FESTUBERT
Objective of Aubers and Festubert--Allies' co-operation--Great French
offensive--Terrific bombardment--British support--Endless German
fortresses--Shortage of munitions--Probable explanation--Effect of
_Times_ disclosures--Outcry in England--Coalition Government--After
Ypres--The Canadian advance--Disposition of Canadians--Attack on the
Orchard--Canadian Scottish--Sapper Harmon's exploits--Drawback to
drill-book tactics--A Canadian ruse--"Sam Slick"--The Orchard
won--Arrival of Second Brigade--The attempt on "Bexhill"--In the German
trenches--Strathcona's Horse--King Edward's Horse--Cavalry fight on
foot--Further attack on "Bexhill"--Redoubt taken--"Bexhill"
captured--"Dig in and hang on"--Attack on the "Well"--Heroic efforts
repulsed--General Seely assumes command--A critical moment--Heavy
officer casualties--The courage of the cavalry--Major Murray's good
work--Gallantry of Sergt. Morris and Corpl. Pym--Death of Sergt.
Hickey--Canadian Division withdrawn--Trench warfare till June.
"In records that defy the tooth of time."--THE STATESMAN'S CREED.
To many minds the battle of Festubert, sometimes called the battle of
Aubers, in which the Canadians played so gallant and glorious a part,
represents only a vast conflict which raged for a long period without
any definite objective, any clearly defined line of attack, and with no
decisive result from which clear conclusions can be drawn.
This unfortunate impression is largely due to the fact that it is
impossible at the opening of a great battle for the commander to give
any indication of his intentions; that newspaper correspondents are
debarred from discussing them; and that the official despatches which
reveal the purpose and the plan of a battle, are only issued when the
engagement has already passed into history and has been lost sight of
among newer feats of arms.
As a matter of fact, the battle of Festubert is, in all its aspects,
one of the most clearly defined of the war, notwithstanding the length
of time that it covered and the numerous and confused individual and
sectional engagements fought along its front. Its aim was clear, and
it was a portion of a definite scheme on the part of the Allies. The
actual fight is perfectly easy to follow, and the results are
important, not only from the military point of view (although in this
respect Festubert must be counted a failure), but from the political
changes they produced in England--changes designed for the better
conduct of the war.
As I have already explained, if we had completely broken the German
lines at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, we should have gained the Aubers
Ridge, which dominates Lille, the retaking of which would have
completely altered the whole aspect of the war on the Western front.
General Joffre had determined on a great offensive movement in Artois,
in May, for which purpose he concentrated the most overwhelming
artillery force up to this time assembled in the West. It was on a par
with the terrific masses of guns with which von Mackensen was, about
the same time, blasting his way through Galicia. The French made
wonderful progress, and only a few of the defences of Lens, the key of
the whole French objective, remained in German hands. But the Germans
were pouring reinforcements into the south, and it was then that Sir
John French, in conjunction with General Joffre, moved his forces to
the attack. This British offensive was designed to hold up the German
reinforcements destined for Lens, and at the same time to offer the
British a second opportunity for gaining the Aubers Ridge, from which
Lille and La Bassée could be dominated. If the British could gain the
ridge, which they hoped to secure at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, and
if the French could win through to Lens, the Allies would then be in a
position to sweep on together towards the city which was their common
goal.
The attack on the German positions began on May 9th,[1] and continued
through several days and nights, and waned, only to be renewed with
redoubled fury on May 16th. On May 19th, the 2nd and 7th Divisions,
which had suffered very severely, were withdrawn, and their places
taken by the Canadian Division and the 51st Highland Division
(Territorial). With the share of the battle which fell to the lot of
the Canadians I will deal in detail directly.
The British attack failed to clear the way to Lille, which still
remains in German hands. With the reasons which resulted in our check
at Neuve Chapelle I have already dealt, and it is now necessary to
consider the two principal reasons which may be assigned for our second
failure to secure the all-important Aubers Ridge.
The first reason is definite and explicable. The second reason is
debatable.
At various points along this sector of the front, and on many
occasions, the German lines were pierced--pierced but not broken.
Again and again the British and Canadian troops took the first, the
second, and the third line German trenches. This may have destroyed
the mathematical precision of the German line, but it only succeeded in
splitting it up into a series of absolutely impregnable _fortins_. It
must be remembered that the Germans fought a defensive battle, and in
this they were greatly assisted by the nature of the ground, which was
dotted with considerable hummocks, cleft with ravines and indented with
chalk pits and quarries, and was, moreover, abundantly furnished with
pit-heads, mine-works, mills, farms, and the like, all transformed into
miniature fortresses, to approach which was certain death. They had
constructed trenches reinforced by concrete-lined galleries, and linked
them up with underground tunnels. The battle of the miniature
fortresses proved the triumph of the machine gun. The Germans employed
the machine gun to an extent which turned even a pig-stye into a
Sebastopol. Only overwhelming artillery fire could have shattered this
chain of forts, bound by barbed wire and everywhere covered by machine
guns.
Our artillery fire was not sufficient to reduce them, and the British
attack slowly weakened; and finally the battle died out on the 26th,
when Sir John French gave orders for the curtailment of our artillery
fire.
This brings me to the second reason which has been assigned for our
failure to clear the way to Lille at the battle of Festubert, and that
is the debatable one of "shortage of munitions."
The military correspondent of _The Times_, who had just returned from
the front, affirmed in his journal on May 14th that the first part of
the battle of Festubert had failed through lack of "high explosives."
The English public was profoundly disturbed at the failure of an
engagement on which it had set high hopes, and, rightly or wrongly, it
fastened on this accusation of _The Times_ as an indictment of the
Government at home. Both the Press and the public settled down with a
grim tenacity to discover what was wrong. They were alike determined
that the British Army in the future should lack nothing which it
required to achieve success.
Amid the hubbub to which _The Times_ disclosure gave rise, the
undercurrent of the reply of officials at home was never heard, and
certainly was never understood. Probably the answer of Lord Kitchener
was this: that the requirements of those in command in the field, based
on the calculations of the artillery experts there, had been faithfully
fulfilled so far as our resources permitted.
In any case, Festubert led us to believe that high explosives must
determine the issue of similar battles in the future, and the outcry in
England against the "shortage of munitions" produced the crisis from
which emerged the Coalition Government.
It may therefore be said that the political effects of Festubert were
infinitely greater than its military results. The munitions crisis
cleared the political atmosphere and gave England a better
understanding of the difficulties of the war and a steadier
determination to see it through. It paved the way for the War
Committee, and, finally, for the Allies' Grand Council of War in Paris.
I will now proceed to deal with the battle of Festubert as it concerns
the fortunes of the Canadians. The record is a bald one of work in the
trenches by our own people. It is couched almost in official phrases,
but now and then I have interpolated some personal anecdote which may
help to show you what triumph and terror and tragedy lie behind the
smooth, impersonal stage directions of this war.
After the second battle of Ypres the Canadian Division, worn but not
shattered, retired into billets and rested until May 14th, when the
Headquarters moved to the southern section of the British line in
readiness for new operations. During that time reinforcements had
poured in from the Canadian base in England, where were gathered the
Dominion troops, whose numbers we owe to the large vision and untiring
energy of the Minister of Militia and Defence.
On May 17th the remade infantry brigades advanced towards the firing
line once more.
It must be understood that on the afternoon of May 18th, the 3rd
Brigade occupied reserve trenches, two companies of the 14th (Royal
Montreal) Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Meighen,[2] and two
companies of the 16th (Canadian Scottish), under Lieut.-Colonel (now
Brig.-General) Leckie, being ordered to make an immediate advance on La
Quinque Rue, north-west of an Orchard which had been placed in a state
of defence by the enemy. One company of the 16th Canadian Scottish was
to make a flanking movement on the enemy's position in the Orchard by
way of an old German communicating trench, and this attack was to be
made; of course, in conjunction with a frontal one.
Little time was available to make dispositions, and as there was no
opportunity to reconnoitre the ground, it was very difficult to
determine the proper objective. The flanking company of the 16th
Battalion reached its allotted position, but after the advance of the
remaining company of that regiment, and the 14th, under very heavy
shell fire, the proper direction was not maintained. The detachments
reached part of their objective, but owing to the lack of covering fire
it was undesirable at the moment to make an attack on the Orchard. The
companies were told to dig themselves in and connect up with the
Wiltshire Battalion on their right and the Coldstream Guards on their
left. They had then gained 500 yards. Lieut.-Colonel Leckie sent up
the other two companies of the 16th to assist in the digging and to
relieve the original two companies at daybreak. During the night the
companies of the 14th Battalion (Royal Montreal) were also withdrawn,
and the trench occupied by these was taken over by stretching out the
Coldstream Guards on one flank and the 16th Canadian Scottish on the
other.[3]
On the morning of the 20th orders were issued for an attack on the
Orchard that night. A reconnaissance of the position was made by Major
Leckie, brother of Lieut.-Colonel Leckie, when patrols were sent out,
one of which very neatly managed to escape being cut off by the enemy,
and another suffered a few casualties. This showed the Germans were in
force, and that an attack on the Orchard would be no light work. That
night the Canadian Scottish occupied a deserted house close to the
German lines, and succeeded in establishing there two machine guns and
a garrison of thirty men. The enemy were evidently not aware that we
were in possession of this house, for although they bombarded all the
British trenches with great severity throughout the whole of the next
day, this little garrison was left untouched. The attacking detachment
under Major Rae consisted of two companies of the Canadian Scottish,
one commanded by Captain Morison, the other by Major Peck. The attack
was to take place at 7.45 p.m., and at the same time the 15th Battalion
(48th Highlanders) were directed to make an assault on a position
several hundred yards to the right. During that afternoon the Orchard
was very heavily bombarded by our artillery, the bombardment increasing
in severity up to the delivery of the attack. Promptly to the minute,
the guns ceased, and the two companies of the 16th Canadians climbed
out of their trenches to advance. At the same instant the two machine
guns situated in the advanced post opened on the enemy. As the advance
was carried out in broad daylight, the movements were at once seen by
the Germans, and immediately a torrent of machine gun, rifle fire, and
shrapnel was directed upon our troops. Their steadiness and discipline
were remarkable, and were greatly praised by the officers of the
Coldstream Guards who were on our left.
[Illustration: Map--The Orchard and surroundings]
When they reached the edge of the Orchard an unexpected obstacle
presented itself in the form of a deep ditch, and on the further side a
wired hedge. Without hesitation, however, the men plunged through the
ditch, in some places up to their necks in water, and made for
previously reconnoitred gaps in the hedge. Not many Germans had stayed
in the Orchard during the bombardment. The bulk of the garrison,
according to the usual German method under artillery fire, had
evidently retired to the support trenches in the rear. A few had been
left behind to man a machine gun redoubt near to the centre of the
Orchard with the idea of holding up our advancing infantry till the
enemy, withdrawn during the bombardment, could return in full strength;
but these machine guns retreated when the Canadians came. On the far
side of the Orchard, however, the Germans, following their system
indicated above, came up to contest the position, but the onset of the
Canadians forced them to beat a hasty retreat. Although double our
numbers, they could not be induced to face a hand-to-hand fight. Three
platoons cleared the Orchard, while a fourth platoon, advancing towards
the north side, were hampered by a very awkward ditch, which forced
them to make a wide detour, so that they did not reach the Orchard
until its occupation was complete.
One company did not enter the Orchard, but pushed forward and occupied
an abandoned German trench running in a south-westerly direction, to
prevent any flank counter-attack being made by the enemy. They then
found themselves in a very exposed position, and consequently suffered
heavily. The casualties, in proportion to the number of men employed
in the attack, were heavy for all engaged, but the position was a very
important one, and had twice repulsed assault by other regiments.
Had our advance been less rapid the enemy would no doubt have got back
into this position, and our task might have been impossible. They
argued, as have said, that any attack might be held up by the machine
guns in the redoubt and in the fortified positions on the flank for
long enough to enable them to return to the Orchard after our
bombardment had ceased, and then throw us back. The speed with which
our assault was carried out altogether checkmated this plan.
The 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) included detachments from the
72nd Seaforths of Vancouver, the 79th Camerons of Winnipeg, the 50th
Gordons of Victoria, and the 91st Highlanders of Hamilton; so all
Canada, from Lake Ontario to the Pacific Ocean, was represented in the
Orchard that night.
It was in the course of the struggle in the Orchard that Sapper Harmon,
of the 1st Field Company, C.E., performed one of those exploits which
have made Canadian arms shine in this war. He was attached to a party
of twelve sappers and fifty infantrymen of the 3rd Canadian Battalion
which constructed a barricade of sandbags across the road leading to
the Orchard, in the face of heavy fire. Later, this barricade was
partially demolished by a shell, and Harmon actually repaired it while
under fire from a machine gun only sixty yards away! Of the party, in
whose company Harmon first went out, six of the twelve sappers were
wounded, and of the fifty infantrymen six were killed and twenty-four
wounded. Later, he remained in the Orchard alone for thirty-six hours
constructing tunnels under a hedge, with a view to further operations.
Sapper B. W. Harmon is a native of Woodstock, New Brunswick, and a
graduate of the University of New Brunswick.
The drawback to drill-book tactics is that if one side does not keep
the rules the other suffers. And a citizen army will not keep to the
rules. For example, not long after the affair of the Orchard, a
Canadian battalion put up a little arrangement with the ever-adaptable
Canadian artillery in its rear. The artillery opened heavy fire on a
section of German trenches while the battalion made ostentatious parade
of fixing bayonets, rigging trench ladders and whistling orders, as a
prelude to attack the instant the bombardment should cease. The
Germans, who are experts in these matters, promptly retired to their
supporting trenches and left the storm to rage in front, ready to rush
forward the instant it stopped, to meet the Canadian attack. So far
all went perfectly. Our guns were lifted from the front trenches and
shelled the supporting trench, in the manner laid down by the best
authorities, to prevent the Germans coming up. The Germans none the
less came, and crowded into the front trenches. But there was no
infantry attack whatever. That deceitful Canadian battalion had not
moved. Only the guns shortened range once more, and the full blast of
their fire fell on the German front trench, now satisfactorily crowded
with men. Next day's German wireless announced that "a desperate
attack had been heavily repulsed," but the general sense of the enemy
was more accurately represented by a "hyphenated" voice that cried out
peevishly next evening: "Say, Sam Slick, no dirty tricks to-night."
But to resume.
At seven o'clock in the evening of the 20th the 13th Battalion (Royal
Highlanders) of the 3rd Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Loomis, advanced
across the British trenches, under heavy shell fire and with severe
losses, in support of the 16th Battalion Canadian Scottish.
The attack on the Orchard having succeeded, three companies of the 13th
Battalion (Royal Highlanders) immediately marched forward. As four
officers of one company, including the officer commanding, had been
severely wounded, the command was taken over by Major Buchanan, the
second in command of the regiment.
A fourth company marched to a support trench immediately in the rear.
The position was then consolidated, and the 16th Battalion, after its
hard work and brilliant triumph, withdrew.
Next afternoon the enemy in their trenches made a demonstration fifty
yards north of the Orchard, but our heavy fire soon drove them off the
parapets. During the night the disputed ground between the trenches
was brightly lighted by the enemy's flares and enlivened by the rattle
of continuous musketry. None the less, our working parties went on
with their improvements and left the position in good shape for the 3rd
(Toronto) Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which relieved the Royal
Highlanders on Saturday.
On the night of May 19th, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade took over
some trenches which had recently been captured by the 21st Brigade
(British), and also a section of trenches from the 47th Division. The
8th and 10th Battalions occupied the front-line trenches, the 5th
Battalion went into Brigade Reserve, with one company near Festubert,
and three companies bivouacked in the vicinity of Willow Road; and the
7th Battalion was posted in Divisional Reserve.
On May 20th, at 745 p.m., the 10th Canadian Battalion, under Major
Guthrie, who joined the Battalion at Ypres as a lieutenant after the
regiment had lost most of its officers, made an attempt to secure a
position known as "Bexhill." This attack was a failure, as no previous
reconnaissance had been carried out, and the preliminary bombardment
had been quite ineffectual. Moreover, our troops were in full view of
the enemy when crossing a gap in the fire trench, and as the only
approach to "Bexhill" was through an old communicating trench swept by
machine guns, the leading men of the front company were all shot down
and the 10th Battalion retired.[4]
During the night a further reconnaissance of the enemy's position was
carried out and repairs were effected in the gap in the fire trenches,
which assured covered communication to all parts of our line.
On the evening of May 21st an artillery bombardment opened under
direction of Brigadier-General Burstall, and went on intermittently
until 8.30, when our attack was launched. The attacking force
consisted of the grenade company of the 1st Canadian Brigade and two
companies of the 10th Canadian Battalion. This attack was met by
overwhelming fire from the "Bexhill" redoubt, and our force on the left
was practically annihilated by machine guns; indeed, against that
steady stream of death no man could advance. On the right the
attackers succeeded in reaching the enemy's trench line running south
from "Bexhill," and, preceded by bombers, drove the enemy 400 paces
down the trench and erected a barricade to hold what they had won.
During the night the enemy made several attempts to counterattack, but
was successfully repulsed.[5]
In our attack, which was only partially successful, Major E. J. Ashton,
of Saskatoon, who was slightly wounded in the head on the previous
night, refused to leave his command. He was again wounded, and
Privates Swan and Walpole tried to get him back to safety, and in so
doing Swan was also wounded. During the same night Corporal W. R.
Brooks, one of the 10th Battalion snipers, went out from our trench
under heavy fire and brought in two men of the 47th Camerons who had
been lying wounded in the open for three days.
At daybreak of May 22nd the enemy opened a terrific bombardment on the
captured trench, which continued without ceasing through the whole day
and practically wiped the trench out.[6] After very heavy casualties
the southern end of the captured trench was abandoned, and a second
barricade was erected across the portion that remained in our hands.
In the afternoon the enemy's infantry prepared for an attack, but
retired after coming under our artillery and machine gun fire. During
the night the trenches were taken over by a detachment of British
troops and a detachment of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, and by
2nd King Edward's Horse and Strathcona's Horse. These latter served,
of course, as infantry, and it was their first introduction to this
war, though Strathcona's Horse took part in the South African campaign.
The 2nd King Edward's Horse took over the trench held up to that time
by the 8th[7] Battalion. On the right of Strathcona's Horse were the
Post Office Rifles, of the 47th Division; but the Post Office Rifles'
machine guns were manned by the machine gun detachment of the
Strathconas.
May 23rd passed without incident, although the enemy threatened an
attack upon 2nd King Edward's Horse, but broke back in the face of a
heavy artillery fire searchingly directed by the Canadian artillery
brigades.[8]
At 11 p.m. on the night of May 23rd the 5th Canadian Battalion received
orders from the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Canadian Infantry
Brigade to take the "Bexhill" salient and redoubt, on which our
previous attack had failed. The force detailed for the fresh attack
then consisted of two companies of the Battalion, numbering about 500
men, under Major Edgar, together with an additional 100 men furnished
by the 7th (British Columbia) Battalion, divided into two
parties--fifty to construct bridges before the attack, and fifty to
consolidate whatever positions were gained. The bridging party was
commanded by Lieut. (now Captain) R. Murdie, and he took his men out at
2.30 a.m. on the morning of May 24th. In bright moonlight, and under
machine gun and rifle fire, he managed to throw twelve bridges across a
ditch 10 ft. in width and full of water, which lay between our line and
the objective of the attack. This party naturally suffered heavy
casualties. The attack itself went over at 2.45, and in it many of the
bridging party joined; at the same time the battalion bombers under
Lieut. Tozer forced their way up a German communication trench leading
to the redoubt. Extremely stiff fighting followed, but in the face of
heavy machine gun fire the redoubt was occupied shortly after four in
the morning. In addition to the redoubt, the attacking party gained
and held 200 yards of trenches to the left of it, and a short piece to
the right, driving the Germans out and back with heavy losses.
"Bexhill" proper, however, had still to be taken, and to that end the
two companies of the 5th Battalion, which were in reality inadequate to
capture so strong a position, were reinforced by a company from the 7th
Battalion and a squadron of Strathcona's Horse.[9] With this
reinforcement the attack was immediately pressed home, and "Bexhill"
and 130 yards of trenches towards the north fell into our hands at 5.49
a.m.
Further progress, however, was impossible owing to the unbreakable
positions of the enemy. Forty minutes later, at about 6.30 a.m.,
further reinforcements were received in the form of a platoon from the
5th Battalion, and with their arrival came orders to "dig in and hang
on," but not to attempt the taking of any more ground. It was about
this time that Major Odlum, commanding the 7th Battalion, took charge
of the 5th, as Colonel Tuxford was ill and Major Edgar had been wounded
soon after the launching of the attack. The losses among the officers
of Major Edgar's little force had been terrible. Major Tenaille and
Captain Hopkins, who commanded the two companies, were killed, as were
also Captains Maikle, Currie, McGee, and Mundell, while Major Thornton,
Captain S. J. Anderson, Captain Endicott, Major Morris, Lieut. Quinan,
and Lieut. Davis were wounded. Matters were made worse by the fact
that Major Powley was wounded just as he came up with his reinforcing
company from the 7th. All through the morning the enemy's artillery
was exceedingly active, although the Canadian artillery surrounded our
troops, who were holding on in the redoubt, with a saving ring of
shrapnel, and, at the same time, distracted the enemy's guns with
accurate fire upon their positions. Canada had good reason to be proud
of her gunners that day.
The captured trenches were held all day, but only at great cost, by the
forces which had won them; and at night the Royal Canadian Dragoons and
the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Brigade arrived, and took them over.
The total losses of the 2nd Brigade amounted to 55 officers and 980 men.
The hostile shelling was the most severe that the Brigade ever
experienced, but the ordeal was borne unshakenly.
On the night of May 24th, at 11.30 p.m., while the troops which had
taken "Bexhill" were still hanging on to what they had won, the 3rd
Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Rennie,
attacked a machine-gun redoubt known as "The Well," which was a very
strongly fortified position. The attacking force gained a section of
trench in the position with fine dash; but to take the redoubt, or to
hold their line under the pounding of bombs and the pitiless fire of
the machine guns in the redoubt, was more than flesh and blood could
accomplish. To remain would have been to die to a man--and win
nothing. This heroic attack was repulsed with heavy losses.
On the following day (May 25th) at noon, Brigadier-General Seely, M.P.,
assumed command of the troops which had won "Bexhill." General Seely
had already endeared himself to the Canadians by his personality, and
now he was to win their confidence as a leader in the field. He
arrived at a perilous and critical moment, and he at once fastened on
the situation with understanding and vigour. He remained in command
until noon on May 27th, and through two extremely trying and hazardous
days and nights, displayed soldierly qualities and a gift for
leadership. Some idea of the severity of the fighting may be gathered
from the fact that the losses among officers of General Seely's Brigade
included, Lieut. W. G. Tennant, Strathcona's Horse, killed; Major D. D.
Young, Royal Canadian Dragoons, Major J. A. Hesketh, Strathcona's
Horse, Lieuts. A. D. Cameron, D. C. McDonald, J. A. Sparkes,
Strathcona's Horse, Major C. Harding and Lieuts. C. Brook and R. C.
Everett, 2nd King Edward's Horse, wounded. The casualties in other
ranks, killed, wounded, and missing, were also very heavy.
An inspiring feature of the fighting at this particular period was the
dash, gallantry, and steadiness of the regiments of horse which, to
relieve the terrible pressure of the moment, were called on to serve as
infantry, without any fighting experience, and flung into the forefront
of a desperate and bloody battle.
It is impossible to record all the acts of heroism performed by
officers and men, but the narrative would be incomplete without a few
of them.
Major Arthur Cecil Murray, M.P., of 2nd King Edward's Horse, for
instance, distinguished himself by the determined and gallant manner in
which he led his squadron, held his ground, and worked at the
construction of a parapet under heavy machine gun fire. The
considerable advance made on the left of the position was in a large
measure due to his efforts. Lieut. (now Captain) J. A. Critchley, of
Strathcona's Horse, armed with bombs, led his men in the assault on an
enemy machine gun redoubt with notable spirit. Corporal W. Legge, of
the Royal Canadian Dragoons, went out on the night of May 25th and
located a German machine gun which had been causing us heavy losses
during the day, and so enabled his regiment to silence it with
converging fire.
It was on May 25th, too, that Sergeant Morris, of 2nd King Edward's
Horse, accompanied the Brigade grenade company, who were sent to assist
the Post Office Rifles of the 47th London Division in an attack on a
certain position on the evening of that day.
Morris led the attack down the German communication trench, and all the
members of his party, with the exception of himself, were either killed
or wounded. He got to a point at the end of the trench and there
maintained himself--to use the cold official phrase--by throwing bombs
and by the work of his single rifle and bayonet. By fighting
single-handed he managed to hold out until the extreme left of the Post
Office Rifles came up to his relief.
On the following day, the 26th, Corporal Pym, Royal Canadian Dragoons,
exhibited a self-sacrifice and contempt for danger which can seldom
have been excelled on any battlefield. Hearing cries for help in
English between the British and German lines, which were only sixty
yards apart, he resolved to go in search of the sufferer. The space
between the lines was swept with incessant rifle and machine gun fire,
but Pym crept out and found the man, who had been wounded in both
thigh-bones and had been lying there for three days and nights. Pym
was unable to move him without causing him pain which he was not in a
state to bear. Pym therefore called back to the trench for help, and
Sergeant Hollowell, Royal Canadian Dragoons, crept out and joined him,
but was shot dead just as he reached Pym and the wounded man.
Pym thereupon crept back across the fire-swept space to see if he could
get a stretcher, but having regained the trench he came to the
conclusion that the ground was too rough to drag the stretcher across
it.
Once more, therefore, he recrossed the deadly space between the
trenches, and at last, with the utmost difficulty, brought the wounded
man in alive.
Those were days of splendid deeds, and this chapter cannot be closed
without recording the most splendid of all--that of Sergeant Hickey, of
the 4th Canadian Battalion,[10] which won for him the recommendation
for the Victoria Cross. Hickey had joined the Battalion at Valcartier
from the 36th Peel Regiment, and on May 24th he volunteered to go out
and recover two trench mortars belonging to the Battalion which had
been abandoned in a ditch the previous day. The excursion promised
Hickey certain death, but he seemed to consider that rather an
inducement than a deterrent. After perilous adventures under hells of
fire he found the mortars and brought them in. But he also found what
was of infinitely greater value--the shortest and safest route by which
to bring up men from the reserve trenches to the firing line. It was a
discovery which saved many lives at a moment when every life was of the
greatest value, and time and time again, at the risk of his own as he
went back and forth, he guided party after party up to the trenches by
this route.
Hickey's devotion to duty had been remarkable throughout, and at
Pilckem Ridge, on April 23rd, he had voluntarily run forward in front
of the line to assist five wounded comrades. How he survived the shell
and rifle fire which the enemy, who had an uninterrupted view of his
heroic efforts, did not scruple to turn upon him, it is impossible to
say: but he succeeded in dressing the wounds of all the five and
conveying them back to cover.
Hickey, who was a cheery and a modest soul, and as brave as any of our
brave Canadians, did not live to receive the honour for which he had
been recommended. On May 30th a stray bullet hit him in the neck and
killed him. And so there went home to the God of Battles a man to whom
battle had been joy.
On May 31st the Canadian Division was withdrawn from the territory it
had seized from the enemy and moved to the extreme south of the British
line. Here the routine of ordinary trench warfare was resumed until
the middle of June.[11]
[1] The detailed plan of the engagement was as follows:--Sir Herbert
Plumer with the 2nd Army was to protect Ypres while the 3rd Corps held
Armentières. The 1st Army under Sir Douglas Haig was to carry the
entrenchments and redoubts on the right of the Crown Prince Rupprecht's
Army. Sir John French had arranged for the 4th Corps to attack the
German position at Rouges-Bancs, to the north-west of Fromelles. The
1st Corps and the Indian Corps were first to occupy the plain between
Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy, and afterwards take the Aubers Ridge.
[2] Lt.-Colonel Meighen led his troops with capacity and judgment. He
had already won distinction at Ypres. In accordance with the English
custom of recalling men who have acquired experience in the field for
training purposes at home, Colonel Meighen has been sent to Canada, and
given charge of the instructional scheme of the Canadian Forces from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the temporary rank of
Brigadier-General.
[3] Our men were very anxious to get to grips with the enemy on this
day (May 18th), as it was the birthday of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria,
who had issued an order that no prisoners were to be taken. Some idea
of the efforts made to incite the enemy's forces to further outrages
against the conventions of war may be gathered from the following
paragraph extracted from the _Lille War News_, an official journal
issued to the German troops:--"Comrades, if the enemy were to invade
our land, do you think he would leave one stone upon another of our
fathers' houses, our churches, and all the works of a thousand years of
love and toil? ... and if your strong arms did not hold back the
English (God damn them!) and the French (God annihilate them!) do you
think they would spare your homes and your loved ones? What would
these pirates from the Isles do to you if they were to set foot on
German soil?"
[4] The casualties of the 10th Battalion during the fighting in April
and May were 809. The casualties at Ypres alone were 600 of all ranks.
[5] Coy. Sergt.-Major G. R. Turner (now Lieutenant), of the 3rd Field
Company, Canadian Engineers, who served with courage and coolness
throughout the second battle of Ypres, and particularly distinguished
himself on the nights of April 22nd and 27th by bringing in wounded
under severe artillery and rifle fire, again attracted the attention of
his superior officers by his courageous conduct at Festubert. From May
18th to 22nd he was in command of detachments of sappers employed in
digging advanced lines of trenches, and generally constructing
defences. This work was carried through most efficiently, although
under fire from field guns, machine guns, and rifles.
[6] It was during this bombardment that Captain McMeans, Lieut.
Smith-Rewse, and Lieut. Passmore were killed, and Lieut. Denison was
wounded. The fate of Captain McMeans was particularly regrettable as
he had on all occasions borne himself most gallantly. Such was the
force of his example that, when he himself, and all the other officers,
as well as half the men of the Company, had been killed or wounded, the
remainder clung doggedly to the position. The conduct of Captain J. M.
Prower also calls for mention. He was wounded, but returned to his
command as soon as his wounds were dressed, and though again buried
under the parapet, continued to do his duty. He is now Brigade Major
of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. On the same day Coy. Sergt.-Major John
Hay steadied and most ably controlled the men of his Company after all
the officers and 70 men out of the 140 had been put out of action.
[7] _Casualties of 8th Battalion_.--About 90 per cent. of the original
officers and men of the 8th Battalion have been casualties. Only three
of the original officers of the battalion have escaped wounds or death.
[8] This was an attack made by the 7th Prussian Army Corps which had
been very strongly reinforced. The German efforts to break through the
Canadian lines were very determined, and they advanced in masses,
which, however, melted away before our fire.
[9] Casualties of 5th Battalion during Ypres, Festubert, and Givenchy
about 60 per cent. Casualties at Festubert alone, 380, all ranks.
[10] The 4th Canadian Battalion was under continuous fire at Festubert
through ten days and eleven nights. On the morning of May 27th all
communication wires between the fire-trench and the Battalion and
Brigade Headquarters were cut by enemy fire, and at nine o'clock Pte.
(now Lieutenant) W. E. F. Hart volunteered to mend the wires. Hart was
with Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) M. J. Colquhoun at the time, and they
had together twice been partially buried by shell fire earlier in the
morning. Pte. Hart mended eleven breaks in the wires, and
re-established communication with both Battalion and Brigade
Headquarters. He was at work in the Orchard, under shrapnel,
machine-gun, and rifle fire, without any cover, for an hour and thirty
minutes. Hart, who is now signalling officer of the 4th Battalion, is
a young man, and the owner of a farm near Brantford, Ontario. He has
been with the Battalion since August, 1914.
[11] The following is Sir John French's official reason for bringing
the battle of Festubert to a close:--"I had now reasons to consider
that the battle which was commenced by the 1st Army on May 9th and
renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate
object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded
with...." "In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a
position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was
won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards."