_McClellan and his Enemies.--The Peninsula Campaign.--The Rebel Forces
Before Richmond.--The Union Forces Outnumbered by the Enemy, and their
Commander Hampered By Superiors.--An Honest Opinion._
It is not my purpose to attempt to detail the various movements of the
army, to describe the battles which were fought, or to chronicle the
victories and defeats which were achieved and sustained by the brave
soldiers who fought under the flag of the Union. That duty belongs to
the historian; mine simply to relate the experiences of my own men in
the delicate, dangerous and laborious duties which devolved upon them.
Far less is it my desire to enter into a discussion upon the various
subjects that have, since that fratricidal conflict, engrossed the
attention of the student of history.
I trust, however, that I may be pardoned, if, for a time, I depart from
the main narrative and devote a brief space to the consideration of that
much discussed subject, the campaign of the Peninsula. I make no
pretension whatever to being a military scholar, nor in any sense a
military man, but my connection with the government during the war, and
participation in the movements of the Army of the Potomac, together
with my long and intimate acquaintance with its commander, General
McClellan, may entitle me to a brief expression of my own views of that
campaign. I may be pardoned, also, if I attempt to ascribe to their
proper source, some of the causes which contributed largely to the
disasters that attended it.
There can be no doubt of the fact, that the young commander-in-chief was
subjected to the persecutions of the most malignant political
intriguers, who feared that his growing popularity would result in
political exaltation. Taking advantage of the fact, therefore, that
General McClellan was an avowed Democrat, a scheming cabal was working
to weaken his influence with the people by vague insinuations against
his loyalty to the Union cause. To further that end, his plans, so
carefully and intelligently matured, for the speedy crushing of the
rebellion, were either totally disregarded by an unfriendly cabinet, or
were so frequently thwarted, that to successfully carry them out was an
utter impossibility.
As I have always been a faithful adherent of the maxim, "speak the
truth, though the heavens fall," and believing it to be a doctrine, that
if practically carried, will right all wrongs, uphold the innocent,
administer censure where deserved, and praise where it is due, I have
invariably attempted to form my judgment of my fellow-men upon their own
intrinsic merits.
Whatever may have been his faults as a man, his mistakes as a General,
he was throughout unflinchingly loyal to the cause of the North. With
him it was but one sentiment, and one ambition--to whip the rebels into
subjection--and manfully did he perform his duty toward the
accomplishment of that object. Much of the censure which has been heaped
upon him and his conduct as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, is due
to a hasty and inconsiderate judgment of the man and his motives, or the
result of direct prejudice and ill-will. In the eyes of his critics his
great fault lay in what they considered his inexcusable delay in moving
against the enemy in the Spring of 1862, after, as they supposed, he had
ample time to prepare his army for the field.
From this point began the open and unfriendly criticisms which were
designed to excite an impatient people, who did not, and could not,
understand why active operations were not at once begun. This delay was
adroitly used by scheming politicians to cast the shadow of disloyalty
upon a man, who never for one moment entertained a disloyal thought, nor
performed a single action which he did not believe would redound to the
credit and honor of the Union troops, and of the Government which he
served.
My acquaintance with General McClellan began before the war, and when he
was the Vice-President of the Illinois Central Railroad. That
corporation had, on frequent occasions, employed my services in various
operations affecting their interests, and in this way I first met and
became associated with the General. From this date began my warm regard
for the man, which, during the many years that have passed, has known no
diminution.
I knew the man so well, and my confidence in his integrity and
patriotism was so thorough, that a doubt of his loyalty never entered my
mind. Many of my old-line abolition friends went so far as to reproach
me for my steadfast adherence to McClellan, and accused me of abandoning
my principles. I, however, knew my own ground, and held it. I knew that
the General was not an abolitionist, but that he was not a patriot I
could not believe for a moment. I have always thought, and my opinion
remains unchanged to this day, that had he been left free to carry out
his plans in the Peninsula campaign, the Army of the Potomac would have
escaped the disasters that befell it; Richmond would have been reduced,
and occupied by the Federal troops; and victory instead of defeat would
have crowned their heroic efforts from the river to the rebel seat of
government.
"How do you account for General McClellan's 'masterly inactivity' during
all these months that his army lay at Washington?" is asked. Ah, there
is the mistake. It was anything but inactivity, and it is beginning to
be pretty generally understood now what he was doing at that time.
More than one writer on the campaigns of the Civil War, has taken
occasion to say that the splendid achievements of the Army of the
Potomac at subsequent periods, and under other commanders, were mainly
due to the careful drilling and the rigid discipline inculcated under
McClellan. At the time he was called to the command of the army it was
nothing better than a band of disorganized men, who had not recovered
from the defeat of Bull Run, and whatever efficiency it attained, was
accomplished by the indefatigable efforts of General McClellan and the
officers under his command.
The South, at the outbreak, was far better prepared for war than the
North. For months preceding the election of Mr. Lincoln the people of
the South were secretly preparing for a struggle. They had even then
determined, if beaten by the ballot, to resort to the bayonet, and to
decide upon the battle-field the questions which they failed to settle
by fair discussion and honest legislation in the National Congress. The
people of the North, on the contrary, being so long accustomed to submit
to the expressed will of the majority, apprehended no danger. While they
were keenly alive to the important nature of the issues presented in the
campaign, they did not dream that the new party, if successful, would
have a gigantic civil war on its hands as the result of its triumph in a
contest peaceably decided by the silent yet all-powerful ballot. Resting
in this fancied security from danger, the war was a surprise, for which
they were but illy prepared.
I need not detail the situation of affairs when the news flashed over
the wires that Fort Sumter was fired upon. Suffice it do say, that the
South was up in arms, in full preparation almost, before the North could
realize that war was at hand.
The first great battle of the war was fought, and the Union troops
suffered a most humiliating defeat, falling back in disordered crowds
upon Washington, and at this time General McClellan took command and
brought order out of chaos.
The community did not seem to consider, or to understand, that it was
necessary to spend so much time in drilling the troops and making
elaborate preparations for the field. But the commanding officer was too
good a general to imitate the impetuous actions of his predecessors, and
to make an aggressive campaign with raw and undisciplined troops. It was
in consequence of this, that months were spent in the patient and
persistent task of properly organizing, drilling and equipping his men
for the field, and in the spring of 1862, when the army did move, in the
language of the General, it was one "from which much was to be
expected."
Unfortunately, however, at the very outset, the General and the
President had each matured a plan for the conduct of the war, and, in
many respects, these were diametrically opposed to each other. At this
point the question might be asked, whose plan should have been followed?
By the Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the
armies and the navy of the United States, and is, of course,
_ex-officio_, the highest military authority in the land. "But if a
President disclaims all knowledge of military affairs," as President
Lincoln did, "it then becomes a question how far he should defer the
conduct of a war to his appointed Commander-in-Chief, who is supposed to
be chosen on account of his skill and sagacity in military matters, and
upon his presumed fitness for the position."
In President Lincoln's hesitation between the advice of his Generals in
the field, and the views urged by his Cabinet lay the foundation of many
of the blunders and mistakes of the war, the trouble being, as one
writer affirms, that "instead of one mind, there were many minds
influencing the management of military affairs." As the result of this
there was a lack of concert and action between the two heads of the
military department, and at the critical period of the campaign,
McDowell's forces were held at Washington when McClellan expected him to
re-enforce the army of the Potomac.
Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I
have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President
and his advisors, stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of
Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their
absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the
close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war
ended.
At the commencement of the campaign I had an interview with General
McClellan, and he expressed the utmost confidence in his ability,
provided his plans were fully supported and carried out, to gain the
objective point of the war, and to accomplish the reduction of the rebel
capital. My force of operatives had been diligently at work in procuring
what information that was possible of attainment, of the numbers of the
enemy, and with such success that in March I was able to report the
approximate strength of the rebel army at 115,500 men, apportioned about
as follows:
At Manassas, Centerville and vicinity, 80,000
" Brooks' Station, Dumfries, &c., 18,000
" Leesburg, 4,500
In the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000
-------
Total, 115,500
In gaining this important information, Timothy Webster, Pryce Lewis,
John Scobell and a host of other efficient members of my force, some of
whom have already been mentioned in these pages, deserve especial credit
for their sleepless energy in prosecuting the work that had been
assigned to them.
On the 4th of April the forward movement was made, and the siege of
Yorktown was begun. The result of this siege the student of history
already knows, a simple detention of the Army of the Potomac, until the
enemy could occupy and fortify Richmond. Here is where McClellan
suffered from the detention of McDowell at Washington--he had prepared a
plan with McDowell as one of its principal actors, and with that force
withdrawn, the General's intentions were not only radically interfered
with, but seriously deranged.
During this time the rebel army was being daily reinforced and
strengthened, until, by June 26th, its numbers were swelled to nearly
200,000 effective men. McClellan, on the contrary, starting as he did,
with a smaller army than he thought was necessary to cope with the
enemy, found himself, when before their fortifications, after being
deprived of McDowell's division, with an army of less than 90,000
effective troops.
Another element in this campaign must not be lost sight of. The Navy,
whose co-operation and assistance had been promised and relied upon, was
unable to aid him at all. Can it be wondered at, therefore, that his
plans, however well laid, and whatever their merits, viewed from a
military stand-point, or the stand-point of common sense, failed in
their execution.
One writer, in speaking of the treatment of General McClellan, has well
said: "A general of high spirit and sensitive soul might have found in
the government's action the occasion for sending in his resignation; but
General McClellan continued in command, accepted the situation, and
endeavored to make the best of it."
And still another has said, although inclined to be partial and unfair,
in his account of the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg:
"His capacity and energy as an organizer are universally recognized. He
was an excellent strategist, and, in many respects, an excellent
soldier. He did not use his own troops with sufficient promptness and
vigor to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftener
successful than unsuccessful with them; and he so conducted affairs that
they never suffered heavily without inflicting heavy loss upon their
adversaries. It may appear a strange statement to follow the other
matter which this volume contains, but it is none the less true, that
there are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander
the Army of the Potomac ever had." Concluding a comparison, that
redounds much to the credit of General McClellan, both as a soldier and
a patriot, the same writer says:
"A growing familiarity with his history as a soldier, increases the
disposition to regard him with respect and gratitude, and to believe,
while recognizing the limitations of his nature, that his failure to
accomplish more was partly his misfortune, and not altogether his
fault."
General McClellan knew much better than some of his self-appointed
critics the numbers and strength of the enemy. He knew from the reports
of the secret service that the general estimate of the rebel army at,
and around Richmond, was far below their real numbers.
My shrewd and daring operatives, men and women trained for the work,
moved in and out among the Rebel troops at all times and places. From
actual observation they gathered the location, character and strength of
their fortifications, and from actual count the estimates were made of
the numerical strength of the opposing army.
Suffice it to say, that I knew of my own knowledge, and General
McClellan knew from the reports I laid before him, the fearful odds
against which he had to contend in the bravely fought but disastrous
campaign of the Peninsula.[C]
FOOTNOTES:
[C] See detailed statement in Appendix.