INSTINCT AND INSTINCTS
“The older writings on Instinct are ineffectual wastes of words,”
writes Professor James, “because their authors never came down to this
simple and definite idea (that the nervous system is to a great extent
a pre-organized bundle of reactions), but smothered everything in vague
wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic power of animals--so superior to
anything in Man.”[24]
Froebel was certainly not in a position to know much of the nervous
system, but what he wrote about instinct cannot be classed with these
older writings. For even without modern knowledge, he waxes indignant
over the opinions of those who created James’ “ineffectual wastes
of words.” Far from allowing that instinct in the lower animals is
superior to anything in man, Froebel maintains that the very weakness,
indefiniteness of man’s instincts or impulses (Triebe) is a sign of his
superiority.
“Notwithstanding the early manifestation in the human infant
of the impulse to employment (Beschäftigungstriebe), much
has been said from an entirely wrong point of view about
man’s helplessness at birth, and his slow development to
independence, which necessitates for so long a period the
care and help of the mother. It has even been said, that,
in this respect, man’s position is behind and below that of
other animals. But that very point, which has been cited as
evidence of man’s imperfection, is a proof of his worth. For we
recognize through this helplessness, that man is called to ever
higher self-consciousness.”--_P., p. 24._
At the same time it should be pointed out that Froebel does not make
the opposite mistake of supposing that man has no instincts. Since he
approached psychology from the biological side, so far as it could be
known to him, Froebel was bound to have faith in instinct, in race-habit,
in tendencies which, because they have been of use to the race, are
bedded in the nature of each individual. It is to Froebel’s later
writings and especially to the little paper, on “The First Action of a
Child,” that we must turn to see how wonderfully correct are his views on
the whole question of instinct.
It may be better to give first the position of modern writers on the
subject by quoting from the last chapter of Professor Lloyd Morgan’s
“Habit and Instinct,” a clear and concise passage showing that the
contrary schools of thought represented on the one hand by the Darwin and
Romanes and on the other by Professors James and Wundt, can after all be
resolved into a matter of definition.
“If, then, the question be asked, whether man has a large or a small
endowment of instinct, the answer will depend upon the precise definition
of ‘instinct.’ If we take congenital definiteness as characteristic
of instinct, we shall agree with Darwin, that ‘the fewness and the
comparative simplicity of the instincts of the higher animals are
remarkable as compared with those of lower animals;’ and with Romanes
that ‘instinct plays a larger part in the psychology of many animals
than it does in the psychology of man.’ If, on the other hand, a broader
definition of instinct be accepted, so as to include what is innate,
in the sense before defined, we shall agree with Professor Wundt that
human life is ‘permeated through and through with instinctive action,
determined in part, however, by intelligence and volition;’ and shall not
profoundly disagree with Professor Wm. James, who says that man possesses
all the impulses that they (the lower animals) have and a great many more
besides.”
In Mr. McDougall’s important contribution to the discussion of human
instinct, he says that the view which is rapidly gaining ground is that
the gradual evolution of intelligence “did not supplant and lead to the
atrophy of the instincts, but controlled and modified their operation.”
As Mr. McDougall goes on to state his belief “that the recognition of the
full scope and function of the human instincts will appear to those that
come after us as the most important advance made by psychology in our
time,” it is important to the purpose of this book, to make clear to what
extent Froebel’s views on the subject approach those of modern writers.
Mr. McDougall makes a very clear distinction between specific tendencies
to which he limits the word instinct, and non-specific or general
tendencies. Naturally Froebel did not reach this standpoint, but he
does seem to have thought out his terminology. He felt strongly as
to the use of words of foreign origin, and generally uses “_Trieb_,”
“_Lebenstrieb_,” “_Drang_” or “_Lebensdrang_,” where we might use
instinct. But he does occasionally use “instinct,” notably in a passage
quoted below “whose impulses, powers and abilities, whose instincts
as they are called” (dessen Lebenstriebe Kräfte und Anlagen, dessen
Instincte wie man es nennt), where he seems to be feeling about for
the right expression. Other words in constant use are “_Neigung_,”
“_Streben_” and “_Richtung_,” probably best translated by “tendency.” It
can be argued, however, that to the word Trieb Froebel does seem to have
attached a more definite meaning, and his use of this word is certainly
limited.
Professor James’ account of instinct begins with the statement that
“Every instinct is an impulse,” a driving to action, but the use of the
words “_Trieb_” and “_Drang_” makes such a pronouncement unnecessary to
a German writer, and if this root idea is not implied by the noun, it
generally, in Froebel’s writings, makes its appearance in the verb. Thus
we frequently read of “a longing which drives the child to,” etc. (die
Sehnsucht die das Kind treibt).
The merest glance through Froebel’s writings is enough to show his belief
in the existence of instinct in the human being. His references to it are
constant. It is an impulse (Trieb) “which the child did not give himself,
which came without his will, in later life even against his will,” but
which “urges to action” (drängt ihn dazu). It is a force so strong, that
it “holds captive mind and body.” The child is described as “driven by
impulse” (des von Lebensdrang getriebenen Kindes). The boy again is “held
captive by harmless, even praiseworthy, impulses” (sogar lobenswerten
Triebe), or “gives himself up entirely to the impulses of his inner life”
(dem Treibenden innern Leben).
In his earlier work, “The Education of Man,” Froebel is first concerned
with urging that the young human being, “a product of Nature,” has
instincts quite as trustworthy as those of any other young animal, and
the following eloquent passage is very well known:
“The undisturbed working of the Divine Unity is necessarily
good, and this implies that the young human being, still as it
were in the process of creation, would seek as a product of
Nature, though still unconsciously, yet decidedly and surely
that which is in itself best: and, moreover, in a form wholly
adapted to his condition, disposition, powers and means. Thus
the duckling hastens to the pond, while the young chicken
scratches the ground, and the young swallow catches his food
upon the wing and scarcely ever touches the ground. We grant
space and time to young plants and animals because we know that
in accordance with the laws that live in them they will develop
properly and grow well. Arbitrary interference with their
growth is avoided because it is known that this would disturb
their development; but the young human being is looked upon as
a piece of wax, a lump of clay, which man can mould into what
he pleases.… Thus, O parents, could your children, on whom you
force in tender years forms and aims against their nature,
thus could your children too unfold in beauty and develop in
harmony.”--_E., p. 7._
It is true that to Froebel evolution is “the working of Divine Unity.”
But there seems to be no special reason why this should invalidate
what Froebel has to say, any more than Sir Oliver Lodge should be
disqualified as a scientist, because he has produced a book in which he
writes: “Development means unfolding latent possibilities … growth and
development are in accordance with the law of the universe … the law
of the universe and the will of God are here regarded as in some sort
synonymous terms.”
This is exactly Froebel’s position; he writes that
“Nature and man have their origin in one and the same eternal
Being, and their development takes place in accordance with the
same laws, only at different stages.”--_E., p. 161._
That Froebel not only recognized the presence of instinct in human
beings, but that he also saw, as Professor Wundt puts it, that this
is “determined in parts by intelligence and volition,” he states very
plainly:
“Natural instinct and good example will do much, but here,
as in all human concerns, one must proceed by extension of
knowledge, and by careful scrutiny, or both the one and the
other may mislead or be misdirected. Experience cries aloud
to us, to warn us of this danger. _Assuredly man ought not to
neglect his natural instincts, still less abandon them, but he
must ennoble them through his intelligence, purify them through
his reason._”--_L., p. 222._
“In the progress of development three stages differentiate
themselves and fall apart; and these stages are seen both in
individual men, and in the race as a whole. They are:
(1) _Unconsciousness, the merely instinctive stage_;
(2) _Vague Feeling, the tendency upwards towards
consciousness_; and
(3) _Relatively clear Conscious Intelligence_.
Everything that is acquired by a great unity, say by a family,
a community, a nation, must in its beginnings be acquired by
the single members of that unity; and further it will take
them in one of the three grades of development, either that of
mere unconsciousness, or of vague feeling, or in the third and
highest grade, that of conscious intelligence, so far as it has
been maintained by mankind up to the present time.”--(Letter to
Madame D. Lutkens, dated March, 1851.)
It is in “The First Action of a Child” that we find Froebel contrasting
the instincts of the lower animals with those of man. Here curiously
enough, Froebel, according to Professor Stout, is almost more correct
than Professor Lloyd Morgan himself, whose statement “that animals do not
perceive relations” Professor Stout regards as misleading. His correction
is, “unless an artificial restriction is put on the meaning of the term
_relation_, this statement would imply that animals cannot perceive the
position of objects in space or their motion.… Hence we should say,
not that the perception of relation is deficient in animals, but only
that definite perception of relations is deficient which depends on
comparison.”
Now it is this very point of comparison which Froebel takes as the
essential intellectual difference between the animal independent from
birth thanks to fully developed instinct, and the child helpless and
apparently inferior at first, yet destined for progress “self-active and
free.” He writes:
“The animal whose life impulses, powers and abilities, whose
instincts as they are called (dessen Lebenstriebe, Kräfte
und Anlagen, dessen Instincte wie man es nennt) are at once
so definite and strong, that in natural conditions it never
fails, indeed cannot fail to overcome every hindrance within
its life’s reach, the animal just on this account can never
arrive at a knowledge of its powers, its qualities, its nature
… _for it lacks all points of comparison. It lacks all points
of comparison, which, in the case of man proceed from the fact
that the weakest output of strength meets with obstacles_ which
increase as the strength increases, and which will only with
difficulty be conquered or overcome and annihilated.
“It is quite different in the life of man, in the beginning
of which practically nothing can be accomplished without help
from without. Nothing especially can be accomplished through
a preponderance of inner power such, for example, as the
newly hatched duckling shows on the water. Thus everything
external must, by Man, with his preponderance of helplessness,
be overcome as an obstacle solely through inner advancing,
and outer strengthening and increasing of power through free
activity of the will.”--_P., p. 25._
With this passage from “The First Action of a Child” we can compare the
following from Stout’s “Analytic Psychology”:
“The peculiar feature in the life of animals which prevents progressive
development is the existence of instincts which do for them what the
human being must do for himself. Their inherited organization is such,
that they perform the movements adapted to supply their needs on the
mere occurrence of an appropriate external stimulus.… In man, a blind
craving has to grope its way from darkness into light in order to become
effective; in the animal the means of satisfaction are provided ready
made by Nature at the outset.”
After having stated that “Every instinct is an impulse,” Professor James
goes on to say that instinct depends upon the biological fact that the
nervous system is “a pre-organized bundle of re-actions,” and that when
impulses block one another, an animal with many impulses, and whose mind
is elevated enough to discriminate, “loses the instinctive demeanour and
appears to live a life of hesitation and choice, an intellectual life.”
Notwithstanding the very obvious fact that Froebel could know but little
of the nervous system and its re-actions, it is still quite evident
that his observation had led him to a clear recognition of the earlier
stage, when “hesitation and choice” are impossible. The child, he says,
“acts in obedience to an instinct which holds captive mind and body,”
he is “incredibly short-sighted in his obedience to instinct.” That he
also recognized the beginning of hesitation and choice is shown in his
defence of the child who “in spite of abandonment to momentary impulse,”
may have “an intense inner desire for goodness,” which, “if it could
be appreciated in time,” would make of him a good man (_E., p. 125_);
and also in his plea for the early awakening and training “of judgment
and of that reflection which avoids so many blunders and which, _in a
natural way_ (i.e. without training), does not come to man sufficiently
early.”--_E., p. 79._
“Another source of boyish faults is in the precipitation,
want of caution, indiscretion, in a word the thoughtlessness,
the acting according to an impulse quite blameless, even
praiseworthy, which holds captive all activity of mind and
body, but whose consequences have not as yet entered into his
experience, indeed it has not yet entered into his mind to
define the consequences.”--_E., p. 122._
Froebel gives from real life a few well-chosen examples of what the
boy so “incredibly short-sighted in his obedience to impulse” may do;
telling how one deliberately aims a stone at a window “with earnest
effort to hit it, yet without even saying to himself that if it does
so, the window must be broken,” and how he “stands rooted to the spot”
when this happens. Another, a “very good-hearted boy, who dearly loved
and took care of pigeons, aimed at his neighbour’s pigeon on the roof,
without considering that if the bullet hit it the dove must fall.” No
wonder that he urges the early awakening of that reflection (Nachdenken)
which would avoid so much, and in this connection it must be remembered
too that Froebel emphasized the indefiniteness of human instinct which
makes comparison possible. It is also worth remarking that Froebel knew
that it is only by noting consequences of actual deeds that reflection
comes, and this he shows in one of his quaint parallels between “the
history of creation and the development of all things.”
“Similarly in each child there is repeated the deed which marks
the beginning of moral and human emancipation, of the dawn
of reason--essentially the same deed that marked the dawn of
reason in the race as a whole.”--_E., p. 41._
It must have been a somewhat unorthodox view in 1826, but some pages
further on Froebel speaks even more boldly of “the fall or--since the
result is the same--the ascent of the mind of man from simple emotional
development into the development of externally analytic and critical
reason.”--_E., p. 193._
Professor James goes on to state two other principles which make for
non-uniformity of instinct. The first of these is that instincts are
inhibited by habits, and the second that instincts are transitory.
The physiological fact of “plasticity” in which these principles are
grounded, was of course quite out of Froebel’s ken. Nevertheless, the
principles themselves do not escape his shrewd observation. Mr. McDougall
points out that even acquired habits of thought and action, so important
as springs of action in the developed human mind, are in a sense
derived from and secondary to instincts. He goes on to say that “in the
absence of instincts no habits could be formed,” so it is interesting
to find Froebel arguing that the phenomena of habit is a proof of the
existence of what in the infant he calls the impulse to activity or to
self-employment.
“The helplessness of the new-born human being in regard to
all outer things is the opposite of his future ability--since
life is a whole--to help himself through the enhancing of
his will-power.… Helplessness and personal will, therefore,
become the two points between which the child’s life turns, and
the fulcrum is free activity. Herein lies for the educator a
key to phenomena of child-life which seem to contradict each
other. For out of the impulse to activity (Thätigkeitstriebe)
and to free self-employment, or rather out of the united
three--helplessness, personal will, and self-employment--soon
proceed custom and habit, often indolence and too facile
yielding.
“Consideration of custom, and of the spontaneous acquiring
of habit in the child, especially in regard to what causes
it, and to its effect upon the child, is just as important
for the educator, as is the consideration and guidance of his
instinct of activity. This very phenomenon that the child so
early accustoms and inures himself to something, this early
phenomenon of child life, the growing together and becoming
one, as it were, with his surroundings, is a proof of the
existence and inner working, even thus early, of the impulse
for activity or employment, even where the child appears
outwardly inactive and passive: in that the child accommodates
himself to outer surroundings, relations and requirements in
order to provide more scope for his inner activity.”--_P., p.
27._
This proof may not be quite so clear to others as it was to Froebel,
but at least the passage shows the close connection in his mind between
instinct--the impulse towards activity and employment--and habit, and
that he had noted the interaction between the two.
There are many references to the transitory nature of at least childish
impulses.
“What delight a child takes in noticing what is smooth, woolly,
hairy, sparkling, round, etc.… But if you do not cherish this
and do not set it going in the right way, it becomes a lost
thing; it grows rusty, and loses its power as a magnet loses
its power when it is not sufficiently used. Power that is not
at once used, effort that does not at once meet the right
object--perishes.”--_M., p. 181._
“Now, at last, we would fain give another direction to the
energies, desires and instincts (Kräfte, Neigungen und Triebe)
of the child growing into boyhood; but it is too late. For the
deep meaning of child-life passing into boyhood we not only
failed to appreciate, but we misjudged it; we not only failed
to nurse it, but we misdirected and crushed it.”--_E., p. 75._
“See parents, the first impulse to activity, the first
constructive impulse (Bildungstrieb) comes from man according
to the nature of the working of his mind, unconsciously,
unrecognized, without his will, as man can indeed perceive
in himself in later life. If, however, this inner summons to
activity (diese innere Aufforderung zur Thätigkeit) meets
with outer hindrance, especially such a one as the will of
the parents, which cannot be set aside, the power is at
once weakened in itself, and with many repetitions of this
weakening, falls into inaction.”--_E., p. 100._
“The neglect of inner power causes the inner power itself to
vanish.”--_E., p. 133._
“It is true there are few such children; but there would be
more, were we not ignorantly blunting so many tendencies in our
children, or starving them into inanition.”--_E., p. 220._
Writing of the origin of boyish faults Froebel says:
“When we look for the sources of these shortcomings … we find
a double reason, first, complete neglect of the development
of certain sides of human life, secondly early misdirection,
early unnatural stages in development, and distortion, through
arbitrary interference with human powers, qualities and
tendencies good in their source.… Therefore at the bottom of
every shortcoming in man, lies a crushed, frustrated quality or
tendency, suppressed, misunderstood or misguided.”--_E., pp.
119-121._
When we come to the enumeration of the various human instincts we find
that Froebel can hardly be said to have omitted any that are important
from an educational point of view, except perhaps the instinct of fear,
and to this he would be loth to appeal.[25] Moreover, it can be shown
that his explanation of certain tendencies suggests a better basis of
classification than is supplied by certain recent writers, who might be
expected to surpass him with ease.
Before the publication of Mr. McDougall’s “Social Psychology,” there were
but few attempts at any classification of instincts within at least the
reach of English readers. In July, 1900, there appeared an article in
“The Pedagogical Seminary” in which Mr. Eby proposed to reconstruct the
Kindergarten on the basis of natural instinct. The writer had apparently
no dawning idea that this was the original basis[26] of the institution
he proposes to reform, but Froebel’s account of Instinct shows in certain
ways a clearer understanding of the subject than does his own.
Mr. Eby’s tabulation was:
I. Language--with gesture and expression.
II. Curiosity, or Instinct for Knowledge.
III. Play Instinct.
(_a_) Motor Plays.
(_b_) Hunting and Wandering.
(_c_) Imitative.
(_d_) Constructive.
(_e_) Agricultural.
(_f_) Improvised.
IV. Artistic and Aesthetic Instincts.
V. Social Instinct.
VI. Instinct of Acquisition and Ownership.
VII. Number Instinct.
VIII. Interest in Stories.
Another classification, well known at least to teachers, is that given by
Mr. Kirkpatrick in his “Fundamentals of Child Study.”[27]
His list comprises:
I. Individual or Self-preserving Instincts.
(Feeding, Fear and Fighting.)
II. Parental Instincts.
III. Social or Group Instincts.
(Gregariousness, Sympathy, Love of Approbation, Altruism.)
IV. Adaptive Instincts.
(Imitation, Play, Curiosity.)
V. Regulative.
(Moral, Religious.)
VI. Resultant and Miscellaneous.
(Including such tendencies as those of
collecting and constructing, and the
tendency to adornment, with the
æsthetic pleasure of contemplating
beautiful objects.)
Interesting, helpful and suggestive as these lists are, they both serve
as examples of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of any hard-and-fast
lines of classification. For example, regulative instincts, which Mr.
Kirkpatrick divides into moral and religious, must be derived from social
instincts; gregarious instincts cannot be satisfactorily separated from
instincts of self-preservation, and surely all instincts must be adaptive.
Froebel’s account of the instincts of a child in some ways resembles that
of Mr. McDougall, and it is certainly in some points more enlightening
than either of the others.
Under the heading of Investigation, Froebel brings both the Number
Instinct, and the Interest in Stories, to which Mr. Eby gives a position
as fundamental as that of the Social Instinct. The constructive instinct
which Mr. Kirkpatrick brings under “Resultant and Miscellaneous,” has a
very special place in Froebel’s account, as being one way of imitating,
that is another mode of investigating the surroundings, and also what is
equally important, a way by which the child gains a knowledge of his own
power, reaches Self-Consciousness.
It is because of the emphasis Froebel continually lays upon the
developing self-consciousness that his views somewhat tend to resemble
those of Mr. McDougall, though it would be absurd to attempt to draw
any parallel. For Froebel, though he in no way minimizes the importance
of Imitation, and although it is as the apostle of Play that he is
most widely known, yet, like Mr. McDougall, he never speaks either of
an Instinct of Play nor of Imitation, that is, he never uses for these
his special word Trieb; nor has he any Instinct for Religion. Curiously
enough, too, Froebel, with his constant insistence on the threefold
aspect of mind, partly forestalls Mr. McDougall’s view that “instinctive
action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process, one which is
incapable of being described in purely mechanical terms, … and one which,
like every other mental process, has and can only be fully described in
terms of the three aspects of all mental process, the cognitive, the
affective, and the conative aspects.”
It is in connection with the very earliest activity that Froebel writes:
“The first phenomenon of awakening child-life is activity.
It is an inner activity, showing itself by consideration of
and working with what is outer, by overcoming hindrances and
subduing the outer. The nature of man as growing towards, and
destined to reach self-consciousness, is shown in the quite
peculiar character of childish activity even as early as when
the infant awakes from its so-called three months’ slumber. It
is shown in the child’s impulse to busy himself (in dem Triebe
sich zu beschäftigen) in the instinct, _one with feeling and
perception_, to be active for the progressive development of
his own life.
“We are repeatedly impressed with the conviction that
everything that is to be done for the specifically human
development of the child must be connected with the fostering
of this instinct to employ himself. For _this instinct
corresponds to man’s triune activity of doing, feeling and
thinking. It corresponds to the essential nature of humanity,
which is to have power and understanding, to become ever more
and more self-conscious and self-determining._”--_P., p. 24._
In the last sentence of this passage, which refers to the merest infant,
and which immediately precedes Froebel’s comparison of human instincts
with those of the lower animals, are indicated the lines on which we
may say Froebel classified though he never did so formally. He deals
only with the “purely” or “specifically” human, as he never tires of
reiterating, so that fundamental animal instincts, self-preserving and
race-preserving, such as feeding and the sexual impulse, are little
noticed, and only in connection with the necessity for self-control.
But, as with Mr. McDougall much is made to depend on self-feeling,
so with Froebel still more does everything centre round that
self-consciousness which to him is of the very nature of man, and which
is made possible by the undefined or undeveloped character of human
instinct.
The instincts and impulses noted by Froebel, all, be it clearly
understood, in the service of the growing self-consciousness, and
self-determination are: the instinct to independent activity (der
Trieb zur Frei- und Selbst-thätigkeit), the instinct to investigation
(Forschungstrieb), with which Froebel deals very thoroughly and by which
he explains a great deal, the impulse of acquisition, the instinct of
construction or formation (Bildungstrieb Gestaltungstrieb), the social
instinct and the maternal instinct.
Froebel himself never tabulates, yet his apparently careful use of the
word Trieb, taken along with his convincing explanations of various
tendencies (Richtungen, Neigungen, Streben) seems to show that in
relation to instinct there were in his mind two pairs of ideas, so
closely related as to be inseparable, viz.:
(_a_) Investigation and Control of Surroundings, and (_b_) Consciousness
of Self and Self-Determination.
It is impossible to become conscious of one’s self except by becoming
conscious of a world of objects.[28] It is equally impossible to
become self-determining without gaining control over these objects,
over the surroundings. In order to control the surroundings, one
must first investigate them, and this investigation brings with it
self-consciousness, knowledge of one’s own powers and consequent
self-determination. All this seems fully in accordance with what has
been already stated as to the close connection between volitional and
intellectual development.
The two main lines on which instinctive action must run, if it is to be,
as it must be, adaptive, are given in Froebel’s words, “to have power
and understanding.” To adapt ourselves to our surroundings we must first
know them, and secondly, have power over them. Even this separation
into firstly and secondly is more a matter of words than of reality.
No one knew more clearly or emphasized more strongly than Froebel that
action, by which alone we gain power, is also the child’s royal road to
knowledge. This he states very plainly in the “Plan” which he drew up for
the school at Helba, which unfortunately never came into existence.
“The institution will be fundamental inasmuch as in training
and instruction it will rest on the foundation from which
proceed all genuine knowledge and all genuine practical
attainments; it will rest on life itself and on creative
effort, on the union and interdependence of doing and thinking,
representation and knowledge, art and science. The institution
will base its work on the pupil’s personal efforts in work and
expression, making these, again, the foundation of all genuine
knowledge and culture. Joined with thoughtfulness these efforts
become a direct medium of culture; joined with reasoning, they
become a direct means of instruction and thus make of work a
true subject of instruction.”--_E., p. 38._
Knowledge of his surroundings is however not the only knowledge that the
child gains through action; this is his only way of gaining knowledge of
himself, of his power and of his weakness. It is through outward activity
that, as Froebel says, he “comes to self-consciousness and learns to
order, determine and master himself,” and it is in connection with the
earliest Impulse to Activity that Froebel writes:
“The present effort of mankind is an effort after freer
self-development, freer self-formation, freer determining of
one’s own destiny.… Therefore the more or less clear aim of
the individual is Consciousness, the attaining of clearness
about himself and about life in its unity as well as in its
thousand ramifications, to attain to _comprehension and right
use_ of life.… That this highest aim may be accomplished,
the present time lays upon the educator the indispensable
obligation--to understand the earliest activity, the first
action of the child, the impulse (Trieb) to spontaneous
activity, which appears so early; to foster the impulse (Trieb)
for self-culture and self-instruction, through independent
doing, observing and experimenting.”--_P., p. 15._
“The first spontaneous employments of the child are noticing
his environment, and play, that is, independent outward action,
living outside himself.… The deepest foundation of all the
phenomena, of the earliest activity of the child is this; that
he must exercise the dim anticipation of conscious life, and
consequently must exercise power, test and thus compare power,
exercise independence, test and thus compare the degree of
independence.”--_P., pp. 29-31._
“All outer activity of the child has its distinctive and
ultimate ground in his inmost nature and life. The deepest
craving of this inner life, this inner activity, is to behold
itself mirrored in some external object. In and through
such reflection the child learns to know his own activity,
its essence, direction and aim, and learns also to order
and determine his activity in correspondence with the outer
phenomena. Such mirroring of the inner life, such making of the
inner life objective is essential, for through it the child
comes to self-consciousness, and learns to order, determine and
master himself. The child must perceive and grasp his own life
in an objective manifestation before he can perceive and grasp
it in himself.”--_P., p. 238._
It may seem very presumptuous to venture to discuss here the
classification of instincts adopted by Mr. McDougall, yet there are in
it a few points which would not have appealed to Froebel, and it is
conceivable that Mr. McDougall might make alterations in a future edition
and attach even more importance to positive self-feeling as Froebel
would undoubtedly have done. It is impossible to imagine Froebel having
any dealings with an Instinct of Self-Abasement, though the Instinct of
Self-Assertion is in full accordance with his ideas. And while it is hard
to see the biological utility of an Instinct of Self-Abasement, it does
seem as if the frustration of the Instinct of Self-Assertion might be
made to cover all that is brought under its opposite.
It is difficult, too, to imagine Froebel allowing an Instinct of
Pugnacity, and Mr. McDougall allows that this presupposes the other
instincts, and that it cannot strictly be brought under his own
definition of instinct. He allows, too, that this instinct is “lacking in
the constitution of the females of some species,” and it seems impossible
not to notice the difference between little boys and girls in this
respect. Surely it puts too much to the credit of mere pugnacity to say:
“A man devoid of the pugnacious instinct would not only be incapable
of anger, but would lack this great source of reserve energy, which
is called into play in most of us by any difficulty in our path.”[29]
The Instinct of Self-Assertion, if it is worth anything, ought to be
sufficient not only to produce anger,[30] but also to call up reserve
energy to deal with difficulties. Certainly Froebel would have said so.
No doubt it is because of her weaker physique that the woman has not
the pugnacity of the man, but Froebel too wrote mainly of the boy, and
he puts boyish tussling and fighting down to the instinctive desire to
measure and to increase power and this can easily be matched on the
female side, though the power measured may not be that of muscle.
“At this age the healthy boy brought up simply and naturally
never evades an obstacle, a difficulty; nay he seeks it and
overcomes it. ‘Let it lie,’ the vigorous youngster exclaims to
his father, who is about to roll a piece of wood out of the
boy’s way--‘let it lie, I can get over it.’ With difficulty,
indeed, the boy gets over it the first time; but he has
accomplished the feat by his own strength. Strength and courage
have grown in him. He returns, gets over the obstacle a
second time, and soon he learns to clear it easily.… The most
difficult thing seems easy, the most daring thing seems without
danger to him, for his prompting comes from the innermost, from
his heart and will.”--_E., p. 102._
“Many of the plays and occupations of boys at this age are
predominantly mere practice and trials of strength, and many
aim simply at display of strength.… _The boy tries to see
himself in his companions, to feel himself in them, to weigh
and measure himself by them, to know and find himself with
their help._”--_E., pp. 112-114._
In passing, it may be suggested that it hardly seems worth while to
postulate an Instinct of Repulsion with the impulses or actions of
rejecting evil-tasting substances from the mouth and of shrinking from
objects which are slimy or slippery. Surely the rejection of unsuitable
food might be a compound reflex action tending to the preservation of
health; while shrinking from slimy objects, and even from the touch of
fur, might have had their uses in the case of children left in caves, and
might be drawn under the instinct of fear.
There does not seem to be anything to which Mr. McDougall would take
exception in what Froebel has to say about Play or about Imitation.
As to play, Froebel must be regarded as a pioneer in the attempt to
explain a subject all important to educators, and by his explanation
certain kinds, and notably imitative play find an appropriate place under
his instinct of investigation (Forschungstrieb).
“The means of shadowing forth to the child his own nature and
that of the cosmos are his play and playthings.”--_P., p. 201._
As the word Investigation certainly implies activity, it may be
permissible to wonder why Mr. McDougall has not made use of the terms
“The Instinct of Investigation and the Emotion of Curiosity,” the more
so that he himself has clearly a strong inclination to use the word
curiosity to express emotion.[31]
Imitation, as we have seen,[32] is, according to Froebel, action which
renders a child conscious of what is around him, conscious of his inner
life of perceptions, ideas and feelings, conscious of his own power.
Froebel also points out that imitation, as well as habit, is the outcome
of a more fundamental impulse to activity.
“It is just as important to notice the habits of a child,
especially with regard to cause and effect, as it is to notice
and to foster its impulse to activity.… As now habit springs
from free and spontaneous activity, so too does imitation, and
it is no less important for the fostering of child-life to keep
in view this origin of imitation, than it is to keep in view
the phenomena of habit, custom and independent activity. For
we see the whole inner life of the child manifest itself as a
tri-unity in the threefold phenomenon of spontaneous activity,
habit and imitation. These three phenomena are closely united
in early childhood, and give us most important discoveries
concerning child-life, as to foundation and result and surest
guides for the early correct treatment of the child.”--_P., p.
27._
Mr. McDougall notes “at least three distinct classes” of imitative
actions. The first class consists of expressive actions, secondary to
the sympathetic induction of the emotions they express, as when a child
responds to a smile with a smile, and here we remember how Froebel notes
the child’s first smile to his mother as the earliest sign of what he
calls “the feeling of community.” The third class is the deliberate and
voluntary imitation of an admired person, which does not concern us here.
The second class are “simple ideo-motor actions evoked by the visual
presentation of a movement,” and as a parallel to this we have Froebel’s
“working of the inner activity wakened by the sight of outer activity.”
“The smallest child moves joyfully, springs gaily, hops up and
down, or beats with his arms when he sees a moving object. This
is certainly not merely delight in the movement of the object
before him, but _it is the working of inner activity wakened in
him by the sight of outer activity_. Through such vision the
inner life has been freed.…”--_P., pp. 239-40._
A point to which exception may well be taken is that in the infant
Froebel notes what he seems to regard as a fundamental tendency, the
impulse or instinct of activity, or as he frequently puts it, the impulse
to busy oneself, which, however, soon differentiates into two more
specific tendencies, viz. the impulse to investigate and the constructive
impulse.
“What formerly the child did only for the sake of activity,
the boy now does for the sake of the result or product of his
activity. The child’s impulse to activity (Thätigkeitstrieb)
has in the boy become a constructive, a formative impulse
(Bildungs-Gestaltungstriebe), in which the whole outer life of
the boy finds at this stage its outlet.”--_E., p. 99._
It may be worth mentioning that Groos would like to assume a “universal
impulse to activity,” and though he “can only hold fast to the primal
need for activity,” yet according to him Ribot approaches this
assumption.--(“The Play of Man,” _p. 3_).
Even in the infant, however, this instinct or impulse to activity is
devoted to “penetrating what is outer,” and the Kindergarten, meant for
children from three to six, is intended to foster the three instincts,
activity, investigation and construction, as well as to cultivate the
social instinct by placing a little child among his equals. Froebel
describes it in his plan as:
“An Institution for fostering of family life and for shaping
the life of the nation and human life generally, through
cultivating the human instincts of activity, of investigation
(Forschungstrieb), and of construction in the child, as a
member of the family, of the nation, and of humanity.…”--_P.,
p. 6._
As regards the child, the word Trieb, which is exactly equal to impulse,
seems to be applied only in one other direction, to what we would call
the social instinct, and here again Froebel shows his recognition of the
vagueness and indefiniteness of early consciousness. As he attributes to
the infant the one impulse to activity which differentiates later into
Investigation and Construction, so in the infant he recognizes a “feeling
of community” (Gesammtgefühl), but says that it differentiates later into
something more definite.[33]
“The development of man constitutes an unbroken whole, steadily
and continuously progressing, gradually ascending. The feeling
of community (Gemeingefühl) awakened in the infant, develops
in the child into impulse, inclination (entwickelt sich in dem
Kinde der Trieb, die Neigung).”--_E., p. 95._
Under the important Instinct of Investigation, or the Instinct for
Self-Instruction, Froebel includes a great deal. Many different
activities until recently somewhat carelessly talked of collectively
as “play,” Froebel has separated and explained as the child’s way of
investigating his surroundings. Even “the earliest activity and first
action of the child,” Froebel says, shows “the instinct to self-teaching
and self-instruction.”
Imitative action or imitative play is always referred to as action which
helps towards understanding of the surroundings. In the “Mother Songs” we
read:
“Your child will certainly understand all the better if you
make him take a part--though it be only by imitation--in
what grown-up people are doing in their anxiety to maintain
life.…”--_M., p. 141._
“I have already said that this little game arose because people
felt that a child’s love of activity, and his striving to get
the use of his limbs, ought to be carried on in such a way
as to lift him at once into the complexity of the life which
surrounds him.… Pray do not disturb them in their ingenious
charming play (saying grace over the dolls’ feast), but rather
avoid noticing it if you cannot identify yourself with its
charm.… For how is your child to cultivate in himself the
feeling of what is holy, if you will not grant that it takes
form for him in all its purity in his innocent games.”--_M., p.
148._
“What man tries to represent he begins to understand.”--_E., p.
76._
Representation, however, may be carried out in many ways, by the use of
material, as well as by bodily action so that the constructive instinct
also subserves that of investigation.
“To grasp a thing through life and action is much more
developing, cultivating and strengthening than merely to
receive it through the verbal communication of ideas.
Similarly, representation of a thing by material means, in life
and action, united with thought and speech, is more developing
than merely verbal representation of ideas.”--_E., p. 279._
“The child must perceive and grasp his own life in an objective
manifestation before he can perceive and grasp it in himself.
This law of development, prescribed by Nature and by the
essential character of the child, must always be respected and
obeyed by the true educator. Its recognition is the aim of my
gifts and games apprehended relatively to the educator.”--_P.,
p. 38._
Here Froebel has plainly stated the main object of his specially selected
play-material. The ordinary parent not being “the man advanced in
insight,” who “makes clear to himself the purpose of playthings,” Froebel
often saw children supplied with expensive but unsuitable toys, toys
which would not bring the child any nearer his destination, “to have
power and understanding, to become ever more and more self-conscious and
self-determining.”
“Here, then, we meet as a great imperfection in ordinary
playthings, a disturbing element which slumbers like a viper
under roses, viz. that it is too complex, too much finished.
The child can begin no new thing with it, cannot produce enough
variety by it; his power of creative imagination, his power of
giving outward form to his own idea is thus actually deadened.
When we provide children with too finished playthings, we
deprive them of the incentive to perceive the particular in
the general (_P., p. 122_).… What presents are most prized
by the child? Those which afford him a means of unfolding
his inner life most freely and of shaping it in various
directions.”--_P., p. 142._
“The man, advanced in insight, should be as clear as possible
in his own mind about all this before he introduces his
child into the outer world. Even when he gives the child a
plaything, he must make clear to himself its purpose, and the
purpose of playthings and occupation material in general. This
purpose is, to aid the child freely to express what is in
him and to bring the phenomena of the outer world nearer to
him.”--_P., p. 171._
“To realize his aims, man, and more particularly the child,
requires material, if it be only a bit of wood or a pebble with
which he makes something or which he makes into something. In
order to lead the child to the handling of material, we gave
him the soft ball, the wooden sphere and cube, etc., discussed
in the chapters on the Kindergarten Gifts. Each of these gifts
incites the child to free spontaneous activity, to independent
movement.”[34]--_P., p. 237._
As the child grows older his constructions advance, but still they
connect themselves with investigating:
“Here he makes a little garden under the hedge; there he
represents the course of the river in his furrow and in his
ditch; there he studies the effects of the fall or pressure of
water upon his little water-wheel.”--_E., p. 105._
Investigating naturally leads to exploring, “external objects invite him
who would bring them nearer to move toward them,” and so the child once
he is able to stand begins to travel:
“When the child makes his first attempts at walking he
frequently tries to go to some particular object. This effort
may have its source in the child’s desire to hold himself
firm and upright by it, but we also observe that it gives him
pleasure to be near the object, to touch it, to feel it, and
perhaps also--a new phase of activity--to be able to move it.
Hence we see the child hops up and down before it and beats
on it with his little hands, in order to assure himself of
the reality of the object, and to notice its qualities.… Each
new phenomenon is a discovery in the child’s small and yet
rich world--e.g. one can go round the chair, one can stand
before, behind, beside it, but one cannot go behind the bench
or the wall. He likes to change his relationship to different
objects, and through these changes he seeks self-recognition
and self-comprehension, as well as recognition of the different
objects which surround him, and recognition of his environment
as a whole. Each little walk is a tour of discovery; each
object is an America--a new world, which he either goes around
to see if it be an island, or whose coast he follows to
discover if it be a continent.”--_P., p. 243._
The boy has lost none of this tendency to explore, but he goes further
afield, and it is worth noting that because the boy has a distinct
purpose in view his exploring is distinctly called work.
“If activity brought joy to the child, work now gives delight
to the boy. Hence the daring and venturesome feats of boyhood;
the explorations of caves and ravines; the climbing of trees
and mountains; the searching of heights and depths; the roaming
through fields and forests.… To climb a new tree means to
the boy the discovery of a new world.… Not less significant
of development is the boy’s inclination (Neigung) to descend
into caves and ravines, to ramble in the shady grove and dark
forest.”--_E., pp. 102-5._
Even the baby shows trace of the collecting or acquiring instinct, but to
Froebel this still falls under the head of investigation. The child who
has just learned to walk is:
“attracted by the bright round smooth pebble, by the quaint
brilliant leaf, by the smooth piece of wood, and he tries to
get hold of these with the help of the newly acquired use of
his limbs. Look at the child that can scarcely keep himself
erect and that can walk only with the greatest care--he sees
a twig, a bit of straw; painfully he secures it.… See the
child laboriously stooping and slowly going forward under the
eaves. The force of the rain has washed out of the sand small,
smooth, bright pebbles, and the ever-observing child gathers
them.”--_E., p. 72._
The boy, still only from six to eight years old, keeps up the collecting
habit with more method and with a wider range, and he demands assistance.
“Not less full of significance, nor less developing, is the
boy’s inclination to descend into caves and ravines, to ramble
in the shady grove and in the dark forest. It is _the effort_
(_Streben_) to seek and find the new, to see and discover the
hidden, the desire to bring to light and _to appropriate_ that
which lies concealed in darkness and shadow.
“From these rambles the boy returns with rich treasures of
unknown stones and plants, of animals--worms, beetles, spiders
and lizards, that dwell in darkness and concealment. ‘What
is this? What is its name?’ etc., are the questions to be
answered; and every new word enriches his world and throws
light upon his surroundings. Beware of greeting him with the
exclamation, ‘Fie, throw that down, that is horrid!’ or ‘Drop
that, it will bite you!’ If the child obeys, he drops and
throws away a considerable portion of his power.”--_E., p. 104._
This quotation brings us to another mode of investigation, that of asking
questions, which Froebel was not likely to miss.
“The child, your child, ye fathers, follows you wherever you
go. Do not harshly repel him. Show no impatience about his
ever-recurring questions. Every harshly repelling word crushes
a bud of his tree of life.… Question upon question comes from
the lips of the boy thirsting for knowledge--How? Why? When?
What for? and every satisfactory answer opens to him a new
world.”--_E., p. 86._
Professor O’Shea has an interesting section on what he calls “The
Sense of Location,” which he says is “at the bottom of one of the most
interesting and important phenomena of adjustment--the questioning
activity.” So it may be worth while to notice that Froebel, whom the
Professor has dismissed with one slighting reference, has been beforehand
with him here, and has dealt with this same early beginning in one of his
earliest Mother Songs, viz. “It’s all Gone,” where he says to the mother:
“How can the child understand that anything is “all gone,” yet
he must see sense in it or he will not be satisfied. What he
saw just now is there no longer, what was above is below, what
was there has vanished.”--_M., p. 18._
Questioning implies language, but Froebel has no language instinct. He
does, however, call speech immediate (unmittelbar), usually translated
“innate,” and he does say that because others talk to him, the child’s
capacity for speech will develop of necessity and will break forth
spontaneously.
It is in connection with the child’s earliest investigations that Froebel
brings in the learning to speak. In “The Education of Man,” he notes
how the young child brings all his discoveries, “his treasures,” to the
mother’s lap, and she is warned to give the right kind of help and at the
right time.
“It is the longing for interpretation that urges the child to
appeal to us, it is the intense desire for this that urges him
to bring his treasures to us and to lay them in our laps. The
child loves all things that enter his small horizon and extend
his little world. To him the least thing is a new discovery;
but it must not come dead into the little world, nor lie dead
therein lest it obscure the small horizon and crush the little
world.”--_E., p. 73._
All the help the mother need give at first is to supply names, since as
Froebel says, “the name, as it were, creates the thing for the child.”
Later she must help him to compare and classify.
“How little is needed from those around the child to aid him
in this tendency (to seek for knowledge). It is only necessary
to name, to put into words what the child does, sees and
finds.”--_E., p. 75._
“It is as well while the child is making these first
experiments (at walking about the room) to name the
objects--e.g. There is the chair, the table, etc.… The object
of giving these names is not primarily the development of
the child’s power of speech, but to assist his comprehension
of the object, its parts and its properties by defining his
sense-impressions. By a rich store of such experiences
the capacity for speech develops of necessity, and speech
breaks forth of itself, as it were, through heightened mental
self-activity in accordance with the nature of mind.”--_P., p.
242._
Expression, of course, of which speech is but one form, is to Froebel
all-important. “Speech,” he says, is “required and conditioned by
the attainment to consciousness,” and as self-consciousness is the
characteristic of humanity, so speech is “the first manifestation of
mankind.” In his “Autobiography” Froebel writes:
“Mankind as a whole, as one great unity, had now become my
quickening thought. I kept this conception continually before
my mind. I sought after proofs of it in my little world within
and in the great world without me; I desired by many a struggle
to win it, and then to set it worthily forth. And thus I was
led back to the first appearance of man upon our earth, and to
the first manifestation of mankind, his speech.”--_A., p. 84._
In talking of the mother’s play with an infant he says that she
accompanies every action with words, “even if obliged to confess that
there can be no understanding of the spoken word,” as “the general sense
of hearing is not yet developed, still less the special sense of hearing
words.” Froebel says she is right:
“for that which will one day develop and which must originate,
begins and must begin when there is as yet only the conditions,
the possibility thereof. Thus it is with the attainment of
the human being to consciousness, and the speech required and
conditioned by consciousness.”--_P., p. 40._
Words, says Froebel, first separate the child from the world outside him.
“Up to this stage (the beginning of speech), the inner being
of man is still an unmembered, undifferentiated unity. With
language, the expression and representation of the internal
begin; with language, organization, or a differentiation with
reference to ends and means sets in.”--_E., p. 50._
Both in the earlier “Education of Man,” and in his later writings Froebel
uses the strong expression that “the word creates the thing” for the
child, and in one passage he adds that by language the idea is defined
and retained.
“This period is pre-eminently the period of the development of
speech. Therefore in all the child did, it was indispensable
that what he did should be clearly designated by words. Every
object, every thing became such, as it were, only through the
word; before it had been named although the child might have
seemed to see it with the outer eyes, it had no existence for
the child. The name, as it were, created the thing for the
child; hence the name and the thing seemed to be one.”--_E., p.
90._
“Through her little rhymes the mother will make clear to the
little one what he has done, and so his accidental productions
will become a point of departure for his self-development. Word
and form are opposite and yet related. Hence the word should
accompany the form as its shadow. In a certain sense, giving
a form a name really creates the form itself. Through the
name, moreover, the form is retained in memory and defined in
thought.”--_P., p. 192._
Of very early speech Froebel says that it shows:
“the peculiarity and requirement of the human mind to render
itself intelligible to clarify itself by communication with
others.”--_P., p. 56._
Having investigated his surroundings, near or far, and collected
what seems to him attractive, the child, whether older or younger,
arranges his treasures in some way, and this arrangement implies some
comparison. “Like things must be ranged together and things unlike must
be separated,” says Froebel of the child “scarce able to walk,” who has
collected “the small, smooth, pebbles washed out of the sand by the
rain.” This “arranging objects of each kind singly in a row” is at first
no doubt only a recognition of the like and unlike, but Froebel notes
that it is also one way in which the child may arrive at “the capacity
for counting” by which his sphere of knowledge is again extended.
“The knowledge of the relations of quantity adds much to a
child’s life.… At first he places together similar objects.…
Who has not had frequent opportunity to observe how the child
arranges the objects of each kind singly in a row. Let the
mother supply the quickening word, saying Apple, apple, apple,
etc. All apples. Pear, pear, pear, etc. All pears.… One pear,
another apple, another apple.… Instead of the indefinite word
“another” the mother subsequently uses the numerals, counting
together with the child, thus: One apple, two apples, three
apples, etc.”--_E., p. 80._
To many children, however, counting may come through efforts to draw. I
have seen a child of four-and-a-half, in drawing a man, make a line for
the arm, then lay down her pencil to count her own fingers and then draw
five lines for the man’s hand. Froebel says:
“The representation of objects by drawing, and the exact
perception conditioned and required by the representation, soon
leads the child quickly to recognize the constantly repeated
association of certain numbers of different objects--e.g. two
eyes and two arms, five fingers, etc. Thus the drawing of the
object leads to the discovery of number.… By the development of
the capacity for counting, the child’s sphere of knowledge, his
world, is again extended.… He was unable to determine relative
quantities, but now he knows that he has two large and three
small pebbles, four white and five yellow flowers,” etc.--_E.,
p. 80._
Yet another mode of Investigation is that of Experimenting; every normal
child is what Froebel calls “a self-teaching scientist.”
“The material must be known not only by its name, but by its
qualities and uses.… For this reason the child examines the
object on all sides; for this reason he tears and breaks it;
for this reason he puts it in his mouth and bites it. We
reprove the child for his naughtiness and foolishness; and
yet he is wiser than we who reprove him. An instinct which
the child did not give himself, the instinct which rightly
understood and rightly guided would lead him to know God in his
works, drives him to this.”--_E., p. 73._
It may well be through his ceaseless experimenting that the little child
begins to draw, gains what the late Mr. Ebenezer Cooke called “a language
of line,” or as Froebel puts it, notices “linear phenomena, which direct
his attention to the linear properties of surrounding objects.”
“A child has found a pebble, a fragment of lime or chalk. In
order to determine by experiment its properties, he has rubbed
it on a board near by, and has discovered its property of
imparting colour. See how he delights in the newly discovered
property, how busily he makes use of it! … but soon he begins
to find pleasure in the winding, straight, curved, and other
forms that appear. These linear phenomena direct his attention
to the linear properties of surrounding objects. Now the
head becomes a circle, and now the circular line represents
the head, the elliptical curve connected with it represents
the body; arms and legs appear as straight or broken lines,
and these again represent arms and legs; the fingers he sees
as straight lines meeting in a common point, and lines so
connected are, for the busy child, again hands and fingers; the
eyes he sees as dots, and these again represent eyes; and thus
a new world opens within and without. For what man tries to
represent, that he begins to understand.”--_E., p. 75._
I have watched a child go through the process of discovering “linear
phenomena,” just as Froebel describes it, no doubt from his own
observation. A boy of three, having folded a piece of paper for the roof
of a house, was colouring it, by rubbing on red chalk, when he called
out, “Oh! I’m making lines.” The other children went on rubbing, but Phil
made “lines” till the roof was finished.
But Froebel does not leave unnoticed the fact that the very earliest
“drawing” is an outgrowth of the muscular action to which his instinct
of activity is urged by the stimulus of contact.
“Would you know how to lead the child in this matter? Watch
him, he will teach you what to do. See! he is tracing the table
by passing his fingers along its edges and outlines as far as
he can reach, he is sketching the object on itself. This is
the first and the safest step by which he becomes aware of the
outlines and forms of objects. In this way he sketches and so
studies the chair, the bench, the window. But soon he advances.
He draws lines across the four-cornered bit of board, across
the leaf of the table, or the seat of the chair, in the dim
anticipation that so he can retain the forms and relations of
the surfaces. Now, already he draws the form diminished.
“See! there the child has drawn table, chair and bench on a
leaf of the table. Do you not see how he spontaneously trained
himself for this? Objects which he could move, which were in
sight, he laid on the board, and drew their form on the plane
surface, following the boundaries of the objects with his
hands. Soon scissors and boxes, and later leaves and twigs,
even his own hand and the shadows of objects will thus be
copied.
“Much is developed in the child by this action, more than
it is possible to express--a clear comprehension of form,
the possibility of representing the form separate from the
object, the possibility of retaining the form as such, and
the strengthening and fitting of hand and arm for the free
representation of form.”--_E., p. 77._
Here, perhaps, is the right place to introduce what Froebel had to say
about the artistic tendencies of children, since Art, to him, is always
expression.
“Absolutely nothing can appear, nothing visible and sensible
can come forth, that does not hold within itself the living
spirit; that does not bear upon its surface the imprint of the
living spirit of the being by whom it has been produced, and
to whom it owes its existence. And this is true of the work
of every human being--from the highest artist to the meanest
labourer--as well as of the works of God, which are Nature, the
creation, and all created things.”--_E., p. 153._
So, when Froebel comes to speak of art as a subject of the school
curriculum he says: “Here, art will be considered only as the pure
representation of the inner … differentiated according to the material
it uses, whether motion, as such, audible in sound, or visible in lines,
surfaces and colours, or massive”; and he adds:
“We noticed that even at an earlier stage children have the
desire to draw, but the desire also to express ideas by
modelling and colouring is frequently found at this earlier
stage of childhood, certainly at the very beginning of the
stage of boyhood (from six years old). _This proves that art
and appreciation of art constitute a general capacity or talent
of man_, and should be cared for early, at latest in boyhood.
“This does not imply that the boy is to devote himself chiefly
to art, and is to become an artist; but that he should be
enabled to understand and appreciate true works of art. At
the same time, a true education will guard him from the error
of claiming to be an artist unless there is in him the true
artistic calling.”--_E., p. 227._
In connection with the mother’s instinctive rhythmic crooning and
dandling of the infant, Froebel says:
“Thus the genuine natural mother cautiously follows in all
directions the slowly developing all-sided life of the
child. Others suppose him to be empty.… Thus those means
of cultivation that lead so simply and naturally to the
development of rhythm are lost.… Nevertheless an early
development of rhythmic movement would prove most wholesome.…
Even very small children, in moments of quiet, and particularly
when going to sleep, will hum little strains of songs they have
heard; and this should be heeded and developed as the first
germ of future growth in melody and song. Undoubtedly this
would soon lead in children to a spontaneity such as is shown
by children in the use of speech.”--_E., p. 71._
In the “Mother Songs,” too, Froebel writes:
“Hence it is so very important to rouse at least the germs
of all this (the perceiving of harmony in sound and form and
colour) early in a human being. If they do not develop and take
shape as independent formations in life, they at least teach
how to understand and recognize those of other people. This is
life-gain enough. It makes a person’s life richer--richer by
the lives of others. And how could our earthly life be long
enough to form our being with equal perfection on all sides.
We can only do it by knowing and respectfully recognizing in
the mirror of the lives of others what we should like to carry
out ourselves. And this is as it should be, for it is by means
of knowledge, regard for and respectful recognition of others,
that the whole of humanity ought to represent the whole of a
God-like harmonious human being.”--_M., p. 162._
In what he says of the Interest in Stories, Froebel again seems to
show deeper insight than either Mr. Eby or Professor Kirkpatrick. Mr.
McDougall does not touch upon the subject. It is still the outcome of the
child’s instinctive desire to understand himself and his surroundings.
Froebel says very truly that he can only understand others in proportion
as he understands himself, and can only learn to understand himself,
his own life, by comparing it with that of others. The desire for
stories is “a striving, a longing, a demand of the mind” (ein Streben,
eine Sehnsucht, eine Forderung des Gemüthes). For the little one, the
simplest story of the mother bird feeding her young ones is a help to the
understanding of his own life, makes his own life objective; the mother’s
“effective story will hold up a looking-glass to the child, especially
if it be told at the right time.” For the boy the story does the same
and also answers to his instinctive demand not only to understand the
present, but the past:
“It is the innermost desire and need of a vigorous, genuine boy
to understand his own life, to get a knowledge of its nature,
its origin and outcome. Only the study of the life of others
can furnish such points of comparison with the life he himself
has experienced. In these the boy, endowed with an active life
of his own, can view the latter as in a mirror and learn to
appreciate its value. This is the chief reason why boys are
so fond of stories, legends and tales; the more so when these
are told as having actually occurred at some time, or as lying
within the reach of probability, for which, however, there are
scarcely any limits for a boy.”--_E., p. 305._
“The existence of the present teaches him the existence of the
past. That, which was before he was, he would know; he would
know the reason, the past cause of what now is. Who fails to
remember the keen desire that filled his heart when he beheld
old walls, and towers, ruins, monuments and columns on hill and
the roadside--to hear others give accounts of these things,
their times and causes … thus is developed the desire and
craving for tales, legends, for all kinds of stories, and later
for historical accounts.”--_E., p. 115._
Even the fairy story seems to have found its legitimate place under
the same heading, the instinct for investigation. Froebel sees that it
covers for the little child the ground occupied by myth in the primitive
consciousness. It explains the otherwise inexplicable.
“Even the present in which the boy lives still contains much
that at this period of development he cannot interpret, and yet
would like to interpret; much that seems to him dumb, and which
he would fain have speak; … and thus there is developed in him
the intense desire for fables and fairy tales which impart
language and reason to speechless things--the one within, the
other beyond the limits of human relations. Surely all must
have noticed this if they have given more than superficial
attention to the life of boys at this age. Similarly, they must
have noticed that if the boy’s desire is not gratified by those
around him, he will spontaneously hit upon the invention and
presentation of fairy tales, and either work them out in his
own mind or entertain his companions with them. These fairy
tales and stories will then very clearly reveal to the observer
what is going on in the innermost mind of the boy, though
doubtless the latter may not himself be conscious of it.”--_E.,
p. 116._
“The child, like the man, would like to learn the significance
of what happens around him. This is the foundation of the Greek
choruses, especially in tragedy. This, too, is the foundation
of very many productions in the realms of legends and fairy
tales, and is indeed the cause of many phenomena in actual
history. This is the result of the deeply-rooted consciousness,
the deeply slumbering premonition of being surrounded by that
which is higher and more conscious than ourselves.”--_P., p.
146._
The outcome of the instinct of construction, which is also so closely
connected with the instinct of investigation, is that “sense of
power” which _is_ self-consciousness. Without this there can be no
self-determination, but, says Froebel, “the sense of power must precede
its cultivation.” With this growing personality, too, Froebel connects
what is called the instinct of Acquisition, which begins when the little
child “painfully secures his bit of straw,” and the boy of six to eight
shows “the tendency to appropriate what he finds in the darkness of cave
and forest.”
“The same tendency that urges the boy to seek knowledge on
the mountain and in the valley, attracts and holds him to
the plain. Here he makes a garden, there he represents the
course of the river, and studies the effect of the presence of
water … here he has dammed up the water to form a pool.… He
is particularly fond of busying himself with clear running
water and with plastic materials. In these the boy who
seeks self-knowledge beholds his soul as in a mirror. These
employments are to him an element of his life, for now, because
of a previously acquired sense of power he seeks to control and
master new material. Everything must submit to his constructive
instinct; there in that heap of earth he digs a cellar and on
it he places a garden and a bench. Boards, branches and poles
must be made into a hut, the deep, fresh snow must be rolled up
to form the walls and ramparts of a fort, and the rough stones
on the hill are heaped together to form a castle.… And thus
each one soon forms for himself his own world; for the feeling
of his own power requires and conditions also the possession
of his own space and his own material belonging exclusively to
him. Whether his kingdom, his province, his estate, as it were,
be a corner of the yard, or of the house, or whether it be the
space of a box, the human being must have at this stage an
external point to which he refers all his activities, and this
is best chosen and provided by himself.”--_E., p. 106._
And here, just when he is emphasizing the fast developing consciousness
of self, with its demand for its own space and its own material, Froebel
brings out the strength of the social instinct in boyhood. It is here
that he points out that this effort to construct has a uniting, not a
separating, tendency. Continuous with the last quotation comes:
“When the space to be filled is extensive, when the province
to be ruled is large, when the whole to be represented is
composed of many parts, then brotherly union of those who are
of one mind is displayed. And when those who are of one mind
meet and put their hearts into the same effort, then either
the work already begun is extended or begun again as a joint
production.”--_E., p. 107._
Froebel describes such joint work first in the Keilhau schoolroom--his
own phrase is “education room”--where the younger boys are using building
blocks, sand, sawdust, and moss, which they have brought in from the
forest around and then among the older boys.
“Down yonder by the brook, how busy are the older boys with
their work! They have made canals with locks, bridges and
seaports, dams and mills, each undisturbed by the others. But
now the water is to be used to carry ships from one level to
another, and now, at every stage, each boy asserts his own
rights while recognizing the rights of others. How can they
settle their difficulties? Only by making agreements, and so,
like States, they bind themselves by strict treaties.”--_E., p.
111._
Of games of physical movement, running, wrestling, etc., Froebel writes:
“It is the sense of power, the sense of its increase, both as
an individual and as a member of a group, that fills the boy
with joy, in these games.… The boy tries to see himself in his
companions, to weigh and measure himself by them, to find and
know himself by their help. Thus the games directly influence
and educate the boy for life, they awake and cultivate many
civic and moral virtues. Every town should have its common
playground for the boys. Glorious would be the results from
this for the entire community. For at this stage of development
games whenever possible are held in common, thus developing
the sense of community and the laws and requirements of a
community.”--_E., p. 113._
Froebel had studied boys to some purpose, and he tells us not, however,
to expect too much in the way of social virtues. Justice, self-control,
honesty, courage and “severe criticism of pleasant indolence” may be
expected, but mutual forbearance and consideration for those who are
weaker or less familiar with the game, though not entirely lacking, are
referred to as “the more delicate blossoms” of the playground. It is here
that he says with wise moderation, “The feeling of power must precede its
cultivation.”
The social instinct does not suddenly spring into existence in boyhood.
It has its roots in what Froebel calls the Feeling of Community which
unites the child first with the mother, then with father, brothers and
sisters.
“We cannot deny that there is at present among children and
boys little gentleness, mutual forbearance … indeed, there is
much egotism, unfriendliness and roughness. This is clearly due
not only to the absence of early cultivation of the feeling of
community, but this sympathy between parents and children is
too often disturbed, yes even annihilated.”--_E., p. 119._
The sympathy of the little child ought to be trained and is trained by
the wise mother always through action.
“Mother love seeks to awaken and to interpret the feeling
of community, which is so important, between the child and
the father, brother and sister, saying while she draws the
child’s little hand caressingly across the face of the father
or of the little sister, ‘Love the dear father--the little
sister.’”--_E., p. 69._
In the Finger Play called “The Nest,” Froebel tells the mother:
“The way lies through our imaginative, tender and emotional
observation of Nature and of man’s life, through the child’s
taking their meaning into his own heart and expressing by
representation what he thus takes in.… The child’s sympathy
is roused by the young creatures’ necessities more than by
anything, and chiefly by their nakedness and softness.”--_M.,
p. 149._
And the action which fosters the growth of sympathy is not to be merely
representative; The Garden Song has this motto:
“If your child’s to love and cherish Life that needs him
day-by-day, Give him things to tend that perish If he ever
stays away.”--_M., p. 84._
It is because “the desire for unity is the basis of all true human
development” that the child is to be encouraged to help in the work he
sees going on around him.
“Family, family--let us say it openly and plainly--you are more
than School and Church, and therefore more than all else that
necessity may have called into being for the protection of
right and property … without you, what are Altar and Church?…
Therefore, Mother, in the little finger game, teach your
child some notion of the nature of a whole, especially of a
family-whole.”--_M., p. 159._
“We have not yet touched nor even considered an important side
of child-life, the side of association with father and mother
in their domestic duties, in the duties of their calling.…
(_E., p. 84_). Do not let the urgency of your business tempt
you to say, ‘Go away, you only hinder me.’ … After a third
rebuff of this kind scarcely any child will again propose to
help and share the work.”--_E., p. 99._
It is an essential part of the Kindergarten to consider the child as a
member of the human family. It is described in one place as:
“An establishment for training quite young children, in their
first stage of intellectual development, where their training
and instruction shall be based upon their own free action
or spontaneity, acting under proper rules … such rules as
are in fact discovered by the actual observation of children
when associated in companies. (_L., p. 251_).… Practice in
combined games for many children, which will train the child,
by his very nature eager for companionship, in the habit of
association with comrades, that is, in good fellowship and all
that this implies.”--_L., p. 252._
Among his Group Instincts Mr. Kirkpatrick mentions the Love of
Approbation, and this receives special attention from Froebel at a
surprisingly early stage. It is in the “Mother Songs,” in connection with
his adaptation of an old German nursery rhyme about knights who come to
visit “a good child,” that Froebel tells the mother that:
“A new life stage has begun, and you, dear Mother, must use
your best and most watchful care, when first the child listens
to a stranger.”
In the same connection he writes:
“The child must be roused to good by inclination, love and
respect, _through the opinion of others around him_, and all
this must be strengthened and developed.… When, therefore,
Mother, observation as to the judgment of others awakes in your
child--when, separating himself and on the watch _he brings
himself before the judgment of others_, then you really have a
double task to perform.…”--_M., p. 190._
The Love of Approbation cannot be separated from what Mr. Kirkpatrick
calls the Regulative, i.e. the Moral and Religious Instincts, for it is
both social and regulative, and in the social instincts Froebel sees the
foundation of the religious instincts or tendencies, to which we shall
come presently. But he also notes a “sense of order,” as Mr. Sully does
in his delightful “Studies of Childhood,” and this he traces back to very
early beginnings, connecting it with the tendency towards rhythm.
“That disorder and rough wilfulness may never enter the games,
it is a good plan wherever it is possible to accompany each
change in the play by rhyme and song; so that the latent sense
of rhythm and song, _and above all the sense of order in the
human being and child_, may be aroused and strengthened to an
impulse for social cooperation.”--_P., p. 267._
One of the earliest Mother Plays, “Tic-tac,” deals with rhythmic
movement, and in “The Education of Man” Froebel takes the beginning
of “conscious control” still further back. His ideal mother fosters
“all-sided life,” that is, she fosters the cognitive, emotional and
conative, the first by calling the child’s attention to his own body and
his immediate surroundings, and the second by “seeking to awaken and to
interpret the feeling of community between the child and the father,
brother and sister,” and Froebel goes on:
“In addition to the sense of community as such, the germ of
so much glorious development, the mother’s love seeks also
through movements to lead the child to feel his own inner
life. By regular rhythmic movements--and this is of special
importance--she brings this life within the child’s conscious
control when she dandles him up and down on her hand or arm in
rhythmic movements and to rhythmic sounds. Thus the genuine
natural mother cautiously follows in all directions the slowly
developing all-sided life in the child, strengthening and
arousing to ever greater activity, and developing the all-sided
life within. Others suppose the child to be empty and wish to
inoculate him with life, and thus make him as empty as they
think him to be.”--_E., p. 69._
It is surprising to find that Froebel, writing so early, has nothing
at all resembling any special “moral faculty.” His references to
“Conscience” are decidedly interesting, though given in quaint connection
with games and rhymes for mere babes. He asks why the “Where’s Baby?”
game gives such delight, and shows his psychological insight in the
answer he finds, viz. that it is the feeling or recognition of self, of
personality, which gives such joy.
“Why, now, is my child so happy over the hiding game? It is the
feeling of Personality which already so delights the child, it
is the feeling of recognition of his own self.”[35]
The game which follows this repeats the hiding experience, but this time
with the cry of “cuckoo,” from some one unseen, and this is likened to
the conscience call, which is described as “consciousness of union in
separation and of separateness, that is personality, in union.”--_M., p.
98._
“In ‘Where’s Baby Been?’ parting and union seem more separate,
as though in order that each may become more and more clearly
conscious of itself; in ‘Cuckoo,’ parting and union are, as
it were, joined. It is parting in union and union in parting
that makes ‘Cuckoo’ such a peculiar game and so delightful
to a child. But consciousness of union in separation, and
of separateness--that is personality--in union, is also the
essence, the deep foundation of conscience.”--_M., p. 197._
Mr. Kirkpatrick’s second Regulative instinct or tendency is that of
Religion, but Froebel again, like Mr. McDougall, finds that Religion has
its roots in an instinct “not specifically religious,”[36] viz. in the
Social Instinct. He says this in “The Education of Man” in the plainest
of terms.
“This feeling of Community first uniting the child with
father, mother, brothers and sisters, and resting on a higher
spiritual unity, to which later on is added the discovery that
father, mother, brothers and sisters, human beings in general,
feel and know themselves to be in community and unity with a
higher principle--with humanity, with God--this is the very
first germ, the very first beginning of all true religious
spirit, of all genuine yearning for unhindered unification with
the Eternal, with God.”--_E., p. 25._
It seems quite in accordance with this that Froebel should write that he
likes better the German word _Gott-einigkeit_--union with God--than the
foreign word religion; and also that he should speak of “developing the
sense of kinship with man in every child, and the sense of kinship with
God in every man.” So, in his “Mother Songs,” he tells the mother to give
her child duties to perform, that so he may “feel his kinship” with her:
“Every age, even the age of childhood, has something to cherish
that is plain, and from doing so no exemption can be procured;
it has therefore its duties. Happy is it for a child if he
be led to deal with them adequately, and for the present
unconsciously. Duties are not burdens.… Fulfilment of duty
strengthens body and mind, and the consciousness of duty done
gives independence; even a child feels this. See, Mother, how
happy your child is in feeling he has done his small duties. He
already feels his kinship with you thereby.”--_M., p. 174._
There is never a separation between Morality and Religion:
“Religion without industry, without work, is liable to be lost
in empty dreams, worthless visions, idle fancies. Similarly,
work or industry without religion degrades man into a beast
of burden, a machine. Work and religion must be simultaneous;
for God, the Eternal has been creating from all eternity.…
Where religion, industry and self-control, the truly undivided
trinity rule, there indeed is heaven upon earth.”--_E., p. 35._
There is only one other instinct mentioned by Froebel, and that is the
parental, or, rather, the maternal instinct. He is eager that this
should be recognized as an instinct, but he is equally eager that, like
other human instincts, its action should be determined by intelligence.
In describing the “Plan” for his Kindergarten, Froebel pleads for more
careful observation of the child and his relationships, and says that
“thereby”:
“Deeper insight will be gained into the meaning and importance
of the child’s actions and outward manifestations and
also into the way of dealing with children which has been
evolved naturally by the mother led by her pure maternal
instinct.”--_L., p. 248._
As to the early beginnings of the instinct in the little girl we can find
just a few references, sufficient to show that it did not pass unnoticed,
and it seems here legitimate to say that “the girl anticipates her
destiny,” as Froebel does in speaking of doll-play, though certainly this
does not cover all such play:
“The joy of the child in its doll has a far deeper human
foundation than is generally supposed--a foundation by no
means resting merely in the external resemblance … the girl
anticipates her destiny--to foster Nature and life.”--_P., p.
93._
The boy’s destiny is “to penetrate and rule Nature,” so in the “Mother
Songs” Froebel describes how the boy is “cowering that no sign of life
in the chicken family may escape him, while the girl starts up, _all her
care of things stirred_, in order to beckon or call the hen or cock not
to forget their chickens.”--_M., p. 143._
In all his writings, Froebel refers to how much he has learned from
mothers: “It was in watching your clever mother-doings that I learnt.”
But, as he says of himself, it was “a necessary part of me to be
irresistibly driven to search out the ultimate or primary cause of every
fact of life,” and so he writes:
“The natural mother does all this instinctively without
instruction or direction; but this is not enough: it is needful
that she should do it consciously, as a conscious being
acting upon another which is growing into consciousness, and
consciously tending toward the continuous development of the
human being.”--_E., p. 64._
“Motherly and womanly instinct does much of its own accord; but
it often makes mistakes.”--_L., p. 63._
“Women’s work in education must be based not upon natural
instinct, so often perverted or misunderstood, but upon
intelligent knowledge.… Some mothers level the taunt at me that
I, a man, understanding nothing of a mother’s instinct, should
dare to presume to instruct mothers in their dealings with
their own children.… How could such a thought enter my head
as to attempt anything against the course of Nature? My whole
strength is exerted on the contrary, to the work of getting the
natural instinct and its tendencies more rightly understood,
and more acknowledged; so that women may follow its leadings
as truly as possible aided by the higher light of intelligent
comprehension, and yet at the same time in all freedom, and
with complete individuality.”--_L., p. 259._
So, in what he says of this last instinct, Froebel is faithful to what he
has said of all human instincts.
“Man shall assuredly not neglect his natural instincts, still
less abandon them, but he must ennoble them through his
intelligence and purify them through his reason.”