Put broadly and roughly, there are, then, three main accounts possible,

or at any rate actually found in occidental civilization to-day, of

the phenomena generally known as religious. The first is that of the

out-and-out sceptic--that they are all illusions, imaginations of the

childhood of the race. This is an extreme view which I do not feel

called upon to discuss. The second is the view of almost every existing

religious denomination in Europe--that God is a personal being. And

the third is one, only just beginning to take shape, which I have

endeavoured, with every consciousness of inadequacy, to outline--the

account made possible by a radically scientific view of the universe.

Those who adopt the third attitude believe that the second is a purely

symbolic and not very accurate presentation of certain fundamental

facts, of which they are attempting to give what seems to them an

account which is closer to reality. Before the scientific work of the

last three or four centuries, it was impossible to attempt what we may

call a realistic account of this nature, so that symbols were perforce

adopted. In Christian theology man formulated a coherent scheme, which,

however, was purely symbolic, to account for the facts we have just

been considering. The chief feature in any such scheme must be the

conception of the powers with which man feels himself in relation; and

in this particular formulation his conception of these powers was that

of a God who was also a person.

Now, the danger of symbols and symbolic thinking comes when the

symbols are accepted for real, and taken as they stand for bases from

which conclusions shall be drawn. The Christian theologians did not

hesitate--why should they, in their position?--to use the personal

nature of the Deity as one premiss in a whole series of syllogisms, and

to accept at their full face value the conclusions which emerged from

these syllogisms.

If a personal God was ruler of the universe, then he must be

omnipotent; if truly divine, then omniscient; if worthy of worship,

then all-wise. He must be capable of interfering with the course

of events by “miracles,” of granting our prayers, of communicating

directly with us, of deciding our fate in afterlife. From these

conclusions yet further conclusions were drawn. If God revealed himself

in the Bible, then the Bible was “true” ... with all that this in its

turn involved as to our beliefs concerning natural causation, creation,

our relations with God, or personal immortality. The whole scheme was

self-consistent, and worked as well as many other human schemes. But

what if the whole premiss, of God as a personal being, ruler and father

and judge--what if this were not in fact tenable? Then, of course, the

whole edifice itself would come toppling down. That is what is actually

happening to-day. God, as personal ruler, is being slowly driven out

of the universe, but returning as this organized idea of which we have

spoken.

Another cardinal point in the older systems has always been its claim

to possess a revelation of Truth which is in some real ways complete

and absolute.

This leads us on immediately to a subject of especial interest to us

as rationalists--namely, the relation of religion to science and to

free inquiry. Religious beliefs, if they are really believed with any

conviction, will be to a greater or less extent dominant beliefs,

because by their nature they concern the general relationship between

man and his surroundings, which must bulk large in all our lives; and

it is matter of common experience with what obstinacy and fanaticism

they may be held. If therefore a system of religious belief includes

the belief that it is revealed, and therefore true with a more ultimate

and complete truth than the truths of observation or experiment, any

fact or idea which conflicts with any part of the system will be

inevitably treated not only as dangerous to the system, but as actually

evil: and this tendency is reinforced by the craving of the average man

for certainty, for intellectual satisfaction without undue intellectual

effort. The cynic who said that beliefs are generally held with an

intensity inversely proportional to the amount of evidence which can be

adduced in their support was not wholly or only cynical.

Since, however, the progress of modern science, in addition to the

discovery of many wholly new facts, has largely consisted in a proper

investigation and a revaluation of the facts subsumed without full

analysis into the symbolism of theology, the inevitable result has been

for the two to find each other in constant antagonism. But be it noted

that it is not science and religion which are in conflict, but science

and a particular brand of religion.

The essence of science is free inquiry combined with experimental

testing. The result is a body of knowledge, of fact, and

explanatory theory, which can properly be regarded as established.

By _established_, however, we do not mean that it is absolute or

immutable--we expect addition and modification. But we also expect

that, in the future as in the past, the additions and alterations will

not involve the scrapping and rebuilding of the whole edifice, but

that it will continue to be harmonious with itself, and to undergo a

gradual evolution. This has been so even with such marked changes as

the discovery of radioactivity, the new outlook in psychology, or the

rediscovery of Mendelism--the new, after apparent contradiction, has

been or is being harmoniously incorporated and organized with the old.

This in its turn implies that toleration should ever be encouraged by

the scientist. Humility cannot be genuine if combined with unsupported

dogmatic assertion: and the recognition that the ideas of revelation

and divine personality are such dogmatic assertions brings a whole new

outlook into being.

Putting matters in a nutshell, we can say that a system based on

revelation or on the pushing of unsupported premisses concerning

the nature of God to their complete logical conclusions is bound to

result in some degree of hostility to the pursuit of truth for its own

sake; whereas a religious system basing itself on scientific method,

while it must resign itself to being unable to produce a complete,

ready-made, and immutable scheme, however beloved of the multitude (and

indeed so beloved because it satisfies a lower and more primitive mode

of thinking only), on the other hand can be assured that its knowledge

and effectiveness will increase, and that contradictions will resolve

themselves, provided that free inquiry, free speech, and tolerance are

allowed and practised. Attempts to reconcile the old formulation with

the new facts and ideas, when not insincere, are doomed to failure

because the premisses of the two systems are different.

In conclusion, we may perhaps point out some of the bearings of such

a change. In the first place, the change in our conception of God

necessitates the stressing of religious experience, as such, as against

belief in particular dogma, or in the efficacy of special ritual.

Secondly, it emphasizes the need for tolerance and enlightenment. The

scientific view asserts not that its knowledge is absolute or complete,

but that, although relative and partial, it will indubitably continue

to grow harmoniously along the general lines already laid down.

Another change wrought by the inclusion of all phenomena under one head

and the banishment of the supernatural is the inestimable advantage

that we thereby find the possibility of constructing a single general

view of the universe for civilization. At present there are two that

matter--the orthodox religious and the scientific. The religious starts

from the top, the scientific from the bottom; but the scientific has

been creeping up, and now that it has begun to attack the problem

of mind it will be able to drown the other out. Since the current

religious formulation is only symbolic, it cannot become scientific;

but since the scientific is based on the closest possible analysis

of reality, it can become religious so far as it investigates the

realities of religious experience.

Once it has done this, we shall be able to construct a _Weltanschauung_

such as never before, with roots in the ordered reactions of inorganic

matter, trunk strong with the steady progress of evolving life, and

branches reaching up into the highest realities of the spirit. Union is

strength; and it is one of the prime duties of educated men and women

to see that the present duality and antagonism at the heart of what

should be the central unity of civilization--of its most fundamental

idea, its conception of the universe--should be terminated.

The new outlook will also interlock with the youthful science of

psychology to produce great results. Much of what now is interpreted,

by all save the few experts, in supernatural terms of the old theology

will become intelligible as a product of the natural workings of that

amazing thing, the human mind. We shall not have sects trying to

exploit the normal dissatisfactions and disharmonies of adolescence

in order to secure “conversions”; repressed tendencies will not be

thought to be the voice of a personal Devil, nor neglected ideals the

voice of a personal God. Irrational fear, to-day still the greatest

enemy of mankind and most potent annihilator of happiness, will, by

comprehension of its curious mechanism and its persistence, often

transformed, from childhood to adult life, become amenable to treatment

and be made more and more to disappear. Proper analysis of mental

processes such as repression, suppression, and sublimation will enable

us to make better use of our faculties, and deliberately to build up

treasures of spiritual experience now attainable only by the lucky few

in whom temperament and circumstances accidentally conspire.

On the moral side, the idea that a Divine command has, at some remote

period in the past, provided a fixed code, and the belief in the

immutable truth of certain dogmas--these will happily disappear.

Morals, like all else, not only have evolved, but should evolve. We

shall find, for instance, that no excuse will be left for the common

horrified (and horrible) views of sex, as of something inherently

hateful, of all its pleasures as involving sin; for it will be realized

that too much of the present attitude is due to the projection of our

own conflicts and complexes, our own pruriences and pruderies, into

what might be innocent and joyous. But this merits a fuller discussion

than we can here allot.

Again, if I had space at my disposal, I would write of the changes in

the position and constitution of religion brought about by changes

other than those in religious beliefs themselves. Most important, of

course, are the spread of education on the one hand, and the spread of

the facilities for the most varied spiritual enjoyment on the other.

If the people is educated to a point at which it can judge for itself,

it wants no special priests or clerical mediators; its mediators are

those who are specially fitted to unravel the intellectual, emotional,

and moral difficulties of its own day and for all time--poets,

philosophers, and men of science. The spread of facilities for reading,

for seeing plays and works of art, and hearing good music, means of

course that, whereas in ruder epochs the Church provided the principal

way of psychological sublimation, now sublimation and spiritual

refreshment can be achieved equally or more effectively (and every

whit as religiously) without ever frequenting a “place of worship”

or belonging to any denomination. This tendency towards fluidity and

plasticity, towards many possibilities of sublimation instead of one,

may by some be lamented. But, as a matter of fact, it is in full

accord with all we know of biological progress. Man has attained his

position of biological pre-eminence simply and solely by virtue of the

plasticity of his mind, which substitutes infinitude of potentiality

for the limited range of actuality given by the instinctive reactions

of lower forms. Humanity will always have some religion, and it will

always be of the utmost importance to man, both as individual and as

species. But the possibility of satisfying his religious tendencies

intellectually, emotionally, and morally, without rigid creed, limited

ritual, and iron-bound code of morals, will mean the liberation of all

that is best in religion from too narrow shackles, and the lifting it

on to a plane where it may be not only more free, but more rich.

It is the task of Rationalism to see that religion, this fundamental

and important activity of man, shall neither be allowed to continue in

false or inadequate forms, nor be stifled or starved, but made to help

humanity in a vigorous growth that is based on truth and in constant

contact with reality.

(_For bibliography, see the end of the next essay._)

FOOTNOTE:

[43] See W. James, _Varieties of Religious Experience_; E. Underhill,

_Essentials of Mysticism_.

VII

RELIGION AND SCIENCE: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

GOD AND MAN

The world of things entered your infant mind

To populate that crystal cabinet.

Within its walls the strangest partners met,

And things turned thoughts did propagate their kind.

For, once within, corporeal fact could find

A spirit. Fact and you in mutual debt

Built there your little microcosm--which yet

Had hugest tasks to its small self assigned.

Dead men can live there, and converse with stars:

Equator speaks with Pole, and Night with Day:

Spirit dissolves the world’s material bars--

A million isolations burn away.

The Universe can live and work and plan,

At last made God within the mind of man.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE:

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

“In la sua volontade è nostra pace.”

--DANTE.

“Ye are the Gods if ye did but realize it.”--CARLYLE.

“The next great task of Science is to create a religion for humanity.”

So says Lord Morley in one of his essays. It is a striking saying,

coming as it does from one in whom thought and action have been so

intertwined, one to whom reason, not dogma, is the basis of morality,

achievement, not emotion, its justification.

Let those words be my encouragement; for they challenge at the outset,

and to my mind rightly, two of the most persistent difficulties that

confront one who tries to write of the relations between Science and

Religion. The man of science too often asks what science can have

to do with what he brands as utterly and wholly unscientific; the

religiously-minded man demands what gain can follow from contact with

the cold and inhuman attitude of pure reason. To those questions I hope

that this essay will provide a partial answer. Meanwhile I shall begin

with a perhaps less ultimate but more pressing question. That question

is asked by many men and women of to-day, who on the one hand feel as

it were instinctively that religion of some sort is necessary for

life, yet on the other are unable to do violence to their intellectual

selves by denying the facts that reason and scientific inquiry reveal,

or by closing their eyes to them.

The question, in briefest form, is this: “What room does science leave

for God?”

To the savage, all is spirit. The meanest objects are charged with

influence, the commonest actions fraught with spiritual possibilities,

the operations of nature one and all are brought about by spiritual

powers--but powers multifarious and conflicting. “Nature can have

little unity for savages. It is a Walpurgis-nacht procession, a

checkered play of light and shadow, a medley of impish and elfish,

friendly and inimical powers.”[44]

But with ordered civilization and dispassionate observation a network

of material cause and effect invaded this spiritual domain. The

mysterious influences, for example, believed to be inherent in springs

and running rivers became personified, and, anthropomorphized as nymphs

or gods, were removed into a seclusion more remote from practical

and everyday life than their unpersonified predecessors. Later, they

retreated still farther from actuality into a half-believed mythology,

and then passed away into the powerlessness of avowed fairy-story or

literary symbolism, while the rivers, perceived as the resultant of

natural forces, were more and more harnessed to man’s use. So with

the wind and the rain, the growth of crops, the storms of the sea. So,

in due time, with the thunder and the lightning, with earthquakes,

eruptions, comets, eclipses, pestilences.

This process of liberating matter from arbitrary and mysterious power,

of perceiving it as orderly and endowed with regularity of natural

law, of bringing it more and more beneath human control, was, on the

other hand, accompanied by what may be called a combined condensation

and sublimation of the spiritual forces accepted by human faith. They

are built up from spirit to spirits, spirits to gods, gods to God. But

now it seems as if this condensation had reached its limit, and the

sublimation could only go farther by resolving the one God into an

empty name or the vaguest unreality.

We look back and see the Gods of early man, and are complacently

prepared to believe that they were based in error, products of mental

immaturity, to be relegated to limbo without regret. But what about the

present? Why should we shrink from applying the same process to the God

of to-day?

Is it then to be so with every God? Is God only a personified symbol

of our residuum of ignorance? Is to hold the idea of God in any form

to be, as Salomon Reinach believes, in an infantile stage of human

development, and must we with him define religion as “a sum of beliefs

impeding the free use of human faculty”?

I think not; and I shall endeavour to justify my belief to you, and

to show that, albeit much alteration and a thorough revision of ideas

is needed, the term _God_ has an important scientific connotation, and

further that the present stagnation of religion can be remedied if, as

has happened again and again in biological evolution, the old forms

become extinct or subordinate, and a new dominant type is developed

along quite fresh lines.

In any case the man of science must obviously, if he face the problem

at all, take up a scientific attitude of mind towards it. He cannot

say that there is no such thing as religion; or try to whittle it away

by explaining that it is something else--a complicated fear, or a

sublimated sex-instinct, or a combination of credulity and duplicity.

A thing, if it is a thing at all, is never merely something else. Nor

can he submit to the pretensions of those who assert that it is too

sacred to be touched, or that its certainties are greater than those

of science. No--he must treat it for what it is--a fact, and a very

important fact at that, in human history: and he must see whether the

application of scientific method to its study--in other words, its

illumination by the faculty of pure intellect--will help not only our

comprehension of religion in the past, but its actual development in

the future.

He can study it in various ways. He can use the method of observation

and comparison, collecting and collating facts until he is able to give

a connected account of the manifestations of religion and of their

past history; he can study it physiologically, so to speak, to see what

part it plays in the body politic, and how that part may alter with

circumstances; or he may seek to investigate its essence, to discover

not only how it appears and what it does, but what it _is_.

Further, he must have some general principles to lean on in his search,

principles both positive and negative. He must be content to leave

certain possibilities out of account because as yet he cannot see how

they can be connected with his organized scheme of things; in other

words, he has to be content to build slowly and imperfectly in order

that he may be sure of building soundly. This is the principle which we

may call positive agnosticism.

This very fact has been in the past one of the great obstacles in

the way of successful treatment of religion by science. One of the

attributes of man is his desire for a complete explanation, or at

least a complete view, of his universe, and this has been at the

bottom of much doctrine and many creeds. But before Kepler and Newton,

no truly scientific account could be given of celestial phenomena;

before Darwin, none of Natural History; before the recent revival

in psychology, none of the mind and its workings. In the second

half of the nineteenth century, for instance, science could give an

adequate account of most inorganic phenomena, and, in broad outline,

of evolutionary geology and biology; but mind was still refractory.

Accordingly, the philosophy of science was mainly materialist. But the

common man felt that mind was not the empty epiphenomenon that orthodox

science would have it; and he desired a scheme of things in which mind

should be more adequately explained than it could be by science at its

then stage of development. _Hinc illae lacrimae._

To-day it is at least possible to link up, not only physics and

chemistry and geology and evolutionary biology, but also anthropology

and psychology, into a whole which, though far from complete, is at

least organized and coherent with itself. If the seventeenth century

cleared the ground for that dwelling-place of human mind which we

call the scientific view of things, if the eighteenth century laid

the foundations and the nineteenth built the walls, the twentieth is

already fitting up some of the rooms for actual habitation.

There are certain other domains of reality which have not yet been

properly investigated by science. Telepathy, for instance, and the

whole mass of phenomena included broadly under the term spiritualism,

are in about the some position with regard to organized scientific

thought to-day as was astronomy before astrology’s collapse, as was the

study of electricity in the eighteenth century, or that of hypnotism

in the middle of the nineteenth. What is more, the average man demands

that phenomena of this order shall be included in his scheme of things.

Science cannot yet do this for him; and accordingly the dwelling-place

that we are building must still be incomplete; it is for those who

come after to build the upper stories.

This cannot be helped. What we build, we must build firmly; on what is

yet to be built, science cannot pronounce, except to say that she knows

that it will be congruous with what has gone before.

What general principles, then, do we assume? We assume that the

universe is composed throughout of the same matter, whose essential

unity, in spite of the diversity of its so-called elements, the recent

researches of physicists are revealing to us; we assume that matter

behaves in the same way wherever it is found, showing the same mode

of sequence of change, of cause and effect. We assume, on fairly

good although indirect evidence, that there has been an evolution of

the forms assumed by matter; that, in this solar system of ours, for

instance, matter was once all in electronic form, that it then attained

to the atomic and the molecular; that later, colloidal organic matter

of a special type made its appearance, and later still, living matter

arose. That the forms of life, simple at first, attained progressively

to greater complexity; that mind, negligible in the lower forms, became

of greater and greater importance, until it reached its present level

in man.[45]

Unity, uniformity, and development are the three great principles that

emerge. We know of no instance where the properties of matter change,

though many where a new state of matter develops. The full properties

of a molecular compound such as water, for instance, cannot be deduced

at present from what we know about the properties of its constituent

atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. The properties of the human mind cannot

be deduced from our present knowledge of the minds of animals. New

combinations and properties thus arise in time. Bergson miscalls

such evolution “creative.” We had better, with Lloyd Morgan, call it

“emergent.”

Essays of a Biologist · 第 13 / 17 段