"A trifling sum of misery
New added to the foot of thy account."
DRYDEN.
"Jack Frost looked forth one still clear night,
And he said, 'Now I shall be out of sight;
So over the valley and over the height
In silence I'll take my way.'"
GOULD.
Again I faced the same task with a fresh mind and fresh hopes, all
that remained with me of my former attempts being _nineteen_ lessons.
Having detailed the two patrols and the guard on Waschout Hill as
already described, I spent some twenty minutes--whilst the stores,
etc., were being arranged--in walking about to choose a position to
hold in the light of my nineteen lessons.
I came to the conclusion that it was not any good being near the top
of a hill and yet not _at_ the top. I would make my post on the top of
Waschout Hill, where I could not be overlooked from any place within
rifle-range, and where I should, I believed, have "command." I was not
quite certain what "command" meant, but I knew it was important--it
says so in the book; besides, in all the manoeuvres I had attended
and tactical schemes I had seen, the "defence" always held a position
on top of a hill or ridge. My duty was plain: Waschout Hill seemed the
only place which did not contravene any of the nineteen lessons I had
learnt, and up it I walked. As I stood near one of the huts, I got an
excellent view of the drift and its southern approach just over the
bulge of the hill, and a clear view of the river further east and
west. I thought at first I would demolish the few grass and matting
huts which, with some empty kerosene tins and heaps of bones and
_debris_, formed the Kaffir kraal, but on consideration I decided to
play cunning, and that this same innocent-looking Kaffir kraal would
materially assist me to hide my defences. I made out my plan of
operations in detail, and we had soon conveyed all our stores up to
the top of the hill, and started work.
Upon the return of the patrols with their prisoners, the Dutchmen and
"boys" were told off to dig for themselves and their females. The
Kaffirs of the kraal we had impressed to assist at once.
My arrangements were as follows: All round the huts on the hill-top,
and close to them we dug some ten short lengths of deep firing-trench,
curved in plan, and each long enough to hold five men. These trenches
had extremely low parapets, really only serving as rifle-rests, some
of the excavated earth being heaped up _behind_ the trenches to the
height of a foot or so, the remainder being dealt with as described
later. In most cases the parapets were provided with grooves to fire
through at ground-level, the parapet on each side being high enough to
just protect the head. As with the background the men's heads were not
really visible, it was unnecessary to provide proper loopholes, which
would have necessitated also the use of new sandbags, which would be
rather conspicuous and troublesome to conceal. When the men using
these trenches were firing, their heads would be just above the level
of the ground. These firing-trenches having been got well under way,
the communication trenches were started. These were to be narrow and
deep, leading from one trench to the next, and also leading from each
trench back to four of the huts, which were to be arranged as follows,
to allow of men to fire standing up without being seen. Round the
inside of the walls of these huts part of the excavated earth, of
which there was ample, would be built up with sand bags, piece of
anthill, stones, etc., to a height that a man can fire over, about
four and a half feet, and to a thickness of some two and a half feet
at the top, and loopholes, which would be quite invisible, cut through
the hut sides above this parapet. There was room in each hut for three
men to fire. In three of them I meant to place my best shots, to act
as snipers, as they would have a more favorable position than the men
in the trenches below, and the fourth was a conning tower for myself.
All the tents and stores were stacked inside one of the huts out of
sight.
That evening, in spite of the hardness of the work, which caused much
grousing among my men, we had got the firing trenches complete, but
the others were not finished--they were only half the necessary depth.
The earth-walls inside the huts were also not quite completed. The
Kaffirs and Dutch had deep pits, as before, in three of the huts.
Ammunition and rations were distributed round the trenches the last
thing before we turned in. I also had all water-bottles and every
vessel that would hold water, such as empty tins, Kaffir gourds, and
cooking-pots, filled and distributed in case of a long and protracted
fight. Having issued orders as to the necessity for the greatest
secrecy in not giving away our position should Boers turn up early
next morning, I went to sleep with confidence. We had, anyhow, a very
good position, and though our communications were not quite perfect,
these we could soon improve if we had any time to ourselves the next
morning.
Next morning broke; no enemy in sight. This was excellent, and before
daylight we were hard at it, finishing the work still undone. By this
time the men had fully entered into the spirit of the thing, and were
quite keen on surprising Brother Boer if possible. While the digging
was proceeding, the "dixies" were being boiled for the breakfasts
inside four grass-screens, some of which we found lying about, so as
to show nothing but some very natural smoke above the kraal. I picked
out one or two of my smartest N.C.O.'s, and instructed them to walk
down the hill in different directions to the river-bank and try if
they could see the heads of the men in the firing trenches against the
sky. If so, the heaps of earth, tins, bones, grass-screens, etc.,
should be re-arranged so as to give a background to every man's head.
To review the place generally, I and my orderly walked off some
half-mile to the north of the river. As we were going some distance,
we doffed our helmets and wrapped ourselves in two beautiful orange
and magenta striped blankets, borrowed from our Kaffir lady guests, in
case any stray Boer should be lurking around, as he might be
interested to see two "khakis" wandering about on the veldt. It was
awkward trying to walk with our rifles hidden under our blankets, and,
moreover, every two minutes we had to look around to see if the sentry
at the camp had signalled any enemy in sight. This was to be done by
raising a pole on the highest hut. The result of our work was
splendid. We saw a Kaffir kraal on a hill, and to us "it was nothing
more." There were the heaps of _debris_ usually round a kraal, looking
most natural, but no heads were visible, and no trenches. There was
only one fault, and that was that a few thoughtless men began, as we
looked, to spread their brown army blankets out in the sun on top of
the huts and on the veldt. To the veriest new chum these square blots,
like squares of brown sticking-plaster all around the kraal, would
have betokened something unusual. To remedy this before it was too
late I hastened back.
After we had done our breakfasts, and some three hours after dawn, the
sentry in one of the huts reported a force to the north. We could do
nothing but wait and hope; everything was ready, and every man knew
what to do. No head was to be raised nor a rifle to be fired until I
whistled from my conning-tower; then every man would pop up and empty
his magazine into any of the enemy in range. If we were shelled the
men in the huts could at once drop into the deep trenches and be safe.
Standing in my "conning-tower," from the loopholes of which I could
see the drift, I thought over the possibilities before us. With great
luck perhaps the Boer scouts would pass us on either side, and so
allow us to lie low for the main body. With a view to seeing exactly
how far I would let the latter come before opening fire, and to
marking the exact spot when it would be best to give the word, I got
down into the firing-trenches facing the drift and the road south to
see how matters appeared from the level of the rifles. To my intense
horror, I found that from these trenches neither the drift nor the
road on the near bank of the river, until it got a long way south of
Waschout Hill, _could be seen_! The bulging convexity of the hill hid
all this; it must be _dead ground_! It was. The very spot where I
could best catch the enemy, where they _must_ pass, was not under my
fire! At most, the northern loopholes of the conning tower and one
other hut alone could give fire on the drift. How I cursed my
stupidity! However, it was no good. I could not now start digging
fresh trenches further down the hill; it would betray our whole
position at once. I determined to make the best of it, and _if_ we
were not discovered by the scouts, to open fire on the main body when
they were just on the other side of the river bunched up on the bank,
waiting for those in front. Here we could fire on them; but it would
be at a much longer range than I had intended. It was really a stroke
of luck that I had discovered this serious fault, for otherwise we
might have let the bulk of the enemy cross the drift without
discovering the little fact of the dead ground till too late. I
reflected, also (though it was not much consolation), that I had erred
in good company, for how often had I not seen a "brass-hat" ride along
on horseback, and from that height fix the exact position for trenches
in which the rifles would be little above the ground. These trenches,
however, had not been put to the test of actual use. My error was not
going to escape in the same way.
Meanwhile the enemy's scouts had advanced in much the same way as
detailed before, except that after coming past Incidentamba Farm they
had not halted suspiciously, but came on in small groups or clumps.
They crossed the river in several places and examined the bushy banks
most carefully, but finding no "khakis" there, they evidently
suspected none on the open veldt beyond them, for they advanced "any
way" without care. Several of the clumps joined together, and came on
chatting in one body of some thirty men. Would they examine the kraal,
or would they pass on? My heart beat. The little hill we were on
would, unluckily, be certain to prove an attraction for them, because
it was an excellent vantage ground whence to scan the horizon to the
south, and to signal back to the main body to the north. The kraal was
also a suitable place to off-saddle for a few minutes while the main
body came up to the drift, and it meant possibly a fire, and therefore
a cup of coffee. They rode up towards it laughing, chatting, and
smoking, quite unsuspecting. We uttered no sound. Our Dutch and Kaffir
guests uttered no sound either, for in their pits was a man with a
rifle alongside them. At last they halted a moment some 250 yards away
on the northeast, where the slope of the hill was more gradual and
showed them all up. A few dismounted, the rest started again straight
towards us. It was not magnificent, but it was war. I whistled.
* * * * *
About ten of them succeeded in galloping off, also some loose horses;
five or six of them on the ground threw up their hands and came into
the post. On the ground there remained a mass of kicking horses and
dead or groaning men. The other parties of scouts to east and west had
at once galloped back to the river, where they dismounted under cover
and began to pepper us. Anyway, we had done _something_.
As soon as our immediate enemy were disposed of, we opened fire on the
main body some 1,500 yards away, who had at once halted and opened
out. To these we did a good deal of damage, causing great confusion,
which was comforting to watch. The Boer in command of the main body
must have gathered that the river-bed was clear, for he made a very
bold move; he drove the whole of the wagons, etc., straight on as fast
as possible over the odd 400 yards to the river and down the drift
into the river-bed, where they were safe from our fire. Their losses
must have been heavy over this short distance, for they had to abandon
two of their wagons on the way to the river. This was done under cover
of the fire from a large number of riflemen, who had at once galloped
up to the river-bank, dismounted, and opened fire at us, and also of
two guns and a pompom, which had immediately been driven a short
distance back and then outwards to the east and west. It was really
the best thing he could have done, and if he had only known that we
could not fire on the ground to the south of the drift, he might have
come straight on with a rush.
We had so far scored; but now ensued a period of stalemate. We were
being fired at from the river-bank on the north, and from anthills,
etc., pretty well all round, and were also under the intermittent
shell-fire from the two guns. They made most excellent practice at the
huts, which were soon knocked to bits, but not till they had well
served their turn. Some of the new white sandbags from inside the huts
were scattered out in full view of the enemy, and it was instructive
to see what a splendid target they made for rifle-fire, and how often
they were hit. They must have drawn a lot of fire away from the actual
trenches. Until the Boers discovered that they could advance south
from the drift without being under rifle-fire from our position, they
were held up.
Would they discover it? As they had ridden all round us by now, well
out of range, they must know all about us and our isolation.
After dark, by which time we had one man killed and two wounded, the
firing died away into a continuous but desultory rifle-fire, with an
occasional dropping shell from the guns. Under cover of dark, I tried
to guard the drift and dead ground to the south of it, by men standing
up and firing at that level, but towards midnight I was forced to
withdraw them into the trenches, after several casualties, as the
enemy then apparently woke up and kept up a furious rifle-fire upon us
for over an hour. During this time the guns went through some
mysterious evolutions. At first we got it very hot from the north,
where the guns had been all along. Then suddenly a gun was opened on
us away from the southwest, and we were shelled for a short time from
both sides. After a little the shelling on the north ceased, and
continued from the southwest only for twenty minutes. After this the
guns ceased, and the rifle-fire also gradually died away.
When day dawned not a living soul was to be seen; there were the dead
men, horses, and the deserted wagons. I feared a trap, but gradually
came to the conclusion the Boers had retired. After a little we
discovered the river-bed was deserted as well, but the Boers had not
retired. They had discovered the dead ground, and under the mutually
supporting fire of their guns, which had kept us to our trenches, had
all _crossed the drift_ and trekked south.
True, we were not captured, and had very few losses, and had severely
mauled the enemy, _but_ they had crossed the drift. It must have
evidently been of great importance to them to go on, or they would
have attempted to capture us, as they were about 500 to our 50.