froebel also makes much play depend on perception of form: “Attention to
the form and figure of the object can also be utilized for the child in
play,” or, again, “Early in life the child delights in round and varied
pebbles, he seeks and collects them, he takes pleasure in the straight
edged and right angled.” He has found “The Target” play very widely
spread, “plainly because it contains, as I see it, the first trace of an
endeavour to make a child notice position and form.”
For perception of movement, to which Froebel would have added perception
of change of position, there are many plays with the ball as well as
“Tic-tac,” “The Child and the Pigeons,” “The Lightbird,” “The Fish in the
Brook,” etc.
Groos’ next class is Play with the Motor Apparatus and under this comes
first Playful movement of the Bodily Organs. Here we have Froebel saying:
“The first toys and occupations of the child come from himself: he plays
with his own limbs.”--_L., p. 108._ “The child at this stage begins to
play with his limbs--his hands, his fingers, his lips, his tongue, his
feet, as well as with the expression of his eyes and face.”--_E., p. 48._
Under playful locomotion, Groos actually quotes Froebel’s description
of the child learning to walk, and we have also marching, running, and
racing games; “the large majority,” says Froebel, “I have created simply
by watching the children at play.… Thus I have prepared a limping-game
because I see my boys always limping and hopping.”
Next comes Playful Movement of Foreign Bodies, and under this heading
Groos gives “Hustling things about, pushing, pulling, shaking, seizing
and pushing away, dabbling in water, handling sand and clay, kite-flying,
and capture of insects.” Of these Froebel mentions pushing of carriages,
kite-flying, hobby-horse riding; he makes much of play with water, sand
and clay, and he speaks of the catching of insects, etc., desiring that
it should be wisely checked by directing the activity into other channels.
As to Destructive or Analytic Movement Play, Froebel notes that: “The
child wishes to know all the properties of the thing, for this reason he
examines it on all sides; for this reason he tears and breaks it; for
this reason he puts it in his mouth and bites it.”--_E., p. 73._ “The
cruel treatment of insects and other animals originates in the little
boy’s desire to obtain an insight into the life of the animal.”--_E., p.
164._
Of Constructive or Synthetic Movement Play, so much has been said
already, that it is not necessary to dwell on it. Froebel, in fact, gives
a far more inclusive account of this than Groos himself, not omitting
his “simplest form,” viz. moulding new forms with sand, etc., nor the
collecting and arranging in rows which to Groos and to Froebel is a more
primitive form of construction. Of Exercise of Endurance, too, we have
spoken, in quoting passages where Froebel shows the boyish desire to
measure and to increase strength. Throwing and Catching Plays have their
place in the “Apprentice and Master Workman” game.
The important third class, the Playful Use of the Higher Mental Powers,
includes according to Groos a good deal that he has dealt with under
other heads, e.g. Memory Play includes (_a_) Recognition and (_b_)
Reflective Memory. Under the former comes that pleasure in recognition
of form which has already been dealt with, the pleasure given by
pictures, often, says Groos, greater than is given by the reality.
Froebel, too, says that if the father makes a sketch, “this man of lines,
this horse of lines, will give the child more joy than an actual man, an
actual horse will do.”--_E., p. 77._ Froebel, too, notes the pleasure it
will give a child to name flowers through recognition of a form: “Spurred
like a rider, circled like a snail, umbrellas, wheels, he’ll find the
names.”--_M., p. 181._ There is also the recognition of animal and other
noises, as in Froebel’s Yard Gate. Rote learning as a play Froebel hardly
mentions.
As to the two groups which Groos brings under the heading of Imagination,
viz. “Illusion either playful or serious,” and “the voluntary or
involuntary transformation of our mental content,” these receive full
recognition. Froebel notes how the stick becomes a horse or the knotted
handkerchief the baby, as well as the play of listening to and inventing
stories.
Under the head of Attention comes such games as Hide and Seek, because
of the alternate stress and relaxation, and Froebel noted before Darwin
did the pleasure of the baby in Bo-peep. Groos also brings curiosity
under this heading, and we have seen that Froebel deals fully with such
play as the outcome of the instinct of investigation, or the instinct for
self-teaching.
Froebel would certainly not draw the line where Groos does, when he says
“the true characteristics of play are in inverse ratio to the intensity
of the desire for knowledge,” and if this rule were strictly adhered to,
a good deal of what Groos does call play might have to come out.
The plays which fall under the head of Reason have two bearings, says
Groos, first causality, and second inherence. There are various
references to the “joy of being a cause” from the child “whose capacity
for speech is as yet undeveloped,” but who draws away the support and
as the cube falls “turns to his mother in joyous triumph,” up to the
pride of Keilhau boys, who “might not have accomplished their fortresses
without the sapper,” but “who believed that if cast on a desert island,
each could build a hut of his own.” Froebel also brings in intellectual
games such as draughts, and he notes how children will invent their own
words and their own alphabets in play. Of the making and solving of
riddles I think Froebel never speaks.
As to what Groos says of Experimentation with the feelings, the parallels
in Froebel are surprise plays such as Hide and Seek, adventure and
hunting games where there may be play with fear, and the legends and
stories.
Under the Impulse of the Second or Socionomic order, come the Fighting
Plays, Love Play, Imitative Play, and Social Play. Of Love Play, Froebel
has none, but the hunting and fighting were allowed abundant scope at
Keilhau. Of Imitative Play there is much that can be cited from the
playful imitation of simple movements and sounds in the Mother Songs and
the Kindergarten Games, to the “classic dramas” of the Keilhau boys.
Plastic and constructive play, too, goes from the simplest sand play,
through the Kindergarten handwork, not only up to the fortress making,
but also to the “boxes with locks and hinges, so neatly finished,
veneered, and polished that many a trained cabinet-maker’s apprentice
could have done no better,” which were made at Keilhau.
Of the Social Plays Groos says with feeling that, however advisable, it
is wellnigh impossible to make a distinct class. He starts, however, with
the “need of bodily association or the herding instinct.” He brings in
the child’s eager desire to be with his fellows, and the importance in
adult life of festivals, religious or otherwise. He mentions the child’s
voluntary submission to a leader, and speaks of play as instrumental in
teaching children submission to law. We have noticed Froebel speaking
of the “combined games, which will train the child, by his very nature
eager for companionship, in the habit of association with comrades, in
good fellowship and all that this implies.” He also wants the child to
take alternately some special part in the game and to be merely one of
the crowd: “Each child should have a chance to lead, for it is especially
developing to a child to recognize himself as independent as well as a
member of the whole.” Among the older boys, the Bergwachts for instance
were carefully organized under separate leaders and the captain of
the first band was director of the whole. Froebel, too, made much of
festivals at Keilhau, and this has always been a recognized feature of
the Kindergarten.
Enjoyment of the comic never, I think, makes its appearance at all.
Froebel had many gifts, but the saving sense of humour does not appear to
have been among them.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Chapter IX.
[2] See Chapter X.
[3] “Froebel’s Educational Principles,” Elementary School Record, Vol. I,
No. 5, or “The Dewey School,” published by the Froebel Society.
[4] See Chapter VI, _p. 79_.
[5] The Philosophy and Psychology of the Kindergarten.--“Teachers’
College Record,” Nov., 1903.
[6] It is true that Froebel was pre-Darwinian, but see _p. 198_.
[7] All this is said in connection with the infant’s play with a woollen
ball, with quaint suggestions that the singing tone accompanying the
swinging like a ball affects the feelings, while the recognition of a
change of position is a thing of “dawning thought,” and that by tic-tac
the movement is expressed. See _p. 176_.
[8] Dies fesselt die Sinnen- und Geistesthätigkeit des Kindes und gibt
_ihm_ mehrseitige Nahrung.
[9] In der Mitte seiner wahrnehmenden (empfindenden) seiner wirkenden und
schaffenden, seiner vergleichenden (denkenden) Thätigkeit.
[10] Die Ausbildung der verschiedenen Richtungen der Geisteskraft des
Kindes.
[11] “Journal of Education.” Reprinted in “Child Life,” January, 1901.
[12] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 152_ _et seq._
[13] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 153_.
[14] It is true that Professor Stout complains of the loose way in which
the word “activity” has been used, and that he is careful to define his
own meaning, but Froebel too is careful. See Appendix I.
[15] See also _p. 82_.
[16] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. II, _p. 82_.
[17] “The Conception of Immortality,” _p. 58_.
[18] Froebel is comparing the child with other young animals, and
somewhat scornfully refers to those who, “notwithstanding the early
manifestation of the instinct to employ himself,” regard the human infant
as inferior to the young of other animals.
[19] See chapter on Instinct.
[20] “In dem ersten Sinnenspiele, kommen also dem Kinde durch Wahrnehmen
u. Schauen, durch Kommen, Bleiben u. Schwinden, durch Wechsel, also auch
in gewisser Hinsicht durch frühes dunkles auffassen … somit von dunkler
Vergleichung, die ersten Eindrücke der Seele, gleichsam die ersten
Erkenntnisse zugleich durch Selbst-thätigkeit, wie durch die sein Leben
und dessen Forderungen in sich tragende Mutterliebe.”--_P., p. 66._
[21] It does not, however, follow that this outer object, or this manner
of presenting it, is so important as Froebel supposed; see Chapter IX.
[22] See _p. 66_.
[23] See Chapter II.
[24] “Principles of Psychology,” Vol. II, _p. 884_.
[25] Froebel is too often ignorantly accused of being “soft,” but it is a
mistake to think that he leaves fear out of count. What he insists on is,
that rightly used authority should produce self-control, not servility.
[26] See _p. 90_.
[27] Macmillan, 1906.
[28] _P. 53._
[29] “Social Psychology,” _p. 61_.
[30] Mr. McDougall allows (_p. 60_) that in the case of an unprovoked
blow, the impulse, the thwarting of which provokes anger, is the impulse
of self-assertion.
[31] For example, on _p. 46_, “Hence language provides special names
for such modes of affective experience, names such as anger, fear,
curiosity”; and on _p. 94_, in connection with the sympathetic induction
of emotion, we have, “Later still, fear, curiosity, and, I think, anger
are communicated readily from one child to another”; and there are other
examples.
[32] _P. 51._
[33] This is all that can be said, for the passage seems incomplete;
after “entwickelt … der Trieb die Neigung,” comes only “sie führen zur
Gemüths- und Herzensbildung; und aus ihr geht in dem Knaben Geistes- und
Willensthätigkeit hervor.”
[34] For a fuller account of these “Gifts,” see Chap. VIII., _p. 148_.
[35] In the well-known translation by F. and E. Lord:
“You wonder why a game at hide-and-seek
Brings a glad flush of joy to baby’s cheek?
The sense of his own personality
Is causing all this joy that you can see
When people call him, say, ‘Where’s Baby been?’
He feels that it is he, himself, they mean.”
[36] “Social Psychology,” _p. 89_.
[37] “The Play of Man,” _p. 400_.
[38] “The Play of Man,” _p. 382_.
[39] See _p. 194_.
[40] In another place Froebel does say that, “Only on condition that
the genuine spirit of play--i.e. the true spirit of life--lives in the
teacher, can he call it forth in the child.”
[41] See Appendix II.
[42] See _pp. 93, 94_.
[43] See _p. 43_.
[44] Froebel goes on to say: “I believe, that after progressing through
the vast orbit of almost two generations (he was nearly fifty-nine) I
have been carried round to the point of commencement, to the fountain
head of the education of mankind, but _with the significant addition of a
full consciousness of my task_.”
[45] The material can of course be used at any age provided it conveys
suitable ideas in a suitable manner. Some of it is even now found useful
in helping senior classes to realize problems in area and in volume.
[46] Many years ago, a young teacher came to me for help. She had been
told to give her class number lessons, for a whole term, from Gift III,
which consists of eight little cubes, and the children had long since
grasped 4 + 4, 6 + 2, 5 + 3, and 8 - 4, 8 - 2, etc. I suggested that she
should leave the number out and let the children play with the blocks.
“Oh! I mayn’t do that,” was the answer, “they have building with Gift IV.”
[47] A really pathetic story has been told me of an earnest teacher in
far Australia, whose educational opportunities had been very limited,
but whose desire for knowledge was most sincere. She had been listening
without comprehension to some glib user of phrases, and was bewailing her
ignorance to an enlightened teacher who knew there had been little of
real value, and who said with a laugh “Never mind, Miss ----, it is only
a case of ‘Mind and Matter glide swift into the vortex of immensity.’”
And the listener said, “Oh please, would you say that slowly, and I’ll
write it down.”
[48] These objections were embodied in a paper entitled “A Criticism
of Froebelian Pedagogy,” which Mr. Graham Wallas read at a Conference
of the Froebel Society in January 1901, and which was published in the
Conference Supplement for Child Life, July 1901.
[49] See _p. 200_.
[50] Few critics are likely to go so far as Mr. Winch, who gave as a
Froebelian conception “that the true destiny of man is to be obtained by
gratifying every youthful impulse.” But, Mr. Winch is perhaps not to be
taken seriously, for in the same paper he took _one sentence out of a
passage on the importance of continuity extending over four pages_, and
says of it, “This jerky discontinuity (!) has not the slightest support
in biological science, and never had.” (See Memorandum written for Mr.
Graham Wallas in “Problems of Education.”)
[51] Deshalb sollen Erziehung, Unterricht und Lehre ursprünglich und in
ihren ersten Grundzügen nothwendig leidend, nachgehend (nur behütend
schützend), nicht vorschreibend, bestimmend, eingreifend sein.
[52] Mr. Graham Wallas said: “The educational task for us is not to find
out how completely we can stand aside, but how far we can so influence
the environment of the child, as to cause those tendencies in it which we
think best, to become permanent.”
[53] Mr. Graham Wallas said: “From the beginning of the Darwinian
reconstruction of the moral sciences, it was absurd, while speaking
of ‘environment,’ to ignore the fact that the deliberate care and
contrivance of the parent must form a large part of the environment of
the child.” The passage quoted shows that Froebel was guilty of no such
absurdity.
[54] “Is Development from Within?” “Child Life,” October, 1904, and
January, 1905.
[55] See _p. 192_.
[56] “Second Review of Plays: A Fragment,” but part of this has been
omitted in the English translation.
[57] Those who desire a full and scholarly account of Froebel’s
philosophy are referred to that given by Professor Angus MacVannel,
Ph.D., “Teachers’ College Record,” Vol. IV, No. 5. The Macmillan Co., New
York.
[58] In Gottes Welt, eben weil es die Welt Gottes, durch Gott Gewordenes
ist, spricht sich ein Stetiges, das heisst ungetrennt Fortgehendes der
Entwickelung in Allem und durch Alles aus.
[59] See Appendix, _p. 216_.
[60] “Das Pedagogik des Kindergartens,” _p. 329_.
[61] According to this principle, the mere fact that a particle is moving
with a certain velocity in a certain direction, is in itself a reason why
it should continue to move with the same velocity in the same direction.…
Now, in so far as continuance of change in a certain direction is
traceable to the pre-existence of change in that direction, this whole
process may be regarded as being in a perfectly intelligible sense,
self-determining (“Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 146_).
[62] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 147_.
[63] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 168_.
[64] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 155_.
[65] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 156_.
[66] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 156_.
[67] _P. 191._
[68] And so to regard “each successive moment of the world-process as
issuing out of the preceding by purely immanent casuality.”
[69] “Analytic Psychology,” Vol. I, _p. 156_.
[70] “Unity and Froebel are synonymous terms,” is one “howler” from a
student’s examination paper.
[71] Ed. by Development, _p. 212_.
[72] “The Eternal Life,” _p. 14_.
[73] “Das Kindergartenwesen,” _p. 330_.
INDEX
A
Acquisition, Instinct of, 96, 109
Activity, Spontaneous, 132
Differentiation, 90
Earliest Activity, 1, 9, 34, 126
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Development of, 48, 81, 84, 85
Nature of First Voluntary Employments, 135
Expression, _see_ that title
Foundation of Education, 6, 84, 142, 210
Fundamental Tendency, 47, 85, 88, 90
Meaning of, in Froebel’s Writings, 213 _et seq._
Self-determination included in connotation, 217
Universal Impulse, 90, 126
Adams, Prof., quoted, 190, 210
Amusement, Distinction from Play, 134
Analysis of Mind
Observation and Introspection, 12
Order of Investigation of Laws of Mental Process, 3, 4
Sense and Understanding, Inseparability, 17, 20
Tri-une Character, 13
Animal Instincts, 72
Anticipations of Modern Psychology, 2 _et seq._--Summary, 10
Anthropological Aspect of Psychological Inquiry, 4, 8, 206
Approbation, Love of, 114, 115
Arrangement and Comparison, 101, 166
Artistic Tendencies of Children, 105
Associationists, Fallacy of, 38
“Atomistic View,” 38, 39
Attacks on Froebel, 2, 190-1
B
Baer referred to, 206
Baldwin, Prof., quoted, 50, 52
Ball-Play--Ideas to be gained, etc., 40, 150, 151, 155, 156, 159
Batch, Froebel’s connection with, 199
Biological Studies, Influence on Froebel’s Views, connection with
stress laid on Development, etc., 13, 40, 67, 138, 192, 199, 210
Blow, Miss Susan--Froebel’s Symbolism, 179, 189
Bradley, Mr., quoted, 213
C
Cause, Early Notice of, 160
Change--Use in fixing Impressions, 43, 152
Collecting or Acquiring Instinct, 96, 109
Colour, Sense of, 165, 166
Community, Feeling of, _refer to_ Social Instinct
Comte referred to, 206
Conation, _refer to_ Will
Connection or Unification, Law of, 204
Conscience, references to, 116, 117
Consciousness
Development by Action, 48
--Movement stopped by Something, 49, 52
Earliest Consciousness
Absolute Beginnings--Beyond the pale of Science, 41
Indefiniteness, 39, 49, 91--Undifferentiated, unorganized Unity,
91, 201
Process of Differentiation, 40, 42, 47
Reasoning and Constructive Imagination, 36, 38
Unity of, 26
_See also_ title Self-Consciousness
Construction, Instinct of, 90
“Sense of Power,” i.e., Self-Consciousness resulting, 109, 133
Subserving Instinct of Investigation, 92, 94
Continuous Development, _see_ Development
Cooke, Mr. Ebenezer, quoted, 102, 199, 202
Counting, Development of Capacity for, 101, 102
Criticisms of Froebel, 2, 190
“Culture Epochs” Theory, 129
D
Darwin, references to, 67, 201
Development--Froebel’s Theory of Continuous Development, 10, 128, 140,
178, 179, 206, 207, 209
Biological Studies, Connection with, 13
Development from within, 136, 192, 195, 196
“Harmonious Development,” 14-16
Individual development of, following that of the Race, 206
Law of--Unlimited to Limited, Whole to Part, Indefinite to Definite,
40, 130, 150, 151, 155, 201, 202
Possibilities and Conditions in place of Faculties, 18-20
Reconciliation of Opposites, Result of, 204
Self-directed Process, 212 _note_
Three Stages, 71
Development of Species, Modernness of Froebel’s View, 205
Dewey, Prof.
Experimental Work at Chicago, 129
Summary of Froebel’s Educational Principles, 6
Discipline
Adjusting Claims of Freedom and Authority, 197
Direction of Impulse, not Opposition, 212 _note_
Non-Interference Theory, 190, 191, 192 _note_, 193-5
Doll-Play, 167
Drawing
Counting Capacity, Means of developing, 101
Origin of Earliest Drawing, 103
Process of discovering “Linear Phenomena,” 103, 166
Duties as a means of realizing Kinship, 61, 114, 118
E
Ebers--Account of Life at Keilhau, 123, 147, 168
Eby, Mr., quoted, 7, 79
Emotion, _see_ Feeling
Employment, Instinct of, _refer to_ Activity
Environment, Alleged Neglect by Froebel, 190, 196
--Reply to Critics, 197, 199, 200-4, 208, 210
Evolution--Froebel’s Post-Darwinianism, 198, 205
Experimenting--Mode of Investigation, 102
Exploring Tendency, 94-5
Expression
Art as, 105
Feeling, Importance in Development of, 57-62
Need for, 50, 99, 133
Play, Definition of, 124, 125
Understanding, Means of, 92
F
Faculty Psychology, Criticism of, 13, 17 _et seq._
Fairy Tales, 108, 182
Family Bonds, 61, 113
Fear, Froebel’s attitude towards, 78 and _note_
Feeling, Development of, etc., 130
Action, Importance of, 57-62
Family Bonds and Service for the Family, 61, 113
Fundamental Importance, 63
Starting Point of Education, 117
Want of Good Feeling in Children, Cause, 63-4, 112
Fichte, Reference to, 204
Fletcher, Dr., quoted, 212 _note_
Following and Tolerating--Character of True Education, 160, 195
G
Games, _refer to_ Play
Genetic Psychology preceded by Analytic, 3
“Gifts” and “Gift Plays”
Description of the Series, 159-166
Excessive Importance attached to, 170
Hailmann’s, Mr., distinction between “Gifts” and “Occupations,” 164,
165
Psychological Aim or Meaning, 40, 149, 150, 164, 169, 178
Selection following Natural Instinct, 169, 170
Tri-Unity of Child-Nature, Relation of Gift Plays to, 14
Weakness of the Series, 166
Two Mistakes, and the Psychological Errors underlying them, 170-6
Groos, Karl, quoted, 90, 125, 126, 130, 132, 136, 137, 145, 147, 219
Grüner, reference to, 200
H
Habit
Instinct, Proof of existence of, 76
Outcome of Impulse of Activity, 88
Hailmann, Mr., quoted, 164, 193
Hall, Stanley, quoted, 206
“Harmonious Development,” 14-16
Hegel, Froebel’s knowledge of, 205
Helba Plan, 26, 84, 212 _note_
Herbartians--“Culture Epochs” Theory, 129
Horne, Prof., quoted, 17
I
Imitation
McDougall’s, Mr., Three Classes of Imitative Actions, 89
Outcome of Activity and Means of Expression, 47, 88, 126
Results gained, 50, 51, 91
Instincts
Classifications
Eby, 79, 80
Froebel, 83 _et seq._
Kirkpatrick, 79, 80, 81
McDougall, 79, 81
Direction and Training needed, 71, 121
Divergent Views a matter of Definition, 67-8
Froebel’s belief in Instinct, 67, 69, 70, 74, 125
Froebel’s Terminology, 68, 69
Habit and Instinct, Interaction between, 76
Indefinite in Man--Proof of Superiority and Capacity for Progressive
Development, 66, 72, 75
Specific and General Tendencies, Distinction between, 68
Specifically Human Instincts only dealt with by Froebel, 82
Transitory Nature, 75, 77, 78
Two Main Lines of Instinctive Action, 83
Interdependence of Life, 62
Intuition of Things--Dr. Ward’s Points, 154-5
Investigation, Instinct of, 88, 90-2, 94-7, 102, 107
J
James, Prof., quoted, 39, 57, 59, 65, 68, 69, 73-5
Jarvis, Miss--Translation of passage _re_ Self-Consciousness, 54
Joy in Activity, 136-7, 139, 143, 145
K
Keilhau, Life at, 111, 123, 143, 147, 168, 212 _note_, 223, 224
Kindergarten
Associated Games, Social Training, etc., 114, 146, 147
Defined, 90, 114, 142
Disregard of Froebel’s instructions by his disciples, 147, 170
End and Aim of, 90, 142, 208, 210
Gifts and Occupations, _refer to_ title Gifts
No gulf between Kindergarten and “The Education of Man,” 210,
212 _note_
King, Mr. Irving, quoted, 8, 26, 48, 49, 50-2, 54
Kirkpatrick, Mr., quoted, 79-80, 114, 115, 117, 134
L
Lamarck, reference to, 201
Language
Development of capacity for Speech, 97-101
Earliest Training, Use in--Names the beginning of Organization, 21,
29, 45, 46, 98, 100
Feeling, Development of, 58
Location, Sense of, 152, 153
Source of questioning Activity, 97
Lodge, Sir Oliver, quoted, 32
M
McDougall, Mr., quoted, 68, 76, 86, 89, 117
MacVannel, Dr. J. A., quoted, 10
Marenholz, Madame von, 205
Material of Instruction and Manner of Teaching--Conditioned by stage
of Development, 129
Maternal Instinct, 119, 120
Mathematical Perceptions--Over-estimate of Children’s Capacity, 170-4
Memory--Froebel’s Description, 19
Mental Activity, 3, 4, 13, 23-7
Earlier and later Forms, 30
Possibilities--Difference between Child and Animal, 49
Sense and Understanding, Close connection, 17, 20, 207
Mental Analysis, _see_ Analysis of Mind
Metaphor, Froebel’s delight in, 187-8
Moral Faculty, 116, 118, 207
Morgan, Prof. Lloyd, quoted, 33, 67, 72
Mother Wit--Need for Thought and Training, 120, 211
Movement, _see_ Activity
Münsterberg, Prof., quoted, 218
Music--Importance of early Training, 106
Mysticism, _see_ Symbolism
N
Naming, _refer to_ Language
Natural Instincts, _see_ Instincts
Non-Interference, Froebel’s Theory of, 190-5
Number, Discovery of, 101, 102
O
Observation of Children, 4-6, 8, 9, 29, 74, 87, 92, 94, 96, 103, 104,
109, 111, 133, 162, 165
Order, Sense of, and the Instinct of Rhythm, 115, 116
Organization and Language, 21, 29, 45-6, 100
Outer Factor in Perception, over-emphasized by Froebel, 171, 173, 174
O’Shea, Prof., quoted, 97, 191, 200, 207, 216
P
Parental Instinct, 119, 120
Personality, Consciousness of, _see_ Self-Consciousness
Philosophy, Froebel’s, 10
Physical and Psychical, Close connection between, 17, 20, 207
Play
Amusement, Distinction from, 134
Biological View, 138
Classifications (Froebel and Groos), 145, 219
Earliest Childhood, Play in, 124, 125, 128, 130, 147
Educative Value, Originality of Froebel’s View, 122
Groos’ Criteria, 130
Guidance needed, 143, 145 and _note_
Imitative Play, 88
Joy in Games, 133, 136, 139
Recreative Play, 122
Self-Consciousness, Development of, in Boyhood, 56
Social Virtues, Development by Games, 111, 144, 146
Surplus Energy Theory, 123, 144
Theories of Play--Recapitulation and Preparation, 138, 140, 141, 142
Work and Play
Distinction between--Froebel’s definition, 124, 128
Earliest Activity--No Differentiation, 130, 131
Early Boyhood, Differentiation in, 131, 132
Playgrounds, Importance of, 143
Play-Material
Definite prescription impossible, 167
First Playthings, 153
Importance in relation to Development, 148, 149
Mistake of giving expensive and complex toys, 164
Number and variety of games noted, 147
Object of Froebel’s play-material, 93
_See_ also title Gifts
Poems and Songs, Use in Development of Feeling, 58, 130
Preyer quoted, 52
Psychological Basis for Educational Theories, 2
Pugnacity, Instinct of, 86
Purpose of Education, 200
_Refer also to_ Self-Consciousness
Q
Quantity, Relations of, 101
Questioning Activity, 97
R
Reflection, Development of, 75
Religious Instincts
Foundation in Social Instincts, 115, 117
Morality and Religion, 118
Work and Religion, 127
Religious Convictions of Froebel, 205-6
Repetition, Impressions fixed by, 43, 152
Representation (Darstellung), _see_ Expression
Rhythm--Importance of early development of Instinct, 106, 160, 187
Order, Sense of, Connection with, 115, 116
Ribot quoted, 90, 126
Romanes quoted, 68
Royce, Prof., quoted, 31
S
Seele, Ida, 209
Self-Abasement and Self-Assertion, Instincts of, 86
Self-Consciousness, Development of, 52, 53, 56, 84, 109, 116, 117, 153
Early Developments, 54, 55
Indefiniteness of Instinct rendering development possible, 82
Purpose of Education and “End of Man,” 30-5, 53, 178
Tales, Craving for, due to nascent idea of Self, 57, 107
Self-Determination, _refer to_ Will
Self-Employment, _refer to_ Activity
Self-Instruction, Instinct of, _refer to_ Investigation
Sense and Movement, Connection of, 48
Sense and Understanding, Close connection of, 17, 20, 207
Separation attempted in use of “Gifts”--Psychological error, 175-6
Service as Expression of Feeling, 59, 60
Social Instinct
Development from the “Feeling of Community,” 91, 110-12
Early Training essential, 63-4, 112
Games, Education in, 111-12, 144, 146
Religious Instincts, Foundation of, 115, 117
Speech, _refer to_ Language
Spencer, Herbert, quoted, 206
Sphere and Cube (Gift II)--Material for Comparison, 41, 159, 161
Spontaneous Activity, _see_ Activity
Stories, Interest in, 57, 107
Stout, Prof., quoted, 3, 4, 12, 22, 23, 24, 26, 36, 37, 38, 48, 73,
135, 213, 215, 216
Summary of Froebel’s Educational Principles, 6
“Surplus Energy” Theory, 123, 144
Symbolism--Froebel’s alleged excessive and far-fetched Symbolism, 169,
179-82
Exaggeration by disciples and translators, 183-6, 188
Instances--Practical application usually harmless, 186-7
T
Tales, Craving for, 57, 107
Thorndyke, Prof., quoted, 180
Time-Relations, 155
Toys, _refer to_ titles Gifts and Play-Material
Tri-une Nature of Man, 10, 32, 34, 89, 116, 126
U
Unfoldment, Doctrine of, _see_ Development
Unification or Connection, Law of, 204-5
Unity and Complexity, 155, 157, 158
Froebel’s yearning for Unity, 199, 217
W
Wallas, Mr. Graham--Criticisms of Froebel, 190, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201,
208
Ward, Dr., quoted, 17, 20, 36, 37, 38, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158
Welton, Prof., quoted, 212 _note_
Will
Definitions (Froebel and Stout), 22
Development
Action and Feeling, Development through, 35
Bound up with Intellectual Development, 26, 27
Parallel Accounts (Froebel and Stout), 27, 28
Self-Consciousness involving true volition, 30
Winch, Mr.--Criticism of Froebel, 192 _note_, 207
Women’s Work in Education--Intelligent knowledge needed in addition to
natural Instinct, 120, 211
Work
Condition of best work, 127, 128
Play, Relation to, _see_ title Play
Religion and Work, 118, 119
Wundt, Prof., quoted, 68
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