THE NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERATION
(1643-1654)
These Dutch settlements brought about a political union of the New
England colonies, although the first cause of the New England
confederation was the Indian tribes who lay between the Dutch and the
English. In August, 1637, during the war with the Pequots, some of the
Connecticut magistrates and ministers suggested to the authorities at
Boston the expediency of such a measure. The next year Massachusetts
submitted a plan of union, but Connecticut demurred because it
permitted a mere majority of the federal commissioners to decide
questions. Thereupon Massachusetts injected the boundary question into
the discussions, and proposed an article not relished by Connecticut,
that the Pequot River should be the line between the two
jurisdictions.[1] Thus the matter lay in an unsettled state till the
next year, when jealousy of the Dutch stimulated renewed action.
In 1639 John Haynes, of Connecticut, and Rev. Thomas Hooker came to
Boston, and again the plan of a confederation was discussed, but
Plymouth and Massachusetts quarrelled over their boundary-line, and
the desirable event was once more postponed. Nearly three more years
passed, and the founding of a confederacy was still delayed. Then, at
a general court held at Boston, September 27, 1642, letters from
Connecticut were read "certifying us that the Indians all over the
country had combined themselves to cut off all the English."
At this time the war between De la Tour and D'Aulnay was at its
height, and the Dutch complaints added to the general alarm. Thus the
Connecticut proposition for a league received a more favorable
consideration and was referred to a committee "to consider" after the
court. At the next general court which met in Boston, May 10, 1643, a
compact of confederation in writing was duly signed by commissioners
from Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven.[2] The
settlement of Gorges and Mason at Piscataqua and the plantations about
Narragansett Bay were denied admission into the confederacy--the
former "because they ran a different course from us both in their
ministry and administration,"[3] and the latter because they were
regarded as "tumultuous" and "schismatic."
After a preamble setting forth that "we live encompassed with people
of several nations and strange languages," that "the savages have of
late combined themselves against us," and that "the sad distractions
in England prevent the hope of advice and protection," the document
states that the contracting parties' object was to maintain "a firm
and perpetual league of friendship and amity, for offence and defence,
mutual advice and succor upon all just occasions both for preserving
and propagating the truth and liberties of the gospel, and for their
own mutual safety and walfare." It then declared the name of the new
confederation to be "the United Colonies of New England," and in ten
articles set out the organization and powers of the federal
government. The management was placed in the hands of eight
commissioners, two for each colony, "all in church-fellowship with
us," who were to hold an annual meeting in each of the colonies by
rotation, and to have power by a vote of six "to determine all affairs
of war or peace, leagues, aids, charges, and number of men for war,
division of spoils, or whatever is gotten by conquest," the admission
of new confederates, etc. All public charges were to be paid by
contributions levied on the colonies proportioned to the number of
inhabitants in each colony between sixteen and sixty; and for this
purpose a census was to be taken at stated times by the commissioners.
In domestic affairs the federal government was not to interfere, but
each colony was guaranteed the integrity of its territory and local
jurisdiction.
Two defects were apparent in this constitution: the federal government
had no authority to act directly upon individuals, and thus it had no
coercive power; the equal number of votes allowed the members of the
confederation in the federal council was a standing contradiction of
the measure of contribution to the burdens of government. The
confederacy contained a population of about twenty-three thousand five
hundred souls, of which number fifteen thousand may be assigned to
Massachusetts, three thousand each to Connecticut and Plymouth, and
two thousand five hundred to New Haven. Massachusetts, with two out of
eight commissioners, possessed a population greater than that of the
other three colonies combined.
There was really no Indian combination in 1643 against the colonists,
but the rivalry between the Narragansetts and the Mohegans gave
grounds for uneasiness. After the death of Miantonomoh, under the
circumstances already related, the fear of an Indian attack was
temporarily removed. But the Narragansetts were grief-stricken over
the loss of their chieftain and thought only of revenge upon the hated
Uncas and his Indians, at whose door they laid all the blame. To give
opportunity for intended operations, they made Gorton and others
intermediaries for a complete cession of their country to the king of
England in April, 1644. Then, when summoned by the general court of
Massachusetts to Boston, Canonicus and Pessacus, the two leading
chiefs, pleaded the king's jurisdiction and declined to appear.[4] Two
envoys sent by the general court in May, 1644, to the wigwam of
Canonicus, were compelled to stay out in the rain for two hours before
being admitted, and Pessacus, instead of giving them satisfaction,
persisted in his threat of hostilities against Uncas, agreeing only
not to attack Uncas "till after next planting-time," nor then till
after due notice given to the English.[5]
The truce did not restrain the Narragansetts, and in the spring of
1645 they attacked the Mohegans and defeated them, and thereupon the
federal commissioners, in July, 1645, met at Boston, and upon the
refusal of the Narragansetts to make peace with Uncas they made
preparations for war. A force of three hundred men was raised, one
hundred and ninety from Massachusetts, forty each from Plymouth and
Connecticut, and thirty from New Haven.
Upon the question of appointment of a commander-in-chief colonial
independence came in conflict with federal supremacy. In 1637
Massachusetts was the champion of the principle that all questions
should be decided by a simple majority vote of the commissioners; but
now the Massachusetts general court asserted that no appointment of a
commander should be valid without their confirmation. The federal
commissioners stood stoutly for their rights, and the issue was evaded
for a time by the appointment of Major Gibbons, who was a citizen of
Massachusetts.
The report of these warlike preparations brought the Narragansetts to
terms; but uneasiness still continued, and the subsequent years,
though free from bloodshed, were full of rumors and reports of
hostilities, compelling frequently the interference of the
commissioners in behalf of their friend Uncas. In all these
troubles[6] the question is not so much the propriety of the
particular measures of the federal commissioners as their conduct in
making the confederation a party to the disputes of the Indians among
themselves. The time finally came when Uncas, "the friend of the white
man," was regarded by his former admirers as a hopeless marplot and
intriguer.
More commendable were the services of the federal commissioners with
the Indians in another particular. One of the professed designs of the
charter of Massachusetts was to Christianize the heathen savages, but
more than twelve years elapsed after the coming of Winthrop and his
colonists before New England was the scene of anything like missionary
work. Then the first mission was established in 1643 by Thomas Mayhew
at the island of Martha's Vineyard, which was not included in any of
the New England governments and was under the jurisdiction of Sir
William Alexander. In 1651 Mayhew reported that one hundred and
ninety-nine men, women, and children of Martha's Vineyard and
Nantucket were "worshippers of the great and ever living God."
His example was followed by John Eliot, the minister of Roxbury, in
Massachusetts, who learned to speak the Indian tongue, and in 1646
preached to the Indians near Watertown. The Massachusetts general
court a week later endorsed the purposes of Eliot by enacting that the
church should take care to send two ministers among the Indians every
year to make known to them by the help of an interpreter "the heavenly
counsel of God." In four years two colonies of Indians were
established, one at Nonantum and the other at Concord. But the
converts were still under the influence of their sagamores, who were
hostile to Eliot's schemes, and in 1651 he removed his Indians to
Natick, on the Charles River, where they might be free from all
heathenish subjection.
In the mean time, the intelligence of what was taking place was
communicated to Edward Winslow, the agent of the colony in England. He
brought the matter to the attention of Parliament, and July 19, 1649,
an ordinance was passed incorporating "the society for the promoting
and propagating of the gospel of Jesus Christ in New England." This
society selected the federal commissioners as the managers of the fund
which flowed into them from persons charitably inclined, and in seven
years the sums which were remitted to New England amounted to more
than £1700. The commissioners laid out the money in paying Eliot and
Mayhew and other teachers, in printing catechisms in the Indian
language, and providing the Indian converts with implements of labor.
By 1674 the number of these "praying Indians," as they were called,
was estimated at four thousand.[7]
The commissioners also rendered many services in the domestic affairs
of the colonies. In order to secure the claim which she had advanced
in 1637 to the Pequot River as her southern boundary, Massachusetts in
1644 authorized John Winthrop, Jr., to plant a colony on Pequot Bay at
a spot called Nameaug, now New London.[8] The Connecticut government
protested against the authority of Massachusetts, and in 1647 the
commissioners decided that "the jurisdiction of the plantation doth
and ought to belong to Connecticut."[9] This decision, however, only
settled the ownership of a particular place, and the exact southern
and northern boundaries of Connecticut remained for several years a
matter of contention.
In another matter of internal interest the influence of the
confederacy was manifested. Among other considerations for the cession
of the Saybrook fort, Fenwick was promised the proceeds for the term
of ten years of a duty on all corn, biscuit, beaver, and cattle
exported from the Connecticut River.[10] March 4, 1645, the general
court of Connecticut passed an act to carry out their promise; but as
the law affected the trade of Springfield on the upper waters of the
Connecticut River as much as that of the Connecticut towns,
Springfield protested, and appealed to the protection of
Massachusetts. Thereupon the general court of that colony lodged a
vigorous complaint with the federal commissioners, and the cause was
patiently heard by them at two separate meetings. Massachusetts had,
doubtless, the right on her side, but the Connecticut contention
rested on what was international usage at the time.
The result of the deliberation of the commissioners was a decision in
July, 1647, in favor of Connecticut. This was far from satisfying
Massachusetts, and she reopened the question in September, 1648. To
enforce her arguments, she offered certain amendments to the
confederation, which, if adopted, would have shorn the commissioners
of pretty nearly all their authority. But the commissioners stood
firm, and declared that "they found not sufficient cause to reverse
what was done last year."[11]
Feeling on both sides had now become quite embittered. At a special
meeting of the federal commissioners in July, 1649, Massachusetts
renewed her objections, and during the discussions her commissioners
produced an order,[12] passed two months before by their general
court, which, reciting the decision against Springfield, laid a tax
upon all articles imported to Boston from any one of the other three
confederate colonies, or exported to them from "any part of the Bay."
This proceeding was justly interpreted by the federal commissioners to
mean not only a retaliation upon Connecticut for the Saybrook tax, but
a punishment upon the other two colonies--Plymouth and New Haven--for
taking her side in the court of the confederation.
The commissioners acted with dignified firmness, and forwarded to
Massachusetts a remonstrance in which they pointedly desired "to be
spared in all further agitations concerning Springfield."[13]
Massachusetts reluctantly yielded and the next year repealed her
impost,[14] while Connecticut continued to tax the trade of
Springfield till the ten years expired. Whether the tax imposed by
Connecticut was right or not, Massachusetts had, nevertheless, gone
dangerously near to nullification in these proceedings.
Not less interesting is the history of the dealings of the
commissioners with the French and Dutch. Encouraged by the favor which
had been extended to him in Massachusetts, De la Tour arrived in
person in Boston, June 12, 1643, to crave assistance against D'Aulnay,
his rival. As, notwithstanding the French king's order of the previous
year, he showed a commission from the vice-admiral of France which
styled him as lieutenant-general of Acadia, Governor Winthrop,
influenced by the merchants of Boston, whose cupidity was excited by
the valuable fur trade of Acadia, permitted him to hire both men and
shipping in Massachusetts. When his preparations were completed he
sailed away, accompanied by a fleet of four ships and a pinnace, the
property of two intimate friends of the governor--Major Gibbons and
Captain Hawkins--the latter of whom went along in charge of the
Puritan contingent.[15]
In permitting this expedition Winthrop not only violated the articles
of confederation and the laws of neutrality, but exposed himself to
the reproach of Endicott and some of the more straitlaced elders, that
he consorted with "idolators" and "antichrists," as Puritans chose to
call Roman Catholics. It seems that Winthrop and his Boston friends
did not intend to do more than to restore De la Tour to St. Johns,
which D'Aulnay was then besieging. But the original wrong had its
natural result. When D'Aulnay saw his rival's formidable fleet
approaching he promptly raised the blockade and made haste to get
under the protection of his stronghold at Port Royal. De la Tour
followed and attacked, and, though he failed to dislodge his enemy,
with the assistance of the Boston men he killed several of D'Aulnay's
soldiers, burned his mill, and did much other damage.
After this, while D'Aulnay went to France to get fresh orders from the
king against his rival, De la Tour came to Massachusetts in May, 1644,
in hopes of again interesting the Puritans there in his fortunes. But
John Endicott had been elected governor in the place of Winthrop, and
all the cheer De la Tour could get in return for permitting free-trade
was the promise of a letter addressed to D'Aulnay urging peace with De
la Tour and protesting against the capture of Massachusetts' trading
vessels.[16]
In September, 1644, the federal commissioners met at Hartford, and
showed dislike of the conduct of ex-Governor Winthrop by passing a
resolution to the effect that "no jurisdiction within this
confederation shall permit any voluntaries to go forth in a warlike
way against any people whatever without order and direction of the
commissioners of the other jurisdictions." In the mean while, D'Aulnay
came back from France with fresh orders from the king for the arrest
of De la Tour, and in October, 1644, sent to Boston an envoy with the
new credentials. The Massachusetts authorities were reluctant to
abandon De la Tour, but seeing no alternative they made a treaty for
free-trade, subject to confirmation by the federal commissioners.[17]
Still the ties that bound the Boston merchants to De la Tour were not
wholly dissolved even now. They gave an asylum to De la Tour's wife at
Boston, and sent her with supplies to his fort at Port Royal; and when
the fort succumbed under D'Aulnay's attack they fitted her husband out
with a ship and truck for trading. At last De la Tour's dealings
thoroughly opened their eyes. When the ship came to Cape Sable, De la
Tour and his Frenchmen suddenly arose against the English crew, put
them out in the woods, and seized and appropriated the vessel and
cargo. Prominent among those who had lent money and influence to De la
Tour was Major Edward Gibbons, who lost upward of £2500.
D'Aulnay retaliated and took a ship belonging to Massachusetts, and in
September, 1646, a new treaty was made with him by envoys representing
the confederacy. The English made a formal acknowledgment of error,
and the French accepted in full satisfaction a present to D'Aulnay of
a sedan-chair, which had been sent as a present by the viceroy of
Mexico to his sister, but was captured in the West Indies by Cromwell
and given by him to Governor Winthrop.[18]
In 1648 the colony of Massachusetts applied to the French officials at
Quebec for a reciprocity of trade. As the Iroquois had proved very
destructive to the French and their Algonquin and Huron allies, the
French governor caught at the plan of granting the desired privileges
in return for military aid. Accordingly, in 1650, the French governor,
D'Aillebout, sent the Jesuit father Druillettes, who had acted as
missionary among the Algonquins of Maine, as envoy to Boston to
negotiate a treaty.[19] But Massachusetts did not repeat the error of
former times, and would do nothing without consent of the federal
commissioners. To them, therefore, the matter was referred, with the
result that the commissioners declined to involve the confederacy in a
war with the Iroquois by authorizing any assistance to be given the
French privately or officially.[20]
In the relations with the Dutch the temperate and conservative force
in the confederacy was Massachusetts, who took steady ground for peace
and opposed hostile measures. In doing so, however, she went the whole
length of nullification and almost broke up the confederacy. William
Kieft, the governor of New Netherland (1637-1647), seemed to recognize
at once the significance of the confederacy as well as the importance
of making friends with Massachusetts; and in July, 1643, before the
commissioners had time to hold their first meeting, he wrote a letter
of congratulations to Governor Winthrop, which he loaded, however,
with complaints against Connecticut for intruding upon the land of the
Dutch fort at Hartford. Governor Winthrop in reply assured Kieft that
the influence of Massachusetts would be on the side of peace, for that
"the ground of difference being only a small parcel of land" was a
matter of too small value to cause a breach between two people so
nearly related as the Dutch and English.
When the federal commissioners met in September they showed a hostile
spirit, and addressed vehement letters to the Swedish and Dutch on
account of their "foul injuries" offered the New Haven settlers on the
Delaware. In March, 1644, letters came from the Swedes and Dutch full
of expressions of regard for the English and "particularly for
Massachusetts." They promised to refrain from interfering with
visitors who should bring authority from the commissioners, which so
encouraged some Boston merchants that they sent to the Delaware a
pinnace to search for a great lake reported to be its source. But when
they arrived at the Delaware, the Swedish and Dutch governors, while
telling the captain that he might go up the river as far as he chose,
prohibited him from any trafficking with the Indians, which caused the
return of the pinnace to Boston. After this the war which Kieft
provoked with the Indians so occupied the Dutch that for two years
they had no time to give attention to their English neighbors. So hard
pressed were they that, instead of making further reclamations on New
Haven, they earnestly but unsuccessfully solicited her aid. After
great losses to both the Dutch and the Indians the Mohawks intervened
as arbitrators, and brought about a peace in September, 1645.[21]
In 1646 the men of New Haven set up a trading-house near the mouth of
the Housatonic, and thereupon Kieft wrote to the commissioners, who
met at New Haven in April, 1646, a blustering letter of which the
following is a good sample: "We protest against all you commissioners
met at the Red Mount (New Haven) as against breakers of the common
league, and also infringers of the rights of the lords, the states,
our superiors, in that you have dared, without our express and
especial consent, to hold your general meeting within the limits of
New Netherland."[22] At the close of Kieft's administration in 1647
the whole province of New Netherland could furnish not more than three
hundred fighting-men and contained a population of not more than two
thousand. Compared with the population of New England these figures
seem insignificant enough, and render highly improbable the story
popular with some New England historians that the Dutch were enlisted
in a great scheme of uprooting the English colonies.
In 1647 Peter Stuyvesant was sent over as governor. He had the sense
to see that the real safety of the Dutch consisted not in bluster, but
in settling a line between the possessions of the two nations as soon
as possible. The charter of the West India Company called for the
territory between forty and forty-five degrees north latitude, but to
assert the full extent of the patent would have been to claim the
jurisdiction of Massachusetts. Accordingly, Stuyvesant, soon after his
arrival, addressed a letter to Governor Winthrop, asserting the Dutch
claim to all the land between the Connecticut and Delaware and
proposing a conference. But it is evident that in claiming the
Connecticut he was actuated more by a hope of deterring the further
aggressions of English settlers than otherwise. The federal
commissioners returned a polite reply, but showed no anxiety to come
to an accommodation. Soon after a fresh quarrel broke out with New
Haven, and in March, 1648, Stuyvesant wrote to the governor of
Massachusetts offering to submit to him and the governor of Plymouth
the matter in dispute. He then wrote home for instructions, and as
diplomatic relations between England and Holland were suspended, the
West India Company bade him make such terms as he could with his
English neighbors.[23]
Accordingly, in September, 1650, Stuyvesant visited Hartford while the
federal commissioners were in session there. The discussions were
carried on in writing, and Stuyvesant dated his letter at "New
Netherland." The federal commissioners declined to receive this
letter, and Stuyvesant changed the address to "Connecticut." This
proving satisfactory to the commissioners, Stuyvesant set out his
territorial claim and the imputed wrongs suffered by the Dutch from
the English, and the federal commissioners rejoined in a similar
manner. Then Stuyvesant proposed to refer the question in dispute to
four arbitrators, all Englishmen, two to be appointed by himself and
two by the federal commissioners.
The offer was accepted, and after a full hearing by these arbitrators,
Thomas Willet, George Baxter, Simon Bradstreet, and Thomas Prince,
declined to decide upon the wrongs complained of by either party and
rendered an award upon the territorial question only. They decided
that the Dutch should retain their fort on the Connecticut, and that
the boundary should begin at a point on the west side of Greenwich
Bay, about four miles from Stamford, and run due north twenty miles.
From that point it should be extended as the Dutch and New Haven might
agree, provided that the line should not come nearer the Hudson River
than ten miles. The English obtained most of Long Island besides, for
in that quarter the line was declared to be a meridian drawn through
the westernmost part of Oyster Bay.[24] If these terms subjected
Stuyvesant to severe criticism at New Amsterdam, it was really a
stroke of statesmanship to obtain, even at a sacrifice, what was for
the first time an international barrier to English intrusion.
The southern flank of New Netherland was left unprotected, and in 1651
New Haven once more endeavored to plant a colony on the Delaware. The
failure of the former attempt bore heavily upon the wealthy merchants
of the town, and they had ill luck in another adventure. In January,
1646, they sent an agent to England to solicit a charter from the
English government. The ship in which he sailed carried seventy other
prominent citizens of the place and a cargo valued at £5000. A great
storm ensued after the ship's departure and she was lost at sea.[25]
So disheartening was this misfortune that many at New Haven
entertained the idea of removing to the West Indies or Ireland.
Now, in 1651, under a commission from Governor Eaton, fifty men from
New Haven prepared to sail for the Delaware.[26] Their ship touched at
New Amsterdam, and Stuyvesant arrested both passengers and officers,
and only released them on their promise to return home. The
adventurers appealed to the commissioners, and these officials wrote a
letter to Stuyvesant protesting against his course.[27]
Next year war broke out between Holland and England, and the war
spirit spread to this side of the ocean. Rumors got afloat that the
Dutch and Indians had conspired against the English, and Connecticut
and New Haven became hysterical for war; while Rhode Island
commissioned John Underhill, lately escaped from the Dutch, to take
all Dutch vessels he could find.[28] Stuyvesant indignantly denied the
charge of conspiring with the Indians, and proposed to refer the
examination of the facts to any impartial tribunal. Nevertheless, all
the old complaints were revived.
In 1652 the federal commissioners resolved on hostilities,[29] but the
Massachusetts general court, which had all along taken a position in
favor of peace, refused to be bound by a vote of six commissioners
representing Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven.[30] On the other
hand, the commissioners of the three smaller colonies protested
against the conduct of the court of Massachusetts as violating the
confederation.[31] New Haven and Connecticut took measures to wage war
on their own account,[32] and in April, 1654, Connecticut sequestered
the Dutch fort at Hartford.[33]
When, in June, 1654, a fleet despatched by Cromwell, in response to
appeals made to him, appeared in Boston harbor, Connecticut and New
Haven were overjoyed, and proceeded with alacrity to make arrangements
for an attack on the hated Dutch. Massachusetts refused to raise
troops, although she gave her citizens privilege to enlist if they
chose. Yet her policy of peace prevailed in the end, for before the
preparations described could be completed a stop was put to them by
the news that a treaty of peace had been signed between England and
Holland April 5, 1654.[34]
Massachusetts had successfully nullified the plain provisions of the
articles, and for a time it looked as if the dissolution of the
confederacy would be the consequence. New Haven voted at first not to
choose commissioners, but finally decided to do so,[35] and meetings
of the commissioners went on apparently as before. Nevertheless, the
effect of the action of Massachusetts was far-reaching--from that time
the respective colonies diverged more and more, till the hope of a
permanent intercolonial bond vanished.
[Footnote 1: Winthrop, _New England_, I., 283, 342-344.]
[Footnote 2: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 95, 99, 102, 121-127.]
[Footnote 3: Ibid., 121.]
[Footnote 4: _Simplicities Defence_ (Force, _Tracts_, IV., No. vi.,
93).]
[Footnote 5: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 203, 243, 301, 463.]
[Footnote 6: _Plymouth Col. Records_, IX., 32-49.]
[Footnote 7: Palfrey, _New England_, II., 187-198, 332-341, III., 141;
Hutchinson, _Massachusetts Bay_, I., 153.]
[Footnote 8: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 325.]
[Footnote 9: Palfrey, _New England_, II., 234.]
[Footnote 10: Trumbull, _Connecticut_, I., 508.]
[Footnote 11: Ibid., 165, 166; Palfrey, _New England_, II., 240-249.]
[Footnote 12: _Mass. Col. Records_, III., 152.]
[Footnote 13: _Plymouth Col. Records_, IX., 158.]
[Footnote 14: _Mass. Col. Records_, IV., pt. i., II.]
[Footnote 15: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 128, 130, 153.]
[Footnote 16: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 163, 180, 219, 220.]
[Footnote 17: _Plymouth Col. Records_, IX., 59.]
[Footnote 18: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 244, 335.]
[Footnote 19: Parkman, _Jesuits_, 327-335.]
[Footnote 20: Hutchinson, _Massachusetts Bay_, I., 156-158.]
[Footnote 21: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 155, 157, 169, 189, 193,
229; Brodhead, _New York_, I., 409.]
[Footnote 22: Trumbull, _Connecticut_, I., 158.]
[Footnote 23: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 382, 395; Brodhead, _New
York_, I. 499.]
[Footnote 24: Trumbull, _Connecticut_, I., 189-192.]
[Footnote 25: Winthrop, _New England_, II., 325, 337.]
[Footnote 26: Trumbull, _Connecticut_, I., 196.]
[Footnote 27: _Plymouth Col. Records_, IX., 210-215.]
[Footnote 28: _R.I. Col. Records_, I., 266.]
[Footnote 29: _Plymouth Col. Records_, X., 102.]
[Footnote 30: _Mass. Col. Records_, III., 311.]
[Footnote 31: _New Haven Col. Records_, II., 36.]
[Footnote 32: Ibid., 37]
[Footnote 33: _Conn. Col. Records_, I., 254.]
[Footnote 34: Trumbull, _Connecticut_, I., 219, 220.]
[Footnote 35: _New Haven Col. Records_, II., iii.]