1833.
The enthusiasm excited in France by the taking of Algiers was of short
duration. A revolution had overthrown the dynasty of the elder branch of
the House of Bourbon, under whose auspices the conquest had been
achieved. The dark cloud of hatred and execration which enveloped the
departed tyranny, threw its ominous shadow over the glories of that
brilliant feat of arms.
Willingness to abandon the fruits of a triumph obtained under such
circumstances became the prevalent feeling. In the French Chambers a
large party denounced the contemplated occupation of Algeria as costly
and useless. Some suggested that the sea-coast towns should be held, not
so much with views of aggrandisement, as from a desire of saving the
national honour.
None understood, and few troubled themselves to investigate, the nature
of the country which was the subject of debate. All knew that Algeria
was a nest of pirates, that the governors were barbarous Turks, and that
the government were degraded Arabs. But what was the condition of the
interior, what were the manners, customs, and social characteristics of
the people, what kind of government would best replace the one which had
been overthrown, what system of administration should be adopted, no one
attempted duly to consider. On all these points the ignorance and
indifference was complete.
Fluctuating in its plans, and unwilling to release its grasp, the French
ministry, at an early period, reduced its army in Algeria to 10,000 men.
For a long time afterwards, all its measures were marked by weakness and
indecision. In the space of six years, no less than ten governor-
generals were sent over to experimentalise on new theories of
legislation. The thread of official experience was constantly broken by
the arrival of successive neophytes in the art of governing. Each new
actor appeared on the stage with his peculiar crotchets, which he
crudely endeavoured to carry into execution.
In the autumn of 1830, Marshal Clausel, the Governor-General, proposed
to entrust the provinces of Oran and Tittery to princes of the family of
the Bey of Tunis, on the condition of their becoming vassals of France.
He gave Oran, accordingly, to Prince Sidi Achmet, for an annual tribute
of one million francs. The prince, uncertain as to his reception by the
Arabs of that province, prudently sent before him a deputy, named Heir-
ed-deen, to feel the way. This functionary, on his arrival, found the
city nearly deserted, and the magazines void of provisions.
Nevertheless, he proceeded to feel his ground. He issued a proclamation
to the Arabs, giving them the most flattering assurances of his future
intentions. They were told that the French had not the slightest desire
to interfere with their established usages and customs; that they would
confine themselves to the occupation of the sea-coast towns; and that
the tribes in the interior should be governed by native chiefs of their
own selection. Some Arab sheiks, seduced by these promises, came in, and
received pelisses, and other marks of honour. They returned to their
tribes, but to become objects of ridicule. The plan proved utterly
abortive. It neither awakened hopes, nor dispelled fears. After a few
weeks, the agent of the prince withdrew.
To the immense advantages which accrued to him from the fluctuations and
failures which embarrassed the councils of the French government, Abdel
Kader was daily adding those solid results which arose from his own
energy and courage. The fruits of the impulse which he had imparted to
his countrymen were becoming more apparent. Confidence, if not victory,
followed everywhere in his train. The Arab character was developing
long-concealed virtues from its inmost depths. Patience, constancy,
perseverance, concentration of purpose, and a spirit of union, had all
been summoned to the surface under the presiding genius of Abdel Kader.
His principal care was to get rid of all the causes likely to endanger
the common weal, or to disturb his general line of action. The edict
which he had issued, forbidding all commercial transactions with the
French, had borne heavily on some of the tribes, who had long been
accustomed to trade with the towns now in French possession. The fruits
of a traffic exercised from generation to generation, and the enormous
profits actually reaped, were advantages not easily foregone. But, by
the influence of certain Marabouts, who, by the order of Abdel Kader,
were moving constantly amongst them, more patriotic feelings were made
to prevail. The Arabs ceased to frequent the French markets.
The system of blockade enforced by Abdel Kader had a telling effect on
the French garrisons. They depended almost entirely on the Arabs for the
necessaries of life. The sea brought them little or nothing, and only at
rare intervals. Hence the nervous anxiety, leading to acts of violence,
with which, like birds of prey, they scented and pounced upon their food
in the interior. Whilst Desmichels was revolving in his mind in what
manner he could, without lowering his dignity, bring about negotiations
with Abdel Kader, and relieve him from his pressing wants and
necessities, there occurred an event which opened the door to a
transaction.
Towards the end of October, 1833, an Arab, named Kudoor, of the Borgia
tribe, came to Arzew and sold some cattle. On his departure he asked the
French commanding officer to give him an escort, as he dreaded the
Sultan’s scouts, whom he knew to be on the look-out. An escort of four
horsemen was given him. At the distance of about a league from the town
the escort was attacked by a large force of Arabs. One man was killed;
the three others were taken prisoners and carried to Mascara.
Desmichels, only too happy to have a plausible pretext for writing to
Abdel Kader, now addressed him the following letter:—
“I do not hesitate to make the first advances to you. My position,
strictly speaking, does not allow me to do so, but humanity compels me.
I reclaim the liberty of those Frenchmen who, while engaged in escorting
an Arab, fell into an ambuscade. I cannot suppose that you will make
their release dependent on conditions, since, when by the fate of war
some of the Zmelas and Gharabas were not long since brought in to me, as
prisoners, I at once sent them back to their tribes, without any
stipulation, and treated them, moreover, with the greatest kindness.
“If, therefore, you wish to be considered a great man, I hope you will
not be behind me in generosity, and that you will immediately release
the Frenchmen who are now in your power.”
Abdel Kader returned the following reply:—
“I have received the letter, in which you express your hope that the
prisoners to whom you allude will be liberated. I understand its
contents. You tell me that, notwithstanding your position, you have
consented to make me the first advances. It was your duty to do so,
according to the rules of war. Between enemies, each has his turn: one
day the chances are for you, another for me. The mill turns for both,
and always crushing new victims.
“As for myself, when you have taken prisoners, I never troubled you with
reclamations in their behalf. I was pained, as a man, for their unhappy
fate; but, as a Mussulman, I looked upon their death, if it occurred, as
a new life. You tell me that your Frenchmen were employed to protect an
Arab. That is no reason with me. Protectors and protected were alike my
enemies; and all Arabs who are found with you are bad believers,
ignorant of their duty.
“You boast that you gratuitously liberated some of the Gharabas and
Zmelas. That is true. But you surprised men who were living under your
protection, and who were actually supplying your own markets. Your
troops robbed them of all they had. If, instead of falling on those who
were doing you a service, you had advanced beyond your lines; if you had
attacked men who were anxiously waiting for you, such as the Beni Amers
and the Hashems, then you might, with justice, talk of your generosity,
had you taken prisoners from them, and set them free.
“Then you would have deserved the praises you claim for yourself for
having pillaged the Zmelas, and setting about the report that I had
fallen into your hands. When you march two days beyond the walls of Oran
I hope we shall behold each other; and then it will be seen which of us
will remain master of the field.”
This haughty challenge would, under other circumstances, have aroused in
the breast of the French general the loftiest feelings of chivalry. The
drums would have been beat, the trumpets sounded, the standards
fluttered, and the Arab champion would have been swiftly summoned to the
test. Desmichels retorted by again attacking and plundering the Douairs
and Zmelas. Abdel Kader was amongst the Beni Amers when he heard of the
incursion.
He was instantly at the head of 5,000 cavalry, and rushed to the rescue.
With slackened reins and thundering hoofs, the Arab horse traversed a
distance of fifty miles in less than three hours. Not more than one-half
of the men, on his arrival, were fit for duty. But with these troops
Abdel Kader charged. The French, utterly confounded by this unexpected
apparition, hastily retreated, abandoning the women and children, whom
they had taken with them, as hostages. Fresh troops come up to their
relief, with more pieces of artillery; but, despite the galling fire to
which he was exposed, Abdel Kader followed up the enemy, and hovered
round them, to the very outskirts of Oran.
On his return to the Arab encampment he ordered the Douairs and Zmelas
to prepare for immediate departure from a spot where temptations to
transgress his edict were constantly held out to them, and where they
were as continually exposed to vile and cruel assaults. He marched them
off, with all their flocks and herds, and located them on a large plain
behind Tlemsen.
Desmichels, paralysed by the boldness and ubiquity of his redoubtable
foe, and finding his resources failing, his supplies cut off, and famine
ready to swoop down on his men, saw no alternative before him but
evacuation or peace. In this dire necessity he thus appealed to Abdel
Kader:—
“You will never find me deaf to any sentiments of generosity, and if it
would be convenient to you to grant me an interview, I am quite ready to
consent, in the hope that we may be able, by the most sacred and solemn
treaties, to stop the effusion of blood between two peoples destined by
Providence to live under the same dominion.”
Abdel Kader seeing his adversary in the attitude of a suppliant,
affected indifference. He left the letter unanswered. At the same time
he employed a Jew, named Mordecai Amar, his agent at Oran, to pacify the
French general with excuses, if any complaint were made as to his
silence, and to suggest the advisability of more explicit and
categorical propositions. After a month had transpired, Desmichels
penned a third dispatch:—
“Not having received any answer to the letter I lately wrote to you, I
prefer supposing that it has never reached you, to imagining that you
have not chosen to give it your attention.”
The general terminated his reasonings by imploring for peace as
follows:—“If you wish to maintain the exalted position to which
circumstances have raised you, in my opinion you could not do better
than accept my invitation, in order that the tribes may devote
themselves to the cultivation of their lands, and enjoy the fruits and
the blessings of peace, under the shadow of treaties binding us firmly
together.”
The young and victorious Sultan, with this document in his hand, could
now show his subjects that the enemy had been the first to crave for a
suspension of hostilities. There was no occasion for any further delay,
and he sent the following answer:—
“I have received your letter, and fully understand its contents. It
gives me great satisfaction to find that your sentiments agree with
mine. I feel quite assured of your loyal intentions; and you may feel
assured that any engagements into which we may enter shall be faithfully
observed on my part. I send you two superior officers of my army—Miloud
ibn Arasch and Ould Mahmoud. They will confer, outside Oran, with
Mordecai Amar, and will make known to him any proposition. If you accept
them, you can send him on to me, and then we will draw up a treaty,
which shall obliterate the hatred and enmity now severing us from each
other, and replace them by an indissoluble friendship. You may count
upon me, for I have never been unfaithful to my word.”
The proposed interview took place February 4, 1834. The Jew Amar was
accompanied by the whole of the French staff. A long discussion ensued
on various propositions made by Desmichels. The Sultan’s agent, Ibn
Arasch, then left, saying he would report what had passed to his master,
and return. He took with him a paper containing a draft of the
propositions, but without the general’s signature.
On the 25th, Ibn Arasch returned to Oran, bearing this draft, approved
and sealed by Abdel Kader, with another paper, containing the
propositions of Abdel Kader. He was instructed not to deliver the former
until the latter had been signed and sealed by Desmichels. Abdel Kader
conceived that these documents, mutually exchanged, would constitute the
Treaty. Their substance was as follows:—
CONDITIONS OF GENERAL DESMICHELS.
“1. Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from this
day.
“2. The religion and usages of the Mussulmans shall be respected.
“3. French prisoners shall be given up.
“4. The markets shall be free.
“5. Every French deserter shall be given up by the Arabs.
“6. Every Christian travelling in the interior shall be furnished with a
passport sealed with the seal of Abdel Kader’s consul, and that of the
General.”
CONDITIONS OF THE SULTAN ABDEL KADER.
“1. The Arabs shall be at liberty to buy and sell powder, arms, sulphur;
in a word, everything necessary for war.
“2. The commerce of the port of Arzew shall be under the jurisdiction of
the Prince of the Faithful. No cargoes shall be shipped except in that
port. Mostaganem and Oran shall merely receive such articles of
merchandise as are necessary for the wants of their inhabitants. To this
there shall be no opposition. Those who wish to ship goods must repair
to Arzew.
“3. The General shall give us up all deserters in chains. He shall not
harbour criminals. The general commanding at Algiers shall have no power
over Arabs who may come to him with the consent of their chiefs.
“4. No Mussulman shall be prevented returning home when he wishes.”
To the paper containing these conditions of Abdel Kader, Desmichels, who
dreaded nothing so much as the breaking off of the negotiation, at once
affixed his seal and signature. The former naturally thought that, by
virtue of the 2nd Article, he had secured a monopoly of commerce.
On the 26th February, 1834, Desmichels proposed to Ibn Arasch, that a
homogeneous treaty should be drawn up, embodying the substance of both
documents, but stating the French conditions more at large. Ibn Arasch
made no difficulty, never conceiving for a moment that such a document
could be intended to abrogate the conditions already conceded to his
master, in the paper which had just been signed and sealed by the
general. Hence arose the “Treaty of Desmichels,” which afterwards gave
rise to so many difficulties and complications.
TREATY OF GENERAL DESMICHELS, _February_ 26, 1834.
“The General commanding the French troops in the town of Oran, and the
Prince of the Faithful, Sidi-il-Hadj Abdel Kader-ibn-Mehi-ed-deen, have
decided on the following conditions:—
“Art. 1.—Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from
this day. The General commanding the French troops and the Emir Abdel
Kader will neglect nothing to maintain that union and friendship which
ought to exist between two peoples, destined by God to live under the
same dominion. To this end, representatives on the part of the Emir
shall reside at Oran, Mostaganem, and Arzew; and, to prevent collisions
between the French and the Arabs, French officers shall reside at
Mascara.
“Art. 2.—The religion and usages of the Arabs shall be respected.
“Art. 3.—All prisoners shall be immediately given up, both on one side
and the other.
“Art. 4.—Freedom of commerce shall be complete and entire.
“Art. 5.—Military men belonging to the French army, who desert their
colours, shall be brought back by the Arabs. In like manner, all Arab
malefactors, who, to avoid punishment, fly from their tribes and seek
refuge with the French, shall be immediately seized and delivered over
to the Emir’s representative, in the three maritime towns occupied by
the French.
“Art. 6.—Every European, having occasion to travel in the interior,
shall be furnished with a passport countersigned by the representatives
of the Emir, and approved by the General in command, in order that they
may find assistance and protection throughout the province.”
These conditions, written in parallel columns of Arab and French, were
signed and sealed by both parties. Nothing is said in this treaty of a
monopoly of commerce. But Abdel Kader had his bond, and was content.
Desmichels, proud of what he considered a diplomatic triumph, hastened
to send the grateful tidings of a peace to the French ministry, and
allowed himself to indulge in the following strain:—
“I have to announce to you the _submission_ of the province of Oran, the
most considerable and warlike of the regency. This great event is the
result of the advantages which have been obtained by the troops of my
division.”
Abdel Kader might well repose on his laurels. He had compelled his enemy
to sue for peace; he had made his own terms; he paid no tribute; his
territory was not limited; the French general had acknowledged his
independence by offering him the power to appoint and receive consuls.
The French were to load at one port alone, and were to submit to his
tariff.
In virtue of the monopoly secured to him by his own terms, Abdel Kader
now issued orders, prohibiting the Arabs from selling corn, or barley,
or agricultural produce, of any kind whatever, to Christians, whether
native or foreign. His agents were declared to be the sole authorised
buyers and sellers, and by them the prices in the markets were to be
fixed.
The French merchants at Arzew complained loudly to Desmichels of the
restriction. Abdel Kader appealed to his bond. Desmichels affected to
ignore it. He adhered to his homogeneous treaty, in which commerce was
declared free. Abdel Kader agreed to the test, but contended that though
the market _places_ (or _sook_) were free, he had the sole right of
supplying them.
One of the French merchants, acting upon the view of the question, as
put forward by the French general, bought a large quantity of corn and
barley from an Arab of the tribe of Hamian. The agent of Abdel Kader
went over and seized it. The merchant complained to the French local
authorities, but he was told that no interference could be tolerated
with the regulations of the Emir.
Desmichels, embarrassed with fresh complaints, and pressed for
explanation by General Voirol, the governor-general, to whom all this
misunderstanding was utterly incomprehensible, adopted a middle course.
He declared that the authorisation given to the Emir to make a monopoly
of grain, extended only to the grain raised on his own private property.
Abdel Kader ridiculed the subterfuge. He knew nothing of the exclusive
interpretation which Desmichels chose to put upon his treaty; he only
knew that he had the General’s seal and signature to a document granting
him a monopoly; and this monopoly he was determined to enact. The French
were not in a position to dispute his verdict; and he carried his point.
Abdel Kader, free at length from external molestation, devoted his
earnest attention to the internal affairs of his kingdom. Difficulties
and trials were yet before him. Jealousy of his successes on the part of
some, envy at the eminence he had attained on the part of others,
insinuations malevolently propagated by his rivals, and readily
entertained by the fanatical party, that he had betrayed the sacred
cause by making peace with the infidels—all combined, as disturbing
elements, to affect, more or less, the stability of his government.
But his retort was ready. To the taunting demand, “Where is now the
leader of the Djehad—where the lofty tone which breathed nothing but
battle and defiance, and invoked death rather than submission?” he
replied by calmly pointing to the French garrisons, confined to the
walls on which their cannon was planted; to the plains freed from
infidel marauders; to the cities unmolested by Frank invaders; and, more
than all, to a treaty, dictated at his sword’s point, which now, for the
first time in the lapse of ages, gave good warranty for hopes of Arab
freedom, and which promised to be the basis of Arab independence.