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To THE WISE MAN ALL THE WORLD'S A SOIL--BEN JONSON
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A VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD
_in the years 1740-4 by_
LORD ANSON
LONDON: PUBLISHED by J. M. DENT & SONS Ltd.
AND IN NEW YORK BY E. P. DUTTON & CO
{vii}
INTRODUCTION
The men-of-war in which Anson went to sea were built mostly of oak.
They were painted externally yellow, with a blue stripe round the upper
works. Internally, they were painted red. They carried cannon on one,
two, or three decks according to their size. The biggest ships carried
a hundred cannon and nearly a thousand men. The ship in which this
famous voyage was made was of the middle size, then called the
fourth-rate. She carried sixty cannon, and a crew of four hundred men.
Her lower gun deck, a little above the level of the water, was about
140 feet long. She was of about a thousand tons burthen.
Though this seems small to us, it is not small for a wooden ship. It
is not possible to build a long wooden ship. The _Centurion_, though
short, was broad, bulky, and deep. She was fit for the sea. As she
was built more to carry cannon than to sail, she was a slow sailer.
She became slower as the barnacles gathered on her planks under the
water. She carried three wooden masts, each fitted with two or three
square sails, extended by wooden yards. Both yards and masts were
frequently injured in bad weather.
The cannon were arranged in rows along her decks. On the lower gun
deck, a little above the level of the water, she carried twenty-six
twenty-four-pounders, thirteen on a side. These guns were
muzzle-loading cannon which flung twenty-four-pound balls for a
distance of about a mile. On the deck above this chief battery, she
carried a lighter battery of twenty-six nine- or twelve-pounder guns,
thirteen on a side. These guns were also muzzle-loading. They flung
their balls for a distance of a little more than a mile.
On the quarter-deck, the poop, the forecastle, and aloft in the tops
(the strong platforms on the masts), were lighter guns, throwing balls
of from a half to six pounds' weight. {viii} Some of the lightest guns
were mounted on swivels, so that they could be easily pointed in any
direction. All the guns were clumsy weapons. They could not be aimed
with any nicety. The iron round shot fired from them did not fit the
bores of the pieces. The gun-carriages were clumsy, and difficult to
move. Even when the carriage had been so moved that the gun was
accurately trained, and when the gun itself had been raised or
depressed till it was accurately pointed, the gunner could not tell how
much the ball would wobble in the bore before it left the muzzle. For
these reasons all the effective sea-fights were fought at close range,
from within a quarter of a mile of the target to close alongside. At a
close range, the muskets and small-arms could be used with effect.
The broadside cannon pointed through square portholes cut in the ship's
sides. The ports were fitted with heavy wooden lids which could be
tightly closed when necessary. In bad weather, the lower-deck gun
ports could not be opened without danger of swamping the ship.
Sometimes, when the lower-deck guns were fought in a gale, the men
stood knee deep in water.
In action the guns were "run out" till their muzzles were well outside
the port, so that the flashes might not set the ship's side on fire.
The shock of the discharge made them recoil into a position in which
they could be reloaded. The guns were run out by means of side
tackles. They were kept from recoiling too far by strong ropes called
breechings. When not in use, and not likely to be used, they were
"housed," or so arranged that their muzzles could be lashed firmly to
the ship's side. In a sea way, when the ship rolled very badly, there
was danger of the guns breaking loose and rolling this way and that
till they had knocked the ship's side out. To prevent this happening,
clamps of wood were screwed behind the wheels of the gun-carriages, and
extra breechings were rove, whenever bad weather threatened.
The great weight of the rows of cannon put a severe strain upon the
upper works of the ship. In bad weather, during excessive rolling,
this strain was often great enough to open the seams in the ship's
sides. To prevent this, and other costly damage, it was the custom to
keep the big men-of-war in harbour from October until the Spring. In
the {ix} smaller vessels the strain was made less by striking down some
of the guns into the hold.
The guns were fired by the application of a slow-match to the priming
powder in the touch-holes. The slow-matches were twisted round wooden
forks called linstocks. After firing, when the guns had recoiled,
their bores were scraped with scrapers called "worms" to remove scraps
of burning wad or cartridge. They were then sponged out with a wet
sponge, and charged by the ramming home of fresh cartridges, wads, and
balls. A gun's crew numbered from four to twelve men, according to the
size of the piece. When a gun was trained aft or forward, to bear on
an object before or abaft the beam, the gun's crew hove it about with
crows and handspikes.
As this, and the other exercise of sponging, loading, and running out
the guns in the heat, stench, and fury of a sea-fight was excessively
hard labour, the men went into action stripped to the waist. The decks
on those occasions were thickly sanded, lest the blood upon them should
make them too slippery for the survivors' feet. Tubs of water were
placed between the guns for the wetting of the sponges and the
extinguishing of chance fires. The ship's boys carried the cartridges
to the guns from the magazines below the water-line. The round-shot
were placed close to hand in rope rings called garlands. Nets were
spread under the masts to catch wreck from aloft. The decks were
"cleared for action." All loose articles about the decks, and all
movable wooden articles such as bulkheads (the partitions between
cabins), mess-tables, chests, casks, etc., were flung into the hold or
overboard, lest shot striking them should splinter them. Splinters
were far more dangerous than shot. In this book it may be noticed that
the officers hoped to have no fighting while the gun decks of the ships
in the squadron were cumbered with provision casks.
The ships of war carried enormous crews. The _Centurion_ carried four
hundred seamen and one hundred soldiers. At sea, most of this
complement was divided into two watches. Both watches were subdivided
into several divisions, to each of which was allotted some special
duty, as the working of the main-mast, the keeping of the main deck
clean, etc., etc. Many members of the crew {x} stood no watch, but
worked at special crafts and occupations about the ship. A wooden ship
of war employed and kept busy a carpenter and carpenter's mates, a
sailmaker and sailmaker's mates, a cooper and a gunner, each with his
mates, and many other specially skilled craftsmen and their assistants.
She was a little world, carrying within herself all that she needed.
Her daily business required men to sail her and steer her, men to fight
her guns, men to rule her, men to drill, men to play the spy, men to
teach, preach, and decorate, men to clean her, caulk her, paint her and
keep her sweet, men to serve out food, water, and intoxicants, men to
tinker, repair, and cook and forge, to doctor and operate, to bury and
flog, to pump, fumigate and scrape, and to load and unload. She called
for so many skilled craftsmen, and provided so much special employment
out of the way of seamanship, that the big crew was never big enough.
The special employments took away now one man, now another, till there
were few left to work the ship. The soldiers and marines acted as a
military guard for the prevention of mutiny. They worked about the
ship, hauling ropes, etc., when not engaged in military duty.
The hundreds of men in the ship's crew lived below decks. Most of them
lived on the lower gun deck in the narrow spaces (known as berths)
between the guns. Here they kept their chests, mess-tables, crockery,
and other gear. Here they ate and drank, made merry, danced, got
drunk, and, in port, entertained their female acquaintance. Many more,
including the midshipmen, surgeon, and gunner, lived below the lower
gun deck, in the orlop or cable tier, where sunlight could never come
and fresh air never came willingly. At night the men slept in
hammocks, which they slung from the beams. They were packed together
very tightly, man to man, hammock touching hammock. In the morning,
the hammocks were lashed up and stowed in racks till the evening.
There was no "regulation" naval uniform until some years after the
_Centurion's_ return to England. The officers and men seem to have
worn what clothes they pleased. The ships carried stores of clothes
which were issued to the men as they needed them. The store clothes,
being (perhaps) of similar patterns, may have given a sort of {xi}
uniformity to the appearance of the crews after some months at sea. In
some of the prints of the time the men are drawn wearing rough, buckled
shoes, coarse stockings, aprons or short skirts of frieze, baize, or
tarred canvas, and short jackets worn open. Anson, like most captains,
took care that the men in his boat's crew all dressed alike. The
marines wore their regimental uniforms.
Life at sea has always been, and may always be, a harder life than the
hardest of shore lives.
Life ashore in the early and middle eighteenth century was, in the
main, both hard and brutal. Society ashore was made up of a little,
brilliant, artificial class, a great, dull, honest, and hardworking
mass, and a brutal, dirty, and debased rabble. Society at sea was like
society ashore, except that, being composed of men, and confronted with
the elements, and based on a grand ceremonial tradition, it was never
brilliant, and never artificial. It was, in the main, an honest and
hardworking society. Much in it was brutal, dirty, and debased; but it
had always behind it an order and a ceremony grand, impressive, and
unfaltering. That life in that society was often barbarous and
disgusting cannot be doubted. The best men in the ships were taken by
force from the merchant service. The others were gathered by
press-gangs and gaol-deliveries. They were knocked into shape by
brutal methods and kept in hand by brutal punishments. The officers
were not always gentlemen; and when they were, they were frequently
incompetent. The administration was scandalously corrupt. The ships
were unhealthy, the food foul, the pay small, and the treatment cruel.
The attractions of the service seem to have been these: the chance of
making a large sum of prize-money, and the possibility of getting drunk
once a day on the enormous daily ration of intoxicating liquor. The
men were crammed together into a dark, stinking, confined space, in
which privacy was impossible, peace a dream, and cleanliness a memory.
Here they were fed on rotten food, till they died by the score, as this
book testifies.
"We sent," says Mr. Walter, chaplain in the _Centurion_, "about eighty
sick from the _Centurion_; and the other ships, I believe, sent nearly
as many, in proportion.... As soon as we had performed this necessary
duty, we scraped our decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleaning; then
smoked {xii} it between decks, and after all washed every part well
with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting
the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin; for ... both
these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree."
"The Biscuit," says Mr. Thomas, the teacher of mathematics in the
_Centurion_, "(was) so worm-eaten it was scarce anything but dust, and
a little blow would reduce it to that immediately; our Beef and Pork
was likewise very rusty and rotten, and the surgeon endeavoured to
hinder us from eating any of it, alledging it was, tho' a slow, yet a
sure Poison."
That tradition and force of will could keep life efficient, and direct
it to great ends, in such circumstances, deserves our admiration and
our reverence.
The traditions and unpleasantness of the sea service are suggested
vividly in many pages of this book. A few glimpses of both may be
obtained from the following extracts from some of the logs and papers
which deal with this voyage and with Anson's entry into the Navy. The
marine chapters in Smollett's _Roderick Random_ give a fair picture of
the way of life below decks during the years of which this book treats.
George Anson was born at Shugborough, in Staffordshire, on April 23,
1697. His first ship was the _Ruby_, Captain Peter Chamberlen, a
54-gun ship, with a scratch crew of 185 men. George Anson's name
appears in her pay book between the names of John Baker, ordinary
seaman, and George Hirgate, captain's servant. He joined her on
February 2, 1712. The ship had lain cleaning and fitting "at Chatham
and in the River Medway" since the 4th of the preceding month. Two
days after the boy came aboard she weighed her anchor "at 1 afternoon,"
fresh gales and cloudy, and ran out to the Nore where she anchored in
seven fathoms and moored.
It is not known what duties the boy performed during his first days of
service. The ship fired twenty-one guns in honour of the queen's
birthday on February 7. The weather was hazy, foggy, and cold, with
snow and rain; lighters came off with dry provisions, and the ship's
boats brought off water. On February 9, the _Centurion_, an earlier,
smaller _Centurion_ than the ship afterwards made {xiii} famous by him,
anchored close to them. On the 16th, two Dutch men-of-war, with a
convoy, anchored close to them. Yards and topmasts were struck and
again got up on the 17th. On the 24th, three shot were fired at a
brigantine to bring her to.
On the 27th, Sir John Norris and Sir Charles Wager hoisted their flags
aboard the _Cambridge_ and the _Ruby_ respectively, and signal was made
for a court-martial. Six men of the _Dover_ were tried for mutiny,
theft, disorderly conduct, and desertion of their ship after she had
gone ashore "near Alborough Haven." Being all found guilty they were
whipped from ship to ship next morning. Each received six lashes on
the bare back at the side of each ship then riding at the Nore. A week
later, the _Ruby_ and the _Centurion_ sailed leisurely to Spithead,
chasing a Danish ship on the way. On March 11, the _Ruby_ anchored at
Spithead and struck her topmasts. On March 18, Captain Chamberlen
removed "into ye _Monmouth_" with all his "followers," Anson among
them. The _Monmouth_ sailed on April 13, with three other men-of-war,
as a guard to the West Indian fleet, bound for Port Royal. Her master
says that on June 7, in lat. 21° 36' N., long. 18° 9' W., "we duckt
those men that want willing to pay for crossing the tropick." In
August, off the Jamaican coast, a man fell overboard and was drowned.
Later in the month, a hurricane very nearly put an end to Anson and
_Monmouth_ together. Both pumps were kept going, there was four feet
of water on the ballast and the same between decks, the foretopmast
went, the main and mizen masts were cut away, and men with buckets
worked for their lives "bealing at each hatchway." Port Royal was
reached on September 1. The _Monmouth_ made a cruise after pirates in
Blewfields Bay, and returned to Spithead in June 1713.
Anson is next heard of as a second lieutenant aboard the _Hampshire_.
He was in the _Montague_, 60-gun ship, in Sir George Byng's action off
Cape Passaro, in March 1718. In 1722, he commanded the _Weasel_ sloop
in some obscure services in the North Sea against the Dutch smugglers
and French Jacobites. During this command he made several captures of
brandy. From 1724 till 1735 he was employed in various commands,
mostly in the {xiv} American colonies, against the pirates. From 1735
till 1737 he was not employed at sea.
In 1737, he took command of the _Centurion_, and sailed in her to the
Guinea Coast, to protect our gum merchants from the French. His gunner
was disordered in his head during the cruise; and Sierra Leone was so
unhealthy that "the merchant ships had scarce a well man on board." A
man going mad and others dying were the only adventures of the voyage.
He was back in the Downs to prepare for this more eventful voyage by
July 21, 1739.
In November he wrote to the Admiralty that in hot climates "the Pease
and Oatemeal put on board his Maj'y Ships have generally decayed and
become not fitt to issue, before they have all been expended." He
proposed taking instead of peas and oatmeal a proportion of "Stockfish,
Grotts, Grout, and Rice." The Admiralty sanctioned the change; but the
purser seems to have failed to procure the substitutes. Whether, as
was the way of the pursers of that time, he pocketed money on the
occasion, cannot be known. He died at sea long before the lack was
discovered.
A more tragical matter took place in this November. A Mr. McKie, a
naval mate, was attacked on Gosport Beach by twenty or thirty of the
_Centurion's_ crew, under one William Cheney, a boatswain's mate; and
the said William Cheney "with a stick did cutt and bruse" the said
McKie, and tore his shirt and conveyed away his "Murning ring," which
was flat burglary in the said Cheney. "Mr. Cheney aledges no other
reason for beating and Abusing Mr. McKie but the said McKie having got
drunk at Sea, did then beat and abuse him." As Hamlet says, this was
hire and salary, not revenge.
Months went by, doubtfully enlivened thus, till June 1740, when the
pressing of men began. The _Centurion's_ men went pressing, and got
seventy-three men, a fair catch, but not enough. She despatched a
tender to the Downs to press men from homeward bound merchant ships.
This method of getting a crew was the best then in use, because the men
obtained by it were trained seamen, which those obtained from the
gaols, the gin-shops, and the slums seldom were. It was an extremely
cruel method. A man within sight of his home, after a voyage of
perhaps two {xv} years, might be dragged from his ship (before his
wages were paid) to serve willy-nilly in the Navy, at a third of the
pay, for the next half-dozen years. An impartial conscription seems
noble beside such a method. Knowing how the ships were manned, it
cannot seem strange that the Navy was not then a loved nor an honoured
service. Nineteen of the _Centurion's_ catch loved and honoured it so
little that they contrived to desert (risking death at the yard-arm by
doing so) during the weeks of waiting at Portsmouth.
Before the tender sailed for the Downs, Anson discovered that the
dockyard men had scamped their work in the _Centurion_. They had
supplied her with a defective foremast "Not fitt for Sarves." High up
on the mast was "a rotten Nott eleven inches deep," a danger to spar
and ship together. The dockyard officials, who had probably pocketed
the money for a good spar, swore that the Nott only "wants a Plugg
drove in" to be perfection. Dockyard men at this time and for many
years afterwards deserved to be suspended both from their duties and by
their necks. Soon after the wrangle over the spar, there was a wrangle
about the _Gloucester's_ beef. Forty-two out of her seventy-two
puncheons of beef were found to be stinking. With some doubts as to
what would happen in the leaf if such things happened in the bud, Anson
got his squadron to sea. Early in the voyage his master "shoved" his
boatswain while he was knotting a cable, and the boatswain complained.
"The Boatswain," says the letter, "is very often Drunk and incapable of
his Duty." Later in the voyage, when many hundreds had died, Mr.
Cheney, who hit Mr. McKie, became boatswain in his stead.
The squadron sailed from England on September 18, 1740, with six ships
of war manned by 1872 seamen and marines, twenty-four of whom were
sick. At Madeira, on November 4, after less than seven weeks at sea,
there were 122 sick, and fourteen had been buried. Less than eleven
weeks later, at St. Catherine's in Brazil, there were 450 sick, and 160
had been buried. From this time until what was left of the squadron
reached Juan Fernandez, sickness and death took continual toll. It is
shocking to see the _Centurion's_ muster lists slowly decreasing, by
one or two a week, till she was up to the Horn, then dropping six, ten,
twenty, or twenty-four a week, as the scurvy and the frost {xvi} took
hold. Few but the young survived. What that passage of the Horn was
like may be read here at length; but perhaps nothing in this book is so
eloquent of human misery as the following entries from Anson's private
record:--
"1741. 8 May.--Heavy Flaws and dangerous Gusts, expecting every Moment
to have my masts Carry'd away, having very little succor, from the
standing rigging, every Shroud knotted, and not men able to keep the
deck sufficient to take in a Topsail, all being violently afflicted
with the Scurvy, and every day lessening our Number by six eight and
Ten.
"1741. 1st Sept.--I mustered my Ship's Company, the number of Men I
brought out of England, being Five hundred, are now reduced by
Mortality to Two hundred and Thirteen, and many of them in a weak and
Low condition."
Nothing in any of the records is so eloquent as the remark in Pascoe
Thomas's account of the voyage:--
"I have seen 4 or 5 dead Bodies at a time, some sown up in their
Hammocks and others not, washing about the Decks, for Want of Help to
bury them in the Sea."
On December 7, 1741, the 1872 men had dwindled down to 201. Of the six
ships of war only one, the _Centurion_, still held her course. She was
leaking an inch an hour, but she showed bright to the world under a new
coat of paint. On this day Anson sent home a letter to the Admiralty
(from Canton in China). The letter was delivered 173 days later.
In spite of the miseries of the service, there were compensations. The
entry off Payta--
"1741. 12 Nov.--I keept Possession of the Town three days and employed
my Boats in plundering"--
must have been pleasant to write; and the entries for Tuesday, June 21,
1743, and following days, become almost incoherent:--
{xvii}
"reced 112 baggs and 6 Chests of Silver.
"11 Baggs of Virgin silver 72 Chests of Dollers and baggs of Dollers
114 Chests and 100 baggs of Dollers 4 baggs of wrought Plate and Virgin
Silver."
The arrival at Portsmouth is thus described:--
"1744. Friday, 15 June.--Came to with the S Bower in 10 fath water and
at 9 began to Moor."
Later interesting entries are:--
"Monday, 2nd July.--Fresh gales and Cloudy sent away the Treasure in 32
Waggons to London with 139 Officers and Seamen to guard it.
"Thursday, 19 July.--Mod and fair, found in the Fish Room three Chests
of Treasure" (which had been overlooked).
The last entry of all is for:--
"Friday, 20 July.--Hard Gales with rain at 4 p.m. all the men on the
spot were paid and the Pendant was Struck."
An old print represents an officer of the _Centurion_ dropping booty
into the apron of a lady friend. Behind him the waggons and their
guard proceed, with a great display of flags. The passing of the
treasure was acclaimed with much enthusiasm both upon the road and in
London. It was no doubt the biggest prize ever brought to England by a
single ship. Anson's share made him a rich man. The rest of the
survivors profited according to their rank.
Anson's subsequent career may be told in a few words. He was created
Lord Anson on June 13, 1747. From 1751 to 1756 and from 1757 till his
death he was a very competent and energetic First Lord of the
Admiralty. He became Admiral of the Fleet in 1761. He died on June 6,
1762. The figurehead of the _Centurion_, the lion which "was very
loose" in the Cape Horn storms of 1741, was preserved at the family
seat at Shugborough till it fell to pieces. A portrait of Anson, which
has been frequently copied and engraved, still exists there. The face
is that of {xviii} a man placidly and agreeably contented. It is the
face of the polite and even spirit who "always kept up his usual
composure and steadiness," and only once allowed joy to "break through"
"the equable and unvaried character which he had hitherto preserved."
Something of that character is in this placid and agreeable story told
by Mr. Walter, chaplain, from Anson's private records.
The book is one of the most popular of the English books of voyages.
It is a pleasantly written work. The story is told with a grace and
quietness "very grateful and refreshing." The story itself is
remarkable. It bears witness to the often illustrated contrast between
the excellence of Englishmen and the stupidity of their governors. The
management of the squadron before it sailed gave continuous evidence of
imbecility. Something fine in a couple of hundred "emaciated
ship-mates" drove them on to triumph through every possible
disadvantage. In the general joy over their triumph, the imbecility
was forgotten. There is something pathetic in the mismanagement of the
squadron. The ships were sent to sea on the longest and most dangerous
of voyages with no anti-scorbutics. When scurvy broke out the only
medicines available were "the pill and drop of Dr. Ward" (very violent
emetic purgatives), which came not from the government, but from
Anson's own stores. In the absence of proper medicines, Anson produced
these things, "and first try'd them on himself." This spirit in our
captains and in our common men has borne us (so far) fairly
triumphantly out of the bogs into which our stupidity so often drives
us.
JOHN MASEFIELD.
_January_ 30, 1911.
{xix}
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A Voyage to the South Seas, and to many other Parts of the World,
performed from the Month of September in the Year 1740, to June 1744,
by Commodore Anson, in his Majesty's Ship the _Centurion_. By an
officer of the Fleet, 1744.
An authentic journal of the late expedition under the command of
Commodore Anson. Containing a regular and exact account of the whole
proceedings, etc. To which is added A Narrative of the Extraordinary
Hardships suffered by the Adventurers, in this voyage. By John
Philips, midshipman of the _Centurion_, 1744.
A True Journal of a Voyage to the South Seas and round the Globe, in
the _Centurion_, 1745, by Pascoe Thomas.
A Voyage round the World in the Year 1740, 1, 2, 3, 4; compiled from
papers and other materials of the Right Honourable George Anson, and
published under his direction by Richard Walter, M.A., chaplain of His
Majesty's ship _Centurion_ in that expedition, 1748, and many later
editions. One in 1749 was illustrated with 42 plates.
A supplement to Lord Anson's Voyage round the World, containing a
discovery and description of the Island of Frivola, by the Abbé Coyer,
1752.
Anson's voyages were included in J. Harris's Navigantium atque
Itinerantium Bibliotheca, etc., vol. 1., revised and enlarged edition
by Campbell, 1744-8, 1764; and also in J. H. More's A New and Complete
Collection of Voyages, etc., vol. i., 1780.
LIFE: By John Barrow, 1839.
{xxi}
CONTENTS
BOOK I
CHAP.
I. Of the Equipment of the Squadron: the Incidents relating thereto,
from its first Appointment to its setting sail from St. Helens
II. The Passage from St. Helens to the Island of Madera; with a short
Account of that Island, and of our Stay there
III. The History of the Spanish Squadron commanded by Don Joseph
Pizarro
IV. From Madera to St. Catherine's
V. Proceedings at St. Catherine's, and a Description of the Place,
with a short Account of Brazil
VI. The run from St. Catherine's to Port St. Julian, with some Account
of that Port, and of the Country to the southward of the River of Plate
VII. Departure from the Bay of St. Julian, and the Passage from thence
to Streights Le Maire
VIII. From Streights Le Maire to Cape Noir
IX. Observations and Directions for facilitating the Passage of our
future Cruisers round Cape Horn
X. From Cape Noir to the Island of Juan Fernandes
BOOK II
I. The Arrival of the _Centurion_ at the Island of Juan Fernandes,
with a Description of that Island
II. The Arrival of the _Gloucester_ and the _Anna_ Pink at the Island
of Juan Fernandes, and the Transactions at that Place during this
Interval
III. A short Narrative of what befel the _Anna_ Pink before she joined
us, with an Account of the Loss of the _Wager_, and of the putting back
of the _Severn_ and _Pearl_, the two remaining Ships of the Squadron
IV. Conclusion of our Proceedings at Juan Fernandes, from the Arrival
of the _Anna_ Pink to our final Departure from thence
{xxii}
V. Our Cruise from the time of our leaving Juan Fernandes to the
taking of the Town of Paita
VI. The taking of Paita, and our Proceedings there
VII. From our Departure from Paita to our Arrival at Quibo
VIII. Our Proceedings at Quibo, with an Account of the Place
IX. From Quibo to the Coast of Mexico
X. An Account of the Commerce carried on between the City of Manila on
the Island of Luconia, and the Port of Acapulco on the Coast of Mexico
XI. Our Cruise off the Port of Acapulco for the Manila Ship
XII. Description of the Harbour of Chequetan, and of the adjacent
Coast and Country
XIII. Our Proceedings at Chequetan and on the adjacent Coast, till our
setting sail for Asia
XIV. A brief Account of what might have been expected from our
Squadron had it arrived in the South Seas in good time
BOOK III
I. The Run from the Coast of Mexico to the Ladrones or Marian Islands
II. Our Arrival at Tinian, and an Account of the Island and of our
Proceedings there till the _Centurion_ drove out to Sea
III. Transactions at Tinian after the Departure of the _Centurion_
IV. Proceedings on Board the _Centurion_ when driven out to Sea
V. Employment at Tinian till the final Departure of the _Centurion_
from thence; with a Description of the Ladrones
VI. From Tinian to Macao
VII. Proceedings at Macao
VIII. From Macao to Cape Espiritu Santo--the taking of the Manila
Galeon, and returning back again
IX. Transactions in the River of Canton
X. Proceedings at the City of Canton, and the Return of the
_Centurion_ to England
Index
[Illustration: A CHART OF THE SOUTHERN PART OF SOUTH AMERICA]
With the Track of the _Centurion_ from the Island of St. Catherine's to
the Island of Juan Fernandas
[Illustration: A CHART OF PART OF PACIFIC OCEAN]
The Chart shows Anson's track in the _Centurion_ from Acapulco to
Tenian, and thence to China.
A
VOYAGE
ROUND THE
WORLD
In the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV.
BY
GEORGE ANSON, ESQ;
Commander in Chief of a Squadron of His Majesty's
Ships, sent upon an Expedition to the _South-Seas_.
COMPILED
From Papers and other Materials of the Right Honourable
GEORGE Lord _ANSON_, and published under his Direction,
By RICHARD WALTER, M.A.
Chaplain of his MAJESTY'S Ship the _Centurion_, in that Expedition.
{1}
TO
HIS GRACE, JOHN
DUKE OF BEDFORD, MARQUIS OF TAVISTOCK, EARL OF BEDFORD, BARON RUSSEL,
BARON RUSSEL OF THORNHAUGH, AND BARON ROWLAND OF STREATHAM;
_One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State; and
Lord-Lieutenant and Custos Rotulorum of the County of Bedford._
MY LORD,
The following narrative of a very singular naval atchievement is
addressed to your Grace, both on account of the infinite obligations
which the commander-in-chief at all times professes to have received
from your friendship, and also as the subject itself naturally claims
the patronage of one under whose direction the British navy has resumed
its ancient spirit and lustre, and has in one summer ennobled itself by
two victories, the most decisive, and (if the strength and number of
the captures be considered) the most important, that are to be met with
in our annals. Indeed, an uninterrupted series of success, and a
manifest superiority gained universally over the enemy, both in
commerce and glory, seem to be the necessary effects of a revival of
strict discipline, and of an unbiassed regard to merit and service.
These are marks that must distinguish the happy period of time in which
your Grace presided, and afford a fitter subject for history than for
an address of this nature. Very signal advantages of rank and
distinction obtained and secured to the naval profession by your
Grace's auspicious influence, will remain a lasting monument of your
unwearied zeal and attachment to it, and be for ever remembered with
the highest gratitude by all who shall be employed in it. As these
were the generous rewards of past exploits, they {2} will be likewise
the noblest incentives and surest pledges of the future. That your
Grace's eminent talents, magnanimity, and disinterested zeal, whence
the public has already reaped such signal benefits, may in all times
prove equally successful in advancing the prosperity of Great Britain,
is the ardent wish of,
MY LORD,
Your Grace's most obedient, most devoted, and
most humble servant,
RICHARD WALTER.
{3}
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the great improvement of navigation within the last two
centuries, a voyage round the world is still considered as an
enterprize of so very singular a nature, that the public have never
failed to be extremely inquisitive about the various accidents and
turns of fortune with which this uncommon attempt is generally
attended. And though the amusement expected in these narrations is
doubtless one great source of that curiosity with the bulk of readers,
yet the more intelligent part of mankind have always agreed that from
accounts of this nature, if faithfully executed, the more important
purposes of navigation, commerce, and national interest may be greatly
promoted: for every authentic description of foreign coasts and
countries will contribute to one or more of these great ends, in
proportion to the wealth, wants, or commodities of those countries, and
our ignorance of those coasts; and therefore a voyage round the world
promises a species of information of all others the most desirable and
interesting, since great part of it is performed in seas with which we
are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted, and in the neighbourhood of
a country renowned for the abundance of its wealth, though it is at the
same time stigmatised for its poverty in the necessaries and
conveniences of a civilized life.
These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work;
which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and
contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the
extension of our commerce and power, may doubtless vie with any
narration of this kind hitherto made public: since as to the first of
these heads it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath
been strongly excited by the circumstances of this undertaking already
known to the world; for whether we consider the force of the squadron
sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single
ship was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying
fortune which attended {4} the whole enterprize, each of these
articles, I conceive, must, from its rude, well-known outlines, appear
worthy of a compleater and more finished delineation.
Besides these descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is
inserted in the ensuing work an ample account of a particular
navigation of which hitherto little more than the name has been known,
except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the track described
by the Manila ship, in her passage to Acapulco, through the northern
part of the Pacific Ocean. This material article is collected from the
draughts and journals met with on board the Manila galeon, founded on
the experience of more than a hundred and fifty years' practice, and
corroborated in its principal circumstances by the concurrent evidence
of all the Spanish prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of
their journals, which I have examined, appear to have been not ill
kept, I presume the particulars of their route may be very safely
relied on by future navigators. The advantages which may be drawn from
an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects that
may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to
be discussed in this place, but they will easily offer themselves to
the skillful in maritime affairs. However, as the Manila ships are the
only ones which have ever traversed this vast ocean, except a French
straggler or two which have been afterwards seized on the coast of
Mexico, and as, during near two ages in which this trade has been
carried on, the Spaniards have, with the greatest care, secreted all
accounts of their voyages from the rest of the world, these reasons
alone would authorize the insertion of those papers, and would
recommend them to the inquisitive as a very great improvement in
geography, and worthy of attention from the singularity of many
circumstances therein recited.
Thus much it has been thought necessary to premise with regard to the
ensuing work, which it is hoped the reader will, on perusal, find much
ampler and more important than this slight sketch can well explain.
But as there are hereafter occasionally interspersed some accounts of
Spanish transactions, and many observations relating to the disposition
of the American Spaniards, and to the condition of the countries
bordering on the South Seas, and as herein I may appear to differ
greatly from the opinions generally established, I think it behoves {5}
me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in
these matters, that I may not be censured as having given way either to
a thoughtless credulity on one hand, or, what would be a much more
criminal imputation, to a willful and deliberate misrepresentation on
the other.
Mr. Anson, before he set sail upon this expedition, besides the printed
journals to those parts, took care to furnish himself with the best
manuscript accounts he could procure of all the Spanish settlements
upon the coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico: these he carefully compared
with the examinations of his prisoners, and the informations of several
intelligent persons who fell into his hands in the South Seas. He had
likewise the good fortune, in some of his captures, to possess himself
of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of
them written by the Viceroy of Peru to the Viceroy of Santa Fee, to the
Presidents of Panama and Chili, to Don Blass de Lezo, admiral of the
galeons, and to divers other persons in considerable employments; and
in these letters there was usually inserted a recital of those they
were intended to answer; so that they contained no small part of the
correspondence between those officers for some time previous to our
arrival on that coast. We took, besides, many letters sent from
persons entrusted by the Spanish Government to their friends and
correspondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public
business, and sometimes contained undisguised animadversions on the
views and conduct of their superiors. From these materials those
accounts of the Spanish affairs are drawn which may at first sight
appear the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the
various casualties which befel Pizarro's squadron is for the most part
composed from intercepted letters. Though indeed the relation of the
insurrection of Orellana and his followers is founded on rather a less
disputable authority: for it was taken from the mouth of an English
gentleman then on board Pizarro, who often conversed with Orellana; and
it was upon inquiry confirmed in its principal circumstances by others
who were in the ship at the same time: so that the fact, however
extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.
And on this occasion I cannot but mention, that though I have
endeavoured with my utmost care to adhere strictly to truth in every
article of the ensuing narration, yet I am {6} apprehensive that in so
complicated a work some oversights must have been committed by the
inattention to which at times all mankind are liable. However, I am as
yet conscious of none but literal and insignificant mistakes; and if
there are others more considerable which have escaped me, I flatter
myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material
transaction, and therefore I hope they may justly claim the reader's
indulgence.
After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected,
perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself, but I cannot finish
this Introduction without adding a few reflections on a matter very
nearly connected with the present subject, and, as I conceive, neither
destitute of utility nor unworthy the attention of the public; I mean
the animating my countrymen, both in their public and private stations,
to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and
nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and
commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these
seemingly minute particulars that our ambitious neighbours have
established some part of that power with which we are now struggling:
and as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more
effectually than they can, it would be a dishonour to us longer to
neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much
more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in
very distant nations, either in the protection of our colonies and
commerce, or in assisting our allies against the common enemy, this
gives us frequent opportunities of furnishing ourselves with such kind
of materials as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to
our advantage either in war or peace. Since, not to mention what might
be expected from the officers of the navy, if their application to
these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence
to the government to establish a particular regulation for this
purpose, as all that would be requisite would be constantly to embark
on board some of our men-of-war which are sent on these distant cruises
a person who, with the character of an engineer and the skill and
talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing
such coasts and planning such harbours as the ship should touch at, and
in making such other observations of all kinds as might either prove of
advantage to future {7} navigators, or might any ways tend to promote
the public service. Persons habituated to these operations (which
could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper
business) would be extremely useful in many other lights besides those
already mentioned, and might tend to secure our fleets from those
disgraces with which their attempts against places on shore have been
often attended; and in a nation like ours, where all sciences are more
eagerly and universally pursued and better understood than in any other
part of the world, proper subjects for these employments could not long
be wanting if due encouragement were given to them. This method here
recommended is known to have been frequently practised by the French,
particularly in the instance of Mons. Frazier, an engineer, who has
published a celebrated voyage to the South Seas; for this person, in
the year 1711, was purposely sent by the French king into that country
on board a merchantman, that he might examine and describe the coast,
and take plans of all the fortified places, the better to enable the
French to prosecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them
and the court of Spain, to form their enterprizes in those seas with
more readiness and certainty. Should we pursue this method, we might
hope that the emulation amongst those who are commissioned for these
undertakings, and the experience which even in the most peaceable
intervals they would hereby acquire, might at length procure us a
proper number of able engineers, and might efface the national scandal
which our deficiency in that species of men has sometimes exposed us
to: and surely every step to encourage and improve them is of great
moment to the publick, as no persons, when they are properly
instructed, make better returns in war for the distinctions and
emoluments bestowed on them in time of peace. Of which the advantages
the French have reaped from their dexterity (too numerous and recent to
be soon forgot) are an ample confirmation.
And having mentioned engineers, or such as are skilled in drawing and
the other usual practices of that profession, as the properest persons
to be employed in these foreign enquiries, I cannot (as it offers
itself so naturally to the subject in hand) but lament how very
imperfect many of our accounts of distant countries are rendered by the
relators being unskilled in drawing, and in the general principles of
surveying, {8} even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had
more of our travellers been initiated in these acquirements, and had
there been added thereto some little skill in the common astronomical
observations (all which a person of ordinary talents might attain with
a very moderate share of application), we should by this time have seen
the geography of the globe much correcter than we now find it: the
dangers of navigation would have been considerably lessened, and the
manners, arts, and produce of foreign countries would have been better
known to us than they are. Indeed, when I consider the strong
incitements that all travellers have to pursue some part at least of
these qualifications, especially drawing; when I consider how much it
will facilitate their observations, assist and strengthen their
memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of
description it would rid them, I cannot but wonder that any person who
intends to visit distant countries with a view of informing either
himself or others, should be wanting in so necessary a piece of skill.
And to enforce this argument still further, I must add that besides the
uses of drawing, already mentioned, there is one which, tho' not so
obvious, is yet perhaps of more consequence than all that has been
hitherto urged; I mean the strength and distinguishing power it adds to
some of our faculties. This appears from hence, that those who are
used to draw objects observe them with more accuracy than others who
are not habituated to that practice. For we may easily find by a
little experience, that when we view any object, however simple, our
attention or memory is scarcely at any time so strong as to enable us,
when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every
part it consisted of, and to recall all the circumstances of its
appearance; since on examination it will be discovered that in some we
were mistaken and others we had totally overlooked: but he that is
accustomed to draw what he sees is at the same time accustomed to
rectify this inattention; for by confronting his ideas copied on the
paper with the object he intends to represent, he finds out what
circumstances have deceived him in its appearance, and hence he at
length acquires the habit of observing much more at one view, and
retains what he sees with more correctness than he could ever have done
without his practice and proficiency in drawing.
If what has been said merits the attention of travellers of {9} all
sorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the gentlemen of
the navy; since, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views
of land can be taken, and without these it is sufficiently evident that
navigation is at a full stand. It is doubtless from a persuasion of
the utility of these qualifications that his Majesty has established a
drawing master at Portsmouth for the instruction of those who are
presumed to be hereafter intrusted with the command of his royal navy:
and tho' some have been so far misled as to suppose that the perfection
of sea-officers consisted in a turn of mind and temper resembling the
boisterous element they had to deal with, and have condemned all
literature and science as effeminate and derogatory to that ferocity
which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring
characteristic of courage: yet it is to be hoped that such absurdities
as these have at no time been authorised by the public opinion, and
that the belief of them daily diminishes. If those who adhere to these
mischievous positions were capable of being influenced by reason or
swayed by example, I should think it sufficient for their conviction to
observe that the most valuable drawings made in the following voyage,
though done with such a degree of skill that even professed artists
could with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr. Piercy Brett, one
of Mr. Anson's lieutenants, and since captain of the _Lion_ man-of-war;
who, in his memorable engagement with the _Elizabeth_ (for the
importance of the service, or the resolution with which it was
conducted, inferior to none this age has seen), has given ample proof
that a proficiency in the arts I have been here recommending is
extremely consistent with the most exemplary bravery, and the most
distinguished skill in every function belonging to the duty of a
sea-officer. Indeed, when the many branches of science are attended
to, of which even the common practice of navigation is composed, and
the many improvements which men of skill have added to this practice
within these few years, it would induce one to believe that the
advantages of reflection and speculative knowledge were in no
profession more eminent than in that of a sea-officer; for, not to
mention some expertness in geography, geometry, and astronomy, which it
would be dishonourable for him to be without (as his journal and his
estimate of the daily position of the ship are founded on particular
branches of these {10} arts), it may be well supposed that the
management and working of a ship, the discovery of her most eligible
position in the water (usually stiled her trim), and the disposition of
her sails in the most advantageous manner, are articles wherein the
knowledge of mechanicks cannot but be greatly assistant. And perhaps
the application of this kind of knowledge to naval subjects may produce
as great improvements in sailing and working a ship as it has already
done in many other matters conducive to the ease and convenience of
human life. Since, when the fabric of a ship and the variety of her
sails are considered, together with the artificial contrivances for
adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted but
these things have been brought about by more than ordinary sagacity and
invention; so neither can it be doubted but that in some conjunctures a
speculative and scientific turn of mind may find out the means of
directing and disposing this complicated mechanism much more
advantageously than can be done by mere habit, or by a servile copying
of what others may perhaps have erroneously practised in similar
emergencies. But it is time to finish this digression, and to leave
the reader to the perusal of the ensuing work, which, with how little
art soever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the
subject and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit some
share of the public attention.
{11}
ANSON'S VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
OF THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SQUADRON: THE INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO, FROM
ITS FIRST APPOINTMENT TO ITS SETTING SAIL FROM ST. HELENS
The squadron under the command of Mr. Anson (of which I here propose to
recite the most material proceedings) having undergone many changes in
its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months
between its original appointment and its final sailing from St. Helens;
I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be
made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and
promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have
been entrusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear
that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which
prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of
the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to presage,
were principally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the
commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his
utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.
When, in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen
that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some
considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs,
that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out
of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by
this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of
success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources
{12} of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely
desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of
that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.
In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and
several resolutions were taken by the council. And in all these
deliberations it was from the first determined that George Anson, Esq.,
then captain of the _Centurion_, should be employed as
commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and he at that time
being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so
early as the beginning of September to order him to return with his
ship to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is on the 10th
of November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager
directing him to repair to London, and to attend the Board of
Admiralty: where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles that
two squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret
expeditions, which, however, would have some connexion with each other;
that he, Mr. Anson, was intended to command one of them, and Mr.
Cornwall (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his
country's honour) the other; that the squadron under Mr. Anson was to
take on board three independent companies of a hundred men each, and
Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark
with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as
this squadron could be fitted for the sea, they were to set sail, with
express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java Head in the
East Indies; that there they were only to stop to take in water, and
thence to proceed directly to the city of Manila, situated on Luconia,
one of the Philippine Islands; that the other squadron was to be of
equal force with this commanded by Mr. Anson, and was intended to pass
round Cape Horn, into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and
after cruising upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their
settlements, this squadron in its return was to rendezvous at Manila,
there to join the squadron under Mr. Anson, where they were to refresh
their men, and refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other
considerable enterprizes.
This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but
greatly advance the public service, and the reputation and fortune of
those concerned in its execution; {13} for had Mr. Anson proceeded for
Manila at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he
would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received
any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before
they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or
had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manila might be
well supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless
condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking
out of the war; that is to say, their fortifications neglected, and in
many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by
the mouldring of their carriages; their magazines, whether of military
stores or provision, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and
consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests
in Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive their redress,
drained to the very bottom; this, from the intercepted letters of their
viceroys and governors, it is well known to have been the defenceless
state of Panama, and the other Spanish places on the coast of the South
Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it
cannot be supposed that the city of Manila, removed still farther by
almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced
from the Spanish government a greater share of attention and concern
for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and
Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends.
Indeed, it is well known that Manila was at that time incapable of
making any considerable defence, and in all probability would have
surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The
consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may be in some
measure estimated, from the known healthiness of its air, the
excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its
inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce which it
carries on to the principal ports in the East Indies, and China, and
its exclusive trade to Acapulco, the returns for which, being made in
silver, are, upon the lowest valuation, not less than three millions of
dollars per annum.
On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent that in a few days after
this first conference, that is, on November 18, Mr. Anson received an
order to take under his command the {14} _Argyle_, _Severn_, _Pearl_,
_Wager_, and _Tryal_ sloop; and other orders were issued to him in the
same month, and in the December following, relating to the victualling
of this squadron. But Mr. Anson attending the Admiralty the beginning
of January, he was informed by Sir Charles Wager that for reasons with
which he, Sir Charles, was not acquainted, the expedition to Manila was
laid aside. It may be conceived that Mr. Anson was extremely chagrined
at the losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every
respect, so desirable an enterprize, especially too as he had already,
at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own
accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove
a very long one. However, Sir Charles, to render his disappointment in
some degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the
South Seas was still intended, and that he, Mr. Anson, and his
squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be
employed in that service. And on the 10th of January he received his
commission, appointing him commander-in-chief of the forementioned
squadron, which (the _Argyle_ being in the course of their preparation
changed for the _Gloucester_) was the same he sailed with above eight
months after from St. Helens. On this change of destination, the
equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as
ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was
soon so far advanced that he conceived the ships might be capable of
putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which
he was in daily expectation. And at last, on the 28th of June 1740,
the Duke of Newcastle, principal Secretary of State, delivered to him
his Majesty's instructions, dated January 31, 1739, with an additional
instruction from the Lords Justices, dated June 19, 1740. On the
receipt of these, Mr. Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a
resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that
all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the
musters that his squadron wanted three hundred seamen of their
complement (a deficiency which, with all its assiduity, he had not been
able to get supplied), yet, as Sir Charles Wager informed him, that an
order from the Board of Admiralty was dispatched to Sir John Norris to
spare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being
complied with. But {15} on his arrival at Portsmouth, he found himself
greatly mistaken, and disappointed in this persuasion; for on his
application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, for he
wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very
considerable delay; for it was the end of July before this deficiency
was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely
short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral Balchen, who
succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed
to the westward, instead of three hundred able sailors, which Mr. Anson
wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron a hundred and
seventy men only; of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick
quarter, thirty-seven from the _Salisbury_, with three officers of
Colonel Lowther's regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and these were
all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.
But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been
already observed that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's
regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, should
embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was
now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five
hundred invalids to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea
College. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers who from their
age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching
regiments, Mr. Anson was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepid
detachment allotted him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest
part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of
action, since the delays he had already encountered necessarily
confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the
year. Sir Charles Wager too joined in opinion with the commodore, that
invalids were no ways proper for this service, and sollicited
strenuously to have them exchanged: but he was told that persons who
were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr. Anson,
thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion.
And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on
the 5th of August; but instead of five hundred, there came on board no
more than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and
strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving behind {16} them
only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of
age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed it is difficult to
conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy
veterans: they were themselves extremely averse to the service they
were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were
afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly marked
by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed
with no small degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their
repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their
bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any ways proportioned, and
where, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting
the success of the enterprize, they would, in all probability,
uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this too after
they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their
country's service.
I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely
unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to
the expedition they were employed in, that amongst all the
out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, which were supposed to amount to
two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out
for so laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known
that however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet
by a prudent choice there might have been found amongst them five
hundred men who had some remains of vigour left: and Mr. Anson fully
expected that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas
the whole detachment that was sent to him seemed to be made up of the
most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the
whole body; and by the desertion above-mentioned, these were a second
time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found
amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for
an infirmary than for any military duty.
And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the
equipment of this squadron. It was proposed to Mr. Anson, after it was
resolved that he should be sent to the South Seas, to take with him two
persons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Those who were
mentioned for this employment had formerly been in the Spanish {17}
West Indies, in the South Sea Company's service, and it was supposed
that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast they might often
procure provisions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was
not to be got by force of arms: these agent victuallers were, for this
purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of £15,000 in merchandize
on board the squadron; for they had represented that it would be much
easier for them to procure provisions with goods than with the value of
the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme,
it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not
principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the
beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr.
Anson from the beginning objected both to the appointment of agent
victuallers and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the
squadron: for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the
squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for
any provisions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coast, he did not
imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should
want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military
operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views
of their trading projects. All that he thought the government ought to
have done on this occasion was to put on board to the value of £2000 or
£3000 only of such goods as the Indians or the Spanish planters in the
less cultivated part of the coast might be tempted with; since it was
in such places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck
with the enemy for provisions: and in these places it was sufficiently
evident a very small cargo would suffice.
But though the commodore objected both to the appointment of these
officers and to their project, of the success of which he had no
opinion; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides
victualling their squadron, might contribute to settling a trade upon
that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty,
and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they
were much listened to by some considerable persons: and of the £15,000
which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to
advance them 10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining 5000 they raised on
bottomry bonds; and {18} the goods purchased by this sum were all that
were taken to sea by the squadron, how much soever the amount of them
might be afterwards magnified by common report.
This cargo was at first shipped on board the _Wager_ storeship, and one
of the victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the
men-of-war. But when the commodore was at St. Catherine's, he
considered that in case the squadron should be separated, it might be
pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for
want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he distributed some of the
least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder
principally on board the _Wager_, where it was lost; and more of the
goods perishing by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no
part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home
to England did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the
original price. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of
this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly
productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at
Portsmouth.
To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had
deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two
hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments. These were
raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely
anything more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them
having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last
detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of August, and on the
10th the squadron sailed from Spithead to St. Helens, there to wait for
a wind to proceed on the expedition.
But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their
influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year when the
westerly winds are usually very constant, and very violent; and it was
thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet
commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart.
As we made up in all twenty-one men-of-war, and a hundred and
twenty-four sail of merchant-men and transports, we had no hopes of
getting out of the Channel with so large a number of ships without the
continuance of a fair wind for some considerable time. This was what
we had every day {19} less and less reason to expect, as the time of
the equinox drew near; so that our golden dreams and our ideal
possession of the Peruvian treasures grew each day more faint, and the
difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape Horn in the winter
season filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days
from our arrival at St. Helens, to our final departure from thence: and
even then (having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart) we tided it
down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days
was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and
being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than
have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind
coming fair for the first time, on the 23d of August, we got under
sail, and Mr. Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have
proceeded to sea, but the wind soon returning to its old quarter
obliged us to put back to St. Helens, not without considerable hazard,
and some damage received by two of the transports, who, in tacking, ran
foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts
to sail, but without any better success. And, on the 6th of September,
being returned to an anchor at St. Helens, after one of these fruitless
efforts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet struck their yards
and topmasts to prevent driving: yet, notwithstanding this precaution,
the _Centurion_ drove the next evening, and brought both cables ahead,
and we were in no small danger of driving foul of the _Prince
Frederick_, a seventy gun ship, moored at a small distance under our
stern; though we happily escaped, by her driving at the same time, and
so preserving her distance: but we did not think ourselves secure till
we at last let go the sheet-anchor, which fortunately brought us up.
However, on the 9th of September, we were in some degree relieved from
this lingring vexatious situation, by an order which Mr. Anson received
from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his
own squadron only, if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus
freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our commodore
resolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, as soon as the weather
should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been
done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders
of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually
complied with, {20} and had we met with none of those other delays
mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy
departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr.
Anson received on the 12th of September; for by that he was required to
take under his convoy the _St. Albans_, with the Turky fleet, and to
join the _Dragon_ and the _Winchester_, with the Streights and the
American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea
as far as their way and ours lay together. This incumbrance of a
convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means
of lengthening our passage to the Maderas. However, Mr. Anson, now
having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former
determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate
weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little
loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that
the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in a readiness
to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of
September, he weighed from St. Helens; and though the wind was at first
contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four
days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter.
Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of
this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this
expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January,
from what it had in the latter end of September, when it left the
Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of
its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place
in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary
seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the commodore
was at first promised) and having our numbers compleated to their full
complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very
indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was
no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board a hundred and
seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from
hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And
in the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more
disadvantageous; for there, instead of three independent companies of a
hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, {21} which was an old
one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one
part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the
other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the
diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest
inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests,
representations, and difficulties which they continually produced (as
we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty
was not always submitted to) occasioned a delay and waste of time, which
in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this
enterprise was afterwards exposed: for by this means we were obliged to
make our passage round Cape Horn in the most tempestuous season of the
year; whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of
numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction.
By this delay, too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs,
that a person who had been employed in the South Sea Company's service,
and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth,
was able to relate to Mr. Anson most of the particulars of the
destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learnt
amongst the Spaniards before he left them. And this was afterwards
confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance: For we shall find that,
when the Spaniards (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended
for the South Seas) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had
so far got the start of us, as to arrive before us off the island of
Madera, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the
form and make of Mr. Anson's broad pendant, and had imitated it so
exactly, that he thereby decoyed the _Pearl_, one of our squadron,
within gun-shot of him, before the captain of the _Pearl_ was able to
discover his mistake.
{22}
CHAPTER II
THE PASSAGE FROM ST. HELENS TO THE ISLAND OF MADERA; WITH A SHORT
ACCOUNT OF THAT ISLAND, AND OF OUR STAY THERE
On the 18th of September 1740, the squadron, as we have observed in the
preceding chapter, weighed from St. Helens with a contrary wind, the
commodore proposing to tide it down the Channel, as he dreaded less the
inconveniences he should thereby have to struggle with, than the risk
he should run of ruining the enterprise by an uncertain, and, in all
probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind.
The squadron allotted to this service consisted of five men-of-war, a
sloop of war and two victualling ships. They were the _Centurion_ of
sixty guns, four hundred men, George Anson, Esq., commander; the
_Gloucester_ of fifty guns, three hundred men, Richard Norris,
commander; the _Severn_ of fifty guns, three hundred men, the
Honourable Edward Legg, commander; the _Pearl_ of forty guns, two
hundred and fifty men, Matthew Mitchel, commander; the _Wager_ of
twenty-eight guns, one hundred and sixty men, Dandy Kidd, commander;
and the _Tryal_ sloop of eight guns, one hundred men, the Honourable
John Murray, commander; the two victuallers were pinks, the largest of
about four hundred, and the other of about two hundred tons burthen.
These were to attend us till the provisions we had taken on board were
so far consumed as to make room for the additional quantity they
carried with them, which, when we had taken into our ships, they were
to be discharged. Besides the complement of men borne by the
above-mentioned ships as their crews, there were embarked on board the
squadron about four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, under the
denomination of land forces (as has been particularly mentioned in the
preceding chapter) which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Cracherode. With this squadron, together with the _St. Albans_ and the
_Lark_, and the trade {23} under their convoy, Mr. Anson, after
weighing from St. Helen's, tided it down the Channel for the first
forty-eight hours; and, on the 20th, in the morning, we discovered off
the Ram Head the _Dragon_, _Winchester_, _South Sea Castle_, and _Rye_,
with a number of merchantmen under their convoy. These we joined about
noon the same day, our commodore having orders to see them (together
with the _St. Albans_ and _Lark_) as far into the sea as their course
and ours lay together. When we came in sight of this last mentioned
fleet, Mr. Anson first hoisted his broad pennant, and was saluted by
all the men-of-war in company.
When we had joined this last convoy, we made up eleven men-of-war, and
about one hundred and fifty sail of merchantmen, consisting of the
Turky, the Streights, and the American trade. Mr. Anson, the same day,
made a signal for all the captains of the men-of-war to come on board
him, where he delivered them their fighting and sailing instructions,
and then, with a fair wind, we all stood towards the south-west; and
the next day at noon, being the 21st, we had run forty leagues from the
Ram Head. Being now clear of the land, our commodore, to render our
view more extensive, ordered Captain Mitchel, in the _Pearl_, to make
sail two leagues ahead of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his
station every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the
_Winchester_ and the American convoy made the concerted signal for
leave to separate, which being answered by the commodore, they left us:
as the _St. Albans_ and the _Dragon_, with the Turkey and Streights
convoy, did on the 29th. After which separation, there remained in
company only our own squadron and our two victuallers, with which we
kept on our course for the island of Madera. But the winds were so
contrary that we had the mortification to be forty days in our passage
thither from St. Helens, though it is known to be often done in ten or
twelve. This delay was a most unpleasing circumstance, productive of
much discontent and ill-humour amongst our people, of which those only
can have a tolerable idea who have had the experience of a like
situation. For besides the peevishness and despondency which foul and
contrary winds and a lingring voyage never fail to create on all
occasions, we, in particular, had very substantial reasons to be
greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment. Since as we had
departed {24} from England much later than we ought to have done, we
had placed almost all our hopes of success in the chance of retrieving
in some measure at sea the time we had so unhappily wasted at Spithead
and St. Helens. However, at last, on Monday, October the 25th, at five
in the morning, we, to our great joy, made the land, and in the
afternoon came to an anchor in Madera Road, in forty fathom water; the
Brazen Head bearing from us E. by S. the Loo N.N.W. and great church
N.N.E. We had hardly let go our anchor when an English privateer sloop
ran under our stern and saluted the commodore with nine guns, which we
returned with five. And, the next day, the consul of the island
visiting the commodore, we saluted him with nine guns on his coming on
board.
This island of Madera, where we are now arrived, is famous through all
our American settlements for its excellent wines, which seem to be
designed by Providence for the refreshment of the inhabitants of the
torrid zone. It is situated in a fine climate, in the latitude of 32°
27' north; and in the longitude from London (by our different
reckonings) of 18-½° to 19-½° west, though laid down in the charts in
17°. It is composed of one continued hill, of a considerable height,
extending itself from east to west: the declivity of which, on the
south side, is cultivated and interspersed with vineyards: and in the
midst of this slope the merchants have fixed their country seats, which
help to form a very agreeable prospect. There is but one considerable
town in the whole island; it is named Fonchiale, and is seated on the
south part of the island, at the bottom of a large bay. Towards the
sea, it is defended by a high wall, with a battery of cannon, besides a
castle on the Loo, which is a rock standing in the water at a small
distance from the shore. Fonchiale is the only place of trade, and
indeed the only place where it is possible for a boat to land. And
even here the beach is covered with large stones, and a violent surf
continually beats upon it; so that the commodore did not care to
venture the ships' long-boats to fetch the water off, there was so much
danger of their being lost; and therefore ordered the captains of the
squadron to employ Portuguese boats on that service.
We continued about a week at this island, watering our ships, and
providing the squadron with wine and other refreshments. Here on the
3d of November, Captain Richard {25} Norris signified by a letter to
the commodore, his desire to quit his command on board the _Gloucester_
in order to return to England for the recovery of his health. This
request the commodore complied with; and thereupon was pleased to
appoint Captain Matthew Mitchel to command the _Gloucester_ in his
room, and to remove Captain Kidd from the _Wager_ to the _Pearl_, and
Captain Murray from the _Tryal_ sloop to the _Wager_, giving command of
the _Tryal_ to Lieutenant Cheap. These promotions being settled, with
other changes in the lieutenancies, the commodore, on the following
day, gave to the captains their orders, appointing St. Jago, one of the
Cape de Verd Islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of
separation; and directing them, if they did not meet the _Centurion_
there, to make the best of their way to the island of St. Catherine's,
on the coast of Brazil. The water for the squadron being the same day
compleated, and each ship supplied with as much wine and other
refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon,
and took our leave of the island of Madera. But before I go on with
the narration of our own transactions, I think it necessary to give
some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they
had taken to render all our designs abortive.
When Mr. Anson visited the governor of Madera, he received information
from him that for three or four days, in the latter end of October,
there had appeared to the westward of that island, seven or eight ships
of the line, and a patache, which last was sent every day close in to
make the land. The governor assured the commodore, upon his honour,
that none upon the island had either given them intelligence, or had in
any sort communicated with them, but that he believed them to be either
French or Spanish, but was rather inclined to think them Spanish. On
this intelligence Mr. Anson sent an officer in a clean sloop, eight
leagues to the westward, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to
discover what they were: but the officer returned without being able to
get a sight of them, so that we still remained in uncertainty.
However, we could not but conjecture that this fleet was intended to
put a stop to our expedition, which, had they cruised to the eastward
of the island instead of the westward, they could not but have executed
with great facility. For as, in that case, they must have certainly
{26} fallen in with us, we should have been obliged to throw overboard
vast quantities of provision to clear our ships for an engagement; and
this alone, without any regard to the event of the action, would have
effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure that
we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them
from pursuing it. And we therefore supposed that this French or
Spanish squadron was sent out, upon advice of our sailing in company
with Admiral Balchen and Lord Cathcart's expedition: and thence, from
an apprehension of being overmatched, they might not think it
adviseable to meet with us till we had parted company, which they might
judge would not happen before our arrival at this island. These were
our speculations at that time, and from hence we had reason to suppose
that we might still fall in with them in our way to the Cape de Verd
Islands. We afterwards, in the course of our expedition, were
persuaded that this was the Spanish squadron, commanded by Don Joseph
Pizarro, which was sent out purposely to traverse the views and
enterprizes of our squadron, to which in strength they were greatly
superior. As this Spanish armament then was so nearly connected with
our expedition, and as the catastrophe it underwent, though not
effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation,
produced in consequence of our equipment, I have, in the following
chapter, given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first
setting out from Spain in the year 1740, till the _Asia_, the only ship
of the whole squadron which returned to Europe, arrived at the Groyne
in the beginning of the year 1746.
{27}
CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON COMMANDED BY DON JOSEPH PIZARRO
The squadron fitted out by the court of Spain to attend our motions,
and traverse our projects, we supposed to have been the ships seen off
Madera, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. As this force was sent
out particularly against our expedition, I cannot but imagine that the
following history of the casualties it met with, as far as by
intercepted letters and other information the same has come to my
knowledge, is a very essential part of the present work. For hence it
will appear that we were the occasion that a considerable part of the
naval power of Spain was diverted from the prosecution of the ambitious
views of that court in Europe. And whatever men and ships were lost by
the enemy in this undertaking, were lost in consequence of the
precautions they took to secure themselves against our enterprizes.
This squadron (besides two ships intended for the West Indies, which
did not part company till after they had left the Maderas) was composed
of the following men-of-war, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro:--
The _Asia_ of sixty-six guns, and seven hundred men; this was the
admiral's ship.
The _Guipuscoa_ of seventy-four guns, and seven hundred men.
The _Hermiona_ of fifty-four guns, and five hundred men.
The _Esperanza_ of fifty guns, and four hundred and fifty men.
The _St. Estevan_ of forty guns, and three hundred and fifty men.
And a patache of twenty guns.
These ships, over and above their complement of sailors and marines,
had on board an old Spanish regiment of foot, {28} intended to
reinforce the garisons on the coast of the South Seas. When this fleet
had cruised for some days to the leeward of the Maderas, as is
mentioned in the preceding chapter, they left that station in the
beginning of November, and steered for the river of Plate, where they
arrived the 5th of January, O.S., and coming to an anchor in the bay of
Maldonado, at the mouth of that river, their admiral Pizarro sent
immediately to Buenos Ayres for a supply of provisions; for they had
departed from Spain with only four months' provisions on board. While
they lay here expecting this supply, they received intelligence, by the
treachery of the Portuguese governor of St. Catherine's, of Mr. Anson's
having arrived at that island on the 21st of December preceding, and of
his preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. Pizarro,
notwithstanding his superior force, had his reasons (and as some say,
his orders, likewise) for avoiding our squadron anywhere short of the
South Seas. He was besides extremely desirous of getting round Cape
Horn before us, as he imagined that step alone would effectually baffle
all our designs; and therefore, on hearing that we were in his
neighbourhood, and that we should soon be ready to proceed for Cape
Horn, he weighed anchor with the five large ships (the patache being
disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her), after a stay of
seventeen days only, and got under sail without his provisions, which
arrived at Maldonado within a day or two after his departure. But
notwithstanding the precipitation with which he departed, we put to sea
from St. Catherine's four days before him, and in some part of our
passage to Cape Horn the two squadrons were so near together that the
_Pearl_, one of our ships, being separated from the rest, fell in with
the Spanish fleet, and mistaking the _Asia_ for the _Centurion_, had
got within gun-shot of Pizarro before she discovered her error, and
narrowly escaped being taken.
It being the 22d of January when the Spaniards weighed from Maldonado
(as has been already mentioned), they could not expect to get into the
latitude of Cape Horn before the equinox; and as they had reason to
apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling it at that season, and
as the Spanish sailors, being for the most part accustomed to a fair
weather country, might be expected to be very averse to so dangerous
and fatiguing a navigation, the better to {29} encourage them, some
part of their pay was advanced to them in European goods, which they
were to be permitted to dispose of in the South Seas, that so the hopes
of the great profit each man was to make on his venture might animate
him in his duty, and render him less disposed to repine at the labour,
the hardships, and the perils he would in all probability meet with
before his arrival on the coast of Peru.
Pizarro with his squadron having, towards the latter end of February,
run the length of Cape Horn, he then stood to the westward, in order to
double it; but in the night of the last day of February, O.S., while
with this view they were turning to windward, the _Guipuscoa_, the
_Hermiona_, and the _Esperanza_ were separated from the admiral; and,
on the 6th of March following, the _Guipuscoa_ was separated from the
other two; and, on the 7th (being the day after we had passed Streights
le Maire), there came on a most furious storm at N.W. which, in
despight of all their efforts, drove the whole squadron to the
eastward, and after several fruitless attempts, obliged them to bear
away for the river of Plate, where Pizarro in the _Asia_ arrived about
the middle of May, and a few days after him the _Esperanza_ and the
_Estevan_. The _Hermiona_ was supposed to founder at sea, for she was
never heard of more; and the _Guipuscoa_ was run on shore and sunk on
the coast of Brazil. The calamities of all kinds which this squadron
underwent in this unsuccessful navigation can only be paralleled by
what we ourselves experienced in the same climate, when buffeted by the
same storms. There was indeed some diversity in our distresses, which
rendered it difficult to decide whose situation was most worthy of
commiseration. For to all the misfortunes we had in common with each
other, as shattered rigging, leaky ships, and the fatigues and
despondency which necessarily attend these disasters, there was
superadded on board our squadron the ravage of a most destructive and
incurable disease, and on board the Spanish squadron the devastation of
famine.
For this squadron, either from the hurry of their outset, their
presumption of a supply at Buenos Ayres, or from other less obvious
motives, departed from Spain, as has been already observed, with no
more than four months' provision on board, and even that, as it is
said, at short allowance only; so that, when by the storms they met
with off Cape Horn {30} their continuance at sea was prolonged a month
or more beyond their expectation, they were reduced to such infinite
distress, that rats, when they could be caught, were sold for four
dollars apiece; and a sailor who died on board had his death concealed
for some days by his brother, who during that time lay in the same
hammock with the corpse, only to receive the dead man's allowance of
provisions. In this dreadful situation they were alarmed (if their
horrors were capable of augmentation) by the discovery of a conspiracy
among the marines on board the _Asia_, the admiral's ship. This had
taken its rise chiefly from the miseries they endured: for though no
less was proposed by the conspirators than the massacring the officers
and the whole crew, yet their motive for this bloody resolution seemed
to be no more than their desire of relieving their hunger by
appropriating the whole ship's provisions to themselves. But their
designs were prevented, when just upon the point of execution, by means
of one of their confessors; and three of their ringleaders were
immediately put to death. However, though the conspiracy was
suppressed, their other calamities admitted of no alleviation, but grew
each day more and more destructive. So that by the complicated
distress of fatigue, sickness, and hunger, the three ships which
escaped lost the greatest part of their men. The _Asia_, their
admiral's ship, arrived at Monte Vedio, in the river of Plate, with
half her crew only; the _St. Estevan_ had lost, in like manner, half
her hands when she anchored in the bay of Barragan; the _Esperanza_, a
fifty-gun ship, was still more unfortunate; for of four hundred and
fifty hands which she brought from Spain, only fifty-eight remained
alive, and the whole regiment of foot perished except sixty men. But
to give the reader a more distinct and particular idea of what they
underwent upon this occasion, I shall lay before him a short account of
the fate of the _Guipuscoa_, extracted from a letter written by Don
Joseph Mendinuetta, her captain, to a person of distinction at Lima, a
copy of which fell into our hands afterwards in the South Seas.
He mentions that he separated from the _Hermiona_ and the _Esperanza_
in a fog on the 6th of March, being then, as I suppose, to the S.E. of
Staten-land, and plying to the westward; that in the night after it
blew a furious storm at N.W. which, at half an hour after ten, split
his main-sail, and {31} obliged him to bear away with his fore-sail;
that the ship went ten knots an hour with a prodigious sea, and often
run her gangway under water; that he likewise sprung his mainmast; and
the ship made so much water, that with four pumps and bailing he could
not free her. That on the 9th it was calm, but the sea continued so
high that the ship in rolling opened all her upper works and seams, and
started the butt ends of her planking, and the greatest part of her top
timbers, the bolts being drawn by the violence of her roll: that in
this condition, with other additional disasters to the hull and
rigging, they continued beating to the westward till the 12th: that
they were then in sixty degrees of south latitude, in great want of
provisions, numbers every day perishing by the fatigue of pumping, and
those who survived being quite dispirited by labour, hunger, and the
severity of the weather, they having two spans of snow upon the decks:
that then finding the wind fixed in the western quarter, and blowing
strong, and consequently their passage to the westward impossible, they
resolved to bear away for the river of Plate: that on the 22d they were
obliged to throw overboard all the upper-deck guns and an anchor, and
to take six turns of the cable round the ship to prevent her opening:
that on the 4th of April, it being calm, but a very high sea, the ship
rolled so much that the main-mast came by the board, and in a few hours
after she lost, in like manner, her fore-mast and her mizen-mast: and
that, to accumulate their misfortunes, they were soon obliged to cut
away their bowsprit, to diminish, if possible, the leakage at her head;
that by this time he had lost two hundred and fifty men by hunger and
fatigue; for those who were capable of working at the pumps (at which
every officer without exception took his turn) were allowed only an
ounce and half of biscuit per diem; and those who were so sick or so
weak that they could not assist in this necessary labour, had no more
than an ounce of wheat; so that it was common for the men to fall down
dead at the pumps: that, including the officers, they could only muster
from eighty to a hundred persons capable of duty: that the south-west
winds blew so fresh after they had lost their masts, that they could
not immediately set up jury-masts, but were obliged to drive like a
wreck, between the latitudes of 32 and 28, till the 24th of April, when
they made the coast of Brazil at Rio de Patas, ten leagues to the
southward of the {32} island of St. Catherine's; that here they came to
an anchor, and that the captain was very desirous of proceeding to St.
Catherine's, if possible, in order to save the hull of the ship, and
the guns and stores on board her; but the crew instantly left off
pumping, and being enraged at the hardships they had suffered, and the
numbers they had lost (there being at that time no less than thirty
dead bodies lying on the deck), they all with one voice cried out, "On
shore, on shore!" and obliged the captain to run the ship in directly
for the land, where, the 5th day after, she sunk with her stores and
all her furniture on board her; but the remainder of the crew, whom
hunger and fatigue had spared, to the number of four hundred, got safe
on shore.
From this account of the adventures and catastrophe of the _Guipuscoa_
we may form some conjecture of the manner in which the _Hermiona_ was
lost, and of the distresses endured by the three remaining ships of the
squadron, which got into the river of Plate. These last being in great
want of masts, yards, rigging, and all kinds of naval stores, and
having no supply at Buenos Ayres, nor in any of their neighbouring
settlements, Pizarro dispatched an advice-boat with a letter of credit
to Rio Janeiro, to purchase what was wanting from the Portuguese. He,
at the same time, sent an express across the continent to St. Jago in
Chili, to be thence forwarded to the Viceroy of Peru, informing him of
the disasters that had befallen his squadron, and desiring a remittance
of 200,000 dollars from the royal chests at Lima, to enable him to
victual and refit his remaining ships, that he might be again in a
condition to attempt the passage to the South Seas, as soon as the
season of the year should be more favourable. It is mentioned by the
Spaniards as a most extraordinary circumstance that the Indian charged
with this express (though it was then the depth of winter, when the
Cordilleras are esteemed impassable on account of the snow) was only
thirteen days in his journey from Buenos Ayres to St. Jago in Chili,
though these places are distant three hundred Spanish leagues, near
forty of which are amongst the snows and precipices of the Cordilleras.
The return to this dispatch of Pizarro's from the Viceroy of Peru was
no ways favourable; instead of 200,000 dollars, the sum demanded, the
viceroy remitted him only 100,000, telling him that it was with great
difficulty he was able to {33} procure him even that: though the
inhabitants of Lima, who considered the presence of Pizarro as
absolutely necessary to their security, were much discontented at this
procedure, and did not fail to assert that it was not the want of
money, but the interested views of some of the viceroy's confidents,
that prevented Pizarro from having the whole sum he had asked for.
The advice-boat sent to Rio Janeiro also executed her commission but
imperfectly; for though she brought back a considerable quantity of
pitch, tar, and cordage, yet she could not procure either masts or
yards: and, as an additional misfortune, Pizarro was disappointed of
some masts he expected from Paragua; for a carpenter, whom he had
entrusted with a large sum of money, and had sent there to cut masts,
instead of prosecuting the business he was employed in, had married in
the country, and refused to return. However, by removing the masts of
the _Esperanza_ into the _Asia_, and making use of what spare masts and
yards they had on board, they made a shift to refit the _Asia_ and the
_St. Estevan_. And in the October following, Pizarro was preparing to
put to sea with these two ships, in order to attempt the passage round
Cape Horn a second time, but the _St. Estevan_, in coming down the
river Plate, ran on a shoal, and beat off her rudder, on which and
other damages she received she was condemned and broke up, and Pizarro
in the _Asia_ proceeded to sea without her. Having now the summer
before him, and the winds favourable, no doubt was made of his having a
fortunate and speedy passage; but being off Cape Horn, and going right
before the wind in very moderate weather, though in a swelling sea, by
some misconduct of the officer of the watch, the ship rolled away her
masts, and was a second time obliged to put back to the river of Plate
in great distress.
The _Asia_ having considerably suffered in this second unfortunate
expedition, the _Esperanza_, which had been left behind at Monte Vedio,
was ordered to be refitted, and the command of her being given to
Mindinuetta, who was captain of the _Guipuscoa_ when she was lost; he,
in the November of the succeeding year, that is, in November 1742,
sailed from the river of Plate for the South Seas, and arrived safe on
the coast of Chili, where his commodore, Pizarro, passing overland from
Buenos Ayres, met him. There were great animosities and contests
between these two gentlemen {34} at their meeting, occasioned
principally by the claim of Pizarro to command the _Esperanza_, which
Mindinuetta had brought round; for Mindinuetta refused to deliver her
up to him, insisting that, as he came into the South Seas alone and
under no superior, it was not now in the power of Pizarro to resume
that authority which he had once parted with. However, the President
of Chili interposing, and declaring for Pizarro, Mindinuetta, after a
long and obstinate struggle, was obliged to submit.
But Pizarro had not yet compleated the series of his adventures, for
when he and Mindinuetta came back by land from Chili to Buenos Ayres,
in the year 1745, they found at Monte Vedio the _Asia_, which near
three years before they had left there.
This ship they resolved, if possible, to carry to Europe; and with this
view they refitted her in the best manner they could; but their great
difficulty was to procure a sufficient number of hands to navigate her,
for all the remaining sailors of the squadron to be met with in the
neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres did not amount to a hundred men. They
endeavoured to supply this defect by pressing many of the inhabitants
of Buenos Ayres, and putting on board besides all the English prisoners
then in their custody, together with a number of Portuguese smugglers
which they had taken at different times, and some of the Indians of the
country. Among these last there was a chief and ten of his followers
which had been surprised by a party of Spanish soldiers about three
months before. The name of this chief was Orellana; he belonged to a
very powerful tribe which had committed great ravages in the
neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres. With this motley crew (all of them,
except the European Spaniards, extremely averse to the voyage) Pizarro
set sail from Monte Vedio in the river of Plate, about the beginning of
November 1745; and the native Spaniards, being no strangers to the
dissatisfaction of their forced men, treated both those, the English
prisoners, and the Indians, with great insolence and barbarity, but
more particularly the Indians, for it was common for the meanest
officers in the ship to beat them most cruelly on the slightest
pretences, and oftentimes only to exert their superiority. Orellana
and his followers, though in appearance sufficiently patient and
submissive, meditated a severe revenge for all these inhumanities. As
he conversed {35} very well in Spanish (these Indians having, in time
of peace, a great intercourse with Buenos Ayres) he affected to talk
with such of the English as understood that language, and seemed very
desirous of being informed how many Englishmen there were on board, and
which they were. As he knew that the English were as much enemies to
the Spaniards as himself, he had doubtless an intention of disclosing
his purposes to them, and making them partners in the scheme he had
projected for revenging his wrongs, and recovering his liberty; but
having sounded them at a distance, and not finding them so precipitate
and vindictive as he expected, he proceeded no further with them, but
resolved to trust alone to the resolution of his ten faithful
followers. These, it should seem, readily engaged to observe his
directions, and to execute whatever commands he gave them; and having
agreed on the measures necessary to be taken, they first furnished
themselves with Dutch knives sharp at the point, which being common
knives used in the ship, they found no difficulty in procuring: besides
this, they employed their leisure in secretly cutting out thongs from
raw hides, of which there were great numbers on board, and in fixing to
each end of these thongs the double-headed shot of the small
quarter-deck guns; this, when swung round their heads, according to the
practice of their country, was a most mischievous weapon, in the use of
which the Indians about Buenos Ayres are trained from their infancy,
and consequently are extremely expert. These particulars being in good
forwardness, the execution of their scheme was perhaps precipitated by
a particular outrage committed on Orellana himself. For one of the
officers, who was a very brutal fellow, ordered Orellana aloft, which
being what he was incapable of performing, the officer, under pretence
of his disobedience, beat him with such violence, that he left him
bleeding on the deck, and stupified for some time with his bruises and
wounds. This usage undoubtedly heightened his thirst for revenge, and
made him eager and impatient, till the means of executing it were in
his power; so that within a day or two after this incident, he and his
followers opened their desperate resolves in the ensuing manner.
It was about nine in the evening, when many of the principal officers
were on the quarter-deck, indulging in the freshness of the night air;
the waste of the ship was filled {36} with live cattle, and the
forecastle was manned with its customary watch. Orellana and his
companions, under cover of the night, having prepared their weapons,
and thrown off their trousers and the more cumbrous part of their
dress, came all together on the quarter-deck, and drew towards the door
of the great cabin. The boatswain immediately reprimanded them and
ordered them to be gone. On this Orellana spoke to his followers in
his native language, when four of them drew off, two towards each
gangway, and the chief and the six remaining Indians seemed to be
slowly quitting the quarter-deck. When the detached Indians had taken
possession of the gangway, Orellana placed his hands hollow to his
mouth, and bellowed out the war-cry used by those savages, which is
said to be the harshest and most terrifying sound known in nature.
This hideous yell was the signal for beginning the massacre: For on
this they all drew their knives, and brandished their prepared
double-headed shot; and the six with their chief, which remained on the
quarter-deck, immediately fell on the Spaniards who were intermingled
with them, and laid near forty of them at their feet, of which above
twenty were killed on the spot, and the rest disabled. Many of the
officers, in the beginning of the tumult, pushed into the great cabin,
where they put out the lights, and barricadoed the door; whilst of the
others, who had avoided the first fury of the Indians, some endeavoured
to escape along the gangways into the forecastle, where the Indians,
placed on purpose, stabbed the greatest part of them, as they attempted
to pass by, or forced them off the gangways into the waste: some threw
themselves voluntarily over the barricadoes into the waste, and thought
themselves fortunate to lie concealed amongst the cattle. But the
greatest part escaped up the main shrouds, and sheltered themselves
either in the tops or rigging. And though the Indians attacked only
the quarter-deck, yet the watch in the forecastle finding their
communication cut off, and being terrified by the wounds of the few,
who, not being killed on the spot, had strength sufficient to force
their passage, and not knowing either who their enemies were, or what
were their numbers, they likewise gave all over for lost, and in great
confusion ran up into the rigging of the foremast and bowsprit.
Thus these eleven Indians, with a resolution perhaps without example,
possessed themselves almost in an instant {37} of the quarter-deck of a
ship mounting sixty-six guns, and mann'd with near five hundred hands,
and continued in peaceable possession of this post a considerable time.
For the officers in the great cabbin (amongst whom were Pizarro and
Mindinuetta), the crew between decks, and those who had escaped into
the tops and rigging, were only anxious for their own safety, and were
for a long time incapable of forming any project for suppressing the
insurrection, and recovering the possession of the ship. It is true,
the yells of the Indians, the groans of the wounded, and the confused
clamours of the crew, all heightened by the obscurity of the night, had
at first greatly magnified their danger, and had filled them with the
imaginary terrors, which darkness, disorder, and an ignorance of the
real strength of an enemy never fail to produce. For as the Spaniards
were sensible of the disaffection of their prest hands, and were also
conscious of their barbarity to their prisoners, they imagined the
conspiracy was general, and considered their own destruction as
infallible; so that, it is said, some of them had once taken the
resolution of leaping into the sea, but were prevented by their
companions.
However, when the Indians had entirely cleared the quarter-deck, the
tumult in a great measure subsided, for those who had escaped were kept
silent by their fears, and the Indians were incapable of pursuing them
to renew the disorder. Orellana, when he saw himself master of the
quarter-deck, broke open the arm chest, which, on a slight suspicion of
mutiny, had been ordered there a few days before, as to a place of the
greatest security. Here he took it for granted he should find
cutlasses sufficient for himself and his companions, in the use of
which weapon they were all extremely skilful, and with these, it was
imagined, they proposed to have forced the great cabbin. But on
opening the chest, there appeared nothing but fire-arms, which to them
were of no use. There were indeed cutlasses in the chest, but they
were hid by the fire-arms being laid over them. This was a sensible
disappointment to them, and by this time Pizarro and his companions in
the great cabbin were capable of conversing aloud through the cabbin
windows and port-holes with those in the gun-room and between decks,
and from thence they learnt that the English (whom they principally
suspected) were all safe below, and had not {38} intermeddled in this
mutiny; and by other particulars they at last discovered that none were
concerned in it but Orellana and his people. On this Pizarro and the
officers resolved to attack them on the quarter-deck, before any of the
discontented on board should so far recover their first surprize, as to
reflect on the facility and certainty of seizing the ship by a junction
with the Indians in the present emergency. With this view Pizarro got
together what arms were in the cabbin, and distributed them to those
who were with him. But there were no other fire-arms to be met with
but pistols, and for these they had neither powder nor ball. However,
having now settled a correspondence with the gun-room, they lowered
down a bucket out of the cabbin window, into which the gunner, out of
one of the gun-room ports, put a quantity of pistol-cartridges. When
they had thus procured ammunition, and had loaded their pistols, they
set the cabbin door partly open, and fired several shots amongst the
Indians on the quarter-deck, though at first without effect. But at
last Mindinuetta, whom we have often mentioned, had the good fortune to
shoot Orellona dead on the spot; on which his faithful companions,
abandoning all thoughts of farther resistance, instantly leaped into
the sea, where they every man perished. Thus was this insurrection
quelled, and the possession of the quarter-deck regained, after it had
been full two hours in the power of this great and daring chief, and
his gallant unhappy countrymen.
Pizarro having escaped this imminent peril, steered for Europe, and
arrived safe on the coast of Gallicia, in the beginning of the year
1746, after having been absent between four and five years, and having,
by his attendance on our expedition, diminished the naval power of
Spain by above three thousand hands (the flower of their sailors), and
by four considerable ships of war and a patache. For we have seen that
the _Hermiona_ foundered at sea; the _Guipuscoa_ was stranded, and sunk
on the coast of Brazil; the _St. Estevan_ was condemned, and broke up
in the river of Plate; and the _Esperanza_, being left in the South
Seas, is doubtless by this time incapable of returning to Spain. So
that the _Asia_, only, with less than one hundred hands, may be
regarded as all the remains of that squadron with which Pizarro first
put to sea. And whoever considers the very large proportion, which
this squadron bore to the whole navy of Spain, will, I believe, {39}
confess, that, had our undertaking been attended with no other
advantages than that of ruining so great a part of the sea force of so
dangerous an enemy, this alone would be a sufficient equivalent for our
equipment, and an incontestable proof of the service which the nation
has thence received. Having thus concluded this summary of Pizarro's
adventures, I shall now return again to the narration of our own
transactions.
{40}
CHAPTER IV
FROM MADERA TO ST. CATHERINE'S
I have already mentioned, that on the 3d of November we weighed from
Madera, after orders had been given to the captains to rendezvous at
St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd Islands, in case the squadron was
separated. But the next day, when we were got to sea, the commodore
considering that the season was far advanced, and that touching at St.
Jago would create a new delay, he for this reason thought proper to
alter his rendezvous, and to appoint the island of St. Catherine's, on
the coast of Brazil, to be the first place to which the ships of the
squadron were to repair in case of separation.
In our passage to the island of St. Catherine's, we found the direction
of the trade-winds to differ considerably from what we had reason to
expect, both from the general histories given of these winds, and the
experience of former navigators. For the learned Dr. Halley, in his
account of the trade-winds which take place in the Ethiopia and
Atlantic Ocean, tells us that from the latitude of 28° N., to the
latitude of 10° N., there is generally a fresh gale of N.E. wind, which
towards the African side rarely comes to the eastward of E.N.E., or
passes to the northward of N.N.E.; but on the American side the wind is
somewhat more easterly, though most commonly even there it is a point
or two to the northward of the east. That from 10° N. to 4° N., the
calms and tornadoes take place; and from 4° N. to 30° S., the winds are
generally and perpetually between the south and the east. This account
we expected to have verified by our own experience; but we found
considerable variations from it, both in respect to the steadiness of
the winds, and the quarter from whence they blew. For though we met
with a N.E. wind about the latitude of 28° N., yet from the latitude of
25° to the latitude of 18° N., the wind was never once to the northward
of the east, but, on the contrary, almost constantly to the southward
of it. However, from thence to the latitude {41} of 6° 20' N., we had
it usually to the northward of the east, though not entirely, it having
for a short time changed to E.S.E. From hence, to about 4° 46' N., the
weather was very unsettled; sometimes the wind was N.E. then changed to
S.E., and sometimes we had a dead calm attended with small rain and
lightning. After this, the wind continued almost invariably between
the S. and E., to the latitude of 7° 30' S.; and then again as
invariably between the N. and E., to the latitude of 15° 30' S.; then
E. and S.E., to 21° 37' S. But after this, even to the latitude of 27°
44' S., the wind was never once between the S. and the E., though we
had it at all times in all the other quarters of the compass. But this
last circumstance may be in some measure accounted for from our
approach to the main continent of the Brazils. I mention not these
particulars with a view of cavilling at the received accounts of these
trade-winds, which I doubt not are in general sufficiently accurate;
but I thought it a matter worthy of public notice that such deviations
from the established rules do sometimes take place. Besides, this
observation may not only be of service to navigators, by putting them
on their guard against these hitherto unexpected irregularities, but is
a circumstance necessary to be attended to in the solution of that
great question about the causes of trade-winds, and monsoons, a
question which, in my opinion, has not been hitherto discussed with
that clearness and accuracy which its importance (whether it be
considered as a naval or philosophical inquiry) seems to demand.
On the 16th of November, one of our victuallers made a signal to speak
with the commodore, and we shortened sail for her to come up with us.
The master came on board, and acquainted Mr. Anson that he had complied
with the terms of his charter-party, and desired to be unloaded and
dismissed. Mr. Anson, on consulting the captains of the squadron,
found all the ships had still such quantities of provision between
their decks, and were withal so deep, that they could not, without
great difficulty, take in their several proportions of brandy from the
_Industry_ pink, one of the victuallers only: consequently he was
obliged to continue the other of them, the _Anna_ pink, in the service
of attending the squadron. This being resolved on, the commodore the
next day made a signal for the ships to bring to, and to take on board
their shares of the brandy from the _Industry_ pink; and in this the
long {42} boats of the squadron were employed the three following days,
that is, till the 19th in the evening, when the pink being unloaded,
she parted company with us, being bound for Barbadoes, there to take in
a freight for England. Most of the officers of the squadron took the
opportunity of writing to their friends at home by this ship; but she
was afterwards, as I have been since informed, unhappily taken by the
Spaniards.
On the 20th of November, the captains of the squadron represented to
the commodore that their ships' companies were very sickly, and that it
was their own opinion, as well as their surgeons', that it would tend
to the preservation of the men to let in more air between decks, but
that their ships were so deep they could not possibly open their lower
ports. On this representation, the commodore ordered six air scuttles
to be cut in each ship, in such places where they would least weaken it.
And on this occasion I cannot but observe, how much it is the duty of
all those who either by office or authority have any influence in the
direction of our naval affairs, to attend to this important article,
the preservation of the lives and health of our seamen. If it could be
supposed that the motives of humanity were insufficient for this
purpose, yet policy, and a regard to the success of our arms, and the
interest and honour of each particular commander, should naturally lead
us to a careful and impartial examination of every probable method
proposed for maintaining a ship's crew in health and vigour. But hath
this been always done? Have the late invented plain and obvious
methods of keeping our ships sweet and clean by a constant supply of
fresh air been considered with that candour and temper which the great
benefits promised hereby ought naturally to have inspired? On the
contrary, have not these salutary schemes been often treated with
neglect and contempt? And have not some of those who have been
entrusted with experimenting their effects, been guilty of the most
indefensible partiality in the accounts they have given of these
trials? Indeed, it must be confessed that many distinguished persons,
both in the direction and command of our fleets, have exerted
themselves on these occasions with a judicious and dispassionate
examination becoming the interesting nature of the inquiry; but the
wonder is, that any could be found irrational enough {43} to act a
contrary part in despight of the strongest dictates of prudence and
humanity. I must, however, own that I do not believe this conduct to
have arisen from motive so savage as the first reflection thereon does
naturally suggest: but I rather impute it to an obstinate, and in some
degree, superstitious attachment to such practices as have been long
established, and to a settled contempt and hatred of all kinds of
innovations, especial such as are projected by landmen and persons
residing on shore. But let us return from this, I hope not,
impertinent digression.
We crossed the equinoxial with a fine fresh gale at S.E. on Friday the
28th of November, at four in the morning, being then in the longitude
of 27° 59' west from London. And on the 2d of December, in the
morning, we saw a sail in the N.W. quarter, and made the _Gloucester's_
and _Tryal's_ signals to chace, and half an hour after we let out our
reefs and chased with the squadron; and about noon a signal was made
for the _Wager_ to take our remaining victualler, the _Anna_ pink, in
tow. But at seven in the evening, finding we did not near the chace,
and that the _Wager_ was very far astern, we shortened sail, and made a
signal for the cruizers to join the squadron. The next day but one we
again discovered a sail, which on a nearer approach we judged to be the
same vessel. We chased her the whole day, and though we rather gained
upon her, yet night came on before we could overtake her, which obliged
us to give over the chace, to collect our scattered squadron. We were
much chagrined at the escape of this vessel, as we then apprehended her
to be an advice-boat sent from Old Spain to Buenos Ayres with notice of
our expedition. But we have since learnt that we were deceived in this
conjecture, and that it was our East India Company's packet bound to
St. Helena.
On the 10th of December, being by our accounts in the latitude of 20°
S., and 36° 30' longitude west from London, the _Tryal_ fired a gun to
denote soundings. We immediately sounded, and found sixty fathom
water, the bottom coarse ground with broken shells. The _Tryal_ being
ahead of us, had at one time thirty-seven fathom, which afterwards
increased to ninety: and then she found no bottom, which happened to us
too at our second trial, though we sounded with a hundred and fifty
fathom of line. This is the shoal which is laid down in most charts by
the name of the Abrollos; and it appeared {44} we were upon the very
edge of it; perhaps farther in it may be extremely dangerous. We were
then, by our different accounts, from ninety to sixty leagues east of
the coast of Brazil. The next day but one we spoke with a Portuguese
brigantine from Rio Janeiro, bound to Bahia del todos Santos, who
informed us that we were thirty-four leagues from Cape St. Thomas, and
forty leagues from Cape Frio, which last bore from us W.S.W. By our
accounts we were near eighty leagues from Cape Frio; and though on the
information of this brigantine we altered our course and stood more to
the southward, yet by our coming in with the land afterwards, we were
fully convinced that our reckoning was much correcter than our
Portuguese intelligence. We found a considerable current setting to
the southward after we had passed the latitude of 16° S. And the same
took place all along the coast of Brazil, and even to the southward of
the river of Plate, it amounting sometimes to thirty miles in
twenty-four hours, and once to above forty miles.
If this current is occasioned (as it is most probable) by the running
off of the water accumulated on the coast of Brazil by the constant
sweeping of the eastern trade-wind over the Ethiopic Ocean, then it is
most natural to suppose that its general course is determined by the
bearings of the adjacent shore. Perhaps too, in almost every other
instance of currents, the same may hold true, as I believe no examples
occur of considerable currents being observed at any great distance
from land. If this then could be laid down for a general principle, it
would be always easy to correct the reckoning by the observed latitude.
But it were much to be wished, for the general interests of navigation,
that the actual settings of the different currents which are known to
take place in various parts of the world were examined more frequently
and accurately than hitherto appears to have been done.
We now began to grow impatient for a sight of land, both for the
recovery of our sick, and for the refreshment and security of those who
as yet continued healthy. When we departed from St. Helens, we were in
so good a condition that we lost but two men on board the _Centurion_
in our long passage to Madera. But in this present run between Madera
and St. Catherine's we were remarkably sickly, so that many died, and
great numbers were confined to their hammocks, {45} both in our own
ship, and in the rest of the squadron, and several of these past all
hopes of recovery. The disorders they in general laboured under were
such as are common to the hot climates, and what most ships bound to
the southward experience in a greater or less degree. These are those
kind of fevers which they usually call calentures: a disease which was
not only terrible in its first instance, but even the remains of it
often proved fatal to those who considered themselves as recovered from
it; for it always left them in a very weak and helpless condition, and
usually afflicted either with fluxes or tenesmus's. By our continuance
at sea all these complaints were every day increasing, so that it was
with great joy we discovered the coast of Brazil on the 16th of
December, at seven in the morning.
The coast of Brazil appeared high and mountainous land, extending from
W. to W.S.W., and when we first saw it, it was about seventeen leagues
distant. At noon we perceived a low double land bearing W.S.W. about
ten leagues distant, which we took to be the island of St. Catherine's.
That afternoon and the next morning, the wind being N.N.W., we gained
very little to windward, and were apprehensive of being driven to the
leeward of the island; but a little before noon the next day the wind
came about to the southward, and enabled us to steer in between the
north point of St. Catherine's and the neighbouring island of Alvoredo.
As we stood in for the land, we had regular soundings, gradually
decreasing from thirty-six to twelve fathom, all muddy ground. In this
last depth of water we let go our anchor at five o'clock in the evening
of the 18th, the north-west point of the island of St. Catherine's
bearing S.S.W., distant three miles; and the island Alvoredo N.N.E.,
distant two leagues. Here we found the tide to set S.S.E. and N.N.W.,
at the rate of two knots, the tide of flood coming from the southward.
We could from our ships observe two fortifications at a considerable
distance within us, which seemed designed to prevent the passage of an
enemy between the island of St. Catherine's and the main. And we could
soon perceive that our squadron had alarmed the coast, for we saw the
two forts hoist their colours and fire several guns, which we supposed
were signals for assembling the inhabitants. To prevent any confusion,
the commodore immediately sent a boat with an officer on shore to
compliment the governor, and to {46} desire a pilot to carry us into
the road. The governor returned a very civil answer, and ordered us a
pilot. On the morning of the 20th we weighed and stood in, and towards
noon the pilot came on board us, who, the same afternoon, brought us to
an anchor in five fathom and an half, in a large commodious bay on the
continent side, called by the French Bon Port. In standing from our
last anchorage to this place we everywhere found an ouzy bottom, with a
depth of water first regularly decreasing to five fathom, and then
increasing to seven, after which we had six and five fathom
alternately. The next morning we weighed again with the squadron, in
order to run above the two fortifications we have mentioned, which are
called the castles of Santa Cruiz and St. Juan. Our soundings now
between the island and the main were four, five, and six fathom, with
muddy ground. As we passed by the castle of Santa Cruiz, we saluted it
with eleven guns, and were answered by an equal number; and at one in
the afternoon the squadron came to an anchor in five fathom and a half,
the governor's island bearing N.N.W., St. Juan's Castle N.E.½E., and
the island of St. Antonio south. In this position we moored at the
island of St. Catherine's on Sunday the 21st of December, the whole
squadron being, as I have already mentioned, sickly, and in great want
of refreshments; both which inconveniencies we hoped to have soon
removed at this settlement, celebrated by former navigators for its
healthiness, and the plenty of its provisions, and for the freedom,
indulgence, and friendly assistance there given to the ships of all
European nations in amity with the crown of Portugal.
{47}
CHAPTER V
PROCEEDINGS AT ST. CATHERINE'S, AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE, WITH A
SHORT ACCOUNT OF BRAZIL
Our first care, after having moored our ships, was to get our sick men
on shore, preparatory to which, each ship was ordered by the commodore
to erect two tents: one of them for the reception of the diseased, and
the other for the accommodation of the surgeon and his assistants. We
sent about eighty sick from the _Centurion_; and the other ships, I
believe, sent nearly as many, in proportion to the number of their
hands. As soon as we had performed this necessary duty, we scraped our
decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleansing: then smoked it between
decks, and after all washed every part well with vinegar. These
operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench
on board, and destroying the vermin; for from the number of our men,
and the heat of the climate, both these nusances had increased upon us
to a very loathsome degree; and besides being most intolerably
offensive, they were doubtless in some sort productive of the sickness
we had laboured under for a considerable time before our arrival at
this island.
Our next employment was wooding and watering our squadron, caulking our
ships' sides and decks, overhauling our rigging, and securing our masts
against the tempestuous weather we were, in all probability, to meet
with in our passage round Cape Horn in so advanced and inconvenient a
season. But before I engage in the particulars of these transactions,
it will not be improper to give some account of the present state of
this island of St. Catherine's, and of the neighbouring country, both
as the circumstances of this place are now greatly changed from what
they were in the time of former writers, and as these changes laid us
under many more difficulties and perplexities than we had reason to
expect, or than other British ships, hereafter bound to the South Seas,
may perhaps think it prudent to struggle with.
This island is esteemed by the natives to be nowhere above {48} two
leagues in breadth, though about nine in length; it lies in 49° 45' of
west longitude of London, and extends from the south latitude of 27°
35', to that of 28°. Although it be of a considerable height, yet it
is scarce discernible at the distance of ten leagues, being then
obscured under the continent of Brazil, whose mountains are exceeding
high; but on a nearer approach it is easy to be distinguished, and may
be readily known by a number of small islands lying at each end, and
scattered along the east side of it. Frezier has given a draught of
the island of St. Catherine's, and of the neighbouring coast, and the
minuter isles adjacent; but he has, by mistake, called the island of
Alvoredo the Isle de Gal, whereas the true Isle de Gal lies seven or
eight miles to the north-westward of it, and is much smaller. He has
also called an island to the southward of St. Catherine's Alvoredo, and
has omitted the island Masaqura; in other respects his plan is
sufficiently exact.
The north entrance of the harbour is in breadth about five miles, and
the distance from thence to the island of St. Antonio is eight miles,
and the course from the entrance to St. Antonio is S.S.W.½W. About the
middle of the island the harbour is contracted by two points of land to
a narrow channel no more than a quarter of a mile broad; and to defend
this passage, a battery was erecting on the point of land on the island
side. But this seems to be a very useless work, as the channel has no
more than two fathom water, and consequently is navigable only for
barks and boats, and therefore seems to be a passage that an enemy
could have no inducement to attempt, especially as the common passage
at the north end of the island is so broad and safe that no squadron
can be prevented from coming in by any of their fortifications when the
sea breeze is made. However, the Brigadier Don Jose Sylva de Paz, the
governor of this settlement, is deemed an expert engineer, and he
doubtless understands one branch of his business very well, which is
the advantages which new works bring to those who are entrusted with
the care of erecting them; for besides the battery mentioned above,
there are three other forts carrying on for the defence of the harbour,
none of which are yet compleated. The first of these, called St. Juan,
is built on a point of St. Catherine's, near Parrot Island; the second,
in form of a half-moon, is on the island of St. Antonio; and the third,
which {49} seems to be the chief, and has some appearance of a regular
fortification, is on an island near the continent, where the governor
resides.
The soil of the island is truly luxuriant, producing fruits of many
kinds spontaneously; and the ground is covered over with one continued
forest of trees of a perpetual verdure, which, from the exuberance of
the soil, are so entangled with briars, thorns, and underwood, as to
form a thicket absolutely impenetrable, except by some narrow pathways
which the inhabitants have made for their own convenience. These, with
a few spots cleared for plantations along the shore facing the
continent, are the only uncovered parts of the island. The woods are
extremely fragrant, from the many aromatic trees and shrubs with which
they abound, and the fruits and vegetables of all climates thrive here,
almost without culture, and are to be procured in great plenty, so that
here is no want of pine-apples, peaches, grapes, oranges, lemons,
citrons, melons, apricots, nor plantains. There are besides great
abundance of two other productions of no small consideration for a
sea-store, I mean onions and potatoes. The flesh provisions are,
however, much inferior to the vegetables. There are indeed small wild
cattle to be purchased, somewhat like buffaloes, but these are very
indifferent food, their flesh being of a loose contexture, and
generally of a disagreeable flavour, which is probably owing to the
wild calabash on which they feed. There are likewise great plenty of
pheasants, but they are not to be compared in taste to those we have in
England. The other provisions of the place are monkeys, parrots, and,
above all, fish of various sorts; these abound in the harbour, are
exceeding good, and are easily catched, for there are a great number of
small sandy bays very convenient for haling the Seyne.
The water both on the island and the opposite continent is excellent,
and preserves at sea as well as that of the Thames. For after it has
been in the cask a day or two it begins to purge itself, and stinks
most intolerably, and is soon covered over with a green scum. But
this, in a few days, subsides to the bottom, and leaves the water as
clear as chrystal, and perfectly sweet. The French (who, during their
South Sea trade in Queen Anne's reign, first brought this place into
repute) usually wooded and watered in Bon Port, on the continent side,
where they anchored with great safety in six {50} fathom water; and
this is doubtless the most commodious road for such ships as intend to
make only a short stay. But we watered on the St. Catherine's side, at
a plantation opposite the island of St. Antonio.
These are the advantages of this island of St. Catherine's; but there
are many inconveniencies attending it, partly from its climate, but
more from its new regulations, and the late form of government
established there. With regard to the climate, it must be remembered
that the woods and hills which surround the harbour prevent a free
circulation of the air. And the vigorous vegetation which constantly
takes place there, furnishes such a prodigious quantity of vapour that
all the night, and great part of the morning, a thick fog covers the
whole country, and continues till either the sun gathers strength to
dissipate it, or it is dispersed by a brisk sea-breeze. This renders
the place close and humid, and probably occasioned the many fevers and
fluxes we were there afflicted with. To these exceptions I must not
omit to add, that all the day we were pestered with great numbers of
muscatos, which are not much unlike the gnats in England, but more
venomous in their stings. And at sunset, when the muscatos retired,
they were succeeded by an infinity of sand-flies, which, though scarce
discernible to the naked eye, make a mighty buzzing, and, wherever they
bite, raise a small bump in the flesh which is soon attended with a
painful itching, like that arising from the bite of an English harvest
bug. But as the only light in which this place deserves our
consideration is its favourable situation for supplying and refreshing
our cruisers intended for the South Seas, in this view its greatest
inconveniences remain still to be related. And to do this more
distinctly, it will not be amiss to consider the changes which it has
lately undergone, both in its inhabitants, its police, and its governor.
In the time of Frezier and Shelvocke, this place served only as a
retreat to vagabonds and outlaws, who fled thither from all parts of
Brazil. They did indeed acknowledge a subjection to the crown of
Portugal, and had a person among them whom they called their captain,
who was considered in some sort as their governor; but both their
allegiance to their king, and their obedience to their captain, seemed
to be little more than verbal. For as they had plenty of provisions,
but no money, they were in a condition to support {51} themselves
without the assistance of any neighbouring settlements, and had not
amongst them the means of tempting any adjacent governor to busy his
authority about them. In this situation they were extremely hospitable
and friendly to such foreign ships as came amongst them. For these
ships wanting only provisions, of which the natives had great store;
and the natives wanting clothes (for they often despised money, and
refused to take it), which the ships furnished them with in exchange
for their provisions, both sides found their account in this traffick;
and their captain or governor had neither power nor interest to
restrain it, or to tax it. But of late (for reasons which shall be
hereafter mentioned) these honest vagabonds have been obliged to
receive amongst them a new colony, and to submit to new laws and new
forms of government. Instead of their former ragged bare-legged
captain (whom, however, they took care to keep innocent), they have now
the honour to be governed by Don Jose Sylva de Paz, a brigadier of the
armies of Portugal. This gentleman has with him a garrison of
soldiers, and has consequently a more extensive and a better supported
power than any of his predecessors; and as he wears better clothes, and
lives more splendidly, and has besides a much better knowledge of the
importance of money than they could ever pretend to, so he puts in
practice certain methods of procuring it, with which they were utterly
unacquainted. But it may be much doubted if the inhabitants consider
these methods as tending to promote either their interests or that of
their sovereign the King of Portugal. This is certain, that his
behaviour cannot but be extremely embarrassing to such British ships as
touch there in their way to the South Seas. For one of his practices
was placing centinels at all the avenues, to prevent the people from
selling us any refreshments, except at such exorbitant rates as we
could not afford to give. His pretence for this extraordinary stretch
of power was, that he was obliged to preserve their provisions for
upwards of an hundred families, which they daily expected to reinforce
their colony. Hence he appears to be no novice in his profession, by
his readiness at inventing a plausible pretence for his interested
management. However, this, though sufficiently provoking, was far from
being the most exceptionable part of his conduct. For by the
neighbourhood of the river Plate, a considerable smuggling traffick is
carried on between the Portuguese and {52} the Spaniards, especially in
the exchanging gold for silver, by which both princes are defrauded of
their fifths; and in this prohibited commerce, Don Jose was so deeply
engaged, that in order to ingratiate himself with his Spanish
correspondents (for no other reason can be given for his procedure) he
treacherously dispatched an express to Buenos Ayres, in the river of
Plate, where Pizarro then lay, with an account of our arrival, and of
the strength of our squadron; particularly mentioning the number of
ships, guns, and men, and every circumstance which he could suppose our
enemy desirous of being acquainted with. And the same perfidy every
British cruiser may expect who touches at St. Catherine's while it is
under the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz.
Thus much, with what we shall be necessitated to relate in the course
of our own proceedings, may suffice as to the present state of St.
Catherine's, and the character of its governor. But as the reader may
be desirous of knowing to what causes the late new modelling of this
settlement is owing; to satisfy him in this particular, it will be
necessary to give a short account of the adjacent continent of Brazil,
and of the wonderful discoveries which have been made there within
these last forty years, which, from a country of but mean estimation,
has rendered it now perhaps the most considerable colony on the face of
the globe.
This country was first discovered by Americus Vesputio, a Florentine,
who had the good fortune to be honoured with giving his name to the
immense continent, some time before found out by Columbus. Vesputio
being in the service of the Portuguese, it was settled and planted by
that nation, and, with the other dominions of Portugal, devolved to the
crown of Spain when that kingdom became subject to it. During the long
war between Spain and the States of Holland, the Dutch possessed
themselves of the northermost part of Brazil, and were masters of it
for some years. But when the Portuguese revolted from the Spanish
Government, this country took part in the revolt, and soon re-possessed
themselves of the places the Dutch had taken; since which time it has
continued without interruption under the crown of Portugal, being, till
the beginning of the present century, only productive of sugar and
tobacco, and a few other commodities of very little account.
{53}
But this country, which for many years was only considered for the
produce of its plantations, has been lately discovered to abound with
the two minerals which mankind hold in the greatest esteem, and which
they exert their utmost art and industry in acquiring, I mean gold and
diamonds. Gold was first found in the mountains which lie adjacent to
the city of Rio Janeiro. The occasion of its discovery is variously
related, but the most common account is, that the Indians lying on the
back of the Portuguese settlements, were observed by the soldiers
employed in an expedition against them, to make use of this metal for
their fish-hooks, and their manner of procuring it being enquired into,
it appeared that great quantities of it were annually washed from the
hills, and left amongst the sand and gravel, which remained in the
vallies after the running off, or evaporation of the water. It is now
little more than forty years since any quantities of gold worth notice
have been imported to Europe from Brazil, but since that time the
annual imports from thence have been continually augmented by the
discovery of places in other provinces, where it is to be met with as
plentifully as at first about Rio Janeiro. And it is now said that
there is a small slender vein of it spread through all the country at
about twenty-four feet from the surface, but that this vein is too thin
and poor to answer the expence of digging; however, where the rivers or
rains have had any course for a considerable time, there gold is always
to be collected, the water having separated the metal from the earth,
and deposited it b the sands, thereby saving the expences of digging:
so that it is esteemed an infallible gain to be able to divert a stream
from its channel, and to ransack its bed. From this account of
gathering this metal, it should follow that there are properly no gold
mines in Brazil; and this the governor of Rio Grande (who being at St.
Catherine's, frequently visited Mr. Anson) did most confidently affirm,
assuring us that the gold was all collected either from rivers, or from
the beds of torrents after floods. It is indeed asserted, that in the
mountains large rocks are found abounding with this metal, and I myself
have seen the fragment of one of these rocks, with a considerable lump
of gold intangled in it; but even in this case the workmen break off
the rocks, and do not properly mine into them, and the great expence in
subsisting among these mountains, and afterwards in separating the
metal from the stone, makes {54} this method of procuring gold to be
but rarely put in practice.
The examining the bottoms of rivers and the gullies of torrents, and
the washing the gold found therein from the sand and dirt with which it
is always mixed, are works performed by slaves, who are principally
negroes, kept in great numbers by the Portuguese for these purposes.
The regulation of the duty of these slaves is singular, for they are
each of them obliged to furnish their master with the eighth part of an
ounce of gold per diem; and if they are either so fortunate or
industrious as to collect a greater quantity, the surplus is considered
as their own property, and they have the liberty of disposing of it as
they think fit. So that it is said, some negroes who have accidentally
fallen upon rich washing places have themselves purchased slaves, and
have lived afterwards in great splendour, their original master having
no other demand on them than the daily supply of the forementioned
eighth, which, as the Portuguese ounce is somewhat lighter than our
troy ounce, may amount to about nine shillings sterling.
The quantity of gold thus collected in the Brazils, and returned
annually to Lisbon, may be in some degree estimated from the amount of
the king's fifth. This hath of late been esteemed, one year with
another, to be one hundred and fifty arroves of 32 lb. Portuguese
weight each, which at £4 the troy ounce, makes very near £300,000
sterling, and consequently the capital, of which this is the fifth, is
about a million and a half sterling. It is obvious that the annual
return of gold to Lisbon cannot be less than this, though it be
difficult to determine how much it exceeds it; perhaps we may not be
very much mistaken in our conjecture, if we suppose the gold exchanged
for silver with the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres, and what is brought
privily to Europe and escapes the duty, amounts to near half a million
more, which will make the whole annual produce of the Brazilian gold
near two millions sterling, a prodigious sum to be found in a country
which a few years since was not known to furnish a single grain.
I have already mentioned that besides gold this country does likewise
produce diamonds. The discovery of these valuable stones is much more
recent than that of gold, it being as yet scarce 20 years since the
first were brought to Europe. They are found in the same manner as the
gold, {55} in the gullies of torrents and beds of rivers, but only in
particular places, and not so universally spread through the country.
They were often found in washing the gold before they were known to be
diamonds, and were consequently thrown away with the sand and gravel
separated from it; and it is very well remembered that numbers of very
large stones, which would have made the fortunes of the possessors,
have passed unregarded through the hands of those who now with
impatience support the mortifying reflection. However, about twenty
years since a person acquainted with the appearance of rough diamonds
conceived that these pebbles, as they were then esteemed, were of the
same kind: but it is said that there was a considerable interval
between the first starting of this opinion and the confirmation of it
by proper trials and examination, it proving difficult to persuade the
inhabitants that what they had been long accustomed to despise could be
of the importance represented by this discovery, and I have been
informed that in this interval a governor of one of their places
procured a good number of these stones, which he pretended to make use
of at cards to mark with instead of counters. But it was at last
confirmed by skilful jewellers in Europe, consulted on this occasion,
that the stones thus found in Brazil were truly diamonds, many of which
were not inferior, either in lustre, or any other quality, to those of
the East Indies. On this determination, the Portuguese, in the
neighbourhood of those places where they had first been observed, set
themselves to search for them with great assiduity. And they were not
without great hopes of discovering considerable masses of them, as they
found large rocks of chrystal in many of the mountains, from whence the
streams came which washed down the diamonds.
But it was soon represented to the King of Portugal that if such plenty
of diamonds should be met with, as their sanguine conjectures seemed to
indicate, this would so debase their value and diminish their
estimation, that besides ruining all the Europeans who had any quantity
of Indian diamonds in their possession, it would render the discovery
itself of no importance, and would prevent his majesty from receiving
any advantages from it, and on these considerations his majesty has
thought proper to restrain the general search of diamonds, and has
erected a diamond company for that {56} purpose, with an exclusive
charter. This company, in consideration of a sum paid to the king, is
vested with the property of all diamonds found in Brazil: but to hinder
their collecting too large quantities, and thereby reducing their
value, they are prohibited from employing above eight hundred slaves in
searching after them. And to prevent any of his other subjects from
acting the same part, and likewise to secure the company from being
defrauded by the interfering of interlopers in their trade and
property, he has depopulated a large town and a considerable district
round it, and has obliged the inhabitants, who are said to amount to
six thousand, to remove to another part of the country; for this town
being in the neighbourhood of the diamonds, it was thought impossible
to prevent such a number of people who were on the spot from frequently
smuggling.
In consequence of these important discoveries in Brazil, new laws, new
governments, and new regulations have been established in many parts of
the country. For not long since a considerable tract, possessed by a
set of inhabitants who from their principal settlement were called
Paulists, was almost independent of the crown of Portugal, to which it
scarcely acknowledged more than a nominal allegiance. These Paulists
are said to be descendants of those Portuguese who retired from the
northern part of Brazil when it was invaded and possessed by the Dutch.
As from the confusion of the times they were long neglected by their
superiors, and were obliged to provide for their own security and
defence, the necessity of their affairs produced a kind of government
amongst them which they found sufficient for the confined manner of
life to which they were inured. And being thus habituated to their own
regulations, they at length grew fond of their independency: so that
rejecting and despising the mandates of the court of Lisbon, they were
often engaged in a state of downright rebellion, and the mountains
surrounding their country, and the difficulty of clearing the few
passages that open into it, generally put it in their power to make
their own terms before they submitted. But as gold was found to abound
in this country of the Paulists, the present King of Portugal (during
whose reign almost the whole discoveries I have mentioned were begun
and compleated) thought it incumbent on him to reduce this province,
which now became of great consequence, to the {57} same dependency and
obedience with the rest of the country, which, I am told, he has at
last, though with great difficulty, happily effected. And the same
motives which induced his Majesty to undertake the reduction of the
Paulists has also occasioned the changes I have mentioned to have taken
place at the island of St. Catherine's. For the governor of Rio
Grande, of whom I have already spoken, assured us that in the
neighbourhood of this island there were considerable rivers which were
found to be extremely rich, and that this was the reason that a
garrison, a military governor, and a new colony was settled there. And
as the harbour at this island is by much the securest and the most
capacious of any on the coast, it is not improbable, if the riches of
the neighbourhood answer their expectation, but it may become in time
the principal settlement in Brazil, and the most considerable port in
all South America.
Thus much I have thought necessary to insert in relation to the present
state of Brazil, and of the island of St. Catherine's. For as this
last place has been generally recommended as the most eligible port for
our cruisers to refresh at, which are bound to the South Seas, I
believed it to be my duty to instruct my countrymen in the hitherto
unsuspected inconveniencies which attend that place; and as the
Brazilian gold and diamonds are subjects about which, from their
novelty, very few particulars have been hitherto published, I conceived
this account I had collected of them would appear to the reader to be
neither a trifling nor a useless digression. These subjects being thus
dispatched, I shall now return to the series of our own proceedings.
When we first arrived at St. Catherine's we were employed in refreshing
our sick on shore, in wooding and watering the squadron, cleansing our
ships, and examining and securing our masts and rigging, as I have
already observed in the foregoing chapter. At the same time Mr. Anson
gave directions that the ships' companies should be supplied with fresh
meat, and that they should be victualled with whole allowance of all
the kinds of provision. In consequence of these orders, we had fresh
beef sent on board us continually for our daily expence, and what was
wanting to make up our allowance we received from our victualler the
_Anna_ pink, in order to preserve the provisions on board our squadron
entire for our future service. The season of the year growing each day
{58} less favourable for our passage round Cape Horn, Mr. Anson was
very desirous of leaving this place as soon as possible, and we were at
first in hopes that our whole business would be done and we should be
in a readiness to sail in about a fortnight from our arrival; but, on
examining the _Tryal's_ masts, we, to our no small vexation, found
inevitable employment for twice that time. For, on a survey, it was
found that the main-mast was sprung at the upper woulding, though it
was thought capable of being secured by a couple of fishes; but the
fore-mast was reported to be unfit for service, and thereupon the
carpenters were sent into the woods to endeavour to find a stick proper
for a fore-mast. But after a search of four days they returned without
having been able to meet with any tree fit for the purpose. This
obliged them to come to a second consultation about the old fore-mast,
when it was agreed to endeavour to secure it by casing it with three
fishes, and in this work the carpenters were employed till within a day
or two of our sailing. In the meantime, the commodore, thinking it
necessary to have a clean vessel on our arrival in the South Seas,
ordered the _Tryal_ to be hove down, as this would not occasion any
loss of time, but might be compleated while the carpenters were
refitting her masts, which was done on shore.
On the 27th of December we discovered a sail in the offing, and not
knowing but she might be a Spaniard, the eighteen-oared boat was manned
and armed, and sent under the command of our second lieutenant, to
examine her before she arrived within the protection of the forts. She
proved to be a Portuguese brigantine from Rio Grande; and though our
officer, as it appeared on inquiry, had behaved with the utmost
civility to the master, and had refused to accept a calf which the
master would have forced on him as a present, yet the governor took
great offence at our sending our boat, and talked of it in a high
strain as a violation of the peace subsisting between the crowns of
Great Britain and Portugal. We at first imputed this ridiculous
blustering to no deeper a cause than Don Jose's insolence; but as we
found he proceeded so far as to charge our officer with behaving
rudely, and opening letters, and particularly with an attempt to take
out of the vessel by violence the very calf which we knew he had
refused to receive as a present (a circumstance which we were satisfied
the governor was well acquainted {59} with), we had thence reason to
suspect that he purposely sought this quarrel, and had more important
motives for engaging in it than the mere captious bias of his temper.
What these motives were it was not so easy for us to determine at that
time; but as we afterwards found by letters which fell into our hands
in the South Seas that he had dispatched an express to Buenos Ayres,
where Pizarro then lay, with an account of our squadron's arrival at
St. Catherine's, together with the most ample and circumstantial
intelligence of our force and condition, we thence conjectured that Don
Jose had raised this groundless clamour only to prevent our visiting
the brigantine when she should put to sea again, lest we might there
find proofs of his perfidious behaviour, and perhaps, at the same time,
discover the secret of his smuggling correspondence with his
neighbouring governors, and the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres. But to
proceed.
It was near a month before the _Tryal_ was refitted; for not only her
lower masts were defective, as hath been already mentioned, but her
main top-mast and fore-yard were likewise decayed and rotten. While
this work was carrying on, the other ships of the squadron fixed new
standing rigging, and set up a sufficient number of preventer shrouds
to each mast, to secure them in the most effectual manner. And in
order to render the ships stiffer and to enable them to carry more sail
abroad, and to prevent their straining their upper works in hard gales
of wind, each captain had orders given him to strike down some of their
great guns into the hold. These precautions being complied with, and
each ship having taken in as much wood and water as there was room for,
the _Tryal_ was at last compleated, and the whole squadron was ready
for the sea: on which the tents on shore were struck, and all the sick
were received on board. And here we had a melancholy proof how much
the healthiness of this place had been over-rated by former writers,
for we found that though the _Centurion_ alone had buried no less than
twenty-eight men since our arrival, yet the number of her sick was in
the same interval increased from eighty to ninety-six. When our crews
were embarked, and everything was prepared for our departure, the
commodore made a signal for all captains, and delivered them their
orders, containing the successive place of rendezvous from hence to the
coast of China. And {60} then, on the next day, being the 18th of
January, the signal was made for weighing, and the squadron put to sea,
leaving without regret this island of St. Catherine's, where we had
been so extremely disappointed in our refreshments, in our
accommodations, and in the humane and friendly offices which we had
been taught to expect in a place which hath been so much celebrated for
its hospitality, freedom, and conveniency.
{61}
CHAPTER VI
THE RUN FROM ST. CATHERINE'S TO PORT ST. JULIAN, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF
THAT PORT, AND OF THE COUNTRY TO THE SOUTHWARD OF THE RIVER OF PLATE
In leaving St. Catherine's, we left the last amicable port we proposed
to touch at, and were now proceeding to an hostile, or at best, a
desart and inhospitable coast. And as we were to expect a more
boisterous climate to the southward than any we had yet experienced,
not only our danger of separation would by this means be much greater
than it had been hitherto, but other accidents of a more mischievous
nature were likewise to be apprehended, and as much as possible to be
provided against. Mr. Anson, therefore, in appointing the various
stations at which the ships of the squadron were to rendezvous, had
considered that it was possible his own ship might be disabled from
getting round Cape Horn, or might be lost, and had given proper
direction, that even in that case the expedition should not be
abandoned. For the orders delivered to the captains, the day before we
sailed from St. Catherine's, were, that in case of separation, which
they were with the utmost care to endeavour to avoid, the first place
of rendezvous should be the bay of port St. Julian; describing the
place from Sir John Narborough's account of it. There they were to
supply themselves with as much salt as they could take in, both for
their own use and for the use of the squadron; and if, after a stay of
ten days, they were not joined by the commodore, they were then to
proceed through Streights le Maire round Cape Horn into the South Seas,
where the next place of rendezvous was to be the island of Nostra
Senora del Socoro, in the latitude of 45° south, and longitude from the
Lizard 71° 12' west. They were to bring this island to bear E.N.E. and
to cruize from five to twelve leagues distance from it as long as their
store of wood and water would permit, both which they were to expend
with the utmost frugality. And when they were under an absolute
necessity of a fresh supply, they were to stand in, {62} and endeavour
to find out an anchoring place; and in case they could not, and the
weather made it dangerous to supply their ships by standing off and on,
they were then to make the best of their way to the island of Juan
Fernandes, in the latitude of 33° 37' south. At this island, as soon
as they had recruited their wood and water, they were to continue
cruizing off the anchoring place for fifty-six days; in which time, if
they were not joined by the commodore, they might conclude that some
accident had befallen him, and they were forthwith to put themselves
under the command of the senior officer, who was to use his utmost
endeavours to annoy the enemy both by sea and land. With these views
their new commodore was to continue in those seas as long as his
provisions lasted, or as long as they were recruited by what he should
take from the enemy, reserving only a sufficient quantity to carry him
and the ships under his command to Macao, at the entrance of the river
of Canton on the coast of China, where, having supplied himself with a
new stock of provisions, he was thence, without delay, to make the best
of his way to England. And as it was found impossible as yet to unload
our victualler, the _Anna_ pink, the commodore gave the master of her
the same rendezvous, and the same orders to put himself under the
command of the remaining senior officer.
Under these orders the squadron sailed from St. Catherine's on Sunday
the 18th of January, as hath been already mentioned in the preceding
chapter. The next day we had very squally weather, attended with rain,
lightning, and thunder, but it soon became fair again with light
breezes, and continued thus till Wednesday evening, when it blew fresh
again; and increasing all night, by eight the next morning it became a
most violent storm, and we had with it so thick a fog, that it was
impossible to see the distance of two ships' length, so that the whole
squadron disappeared. On this a signal was made, by firing guns, to
bring to with the larboard tacks, the wind being then due east. We
ourselves immediately handed the top-sails, bunted the main-sail, and
lay to under a reefed mizen till noon, when the fog dispersed, and we
soon discovered all the ships of the squadron, except the _Pearl_, who
did not join us till near a month afterwards. Indeed the _Tryal_ sloop
was a great way to the leeward, having lost her main-mast in the
squall, and having been {63} obliged, for fear of bilging, to cut away
the raft. We therefore bore down with the squadron to her relief, and
the _Gloucester_ was ordered to take her in tow, for the weather did
not entirely abate till the day after, and even then a great swell
continued from the eastward in consequence of the preceding storm.
After this accident we stood to the southward with little interruption,
and here we experienced the same setting of the current which we had
observed before our arrival at St. Catherine's; that is, we generally
found ourselves to the southward of our reckoning by about twenty miles
each day. This deviation, with a little inequality, lasted till we had
passed the latitude of the river of Plate; and even then we discovered
that the same current, however difficult to be accounted for, did yet
undoubtedly take place; for we were not satisfied in deducing it from
the error in our reckoning, but we actually tried it more than once
when a calm made it practicable.
As soon as we had passed the latitude of the river of Plate, we had
soundings which continued all along the coast of Patagonia. These
soundings, when well ascertained, being of great use in determining the
position of the ships, and we having tried them more frequently, and in
greater depths, and with more attention than, I believe, hath been done
before us, I shall recite our observations as succinctly as I can. In
the latitude of 36° 52' we had sixty fathom of water, with a bottom of
fine black and grey sand; from thence to 39° 55' we varied our depths
from fifty to eighty fathom, though we had constantly the same bottom
as before; between the last mentioned latitude and 43° 16' we had only
fine grey sand, with the same variation of depths, except that we once
or twice lessened our water to forty fathom. After this, we continued
in forty fathom for about half a degree, having a bottom of coarse sand
and broken shells, at which time we were in sight of land, and not
above seven leagues from it. As we edged from the land, we met with
variety of soundings; first black sand, then muddy, and soon after
rough ground with stones; but when we had increased our water to
forty-eight fathom we had a muddy bottom to the latitude of 46° 10'.
Hence, drawing towards the shore, we had first thirty-six fathom, and
still kept shoaling our water, till at length we came into twelve
fathom, having {64} constantly small stones and pebbles at the bottom.
Part of this time we had a view of Cape Blanco, which lies in about the
latitude of 47° 10', and longitude west from London 69°. This is the
most remarkable land upon the coast. Steering from hence S. by E.
nearly, we, in a run of about thirty leagues, deepned our water to
fifty fathom without once altering the bottom: and then drawing towards
the shore with a S.W. course, varying rather to the westward, we had
constantly a sandy bottom till our coming into thirty fathom, where we
had again a sight of land distant from us about eight leagues lying in
the latitudes of 48° 31'. We made this land on the 17th of February,
and at five that afternoon we came to an anchor, having the same
soundings as before, in the latitude of 48° 58', the souther-most land
then in view bearing S.S.W., the northermost N.½E., a small island
N.W., and the westermost hummock W.S.W. In this station we found the
tide to set S. by W.; and weighing again at five the next morning, we
an hour afterwards discovered a sail, upon which the _Severn_ and
_Gloucester_ were both directed to give chase; but we soon perceived it
to be the _Pearl_, which separated from us a few days after we left St.
Catherine's, and on this we made a signal for the _Severn_ to rejoin
the squadron, leaving the _Gloucester_ alone in the pursuit. And now
we were surprised to see that on the _Gloucester's_ approach the people
on board the _Pearl_ increased their sail, and stood from her.
However, the _Gloucester_ came up with them, but found them with their
hammocks in their nettings, and every thing ready for an engagement.
At two in the afternoon the _Pearl_ joined us, and running up under our
stern, Lieutenant Salt haled the commodore, and acquainted him that
Captain Kidd died on the 31st of January. He likewise informed us that
he had seen five large ships the 10th instant, which he for some time
imagined to be our squadron: so that he suffered the commanding ship,
which wore a red broad pendant exactly resembling that of the commodore
at the main top-mast head, to come within gun-shot of him before he
discovered his mistake; but then, finding it not to be the _Centurion_,
he haled close upon the wind, and crowded from them with all his sail,
and standing cross a ripling, where they hesitated to follow him, he
happily escaped. He made them to be five Spanish men-of-war, one of
them exceedingly {65} like the _Gloucester_, which was the occasion of
his apprehensions when the _Gloucester_ chaced him. By their
appearance he thought they consisted of two ships of seventy guns, two
of fifty, and one of forty guns. It seems the whole squadron continued
in chace of him all that day, but at night, finding they could not get
near him, they gave over the chace, and directed their course to the
southward.
Had it not been for the necessity we were under of refitting the
_Tryal_, this piece of intelligence would have prevented our making any
stay at St. Julian's; but as it was impossible for that sloop to
proceed round the Cape in her present condition, some stay there was
inevitable, and therefore the same evening we came to an anchor again
in twenty-five fathom water; the bottom a mixture of mud and sand, and
the high hummock bearing S.W. by W. And weighing at nine in the
morning, we sent the two cutters belonging to the _Centurion_ and
_Severn_ in shore to discover the harbour of St. Julian, while the
ships kept standing along the coast, about the distance of a league
from the land. At six o'clock we anchored in the bay of St. Julian in
nineteen fathom, the bottom muddy ground with sand, the northermost
land in sight bearing N. and by E., the southermost S.-½E., and the
high hummock, to which Sir John Narborough formerly gave the name of
Wood's Mount, W.S.W. Soon after, the cutter returned on board, having
discovered the harbour, which did not appear to us in our situation,
the northermost point shutting in upon the southermost, and in
appearance closing the entrance.
Being come to an anchor in this bay of St. Julian, principally with a
view of refitting the _Tryal_, the carpenters were immediately employed
in that business, and continued so during our whole stay at the place.
The _Tryal's_ main-mast having been carried away about twelve feet
below the cap, they contrived to make the remaining part of the mast
serve again; and the _Wager_ was ordered to supply her with a spare
main top-mast, which the carpenters converted into a new fore-mast.
And I cannot help observing that this accident to the _Tryal's_ mast,
which gave us so much uneasiness at that time, on account of the delay
it occasioned, was, in all probability, the means of preserving the
sloop, and all her crew. For before this, her masts, how well soever
proportioned to a better climate, were much too lofty for these {66}
high southern latitudes, so that had they weathered the preceding
storm, it would have been impossible for them to have stood against
those seas and tempests we afterwards encountered in passing round Cape
Horn, and the loss of masts in that boisterous climate would scarcely
have been attended with less than the loss of the vessel and of every
man on board her, since it would have been impracticable for the other
ships to have given them any relief during the continuance of those
impetuous storms.
Whilst we stayed at this place, the commodore appointed the Honourable
Captain Murray to succeed to the _Pearl_, and Captain Cheap to the
_Wager_, and he promoted Mr. Charles Saunders, his first lieutenant, to
the command of the _Tryal_ sloop. But Captain Saunders lying
dangerously ill of a fever on board the _Centurion_, and it being the
opinion of the surgeons that the removing him on board his own ship in
his present condition might tend to the hazard of his life, Mr. Anson
gave an order to Mr. Saumarez, first lieutenant of the _Centurion_, to
act as master and commander of the _Tryal_ during the illness of
Captain Saunders.
Here the commodore, too, in order to ease the expedition of all
unnecessary expence, held a farther consultation with his captains
about unloading and discharging the _Anna_ pink; but they represented
to him that they were so far from being in a condition of taking any
part of her loading on board, that they had still great quantities of
provisions in the way of their guns between decks, and that their ships
were withal so very deep that they were not fit for action without
being cleared. This put the commodore under a necessity of retaining
the pink in the service; and as it was apprehended we should certainly
meet with the Spanish squadron in passing the Cape, Mr. Anson thought
it adviseable to give orders to the captains to put all their
provisions which were in the way of their guns on board the _Anna_
pink, and to remount such of their guns as had formerly, for the ease
of their ships, been ordered into the hold.
This bay of St. Julian, where we are now at anchor, being a convenient
rendezvous, in case of separation, for all cruizers bound to the
southward, and the whole coast of Patagonia, from the river of Plate to
the Streights of Magellan, lying nearly parallel to their usual route,
a short account of the singularity of this country, with a particular
{67} description of port St. Julian, may, perhaps, be neither
unacceptable to the curious, nor unworthy the attention of future
navigators, as some of them, by unforeseen accidents, may be obliged to
run in with the land, and to make some stay on this coast, in which
case the knowledge of the country, its produce and inhabitants, cannot
but be of the utmost consequence to them.
To begin then with the tract of country usually styled Patagonia. This
is the name often given to the southermost part of South America, which
is unpossessed by the Spaniards, extending from their settlements to
the Streights of Magellan. This country on the east side is extremely
remarkable for a peculiarity not to be paralleled in any other known
part of the globe, for though the whole territory to the northward of
the river of Plate is full of wood, and stored with immense quantities
of large timber trees, yet to the southward of the river no trees of
any kind are to be met with except a few peach trees, first planted and
cultivated by the Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres. So
that on the whole eastern coast of Patagonia, extending near four
hundred leagues in length, and reaching as far back as any discoveries
have yet been made, no other wood has been found than a few
insignificant shrubs. Sir John Narborough in particular, who was sent
out by King Charles the Second expressly to examine this country and
the Streights of Magellan, and who, in pursuance of his orders,
wintered upon this coast in Port St. Julian and Port Desire, in the
year 1670; Sir John Narborough, I say, tells us that he never saw a
stick of wood in the country large enough to make the handle of an
hatchet.
But though the country be so destitute of wood, it abounds with
pasture. For the land appears in general to be made up of downs, of a
light dry gravelly soil, and produces great quantities of long coarse
grass, which grows in tufts, interspersed with large barren spots of
gravel between them. This grass, in many places, feeds immense herds
of cattle, for the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres having, soon after their
first settling there, brought over a few black cattle from Europe, they
have thriven prodigiously by the plenty of herbage which they
everywhere met with, and are now increased to that degree, and are
extended so far into different parts of Patagonia, that they are not
considered as private {68} property; but many thousands at a time are
slaughtered every year by the hunters, only for their hides and tallow.
The manner of killing these cattle, being a practice peculiar to that
part of the world, merits a more circumstantial description. The
hunters employed on this occasion, being all of them mounted on
horseback (and both the Spaniards and Indians in that part of the world
are usually most excellent horsemen), they arm themselves with a kind
of a spear, which, at its end, instead of a blade fixed in the same
line with the wood in the usual manner, has its blade fixed across.
With this instrument they ride at a beast, and surround him, when the
hunter that comes behind him hamstrings him, and as after this
operation the beast soon tumbles, without being able to raise himself
again, they leave him on the ground and pursue others, whom they serve
in the same manner. Sometimes there is a second party, who attend the
hunters to skin the cattle as they fall, but it is said that at other
times the hunters chuse to let them languish in torment till the next
day, from an opinion that the anguish, which the animal in the meantime
endures, may burst the lymphaticks, and thereby facilitate the
separation of the skin from the carcase; and though their priests have
loudly condemned this most barbarous practice, and have gone so far, if
my memory does not fail me, as to excommunicate those who follow it,
yet all their efforts to put an entire stop to it have hitherto proved
ineffectual.
Besides the numbers of cattle which are every year slaughtered for
their hides and tallow, in the manner already described, it is often
necessary for the uses of agriculture, and for other purposes, to take
them alive without wounding them. This is performed with a most
wonderful and almost incredible dexterity, and principally by the use
of a machine which the English who have resided at Buenos Ayres
generally denominate a lash. It is made of a thong of several fathoms
in length, and very strong, with a running noose at one end of it.
This the hunters (who in this case are also mounted on horseback) take
in their right hands, it being first properly coiled up, and having its
end opposite to the noose fastened to the saddle; and thus prepared
they ride at a herd of cattle. When they arrive within a certain
distance of a beast, they throw their thong at him with such exactness
that they never fail of fixing the noose about his {69} horns. The
beast, when he finds himself entangled, generally runs, but the horse,
being swifter, attends him, and prevents the thong from being too much
strained, till a second hunter, who follows the game, throws another
noose about one of its hind legs; and this being done, both horses (for
they are trained to this practice) instantly turn different ways, in
order to strain the two thongs in contrary directions, on which the
beast, by their opposite pulls, is presently overthrown, and then the
horses stop, keeping the thongs still upon the stretch. Being thus on
the ground, and incapable of resistance (for he is extended between the
two horses), the hunters alight, and secure him in such a manner that
they afterwards easily convey him to whatever place they please. They
in like manner noose horses, and, as it is said, even tigers; and
however strange this last circumstance may appear, there are not
wanting persons of credit who assert it. Indeed, it must be owned,
that the address both of the Spaniards and Indians in that part of the
world in the use of this lash or noose, and the certainty with which
they throw it, and fix it on any intended part of the beast at a
considerable distance, are matters only to be believed from the
repeated and concurrent testimony of all who have frequented that
country, and might reasonably be questioned, did it rely on a single
report, or had it been ever contradicted or denied by any one who had
resided at Buenos Ayres.
The cattle which are killed in the manner I have already observed are
slaughtered only for their hides and tallow, to which sometimes are
added their tongues, but the rest of their flesh is left to putrify, or
to be devoured by the birds and wild beasts. The greatest part of this
carrion falls to the share of the wild dogs, of which there are immense
numbers to be found in that country.
These are supposed to have been originally produced by Spanish dogs
from Buenos Ayres, who, allured by the great quantity of carrion, and
the facility they had by that means of subsisting, left their masters,
and ran wild amongst the cattle; for they are plainly of the breed of
European dogs, an animal not originally found in America. But though
these dogs are said to be some thousands in a company, they hitherto
neither diminish nor prevent the increase of the cattle, not daring to
attack the herds, by reason of the numbers, which constantly feed
together; but contenting {70} themselves with the carrion left them by
the hunters, and perhaps now and then with a few stragglers, who, by
accidents, are separated from the main body they belong to.
Besides the wild cattle which have spread themselves in such vast herds
from Buenos Ayres towards the southward, the same country is in like
manner furnished with horses. These too were first brought from Spain,
and are also prodigiously increased, and run wild to a much greater
distance than the black cattle; and though many of them are excellent,
yet their number makes them of very little value, the best of them
being often sold in the neighbouring settlements, where money is plenty
and commodities very dear, for not more than a dollar a-piece. It is
not as yet certain how far to the southward these herds of wild cattle
and horses have extended themselves, but there is some reason to
conjecture that stragglers of both kinds are to be met with very near
the Streights of Magellan; and they will in time doubtless fill all the
southern part of this continent with their breed, which cannot fail of
proving of considerable advantage to such ships as may touch upon the
coast, for the horses themselves are said to be very good eating, and,
as such, are preferred by some of the Indians even before the black
cattle. But whatever plenty of flesh provisions may be hereafter found
here, there is one material refreshment which this eastern side of
Patagonia seems to be very defective in, and that is fresh water, for
the land being generally of a nitrous and saline nature, the ponds and
streams are frequently brackish. However, as good water has been found
there, though in small quantities, it is not improbable, but on a
further search, this inconvenience may be removed.
To the account already given, I must add that there are in all parts of
this country a good number of vicunnas or Peruvian sheep; but these, by
reason of their shyness and swiftness, are killed with difficulty. On
the eastern coast, too, there are found immense quantities of seals,
and a vast variety of sea-fowl, amongst which the most remarkable are
the penguins. They are in size and shape like a goose, but instead of
wings, they have short stumps like fins, which are of no use to them,
except in the water. Their bills are narrow, like that of an
albitross, and they stand and walk in an erect posture. From this and
their white bellies, Sir John {71} Narborough has whimsically likened
them to little children standing up in white aprons.
The inhabitants of this eastern coast (to which I have all along
hitherto confined my relation) appear to be but few, and have rarely
been seen more than two or three at a time by any ships that have
touched here. We, during our stay at the port of St. Julian, saw none.
However, towards Buenos Ayres they are sufficiently numerous, and
oftentimes very troublesome to the Spaniards, but there the greater
breadth and variety of the country, and a milder climate, yield them a
better protection, for in that place the continent is between three and
four hundred leagues in breadth, whereas at Port St. Julian it is
little more than a hundred; so that I conceive the same Indians who
frequent the western coast of Patagonia and the Streights of Magellan
often ramble to this side. As the Indians near Buenos Ayres exceed
these southern Indians in number, so they greatly surpass them in
activity and spirit, and seem in their manners to be nearly allied to
those gallant Chilian Indians who have long set the whole Spanish power
at defiance, have often ravaged their country, and remain to this hour
independent. For the Indians about Buenos Ayres have learnt to be
excellent horsemen, and are extremely expert in the management of all
cutting weapons, though ignorant of the use of firearms, which the
Spaniards are very solicitous to keep out of their hands. And of the
vigour and resolution of these Indians, the behaviour of Orellana and
his followers, whom we have formerly mentioned, is a memorable
instance. Indeed were we disposed to aim at the utter subversion of
the Spanish power in America, no means seem more probable to effect it
than due encouragement and assistance given to these Indians and those
of Chili.
Thus much may suffice in relation to the eastern coast of Patagonia.
The western coast is of less extent, and by reason of the Andes which
skirt it, and stretch quite down to the water, is a very rocky and
dangerous shore. However, I shall be hereafter necessitated to make
further mention of it, and therefore shall not enlarge thereon at this
time, but shall conclude this account with a short description of the
harbour of St. Julian.
We, on our first arrival here, sent an officer on shore to the salt
pond in order to procure a quantity of salt for the {72} use of the
squadron, Sir John Narborough having observed when he was here that the
salt produced in that place was very white and good, and that in
February there was enough of it to fill a thousand ships; but our
officer returned with a sample which was very bad, and he told us that
even of this there was but little to be got. I suppose the weather had
been more rainy than ordinary, and had destroyed it.
{73}
CHAPTER VII
DEPARTURE FROM THE BAY OF ST. JULIAN, AND THE PASSAGE FROM THENCE TO
STREIGHTS LE MAIRE
The _Tryal_ being nearly refitted, which was our principal occupation
at this bay of St. Julian, and the sole occasion of our stay, the
commodore thought it necessary, as we were now directly bound for the
South Seas and the enemy's coasts, to fix the plan of his first
operations; and, therefore, on the 24th of February, a signal was made
for all captains, and a council of war was held on board the
_Centurion_, at which were present the Honourable Edward Legg, Captain
Matthew Mitchell, the Honourable George Murray, Captain David Cheap,
together with Colonel Mordaunt Cracherode, commander of the
land-forces. At this council Mr. Anson proposed that their first
attempt, after their arrival in the South Seas, should be the attack of
the town and harbour of Baldivia, the principal frontier of the
district of Chili; Mr. Anson informing them, at the same time, that it
was an article contained in his Majesty's instructions to him to
endeavour to secure some port in the South Seas where the ships of the
squadron might be careened and refitted. To this proposition made by
the commodore, the council unanimously and readily agreed, and, in
consequence of this resolution, new instructions were given to the
captains of the squadron, by which, though they were still directed, in
case of separation, to make the best of their way to the island of
Nuestra Senora del Socoro (yet notwithstanding the orders they had
formerly given them at St. Catherine's) they were to cruise off that
island only ten days; from whence, if not joined by the commodore, they
were to proceed and cruise off the harbour of Baldivia, making the land
between the latitudes of 40° and 40° 30', and taking care to keep to
the southward of the port; and if in fourteen days they were not joined
by the rest of the squadron, they were then to quit this station, and
to direct their course to the island of Juan Fernandes, after which
they were to {74} regulate their further proceedings by their former
orders. The same directions were also given to the master of the
_Anna_ pink, who was not to fail in answering the signals made by any
ship of the squadron, and was to be very careful to destroy his papers
and orders if he should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of
the enemy. And as the separation of the squadron might prove of the
utmost prejudice to his Majesty's service, each captain was ordered to
give it in charge to the respective officers of the watch not to keep
their ship at a greater distance from the _Centurion_ than two miles,
as they would answer it at their peril; and if any captain should find
his ship beyond the distance specified, he was to acquaint the
commodore with the name of the officer who had thus neglected his duty.
These necessary regulations being established, and the _Tryal_ sloop
compleated, the squadron weighed on Friday the 27th of February, at
seven in the morning, and stood to the sea; the _Gloucester_ indeed
found a difficulty in purchasing her anchor, and was left a
considerable way a-stern, so that in the night we fired several guns as
a signal to her captain to make sail, but he did not come up to us till
the next morning, when we found that they had been obliged to cut their
cable, and leave their best bower behind them. At ten in the morning,
the day after our departure, Wood's Mount, the high land over St.
Julian, bore from us N. by W. distant ten leagues, and we had fifty-two
fathom of water. And now standing to the southward, we had great
expectation of falling in with Pizarro's squadron; for, during our stay
at Port St. Julian, there had generally been hard gales between the
W.N.W. and S.W., so that we had reason to conclude the Spaniards had
gained no ground upon us in that interval. Indeed it was the prospect
of meeting with them that had occasioned our commodore to be so very
solicitous to prevent the separation of our ships, for had we been
solely intent upon getting round Cape Horn in the shortest time, the
properest method for this purpose would have been to have ordered each
ship to have made the best of her way to the rendezvous without waiting
for the rest.
From our departure from St. Julian to the 4th of March we had little
wind, with thick hazy weather and some rain; and our soundings were
generally from forty to fifty fathom, with a bottom of black and grey
sand, sometimes intermixed {75} with pebble stones. On the 4th of
March we were in sight of Cape Virgin Mary, and not more than six or
seven leagues distant from it. This cape is the northern boundary of
the entrance of the Straights of Magellan; it lies in the latitude of
52° 21' south, and longitude from London 71° 44' west, and seems to be
a low flat land, ending in a point. Off this cape our depth of water
was from thirty-five to forty-eight fathom. The afternoon of this day
was very bright and clear, with small breezes of wind, inclinable to a
calm, and most of the captains took the opportunity of this favourable
weather to pay a visit to the commodore; but while they were in company
together, they were all greatly alarmed by a sudden flame which burst
out on board the _Gloucester_, and which was succeeded by a cloud of
smoke. However, they were soon relieved from their apprehensions by
receiving information that the blast was occasioned by a spark of fire
from the forge lighting on some gunpowder and other combustibles which
an officer on board was preparing for use, in case we should fall in
with the Spanish fleet, and that it had been extinguished without any
damage to the ship.
We here found what was constantly verified by all our observations in
these high latitudes, that fair weather was always of an exceeding
short duration, and that when it was remarkably fine it was a certain
presage of a succeeding storm, for the calm and sunshine of our
afternoon ended in a most turbulent night, the wind freshning from the
S.W. as the night came on, and increasing its violence continually till
nine in the morning the next day, when it blew so hard that we were
obliged to bring-to with the squadron, and to continue under a reefed
mizen till eleven at night, having in that time from forty-three to
fifty-seven fathom water, with black sand and gravel; and by an
observation we had at noon, we concluded a current had set us twelve
miles to the southward of our reckoning. Towards midnight, the wind
abating, we made sail again, and steering south, we discovered in the
morning, for the first time, the land called Terra del Fuego,
stretching from the S. by W., to the S.E-½E. This indeed afforded us
but a very uncomfortable prospect, it appearing of a stupendous height,
covered everywhere with snow. The dreariness of this scene can be but
imperfectly represented by any drawing. We steered along this shore
all day, having soundings from forty to fifty {76} fathom, with stones
and gravel. And as we intended to pass through Streights Le Maire next
day, we lay-to at night, that we might not overshoot them, and took
this opportunity to prepare ourselves for the tempestuous climate we
were soon to be engaged in; with which view we employed ourselves good
part of the night in bending an entire new suit of sails to the yards.
At four the next morning, being the 7th of March, we made sail, and at
eight saw the land, and soon after we began to open the streights, at
which time Cape St. James bore from us E.S.E., Cape St. Vincent
S.E.½E., the middlemost of the Three Brothers S. and by W., Montegorda
south, and Cape St. Bartholomew, which is the souther-most point of
Staten-land, E.S.E. And here I must observe, that though Frezier has
given us a very correct prospect of the part of Terra del Fuego which
borders on the streights, yet he has omitted that of Staten-land, which
forms the opposite shore: hence we found it difficult to determine
exactly where the streights lay, till they began to open to our view;
and for want of this, if we had not happened to have coasted a
considerable way along shore, we might have missed the streights, and
have got to the eastward of Staten-land before we knew it. This is an
accident that has happened to many ships, particularly, as Frezier
mentions, to the _Incarnation_ and _Concord_, who intending to pass
through Streights Le Maire, were deceived by three hills on Staten-land
like the Three Brothers, and some creeks resembling those of Terra del
Fuego, and thereby overshot the streights.
And on occasion of the prospect of Staten-land, I cannot but remark,
that though Terra del Fuego had an aspect extremely barren and
desolate, yet this island of Staten-land far surpasses it in the
wildness and horror of its appearance, it seeming to be entirely
composed of inaccessible rocks, without the least mixture of earth or
mold between them. These rocks terminate in a vast number of ragged
points, which spire up to a prodigious height, and are all of them
covered with everlasting snow; the points themselves are on every side
surrounded with frightful precipices, and often overhang in a most
astonishing manner, and the hills which bear them are generally
separated from each other by narrow clefts which appear as if the
country had been frequently rent by earthquakes; for these chasms are
nearly perpendicular, and extend through the substance {77} of the main
rocks, almost to their very bottoms: so that nothing can be imagined
more savage and gloomy than the whole aspect of this coast. But to
proceed.
I have above mentioned, that on the 7th of March, in the morning, we
opened Streights Le Maire, and soon after, or about ten o'clock, the
_Pearl_ and the _Tryal_ being ordered to keep ahead of the squadron, we
entered them with fair weather and a brisk gale, and were hurried
through by the rapidity of the tide in about two hours, though they are
between seven and eight leagues in length. As these Streights are
often esteemed to be the boundary between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and as we presumed we had nothing before us from hence but an
open sea, till we arrived on those opulent coasts where all our hopes
and wishes centered, we could not help perswading ourselves that the
greatest difficulty of our voyage was now at an end, and that our most
sanguine dreams were upon the point of being realised; and hence we
indulged our imaginations in those romantic schemes which the fancied
possession of the Chilian gold and Peruvian silver might be conceived
to inspire. These joyous ideas were considerably heightened by the
brightness of the sky and serenity of the weather, which was indeed
most remarkably pleasing; for though the winter was now advancing
apace, yet the morning of this day, in its brilliancy and mildness,
gave place to none we had seen since our departure from England. Thus
animated by these flattering delusions, we passed those memorable
Streights, ignorant of the dreadful calamities which were then
impending, and just ready to break upon us; ignorant that the time drew
near when the squadron would be separated never to unite again, and
that this day of our passage was the last chearful day that the
greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy.
{78}
CHAPTER VIII
FROM STREIGHTS LE MAIRE TO CAPE NOIR
We had scarcely reached the southern extremity of the Streights Le
Maire, when our flattering hopes were instantly lost in the
apprehensions of immediate destruction: for before the sternmost ships
of the squadron were clear of the streights, the serenity of the sky
was suddenly obscured, and we observed all the presages of an impending
storm; and presently the wind shifted to the southward, and blew in
such violent squalls that we were obliged to hand our topsails, and
reef our main-sail; whilst the tide, too, which had hitherto favoured
us, at once turned furiously against us, and drove us to the eastward
with prodigious rapidity, so that we were in great anxiety for the
_Wager_ and the _Anna_ pink, the two sternmost vessels, fearing they
would be dashed to pieces against the shore of Staten-land: nor were
our apprehensions without foundation, for it was with the utmost
difficulty they escaped. And now the whole squadron, instead of
pursuing their intended course to the S.W., were driven to the eastward
by the united force of the storm and of the currents; so that next day
in the morning we found ourselves near seven leagues to the eastward of
Streights Le Maire, which then bore from us N.W. The violence of the
current, which had set us with so much precipitation to the eastward,
together with the fierceness and constancy of the westerly winds, soon
taught us to consider the doubling of Cape Horn as an enterprize that
might prove too mighty for our efforts, though some amongst us had
lately treated the difficulties which former voyagers were said to have
met with in this undertaking as little better than chimerical, and had
supposed them to arise rather from timidity and unskilfulness than from
the real embarrassments of the winds and seas: but we were now severely
convinced that these censures were rash and ill-grounded, for the
distresses with which we struggled, during the three succeeding months,
will not easily be paralleled in the relation of any former {79} naval
expedition. This will, I doubt not, be readily allowed by those who
shall carefully peruse the ensuing narration.
From the storm which came on before we had well got clear of Streights
Le Maire, we had a continual succession of such tempestuous weather as
surprized the oldest and most experienced mariners on board, and
obliged them to confess that what they had hitherto called storms were
inconsiderable gales compared with the violence of these winds, which
raised such short, and at the same time such mountainous waves, as
greatly surpassed in danger all seas known in any other part of the
globe: and it was not without great reason that this unusual appearance
filled us with continual terror; for, had any one of these waves broke
fairly over us, it must, in all probability, have sent us to the
bottom. Nor did we escape with terror only; for the ship rolling
incessantly gunwale to, gave us such quick and violent motions that the
men were in perpetual danger of being dashed to pieces against the
decks or sides of the ship. And though we were extremely careful to
secure ourselves from these shocks by grasping some fixed body, yet
many of our people were forced from their hold, some of whom were
killed, and others greatly injured; in particular, one of our best
seamen was canted overboard and drowned, another dislocated his neck, a
third was thrown into the main hold and broke his thigh, and one of our
boatswain's mates broke his collar-bone twice; not to mention many
other accidents of the same kind. These tempests, so dreadful in
themselves, though unattended by any other unfavourable circumstance,
were yet rendered more mischievous to us by their inequality, and the
deceitful intervals which they at sometimes afforded; for though we
were oftentimes obliged to lie-to, for days together, under a reefed
mizen, and were frequently reduced to lie at the mercy of the waves
under our bare poles, yet now and then we ventured to make sail with
our courses double reefed; and the weather proving more tolerable,
would perhaps encourage us to set our top-sails; after which, the wind,
without any previous notice, would return upon us with redoubled force,
and would in an instant tear our sails from the yards. And that no
circumstance might be wanting which could aggrandize our distress,
these blasts generally brought with them a great quantity of snow and
sleet, which cased our rigging, and froze our sails, thereby rendering
{80} them and our cordage brittle, and apt to snap upon the slightest
strain, adding great difficulty and labour to the working of the ship,
benumbing the limbs of our people, and making them incapable of
exerting themselves with their usual activity, and even disabling many
of them by mortifying their toes and fingers. It were indeed endless
to enumerate the various disasters of different kinds which befel us;
and I shall only mention the most material, which will sufficiently
evince the calamitous condition of the whole squadron during the course
of this navigation.
It was on the 7th of March, as hath been already observed, that we
passed Streights Le Maire, and were immediately afterwards driven to
the eastward by a violent storm, and the force of the current which set
that way. For the four or five succeeding days we had hard gales of
wind from the same quarter, with a most prodigious swell; so that
though we stood, during all that time, towards the S.W., yet we had no
reason to imagine we had made any way to the westward. In this
interval we had frequent squalls of rain and snow, and shipped great
quantities of water; after which, for three or four days, though the
seas ran mountains high, yet the weather was rather more moderate: but
on the 18th, we had again strong gales of wind, with extreme cold, and
at midnight the main top-sail split, and one of the straps of the main
dead-eyes broke. From hence to the 23d, the weather was more
favourable, though often intermixed with rain and sleet, and some hard
gales; but as the waves did not subside, the ship, by labouring in this
lofty sea, was now grown so loose in her upper works that she let in
the water at every seam, so that every part within board was constantly
exposed to the sea-water, and scarcely any of the officers ever lay in
dry beds. Indeed it was very rare that two nights ever passed without
many of them being driven from their beds by the deluge of water that
came in upon them.
On the 23d, we had a most violent storm of wind, hail, and rain, with a
very great sea; and though we handed the main top-sail before the
height of the squall, yet we found the yard sprung; and soon after the
foot rope of the main-sail breaking, the main-sail itself split
instantly to rags, and, in spite of our endeavours to save it, much the
greater part of it was blown overboard. On this, the commodore made
the signal for the squadron to bring-to; and the storm at length {81}
flattening to a calm, we had an opportunity of getting down our main
top-sail yard to put the carpenters to work upon it, and of repairing
our rigging; after which, having bent a new main-sail, we got under
sail again with a moderate breeze; but in less than twenty-four hours
we were attacked by another storm still more furious than the former;
for it proved a perfect hurricane, and reduced us to the necessity of
lying-to under our bare poles. As our ship kept the wind better than
any of the rest, we were obliged, in the afternoon, to wear ship, in
order to join the squadron to the leeward, which otherwise we should
have been in danger of losing in the night: and as we dared not venture
any sail abroad, we were obliged to make use of an expedient which
answered our purpose; this was putting the helm a weather, and manning
the fore-shrouds: but though this method proved successful for the end
intended, yet in the execution of it one of our ablest seamen was
canted overboard; we perceived that, notwithstanding the prodigious
agitation of the waves, he swam very strong, and it was with the utmost
concern that we found ourselves incapable of assisting him; indeed we
were the more grieved at his unhappy fate, as we lost sight of him
struggling with the waves, and conceived from the manner in which he
swam that he might continue sensible, for a considerable time longer,
of the horror attending his irretrievable situation.
Before this last-mentioned storm was quite abated, we found two of our
main-shrouds and one mizen-shroud broke, all which we knotted, and set
up immediately. From hence we had an interval of three or four days
less tempestuous than usual, but accompanied with a thick fog, in which
we were obliged to fire guns almost every half-hour, to keep our
squadron together. On the 31st, we were alarmed by a gun fired from
the _Gloucester_, and a signal made by her to speak with the commodore;
we immediately bore down to her, and were prepared to hear of some
terrible disaster; but we were apprized of it before we joined her, for
we saw that her main-yard was broke in the slings. This was a grievous
misfortune to us all at this juncture, as it was obvious it would prove
an hindrance to our sailing, and would detain us the longer in these
inhospitable latitudes. But our future success and safety was not to
be promoted by repining, but by resolution and activity; and therefore
that this unhappy {82} incident might delay us as little as possible,
the commodore ordered several carpenters to be put on board the
_Gloucester_ from the other ships of the squadron, in order to repair
her damage with the utmost expedition. And the captain of the _Tryal_
complaining at the same time that his pumps were so bad, and the sloop
made so great a quantity of water, that he was scarcely able to keep
her free, the commodore ordered him a pump ready fitted from his own
ship. It was very fortunate for the _Gloucester_ and the _Tryal_ that
the weather proved more favourable this day than for many days, both
before and after; since by this means they were enabled to receive the
assistance which seemed essential to their preservation, and which they
could scarcely have had at any other time, as it would have been
extremely hazardous to have ventured a boat on board.
The next day, that is, on the 1st of April, the weather returned again
to its customary bias, the sky looked dark and gloomy, and the wind
began to freshen and to blow in squalls; however, it was not yet so
boisterous as to prevent our carrying our top-sails close reefed; but
its appearance was such as plainly prognosticated that a still severer
tempest was at hand: and accordingly, on the 3d of April, there came on
a storm which both in its violence and continuation (for it lasted
three days) exceeded all that we had hitherto encountered. In its
first onset we received a furious shock from a sea which broke upon our
larboard quarter, where it stove in the quarter gallery, and rushed
into the ship like a deluge; our rigging too suffered extremely from
the blow; amongst the rest, one of the straps of the main dead-eyes was
broke, as was also a main-shroud and puttock-shroud, so that to ease
the stress upon the masts and shrouds, we lowered both our main and
fore-yards, and furled all our sails, and in this posture we lay-to for
three days, when the storm somewhat abating, we ventured to make sail
under our courses only; but even this we could not do long; for the
next day, which was the 7th, we had another hard gale of wind, with
lightening and rain, which obliged us to lie-to again till night. It
was wonderful that notwithstanding the hard weather we had endured, no
extraordinary accident had happened to any of the squadron since the
breaking of the _Gloucester's_ main-yard: but this good fortune now no
longer attended us; for at three the next morning, several guns were
fired to leeward as signals of distress: and the {83} commodore making
a signal for the squadron to bring-to, we, at daybreak, saw the _Wager_
a considerable way to leeward of any of the other ships; and we soon
perceived that she had lost her mizen-mast and main top-sail yard. We
immediately bore down to her, and found this disaster had arisen from
the badness of her iron work; for all the chain-plates to windward had
given way, upon the ship's fetching a deep roll. This proved the more
unfortunate to the _Wager_, as her carpenter had been on board the
_Gloucester_ ever since the 31st of March, and the weather was now too
severe to permit him to return. Nor was the _Wager_ the only ship of
the squadron that suffered in this tempest; for the next day a signal
of distress was made by the _Anna_ pink, and, upon speaking with the
master, we learnt that they had broke their fore-stay and the gammon of
the bowsprit, and were in no small danger of having all their masts
come by the board; so that we were obliged to bear away until they had
made all fast, after which we haled upon a wind again.
And now after all our solicitude, and the numerous ills of every kind
to which we had been incessantly exposed for near forty days, we had
great consolation in the flattering hopes we entertained that our
fatigues were drawing to a period, and that we should soon arrive in a
more hospitable climate, where we should be amply repayed for all our
past sufferings. For, towards the latter end of March, we were
advanced, by our reckoning, near 10° to the westward of the westernmost
point of Terra del Fuego, and this allowance being double what former
navigators have thought necessary to be taken, in order to compensate
the drift of the western current, we esteemed ourselves to be well
advanced within the limits of the southern ocean, and had therefore
been ever since standing to the northward with as much expedition as
the turbulence of the weather and our frequent disasters permitted.
And, on the 13th of April, we were but a degree in latitude to the
southward of the west entrance of the Streights of Magellan; so that we
fully expected, in a very few days, to have experienced the celebrated
tranquillity of the Pacifick Ocean.
But these were delusions which only served to render our disappointment
more terrible; for the next morning, between one and two, as we were
standing to the northward, and the weather, which had till then been
hazy, accidentally cleared up, the pink made a signal for seeing land
right ahead; and {84} it being but two miles distant, we were all under
the most dreadful apprehensions of running on shore, which, had either
the wind blown from its usual quarter with its wonted vigour, or had
not the moon suddenly shone out, not a ship amongst us could possibly
have avoided: but the wind, which some few hours before blew in squalls
from the S.W., having fortunately shifted to W.N.W., we were enabled to
stand to the southward, and to clear ourselves of this unexpected
danger, and were fortunate enough by noon to have gained an offing of
near twenty leagues.
By the latitude of this land we fell in with, it was agreed to be a
part of Terra del Fuego, near the southern outlet described in
Frezier's chart of the Streights of Magellan, and was supposed to be
that point called by him Cape Noir. It was indeed most wonderful that
the currents should have driven us to the eastward with such strength;
for the whole squadron esteemed themselves upwards of ten degrees more
westerly than this land, so that in running down, by our account, about
nineteen degrees of longitude, we had not really advanced half that
distance. And now, instead of having our labours and anxieties
relieved by approaching a warmer climate and more tranquil seas, we
were to steer again to the southward, and were again to combat those
western blasts which had so often terrified us; and this too when we
were greatly enfeebled by our men falling sick, and dying apace, and
when our spirits, dejected by a long continuance at sea, and by our
late disappointment, were much less capable of supporting us in the
various difficulties which we could not but expect in this new
undertaking. Add to all this, too, the discouragement we received by
the diminution of the strength of the squadron; for, three days before
this, we lost sight of the _Severn_ and the _Pearl_ in the morning, and
though we spread our ships, and beat about for them some time, yet we
never saw them more; whence we had apprehensions that they too might
have fallen in with this land in the night, and by being less favoured
by the wind and the moon than we were, might have run on shore and have
perished. Full of these desponding thoughts and gloomy presages, we
stood away to the S.W., prepared by our late disaster to suspect that
how large soever an allowance we made in our westing for the drift of
the western current, we might still, upon a second trial, perhaps find
it insufficient.
{85}
CHAPTER IX
OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE PASSAGE OF OUR FUTURE
CRUISERS ROUND CAPE HORN
The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape
Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the
foregoing chapter) of falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned
ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast,
and consequently well advanced into the Pacifick Ocean; this
unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our
too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the
misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the
separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our
project on Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish places,
and the reduction of our squadron from the formidable condition in
which it passed Streights Le Maire to a couple of shattered half-manned
cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled that in many climates they
scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in
me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the South Seas from suffering the
same calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such
directions and observations as either my own experience and reflection,
or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the
squadron, could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible
manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the
year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment
both on the east and west side of South America.
And first, with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the east
side of South America. For this purpose the island of St. Catherine's
has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their faith we
put in there, as has been formerly mentioned. But the treatment we met
with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are
sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious {86} how
they trust themselves in the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz, for
they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition, and
designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor
can procure of these particulars will give him leave. And as this
treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain in the
illicit commerce carried on to the river of Plate, rather than by any
national affection which the Portuguese bear the Spaniards, the same
perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors of the
Brazil coast, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very
extensive and general. And though the governors should themselves
detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing
from some or other of the Brazil ports to the river of Plate, the
Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual
intelligence of any British ships upon the coast, which, however
imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import
to the views and interests of those cruisers who were thus discovered.
For the Spanish trade in the South Seas running all in one track from
north to south, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward,
it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in
different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that
puts to sea; but this is only so long as they can continue concealed
from the neighbouring coast, for the instant an enemy is known to be in
those seas, all navigation is prohibited, and consequently all captures
are at an end, since the Spaniards, well apprized of these advantages
of the enemy, send expresses along the coast and lay a general embargo
on all their trade; a measure which they prudentially foresee will not
only prevent their vessels being taken, but will soon lay any cruisers
who have not strength sufficient to attempt their places under
necessity of returning home. Hence then appears the great importance
of concealing all expeditions of this kind, and hence, too, it follows
how extremely prejudicial that intelligence may prove which is given by
the Portuguese governors to the Spaniards in relation to the designs of
ships touching at the ports of Brazil.
However, notwithstanding the inconveniences we have mentioned of
touching on the coast of Brazil, it will often-times happen that ships
bound round Cape Horn will be {87} obliged to call there for a supply
of wood and water, and other refreshments. In this case, St.
Catherine's is the last place I would recommend, both as the proper
animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, cannot be
procured there (for want of which we found ourselves greatly
distressed, by being reduced to live almost entirely on salt
provisions), and also because, from its being nearer the river of Plate
than many of their other settlements, the inducements and conveniences
of betraying us are much stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio
Janeiro, where two of our squadron put in after they were separated
from us in passing Cape Horn, for here, as I have been informed by one
of the gentlemen on board those ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry
may be procured; and this place being more distant from the river of
Plate, the difficulty of intelligence is somewhat inhanced, and
consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered in some degree
augmented. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these
embarrassments, shall be considered more at large hereafter.
I next proceed to the consideration of the proper course to be steered
for doubling Cape Horn. And here, I think, I am sufficiently
authorised by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and
examination of the journals of former navigators, to give this piece of
advice, which in prudence I think ought never to be departed from: that
is, that all ships bound to the South Seas, instead of passing through
Streights Le Maire, should constantly pass to the eastward of
Staten-land, and should be invariably bent on running to the southward,
as far as the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before they endeavour to
stand to the westward; and that when they are got into that latitude
they should then make sure of sufficient westing before they once think
of steering to the northward.
But as directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly
given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons for
each part of this maxim. And first, as to the passing to the eastward
of Staten-land. Those who have attended to the risque we ran in
passing Streights Le Maire, the danger we were in of being driven upon
Staten-land by the current, when, though we happily escaped being put
on shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that island; those who
reflect on this, and the like {88} accidents which have happened to
other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to pass through
Streights Le Maire, and run the risque of shipwreck, and after all find
themselves no farther to the westward (the only reason hitherto given
for this practice) than they might have been in the same time by a
secure navigation in an open sea.
And next as to the directions I have given for running into the
latitude of 61 or 62 south, before any endeavour is made to stand to
the westward. The reasons for this precept are, that in all
probability the violence of the currents will be hereby avoided, and
the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This last
circumstance we ourselves experienced most remarkably, for after we had
unexpectedly fallen in with the land, as has been mentioned in the
preceding chapter, we stood away to the southward to run clear of it,
and were no sooner advanced into sixty degrees or upwards but we met
with much better weather and smoother water than in any other part of
the whole passage. The air indeed was very cold and sharp, and we had
strong gales, but they were steady and uniform, and we had at the same
time sunshine and a clear sky; whereas in the lower latitudes the winds
every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength,
and then returned suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at
each blast the loss of our masts, which must have ended in our certain
destruction. And that the currents in this high latitude would be of
much less efficacy than nearer the land seems to be evinced from these
considerations, that all currents run with greater violence near the
shore than at sea, and that at great distances from shore they are
scarcely perceptible. Indeed the reason of this seems sufficiently
obvious, if we consider that constant currents are, in all probability,
produced by constant winds, the wind driving before it, though with a
slow and imperceptible motion, a large body of water, which being
accumulated upon any coast that it meets with, must escape along the
shore by the endeavours of its surface to reduce itself to the same
level with the rest of the ocean. And it is reasonable to suppose that
those violent gusts of wind which we experienced near the shore, so
very different from what we found in the latitude of sixty degrees and
upwards, may be owing to a similar cause, for a westerly wind almost
perpetually prevails in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. {89}
And this current of air being interrupted by those immense hills called
the Andes, and by the mountains on Terra del Fuego, which together bar
up the whole country to the southward as far as Cape Horn, a part of it
only can force its way over the tops of those prodigious precipices,
whilst the rest must naturally follow the direction of the coast, and
must range down the land to the southward, and sweep with an impetuous
and irregular blast round Cape Horn and the southermost part of Terra
del Fuego. However, not to rely on these speculations, we may, I
believe, establish as incontestible these matters of fact, that both
the rapidity of the currents and the violence of the western gales are
less sensible in the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees than nearer the shore
of Terra del Fuego.
But though I am satisfied from both our own experience, and the
relations of other navigators, of the importance of the precept I here
insist on, that of running into the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees,
before any endeavours are made to stand to the westward, yet I would
advise no ships hereafter to trust so far to this management as to
neglect another most essential maxim, which is the making this passage
in the height of summer--that is, in the months of December and
January; and the more distant the time of passing is taken from this
season, the more disastrous it may be reasonably expected to prove.
Indeed, if the mere violence of the western winds be considered, the
time of our passage, which was about the equinox, was perhaps the most
unfavourable of the whole year; but then it must be remembered that
independent of the winds there are in the depth of winter many other
inconveniences to be apprehended which are almost insuperable, for the
severity of the cold and the shortness of the days would render it
impracticable at that season to run so far to the southward as is here
recommended; and the same reasons would greatly augment the alarms of
sailing in the neighbourhood of an unknown shore, dreadful in its
appearance in the midst of summer, and would make a winter navigation
on this coast to be, of all others, the most dismaying and terrible.
As I would therefore advise all ships to make their passage in December
and January, if possible, so I would warn them never to attempt the
doubling Cape Horn, from the eastward, after the month of March.
{90}
And now, as to the remaining consideration, that is, the properest port
for cruisers to refresh at on their first arrival in the South Seas.
On this head there is scarcely any choice, the island of Juan Fernandes
being the only place that can be prudently recommended for this
purpose. For though there are many ports on the western side of
Patagonia, between the Streights of Magellan and the Spanish
settlements, where ships might ride in great safety, might recruit
their wood and water, and might procure some few refreshments, yet that
coast is in itself so dangerous from its numerous rocks and breakers,
and from the violence of the western winds which blow constantly full
upon it, that it is by no means adviseable to fall in with that land,
at least till the roads, channels, and anchorage, in each part of it
are accurately surveyed, and both the perils and shelter it abounds
with are more distinctly known.
Thus having given the best directions in my power for the success of
our cruisers who may be hereafter bound to the South Seas, it might be
expected that I should again resume the thread of my narration. Yet as
both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work I have thought
it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate such
maxims as had the least appearance of proving beneficial to future
navigators, but also occasionally to recommend such measures to the
public as I conceive are adapted to promote the same laudable purpose,
I cannot desist from the present subject without beseeching those to
whom the conduct of our naval affairs is committed to endeavour to
remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the
navigation to the South Seas is at present necessarily encumbered. An
effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to
themselves, and extremely beneficial to their country. For it seems to
be sufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall
receive, either by the invention of methods that shall render its
practice less hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the
coasts, roads, and ports already known, or by the discovery of new
nations, or new species of commerce; it seems, I say, sufficiently
evident, that by whatever means navigation is promoted, the
conveniences hence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of
Great Britain. Since as our fleets are at present superior to those of
the {91} whole world united, it must be a matchless degree of
supineness or mean-spiritedness if we permitted any of the advantages
which new discoveries, or a more extended navigation, may produce to
mankind to be ravished from us.
As, therefore, it appears that all our future expeditions to the South
Seas must run a considerable risque of proving abortive whilst in our
passage thither, we are under the necessity of touching at Brazil, the
discovery of some place more to the southward, where ships might
refresh and supply themselves with the necessary sea-stock for their
voyage round Cape Horn, would be an expedient which would relieve us
from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter worthy of the
attention of the public. Nor does this seem difficult to be effected.
For we have already the imperfect knowledge of two places which might
perhaps, on examination, prove extremely convenient for this purpose.
One of them is Pepys's Island, in the latitude of 47° south, and laid
down by Dr. Halley about eighty leagues to the eastward of Cape Blanco,
on the coast of Patagonia; the other is Falkland's Isles, in the
latitude of 51-½°, lying nearly south of Pepys's Island. The first of
these was discovered by Captain Cowley in his voyage round the world in
the year 1686, who represents it as a commodious place for ships to
wood and water at, and says it is provided with a very good and
capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride at anchor
in great safety; that it abounds with fowls, and that as the shore is
either rocks or sands, it seems to promise great plenty of fish. The
second place, or Falkland's Isles, has been seen by many ships, both
French and English, being the land laid down by Frezier, in his chart
of the extremity of South America, under the title of the New Islands.
Woodes Rogers, who run along the N.E. coast of these isles in the year
1708, tells us that they extended about two degrees in length, and
appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, and seemed to be good
ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours. Either
of these places, as they are islands at a considerable distance from
the continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to lie in a
climate sufficiently temperate. It is true, they are too little known
to be at present recommended as the most eligible places of refreshment
for ships bound to the southward, but if the Admiralty should think it
adviseable to {92} order them to be surveyed, which may be done at a
very small expence by a vessel fitted out on purpose, and if, on this
examination, one or both of these places should appear proper for the
purpose intended, it is scarcely to be conceived of what prodigious
import a convenient station might prove, situated so far to the
southward, and so near Cape Horn. The Duke and Duchess of Bristol were
but thirty-five days from their losing sight of Falkland's Isles to
their arrival at Juan Fernandes in the South Seas: and as the returning
back is much facilitated by the western winds, I doubt not but a voyage
might be made from Falkland's Isles to Juan Fernandes and back again in
little more than two months. This, even in time of peace, might be of
great consequence to this nation; and, in time of war, would make us
masters of those seas.
And as all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to
those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an
inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the properest to
be employed in this service: it were to be wished that the whole coast
of Patagonia, Terra del Fuego, and Staten-land were carefully surveyed,
and the numerous channels, roads, and harbours with which they abound
were accurately examined. This might open to us facilities of passing
into the Pacifick Ocean, which as yet we may be unacquainted with, and
would render all that southern navigation infinitely securer than at
present; particularly an exact draught of the west coast of Patagonia,
from the Streights of Magellan to the Spanish settlements, might
perhaps furnish us with better and more convenient ports for
refreshment, and better situated for the purposes either of war or
commerce, and above a fortnight's sail nearer to Falkland's Island than
the island of Juan Fernandes. The discovery of this coast hath
formerly been thought of such consequence by reason of its
neighbourhood to the Araucos and other Chilian Indians, who are
generally at war, or at least on ill terms, with their Spanish
neighbours, that Sir John Narborough was purposely fitted out in the
reign of King Charles II. to survey the Streights of Magellan, the
neighbouring coast of Patagonia, and the Spanish ports on that
frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse
with the Chilian Indians, and to establish a commerce and a lasting
correspondence with them. His {93} Majesty's views in employing Sir
John Narborough in this expedition were not solely the advantage he
might hope to receive from the alliance of those savages, in
restraining and intimidating the crown of Spain; but he conceived that,
independent of those motives, the immediate traffick with these Indians
might prove extremely advantageous to the English nation. For it is
well known that at the first discovery of Chili by the Spaniards, it
abounded with vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has at any
time produced since it has been in their possession. And hence it has
been generally believed that the richest mines are carefully concealed
by the Indians, as well knowing that the discovery of them would only
excite in the Spaniards a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and
would render their own independence more precarious. But with respect
to their commerce with the English, these reasons would no longer
influence them; since it would be in our power to furnish them with
arms and ammunition of all kinds, of which they are extremely desirous,
together with many other conveniencies which their intercourse with the
Spaniards has taught them to relish. They would then, in all
probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffick of such
mutual convenience to both nations; for then their gold, instead of
proving an incitement to enslave them, would procure them weapons to
assert their liberty, to chastise their tyrants, and to secure
themselves for ever from the Spanish yoke; whilst with our assistance,
and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and
might secure to us that wealth which formerly by the House of Austria,
and lately by the House of Bourbon, has been most mischievously
lavished in the pursuit of universal monarchy.
It is true, Sir John Narborough did not succeed in opening this
commerce, which, in appearance, promised so many advantages to this
nation. However, his disappointment was merely accidental, and his
transactions upon that coast (besides the many valuable improvements he
furnished to geography and navigation) are rather an encouragement for
future trials of this kind than any objection against them; his
principal misfortune being the losing company of a small bark which
attended him, and having some of his people trepanned at Baldivia.
However, it appeared, by the precautions and fears of the Spaniards,
that they were fully {94} convinced of the practicability of the scheme
he was sent to execute, and extremely alarmed with the apprehension of
its consequences. It is said that his Majesty King Charles the Second
was so far prepossessed with the belief of the emoluments which might
redound to the publick from this expedition, and was so eager to be
informed of the event of it, that having intelligence of Sir John
Narborough's passing through the Downs on his return, he had not
patience to attend his arrival at court, but went himself in his barge
to Gravesend to meet him.
To facilitate as much as possible any attempts of this kind which may
be hereafter undertaken, I prepared a chart of that part of the world,
as far as it is hitherto known, which I flatter myself is, in some
respects, much correcter than any which has been yet published. To
evince which, it may be necessary to mention what materials I have
principally made use of, and what changes I have introduced different
from other authors.
The two most celebrated charts hitherto published of the southermost
part of South America, are those of Dr. Halley, in his general chart of
the magnetic variation, and of Frezier in his voyage to the South Seas.
But besides these, there is a chart of the Streights of Magellan, and
of some part of the adjacent coast, by Sir John Narborough
above-mentioned, which is doubtless infinitely exacter in that part
than Frezier's, and in some respects superior to Halley's, particularly
in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of those
streights. The coast from Cape Blanco to Terra del Fuego, and thence
to Streights Le Maire, we were in some measure capable of correcting by
our own observations, as we ranged that shore generally in sight of
land. The position of the land to the northward of the Streights of
Magellan, on the west side, is doubtless laid down but very
imperfectly; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than what
has hitherto been done, as it is drawn from the information of some of
the _Wager's_ crew who were shipwrecked on that shore and afterwards
coasted it down, and as it agrees pretty nearly with the description of
some Spanish manuscripts I have seen. The channel dividing Terra del
Fuego is drawn from Frezier; but Sir Francis Drake, who first
discovered Cape Horn, and the S.W. part of Terra del Fuego, observed
that whole coast to be divided by {95} a great number of inlets, all
which he conceived did communicate with the Streights of Magellan. And
I doubt not that whenever this country is thoroughly examined this
circumstance will be verified, and Terra del Fuego will be found to
consist of several islands.
And having mentioned Frezier so often, I must not omit warning all
future navigators against relying on the longitude of Streights Le
Maire, or of any part of that coast, laid down in his chart, the whole
being from 8 to 10 degrees too far to the eastward, if any faith can be
given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals,
verified in some particulars by astronomical observation. For
instance, Sir John Narborough places Cape Virgin Mary in 65° 42' of
west longitude from the Lizard, that is in about 71-½° from London.
And the ships of our squadron, who took their departure from St.
Catherine's (where the longitude was rectified by an observation of the
eclipse of the moon), found Cape Virgin Mary to be from 70-½° to 72-½°
from London, according to their different reckonings; and since there
were no circumstances in our run that could render it considerably
erroneous, it cannot be esteemed in less than 71 degrees of west
longitude; whereas Frezier lays it down in less than 66 degrees from
Paris, that is, little more than 63 degrees from London, which is
doubtless 8 degrees short of its true quantity. Again, our squadron
found Cape Virgin Mary and Streights Le Maire to be not more than 2-½°
different in longitude, which in Frezier are distant near 4 degrees, so
that not only the longitude of Cape St. Bartholomew is laid down in him
near 10 degrees too little, but the coast from the Streights of
Magellan to Streights Le Maire is enlarged to near double its real
extent.
But to have done with Frezier, whose errors, the importance of the
subject, and not a fondness for cavilling, has obliged me to remark
(though his treatment of Dr. Halley might, on the present occasion,
authorise much severer usage), I must, in the next place, relate
wherein I differ from that of our learned countryman last mentioned.
It is well known that this gentleman was sent abroad by the public to
make such geographical and astronomical observations as might
facilitate the future practice of navigation, and particularly to
determine the variation of the compass in such places as he should
touch at, and, if {96} possible, to ascertain its general laws and
affections. These things Dr. Halley, to his immortal reputation and
the honour of our nation, in good measure accomplished, especially with
regard to the variation of the compass, a subject, of all others, the
most interesting to those employed in the art of navigation. He
likewise corrected the position of the coast of Brazil, which had been
very erroneously laid down by all former hydrographers; and from a
judicious comparison of the observations of others, he happily
succeeded in settling the geography of many considerable places where
he had not himself been. So that the chart he composed, with the
variation of the needle marked thereon, being the result of his labours
on this subject, was allowed by all Europe to be far compleater in its
geography than any that had till then been published, whilst it was at
the same time most surprisingly exact in the quantity of variation
assigned to the different parts of the globe; a subject so very
intricate and perplexing, that all general determinations about it had
been usually deemed impossible.
But as the only means he had of correcting the situation of those
coasts, where he did not touch himself, were the observations of
others, when those observations were wanting, or were inaccurate, it
was no imputation on his skill that his decisions were defective. And
this, upon the best comparison I have been able to make, is the case
with regard to that part of his chart, which contains the south coast
of South America. For though the coast of Brazil, and the opposite
coast of Peru on the South Seas, are laid down, I presume, with the
greatest accuracy, yet from about the river of Plate on the east side,
and its opposite point on the west, the coast gradually declines too
much to the westward, so as at the Streights of Magellan to be, as I
conceive, about fifty leagues removed from its true position; at least,
this is the result of the observations of our squadron, which agree
extremely well with those of Sir John Narborough. I must add that Dr.
Halley has, in the philosophical transactions, given the foundation on
which he has proceeded in fixing Port St. Julian in 76-½° of west
longitude, which the concurrent journals of our squadron place from
70-¾° to 71-½°. This, he tells us, was an observation of an eclipse of
the moon made at that place by Mr. Wood, then Sir John Narborough's
lieutenant, and which is said to have happened {97} there at eight in
the evening, on the 18th of September 1670. But Captain Wood's journal
of this whole voyage under Sir John Narborough is since published
together with this observation, in which he determines the longitude of
Port St. Julian to be 73 degrees from London, and the time of the
eclipse to have been different from Dr. Halley's account. But the
numbers he has given are so faultily printed that nothing can be
determined from them.
{98}
CHAPTER X
FROM CAPE NOIR TO THE ISLAND OF JUAN FERNANDES
After the mortifying disappointment of falling in with the coast of
Terra del Fuego, when we esteemed ourselves ten degrees to the westward
of it, as hath been at large recited in the eighth chapter, we stood
away to the S.W. till the 22d of April, when we were in upwards of 60°
of south latitude, and by our account near 6° to the westward of Cape
Noir. In this run, we had a series of as favourable weather as could
well be expected in that part of the world, even in a better season, so
that this interval, setting the inquietude of our thoughts aside, was
by far the most eligible of any we enjoyed from Streights Le Maire to
the west coast of America. This moderate weather continued with little
variation till the 24th, but on the 24th, in the evening, the wind
began to blow fresh, and soon increased to a prodigious storm, and the
weather being extremely thick, about midnight we lost sight of the
other four ships of the squadron, which, notwithstanding the violence
of the preceding storms, had hitherto kept in company with us. Nor was
this our sole misfortune, for the next morning, endeavouring to hand
the top-sails, the clew-lines and bunt-lines broke, and the sheets
being half-flown, every seam in the top-sails was soon split from top
to bottom, and the main top-sail shook so strongly in the wind that it
carried away the top lanthorn, and endangered the head of the mast;
however, at length some of the most daring of our men ventured upon the
yard and cut the sail away close to the reefs, though with the utmost
hazard of their lives. Whilst at the same time the fore top-sail beat
about the yard with so much fury that it was soon blown to pieces; nor
was our attention to our top-sails our sole employment, for the
main-sail blew loose, which obliged us to lower down the yard to secure
the sail, and the fore-yard being likewise lowered, we lay-to under a
mizen. In this storm, besides the loss of our top-sails, we had much
of our {99} rigging broke, and lost a main-studding sail-boom out of
the chains.
On the 25th, about noon, the weather became more moderate, which
enabled us to sway up our yards, and to repair, in the best manner we
could, our shattered rigging, but still we had no sight of the rest of
our squadron, nor indeed were we joined by any of them again till after
our arrival at Juan Fernandes, nor did any two of them, as we have
since learned, continue in company together. This total and almost
instantaneous separation was the more wonderful as we had hitherto kept
together for seven weeks, through all the reiterated tempests of this
turbulent climate. It must indeed be owned that we had hence room to
expect that we might make our passage in a shorter time than if we had
continued together, because we could now make the best of our way
without being retarded by the misfortunes of the other ships; but then
we had the melancholy reflection that we ourselves were hereby deprived
of the assistance of others, and our safety would depend upon our
single ship, so that if a plank started, or any other accident of the
same nature should take place, we must all irrecoverably perish; or
should we be driven on shore, we had the uncomfortable prospect of
ending our days on some desolate coast, without any reasonable hope of
ever getting off again, whereas, with another ship in company, all
these calamities are much less formidable, since in every kind of
danger there would be some probability that one ship at least might
escape, and might be capable of preserving or relieving the crew of the
other.
The remaining part of this month of April we had generally hard gales,
although we had been every day, since the 22d, edging to the northward;
however, on the last day of the month, we flattered ourselves with the
expectation of soon terminating all our sufferings, for we that day
found ourselves in the latitude of 52° 13', which being to the
northward of the Streights of Magellan, we were assured that we had
compleated our passage, and had arrived in the confines of the southern
ocean; and this ocean being denominated Pacifick, from the equability
of the seasons which are said to prevail there, and the facility and
security with which navigation is there carried on, we doubted not but
we should be speedily cheared with the moderate gales, the smooth
water, {100} and the temperate air for which that track of the globe
has been so renowned. And under the influence of these pleasing
circumstances we hoped to experience some kind of compensation for the
complicated miseries which had so constantly attended us for the last
eight weeks. But here we were again disappointed, for in the
succeeding month of May our sufferings rose to a much higher pitch than
they had ever yet done, whether we consider the violence of the storms,
the shattering of our sails and rigging, or the diminishing and
weakening of our crew by deaths and sickness, and the probable prospect
of our total destruction. All this will be sufficiently evident from
the following circumstantial account of our diversified misfortunes.
Soon after our passing Streights Le Maire, the scurvy began to make its
appearance amongst us, and our long continuance at sea, the fatigue we
underwent, and the various disappointments we met with, had occasioned
its spreading to such a degree that at the latter end of April there
were but few on board who were not in some degree afflicted with it,
and in that month no less than forty-three died of it on board the
_Centurion_. But though we thought that the distemper had then risen
to an extraordinary height, and were willing to hope that as we
advanced to the northward its malignity would abate, yet we found, on
the contrary, that in the month of May we lost near double that number;
and as we did not get to land till the middle of June, the mortality
went on increasing, and the disease extended itself so prodigiously
that, after the loss of above two hundred men, we could not at last
muster more than six fore-mast men in a watch capable of duty.
This disease, so frequently attending long voyages, and so particularly
destructive to us, is surely the most singular and unaccountable of any
that affects the human body. Its symptoms are inconstant and
innumerable, and its progress and effects extremely irregular; for
scarcely any two persons have complaints exactly resembling each other,
and where there hath been found some conformity in the symptoms, the
order of their appearance has been totally different. However, though
it frequently puts on the form of many other diseases, and is therefore
not to be described by any exclusive and infallible criterions, yet
there are some symptoms which are more general than the rest, and,
{101} occurring the oftenest, deserve a more particular enumeration.
These common appearances are large discoloured spots dispersed over the
whole surface of the body, swelled legs, putrid gums, and, above all,
an extraordinary lassitude of the whole body, especially after any
exercise, however inconsiderable; and this lassitude at last
degenerates into a proneness to swoon, and even die, on the least
exertion of strength, or even on the least motion.
This disease is likewise usually attended with a strange dejection of
the spirits, and with shiverings, tremblings, and a disposition to be
seized with the most dreadful terrors on the slightest accident.
Indeed it was most remarkable, in all our reiterated experience of this
malady, that whatever discouraged our people, or at any time damped
their hopes, never failed to add new vigour to the distemper; for it
usually killed those who were in the last stages of it, and confined
those to their hammocks who were before capable of some kind of duty;
so that it seemed as if alacrity of mind, and sanguine thoughts, were
no contemptible preservatives from its fatal malignity.
But it is not easy to compleat the long roll of the various
concomitants of this disease; for it often produced putrid fevers,
pleurisies, the jaundice, and violent rheumatic pains, and sometimes it
occasioned an obstinate costiveness, which was generally attended with
a difficulty of breathing, and this was esteemed the most deadly of all
the scorbutick symptoms; at other times the whole body, but more
especially the legs, were subject to ulcers of the worst kind, attended
with rotten bones, and such a luxuriancy of fungous flesh as yielded to
no remedy. But a most extraordinary circumstance, and what would be
scarcely credible upon any single evidence, is, that the scars of
wounds which had been for many years healed were forced open again by
this virulent distemper. Of this there was a remarkable instance in
one of the invalids on board the _Centurion_, who had been wounded
above fifty years before at the battle of the Boyne, for though he was
cured soon after, and had continued well for a great number of years
past, yet on his being attacked by the scurvy, his wounds, in the
progress of his disease, broke out afresh, and appeared as if they had
never been healed: nay, what is still more astonishing, the callus of a
broken bone, which had been compleatly formed for a long {102} time,
was found to be hereby dissolved, and the fracture seemed as if it had
never been consolidated. Indeed, the effects of this disease were in
almost every instance wonderful; for many of our people, though
confined to their hammocks, appeared to have no inconsiderable share of
health, for they eat and drank heartily, were chearful, and talked with
much seeming vigour, and with a loud strong tone of voice; and yet, on
their being the least moved, though it was from only one part of the
ship to the other, and that too in their hammocks, they have
immediately expired; and others, who have confided in their seeming
strength, and have resolved to get out of their hammocks, have died
before they could well reach the deck; nor was it an uncommon thing for
those who were able to walk the deck, and to do some kind of duty, to
drop down dead in an instant, on any endeavours to act with their
utmost effort, many of our people having perished in this manner during
the course of this voyage.
With this terrible disease we struggled the greatest part of the time
of our beating round Cape Horn; and though it did not then rage with
its utmost violence, yet we buried no less than forty-three men on
board the _Centurion_ in the month of April, as hath been already
observed; however, we still entertained hopes that when we should have
once secured our passage round the Cape, we should put a period to
this, and all the other evils which had so constantly pursued us. But
it was our misfortune to find that the Pacifick Ocean was to us less
hospitable than the turbulent neighbourhood of Terra del Fuego and Cape
Horn. For being arrived, on the 8th of May, off the island of Socoro,
which was the first rendezvous appointed for the squadron, and where we
hoped to have met with some of our companions, we cruised for them in
that station several days. But here we were not only disappointed in
our expectations of being joined by our friends, and were thereby
induced to favour the gloomy suggestions of their having all perished;
but we were likewise perpetually alarmed with the fears of being driven
on shore upon this coast, which appeared too craggy and irregular to
give us the least prospect that in such a case any of us could possibly
escape immediate destruction. For the land had indeed a most
tremendous aspect: the most distant part of it, and which appeared far
{103} within the country, being the mountains usually called the Andes
or Cordilleras, was extremely high and covered with snow; and the coast
itself seemed quite rocky and barren, and the water's edge skirted with
precipices. In some places indeed we discerned several deep bays
running into the land, but the entrance into them was generally blocked
up by numbers of little islands; and though it was not improbable but
there might be convenient shelter in some of those bays, and proper
channels leading thereto, yet, as we were utterly ignorant of the
coast, had we been driven ashore by the western winds which blew almost
constantly there, we did not expect to have avoided the loss of our
ship, and of our lives.
This continued peril, which lasted for above a fortnight, was greatly
aggravated by the difficulties we found in working the ship, as the
scurvy had by this time destroyed so great a part of our hands, and had
in some degree affected almost the whole crew. Nor did we, as we
hoped, find the winds less violent as we advanced to the northward; for
we had often prodigious squalls which split our sails, greatly damaged
our rigging, and endangered our masts. Indeed, during the greatest
part of the time we were upon this coast, the wind blew so hard, that
in another situation, where we had sufficient sea room, we should
certainly have lain-to; but in the present exigency we were
necessitated to carry both our courses and top-sails in order to keep
clear of this lee shore. In one of these squalls, which was attended
by several violent claps of thunder, a sudden flash of fire darted
along our decks, which, dividing, exploded with a report like that of
several pistols, and wounded many of our men and officers as it passed,
marking them in different parts of the body. This flame was attended
with a strong sulphureous stench, and was doubtless of the same nature
with the larger and more violent blasts of lightning which then filled
the air.
It were endless to recite minutely the various disasters, fatigues, and
terrors which we encountered on this coast; all these went on
increasing till the 22d of May, at which time the fury of all the
storms which we had hitherto encountered seemed to be combined, and to
have conspired our destruction. In this hurricane almost all our sails
were split, and great part of our standing rigging broken; and, about
eight in the evening, a mountainous over-grown sea {104} took us upon
our starboard-quarter, and gave us so prodigious a shock that several
of our shrouds broke with the jerk, by which our masts were greatly
endangered; our ballast and stores too were so strangely shifted that
the ship heeled afterwards two streaks to port. Indeed it was a most
tremendous blow, and we were thrown into the utmost consternation from
the apprehension of instantly foundering; and though the wind abated in
a few hours, yet, as we had no more sails left in a condition to bend
to our yards, the ship laboured very much in a hollow sea, rolling
gunwale to, for want of sail to steady her: so that we expected our
masts, which were now very slenderly supported, to come by the board
every moment. However, we exerted ourselves the best we could to
stirrup our shrouds, to reeve new lanyards, and to mend our sails; but
while these necessary operations were carrying on, we ran great risque
of being driven on shore on the island of Chiloe, which was not far
distant from us; but in the midst of our peril the wind happily shifted
to the southward, and we steered off the land with the main-sail only,
the master and myself undertaking the management of the helm, while
every one else on board was busied in securing the masts, and bending
the sails as fast as they could be repaired. This was the last effort
of that stormy climate; for in a day or two after we got clear of the
land, and found the weather more moderate than we had yet experienced
since our passing Streights Le Maire. And now having cruized in vain
for more than a fortnight in quest of the other ships of the squadron,
it was resolved to take the advantage of the present favourable season,
and the offing we had made from this terrible coast, and to make the
best of our way for the island of Juan Fernandes. For though our next
rendezvous was appointed off the harbour of Baldivia, yet as we had
hitherto seen none of our companions at this first rendezvous, it was
not to be supposed that any of them would be found at the second:
indeed we had the greatest reason to suspect that all but ourselves had
perished. Besides, we were by this time reduced to so low a condition,
that instead of attempting to attack the places of the enemy, our
utmost hopes could only suggest to us the possibility of saving the
ship, and some part of the remaining enfeebled crew, by our speedy
arrival at Juan Fernandes; for this was the only road in that part of
the {105} world where there was any probability of our recovering our
sick, or refitting our vessel, and consequently our getting thither was
the only chance we had left to avoid perishing at sea.
Our deplorable situation then allowing no room for deliberation, we
stood for the island of Juan Fernandes; and to save time, which was now
extremely precious (our men dying four, five, and six in a day), and
likewise to avoid being engaged again with a lee shore, we resolved, if
possible, to hit the island upon a meridian. And, on the 28th of May,
being nearly in the parallel upon which it is laid down, we had great
expectations of seeing it: but not finding it in the position in which
the charts had taught us to expect it, we began to fear that we had
gone too far to the westward; and therefore, though the commodore
himself was strongly persuaded that he saw it on the morning of the
28th, yet his officers believing it to be only a cloud, to which
opinion the haziness of the weather gave some kind of countenance, it
was, on a consultation, resolved to stand to the eastward, in the
parallel of the island, as it was certain that by this course we should
either fall in with the island, if we were already to the westward of
it, or should at least make the mainland of Chili, from whence we might
take a new departure, and assure ourselves, by running to the westward
afterwards, of not missing the island a second time.
On the 30th of May we had a view of the continent of Chili, distant
about twelve or thirteen leagues; the land made exceeding high and
uneven, and appeared quite white; what we saw being doubtless a part of
the Cordilleras, which are always covered with snow. Though by this
view of the land we ascertained our position, yet it gave us great
uneasiness to find that we had so needlessly altered our course, when
we were, in all probability, just upon the point of making the island;
for the mortality amongst us was now increased to a most dreadful
degree, and those who remained alive were utterly dispirited by this
new disappointment, and the prospect of their longer continuance at
sea. Our water too began to grow scarce; so that a general dejection
prevailed amongst us, which added much to the virulence of the disease,
and destroyed numbers of our best men; and to all these calamities
there was added this vexatious circumstance, that when, after having
got a sight of the {106} main, we tacked and stood to the westward in
quest of the island, we were so much delayed by calms and contrary
winds, that it cost us nine days to regain the westing which, when we
stood to the eastward, we ran down in two. In this desponding
condition, with a crazy ship, a great scarcity of fresh water, and a
crew so universally diseased that there were not above ten fore-mast
men in a watch capable of doing duty, and even some of these lame, and
unable to go aloft: under these disheartening circumstances, we stood
to the westward; and, on the 9th of June, at daybreak, we at last
discovered the long-wished-for island of Juan Fernandes. With this
discovery I shall close this chapter and the first book, after
observing (which will furnish a very strong image of our unparalleled
distresses) that by our suspecting ourselves to be to the westward of
the island on the 28th of May, and in consequence of this standing in
for the main, we lost between seventy and eighty of our men, whom we
should doubtless have saved had we made the island that day, which, had
we kept on our course for a few hours longer, we could not have failed
to have done.
{107}
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
THE ARRIVAL OF THE "CENTURION" AT THE ISLAND OF JUAN FERNANDES, WITH A
DESCRIPTION OF THAT ISLAND
On the 9th of June, at daybreak, as is mentioned in the preceding
chapter, we first descried the island of Juan Fernandes, bearing N. by
E.½E., at eleven or twelve leagues distance. And though, on this first
view, it appeared to be a very mountainous place, extremely ragged and
irregular, yet as it was land, and the land we sought for, it was to us
a most agreeable sight: because at this place only we could hope to put
a period to those terrible calamities we had so long struggled with,
which had already swept away above half our crew, and which, had we
continued a few days longer at sea, would inevitably have compleated
our destruction. For we were by this time reduced to so helpless a
condition, that out of two hundred and odd men which remained alive, we
could not, taking all our watches together, muster hands enough to work
the ship on an emergency, though we included the officers, their
servants, and the boys.
The wind being northerly when we first made the island, we kept plying
all that day, and the next night, in order to get in with the land; and
wearing the ship in the middle watch, we had a melancholy instance of
the almost incredible debility of our people; for the lieutenant could
muster no more than two quarter-masters and six fore-mast men capable
of working; so that without the assistance of the officers, servants,
and the boys, it might have proved impossible for us to have reached
the island, after we had got sight of it; and even with this assistance
they were two hours in trimming the sails: to so wretched a condition
was a sixty-gun ship reduced, which had passed Streights Le Maire but
three months before, with between four and five hundred men, almost all
of them in health and vigour.
{108}
However, on the 10th in the afternoon we got under the lee of the
island, and kept ranging along it, at about two miles distance, in
order to look out for the proper anchorage, which was described to be
in a bay on the north side. Being now nearer in with the shore, we
could discover that the broken craggy precipices, which had appeared so
unpromising at a distance, were far from barren, being in most places
covered with woods, and that between them there were everywhere
interspersed the finest vallies, clothed with a most beautiful verdure,
and watered with numerous streams and cascades, no valley of any extent
being unprovided of its proper rill. The water too, as we afterwards
found, was not inferior to any we had ever tasted, and was constantly
clear. The aspect of this country, thus diversified, would, at all
times, have been extremely delightful; but in our distressed situation,
languishing as we were for the land and its vegetable productions (an
inclination constantly attending every stage of the sea-scurvy), it is
scarcely credible with what eagerness and transport we viewed the
shore, and with how much impatience we longed for the greens and other
refreshments which were then in sight, and particularly the water, for
of this we had been confined to a very sparing allowance a considerable
time, and had then but five ton remaining on board. Those only who
have endured a long series of thirst, and who can readily recal the
desire and agitation which the ideas alone of springs and brooks have
at that time raised in them, can judge of the emotion with which we
eyed a large cascade of the most transparent water, which poured itself
from a rock near a hundred feet high into the sea at a small distance
from the ship. Even those amongst the diseased who were not in the
very last stages of the distemper, though they had been long confined
to their hammocks, exerted the small remains of strength that were left
them, and crawled up to the deck to feast themselves with this reviving
prospect. Thus we coasted the shore, fully employed in the
contemplation of this enchanting landskip, which still improved upon us
the farther we advanced. But at last the night closed upon us, before
we had satisfied ourselves which was the proper bay to anchor in; and
therefore we resolved to keep in soundings all night (we having then
from sixty-four to seventy fathom), and to send our boat next morning
to discover the road. However, the current {109} shifted in the night,
and set us so near the land that we were obliged to let go the best
bower in fifty-six fathom, not half a mile from the shore. At four in
the morning, the cutter was dispatched with our third lieutenant to
find out the bay we were in search of, who returned again at noon with
the boat laden with seals and grass; for though the island abounded
with better vegetables, yet the boat's crew, in their short stay, had
not met with them; and they well knew that even grass would prove a
dainty, as indeed it was all soon and eagerly devoured. The seals too
were considered as fresh provision, but as yet were not much admired,
though they grew afterwards into more repute: for what rendered them
less valuable at this juncture was the prodigious quantity of excellent
fish which the people on board had taken during the absence of the boat.
The cutter, in this expedition, had discovered the bay where we
intended to anchor, which we found was to the westward of our present
station; and, the next morning, the weather proving favourable, we
endeavoured to weigh, in order to proceed thither; but though, on this
occasion, we mustered all the strength we could, obliging even the
sick, who were scarce able to keep on their legs, to assist us, yet the
capstan was so weakly manned that it was near four hours before we hove
the cable right up and down: after which, with our utmost efforts, and
with many surges and some purchases we made use of to increase our
power, we found ourselves incapable of starting the anchor from the
ground. However, at noon, as a fresh gale blew towards the bay, we
were induced to set the sails, which fortunately tripped the anchor;
and then we steered along shore till we came abreast of the point that
forms the eastern part of the bay. On the opening of the bay, the
wind, that had befriended us thus far, shifted and blew from thence in
squalls; but by means of the headway we had got we loofed close in,
till the anchor brought us up in fifty-six fathom. Soon after we had
thus got to our new birth we discovered a sail, which we made no doubt
was one of our squadron; and on its nearer approach we found it to be
the _Tryal_ sloop. We immediately sent some of our hands on board her,
by whose assistance she was brought to an anchor between us and the
land. We soon found that the sloop had not been exempted from the same
calamities which we had so severely felt; for {110} her commander,
Captain Saunders, waiting on the commodore, informed him that out of
his small complement he had buried thirty-four of his men; and those
that remained were so universally afflicted with the scurvy, that only
himself, his lieutenant, and three of his men, were able to stand by
the sails. The _Tryal_ came to an anchor within us on the 12th, about
noon, and we carried our hawsers on board her, in order to moor
ourselves nearer in shore; but the wind coming off the land in violent
gusts, prevented our mooring in the birth we intended. Indeed our
principal attention was employed on business rather of more importance:
for we were now extremely occupied in sending on shore materials to
raise tents for the reception of the sick, who died apace on board, and
doubtless the distemper was considerably augmented by the stench and
filthiness in which they lay; for the number of the deceased was so
great, and so few could be spared from the necessary duty of the sails
to look after them, that it was impossible to avoid a great relaxation
in the article of cleanliness, which had rendered the ship extremely
loathsome between decks. Notwithstanding our desire of freeing the
sick from their hateful situation, and their own extreme impatience to
get on shore, we had not hands enough to prepare the tents for their
reception before the 16th; but on that and the two following days we
sent them all on shore, amounting to a hundred and sixty-seven persons,
besides twelve or fourteen who died in the boats, on their being
exposed to the fresh air. The greatest part of our sick were so infirm
that we were obliged to carry them out of the ship in their hammocks,
and to convey them afterwards in the same manner from the water-side to
their tents, over a stony beach. This was a work of considerable
fatigue to the few who were healthy, and therefore the commodore,
according to his accustomed humanity, not only assisted herein with his
own labour, but obliged his officers, without distinction, to give
their helping hand. The extreme weakness of our sick may in some
measure be collected from the numbers who died after they had got on
shore; for it had generally been found that the land, and the
refreshments it produces, very soon recover most stages of the
sea-scurvy; and we flattered ourselves, that those who had not perished
on this first exposure to the open air, but had lived to be placed in
their tents, would have been speedily restored to {111} their health
and vigour. Yet, to our great mortification, it was near twenty days
after their landing before the mortality was tolerably ceased; and for
the first ten or twelve days we buried rarely less than six each day,
and many of those who survived recovered by very slow and insensible
degrees. Indeed, those who were well enough at their first getting on
shore to creep out of their tents, and crawl about, were soon relieved,
and recovered their health and strength in a very short time; but in
the rest, the disease seemed to have acquired a degree of inveteracy
which was altogether without example.
Having proceeded thus far, and got our sick on shore, I think it
necessary, before I enter into any longer detail of our transactions,
to give a distinct account of this island of Juan Fernandes, its
situation, productions, and all its conveniencies. These particulars
we were well enabled to be minutely instructed in during our three
months' stay there; and as it is the only commodious place in those
seas where British cruisers can refresh and recover their men after
their passage round Cape Horn, and where they may remain for some time
without alarming the Spanish coast, these its advantages will merit a
circumstantial description. Indeed Mr. Anson was particularly
industrious in directing the roads and coasts to be surveyed, and other
observations to be made, knowing from his own experience of how great
consequence these materials might prove to any British vessels
hereafter employed in those seas. For the uncertainty we were in of
its position, and our standing in for the main on the 28th of May, in
order to secure a sufficient easting, when we were indeed extremely
near it, cost us the lives of between seventy and eighty of our men, by
our longer continuance at sea: from which fatal accident we might have
been exempted had we been furnished with such an account of its
situation as we could fully have depended on.
The island of Juan Fernandes lies in the latitude of 33° 40' south, and
is a hundred and ten leagues distant from the continent of Chili. It
is said to have received its name from a Spaniard, who formerly
procured a grant of it, and resided there some time with a view of
settling on it, but afterwards abandoned it. The island itself is of
an irregular figure. Its greatest extent is between four and five
leagues, and its greatest breadth somewhat short of two leagues. The
only {112} safe anchoring at this island is on the north side, where
are the three bays mentioned above, but the middlemost, known by the
name of Cumberland Bay, is the widest and deepest, and in all respects
much the best; for the other two, denominated the East and West bays,
are scarcely more than good landing-places, where boats may
conveniently put their casks on shore. Cumberland Bay is well secured
to the southward, and is only exposed from the N. by W. to the E. by
S.; and as the northerly winds seldom blow in that climate, and never
with any violence, the danger from that quarter is not worth attending
to.
As the bay last described, or Cumberland Bay, is by far the most
commodious road in the island, so it is adviseable for all ships to
anchor on the western side of this bay, within little more than two
cables' lengths of the beach. Here they may ride in forty fathom of
water, and be, in a great measure, sheltered from a large heavy sea
which comes rolling in whenever an eastern or a western wind blows. It
is however expedient, in this case, to cackle or arm the cables with an
iron chain, or good rounding, for five or six fathom from the anchor,
to secure them from being rubbed by the foulness of the ground.
I have before observed that a northerly wind, to which alone this bay
is exposed, very rarely blew during our stay here; and as it was then
winter, it may be supposed, in other seasons, to be less frequent.
Indeed, in those few instances when it was in that quarter, it did not
blow with any great force; but this perhaps might be owing to the
highlands on the southward of the bay, which checked its current, and
thereby abated its violence, for we had reason to suppose that a few
leagues off it blew with considerable strength, since it sometimes
drove before it a prodigious sea, in which we rode forecastle in. But
though the northern winds are never to be apprehended, yet the southern
winds, which generally prevail here, frequently blow off the land in
violent gusts and squalls, which, however, rarely last longer than two
or three minutes. This seems to be owing to the obstruction of the
southern gale by the hills in the neighbourhood of the bay, for the
wind being collected by this means, at last forces its passage through
the narrow vallies, which, like so many funnels, both facilitate its
escape and increase its violence. These frequent and sudden gusts make
it difficult {113} for ships to work in with the wind off shore, or to
keep a clear hawse when anchored.
The northern part of this island is composed of high craggy hills, many
of them inaccessible, though generally covered with trees. The soil of
this part is loose and shallow, so that very large trees on the hills
soon perish for want of root, and are then easily overturned; which
occasioned the unfortunate death of one of our sailors, who being upon
the hills in search of goats, caught hold of a tree upon a declivity to
assist him in his ascent, and this giving way, he immediately rolled
down the hill, and though in his fall he fastened on another tree of
considerable bulk, yet that too gave way, and he fell amongst the
rocks, and was dashed to pieces. Mr. Brett likewise met with an
accident only by resting his back against a tree, near as large about
as himself, which stood on a slope; for the tree giving way, he fell to
a considerable distance, though without receiving any injury. Our
prisoners (whom, as will be related in the sequel, we afterwards
brought in here) remarked that the appearance of the hills in some part
of the island resembled that of the mountains in Chili where the gold
is found, so that it is not impossible but mines might be discovered
here. We observed, in some places, several hills of a peculiar sort of
red earth, exceeding vermilion in colour, which perhaps, on
examination, might prove useful for many purposes. The southern, or
rather the S.W., part of the island is widely different from the rest,
being dry, stony, and destitute of trees, and very flat and low
compared with the hills on the northern part. This part of the island
is never frequented by ships, being surrounded by a steep shore, and
having little or no fresh water; and, besides, it is exposed to the
southerly wind, which generally blows here the whole year round, and in
the winter solstice very hard.
The trees of which the woods on the northern side of the island are
composed are most of them aromaticks, and of many different sorts.
There are none of them of a size to yield any considerable timber,
except the myrtle-trees, which are the largest on the island, and
supplied us with all the timber we made use of, but even these would
not work to a greater length than forty feet. The top of the
myrtle-tree is circular, and appears as uniform and regular as if it
had been clipped by art. It bears on its bark an excrescence like moss
which in taste and smell resembles garlick, and {114} was used by our
people instead of it. We found here too the piemento-tree, and
likewise the cabbage-tree, though in no great plenty. And besides a
great number of plants of various kinds, which we were not botanists
enough either to describe or attend to, we found here almost all the
vegetables which are usually esteemed to be particularly adapted to the
cure of those scorbutick disorders which are contracted by salt diet
and long voyages. For here we had great quantities of water-cresses
and purslain, with excellent wild sorrel, and a vast profusion of
turnips and Sicilian radishes: these two last, having some resemblance
to each other, were confounded by our people under the general name of
turnips. We usually preferred the tops of the turnips to the roots,
which were often stringy, though some of them were free from that
exception, and remarkably good. These vegetables, with the fish and
flesh we got here, and which I shall more particularly describe
hereafter, were not only extremely grateful to our palates, after the
long course of salt diet which we had been confined to, but were
likewise of the most salutary consequence to our sick, in recovering
and invigorating them, and of no mean service to us who were well, in
destroying the lurking seeds of the scurvy, from which perhaps none of
us were totally exempt, and in refreshing and restoring us to our
wonted strength and activity.
To the vegetables I have already mentioned, of which we made perpetual
use, I must add that we found many acres of ground covered with oats
and clover. There were also some few cabbage-trees upon the island, as
was observed before, but as they generally grew on the precipices, and
in dangerous situations, and as it was necessary to cut down a large
tree for every single cabbage, this was a dainty that we were able but
rarely to indulge in.
The excellence of the climate and the looseness of the soil render this
place extremely proper for all kinds of vegetation; for if the ground
be anywhere accidentally turned up, it is immediately overgrown with
turnips and Sicilian radishes. Mr. Anson therefore having with him
garden-seeds of all kinds, and stones of different sorts of fruits, he,
for the better accommodation of his countrymen who should hereafter
touch here, sowed both lettuces, carrots, and other garden plants, and
sett in the woods a great variety of plum, apricot, and peach stones:
and these last, he has been informed, have {115} since thriven to a
very remarkable degree, for some gentlemen, who in their passage from
Lima to Old Spain were taken and brought to England, having procured
leave to wait upon Mr. Anson, to thank him for his generosity and
humanity to his prisoners, some of whom were their relations, they, in
casual discourse with him about his transactions in the South Seas,
particularly asked him if he had not planted a great number of fruit
trees on the island of Juan Fernandes, for they told him their late
navigators had discovered there numbers of peach-trees and
apricot-trees, which being fruits before unobserved in that place, they
concluded them to have been produced from kernels sett by him.
This may in general suffice as to the soil and vegetable productions of
this place; but the face of the country, at least of the north part of
the island, is so extremely singular that I cannot avoid giving it a
particular consideration. I have already taken notice of the wild,
inhospitable air with which it first appeared to us, and the gradual
improvement of this uncouth landskip as we drew nearer, till we were at
last captivated by the numerous beauties we discovered on the shore.
And I must now add that we found, during the time of our residence
there, that the inland parts of the island did no ways fall short of
the sanguine prepossessions which we first entertained in their favour:
for the woods, which covered most of the steepest hills, were free from
all bushes and underwood, and afforded an easy passage through every
part of them, and the irregularities of the hills and precipicies, in
the northern part of the island, necessarily traced out by their
various combinations a great number of romantic vallies, most of which
had a stream of the clearest water running through them, that tumbled
in cascades from rock to rock, as the bottom of the valley, by the
course of the neighbouring hills, was at any time broken into a sudden
sharp descent. Some particular spots occurred in these vallies where
the shade and fragrance of the contiguous woods, the loftiness of the
overhanging rocks, and the transparency and frequent falls of the
neighbouring streams, presented scenes of such elegance and dignity as
would with difficulty be rivalled in any other part of the globe. It
is in this place, perhaps, that the simple productions of unassisted
nature may be said to excel all the fictitious descriptions of the most
animated imagination. I shall finish this article {116} with a short
account of that spot where the commodore pitched his tent, and which he
made choice of for his own residence, though I despair of conveying an
adequate idea of its beauty. The piece of ground which he chose was a
small lawn that lay on a little ascent, at the distance of about half a
mile from the sea. In the front of his tent there was a large avenue
cut through the woods to the seaside, which sloping to the water with a
gentle descent, opened a prospect of the bay and the ships at anchor.
This lawn was screened behind by a tall wood of myrtle sweeping round
it, in the form of a theatre, the slope on which the wood stood, rising
with a much sharper ascent than the lawn itself, though not so much but
that the hills and precipices within land towered up considerably above
the tops of the trees, and added to the grandeur of the view. There
were, besides, two streams of crystal water, which ran on the right and
left of the tent, within an hundred yards distance, and were shaded by
the trees which skirted the lawn on either side, and compleated the
symmetry of the whole.
It remains now only that we speak of the animals and provisions which
we met with at this place. Former writers have related that this
island abounded with vast numbers of goats, and their accounts are not
to be questioned, this place being the usual haunt of the buccaneers
and privateers who formerly frequented those seas. And there are two
instances--one of a Musquito Indian, and the other of Alexander
Selkirk, a Scotchman, who were left here by their respective ships, and
lived alone upon this island for some years, and consequently were no
strangers to its produce. Selkirk, who was the last, after a stay of
between four and five years, was taken off the place by the _Duke_ and
_Duchess_ privateers of Bristol, as may be seen at large in the journal
of their voyage. His manner of life during his solitude was in most
particulars very remarkable; but there is one circumstance he relates,
which was so strangely verified by our own observation, that I cannot
help reciting it. He tells us, amongst other things, that as he often
caught more goats than he wanted, he sometimes marked their ears and
let them go. This was about thirty-two years before our arrival at the
island. Now it happened that the first goat that was killed by our
people at their landing had his ears slit, whence we concluded that he
had doubtless been formerly under {117} the power of Selkirk. This was
indeed an animal of a most venerable aspect, dignified with an
exceeding majestic beard, and with many other symptoms of antiquity.
During our stay on the island we met with others marked in the same
manner, all the males being distinguished by an exuberance of beard and
every other characteristick of extreme age.
But the great numbers of goats, which former writers describe to have
been found upon this island, are at present very much diminished, as
the Spaniards, being informed of the advantages which the buccaneers
and privateers drew from the provisions which goat's flesh here
furnished them with, have endeavoured to extirpate the breed, thereby
to deprive their enemies of this relief. For this purpose they have
put on shore great numbers of large dogs, who have increased apace and
have destroyed all the goats in the accessible part of the country, so
that there now remain only a few amongst the craggs and precipices,
where the dogs cannot follow them. These are divided into separate
herds of twenty or thirty each, which inhabit distinct fastnesses, and
never mingle with each other. By this means we found it extremely
difficult to kill them, and yet we were so desirous of their flesh,
which we all agreed much resembled venison, that we got knowledge, I
believe, of all their herds, and it was conceived, by comparing their
numbers together, that they scarcely exceeded two hundred upon the
whole island. I remember we had once an opportunity of observing a
remarkable dispute betwixt a herd of these animals and a number of
dogs; for going in our boat into the eastern bay, we perceived some
dogs running very eagerly upon the foot, and being willing to discover
what game they were after, we lay upon our oars some time to view them,
and at last saw them take to a hill, where looking a little further, we
observed upon the ridge of it an herd of goats, which seemed drawn up
for their reception. There was a very narrow path skirted on each side
by precipices, on which the master of the herd posted himself fronting
the enemy, the rest of the goats being all behind him, where the ground
was more open. As this spot was inaccessible by any other path,
excepting where this champion had placed himself, the dogs, though they
ran up-hill with great alacrity, yet when they came within about twenty
yards of him, they found they durst not encounter him (for he would
infallibly {118} have driven them down the precipice), but gave over
the chace, and quietly laid themselves down panting at a great rate.
These dogs, who are masters of all the accessible parts of the island,
are of various kinds, some of them very large, and are multiplied to a
prodigious degree. They sometimes came down to our habitations at
night, and stole our provision; and once or twice they set upon single
persons, but assistance being at hand they were driven off without
doing any mischief. As at present it is rare for goats to fall in
their way, we conceived that they lived principally upon young seals,
and indeed some of our people had the curiosity to kill dogs sometimes
and dress them, and it seemed to be agreed that they had a fishy taste.
Goat's flesh, as I have mentioned, being scarce, we rarely being able
to kill above one a day, and our people growing tired of fish (which,
as I shall hereafter observe, abound at this place), they at last
condescended to eat seals, which by degrees they came to relish, and
called it lamb. The seal, numbers of which haunt this island, hath
been so often mentioned by former writers that it is unnecessary to say
anything particular about them in this place. But there is another
amphibious creature to be met with here, called a sea-lion, that bears
some resemblance to a seal, though it is much larger. This too we eat
under the denomination of beef; and as it is so extraordinary an
animal, I conceive it well merits a particular description. They are
in size, when arrived at their full growth, from twelve to twenty feet
in length, and from eight to fifteen in circumference. They are
extremely fat, so that after having cut through the skin, which is
about an inch in thickness, there is at least a foot of fat before you
can come at either lean or bones; and we experienced more than once
that the fat of some of the largest afforded us a butt of oil. They
are likewise very full of blood, for if they are deeply wounded in a
dozen places, there will instantly gush out as many fountains of blood,
spouting to a considerable distance; and to try what quantity of blood
they contained, we shot one first, and then cut its throat, and
measuring the blood that came from him, we found that besides what
remained in the vessels, which to be sure was considerable, we got at
least two hogsheads. Their skins are covered with short hair, of a
light dun colour, but their tails and their fins, which serve them for
feet on shore, are {119} almost black; their fins or feet are divided
at the ends like fingers, the web which joins them not reaching to the
extremities, and each of these fingers is furnished with a nail. They
have a distant resemblance to an overgrown seal, though in some
particulars there is a manifest difference between them, especially in
the males. These have a large snout or trunk hanging down five or six
inches below the end of the upper jaw, which the females have not, and
this renders the countenance of the male and female easy to be
distinguished from each other, and besides, the males are of a much
larger size. The largest of these animals, which was found upon the
island, was the master of the flock, and from his driving off the other
males, and keeping a great number of females to himself, he was by the
seamen ludicrously styled the Bashaw. These animals divide their time
equally between the land and sea, continuing at sea all the summer, and
coming on shore at the setting in of the winter, where they reside
during that whole season. In this interval they engender and bring
forth their young, and have generally two at a birth, which they suckle
with their milk, they being at first about the size of a full-grown
seal. During the time these sea-lions continue on shore, they feed on
the grass and verdure which grows near the banks of the fresh-water
streams; and, when not employed on feeding, sleep in herds in the most
miry places they can find out. As they seem to be of a very lethargic
disposition, and are not easily awakened, each herd was observed to
place some of their males at a distance, in the nature of sentinels,
who never failed to alarm them whenever any one attempted to molest or
even to approach them; and they were very capable of alarming, even at
a considerable distance, for the noise they make is very loud, and of
different kinds, sometimes grunting like hogs, and at other times
snorting like horses in full vigour. They often, especially the males,
have furious battles with each other, principally about their females;
and we were one day extremely surprized by the sight of two animals,
which at first appeared different from all we had ever observed, but,
on a nearer approach, they proved to be two sea-lions, who had been
goring each other with their teeth, and were covered over with blood.
And the Bashaw before mentioned, who generally lay surrounded with a
seraglio of females, which no other male dared to approach, had not
acquired that envied {120} pre-eminence without many bloody contests,
of which the marks still remained in the numerous scars which were
visible in every part of his body. We killed many of them for food,
particularly for their hearts and tongues, which we esteemed exceeding
good eating, and preferable even to those of bullocks. In general
there was no difficulty in killing them, for they were incapable either
of escaping or resisting, as their motion is the most unwieldy that can
be conceived, their blubber, all the time they are moving, being
agitated in large waves under their skins. However, a sailor one day
being carelessly employed in skinning a young sea-lion, the female from
whence he had taken it came upon him unperceived, and getting his head
in her mouth, she with her teeth scored his skull in notches in many
places, and thereby wounded him so desperately, that, though all
possible care was taken of him, he died in a few days.
These are the principal animals which we found upon the island: for we
saw but few birds, and those chiefly hawks, blackbirds, owls, and
humming birds. We saw not the pardela, which burrows in the ground,
and which former writers have mentioned to be found here; but as we
often met with their holes, we supposed that the dogs had destroyed
them, as they have almost done the cats: for these were very numerous
in Selkirk's time, but we saw not above one or two during our whole
stay. However, the rats still keep their ground, and continue here in
great numbers, and were very troublesome to us by infesting our tents
nightly.
But that which furnished us with the most delicious repasts at this
island remains still to be described. This was the fish with which the
whole bay was most plentifully stored, and with the greatest variety:
for we found here cod of a prodigious size, and by the report of some
of our crew, who had been formerly employed in the Newfoundland
fishery, not in less plenty than is to be met with on the banks of that
island. We caught also cavallies, gropers, large breams, maids, silver
fish, congers of a peculiar kind, and above all, a black fish which we
most esteemed, called by some a chimney-sweeper, in shape resembling a
carp. The beach indeed is everywhere so full of rocks and loose stones
that there is no possibility of haling the Seyne; but with hooks and
lines we caught what numbers we pleased, so that a boat with two or
three lines would return loaded with fish in about {121} two or three
hours' time. The only interruption we ever met with arose from great
quantities of dog-fish and large sharks, which sometimes attended our
boats and prevented our sport. Besides the fish we have already
mentioned, we found here one delicacy in greater perfection, both as to
size, flavour, and quantity, than is perhaps to be met with in any
other part of the world. This was sea crayfish; they generally weighed
eight or nine pounds apiece, were of a most excellent taste, and lay in
such abundance near the water's edge, that the boat-hooks often struck
into them in putting the boat to and from the shore.
These are the most material articles relating to the accommodations,
soil, vegetables, animals, and other productions of the island of Juan
Fernandes: by which it must appear how properly that place was adapted
for recovering us from the deplorable situation to which our tedious
and unfortunate navigation round Cape Horn had reduced us. And having
thus given the reader some idea of the site and circumstances of this
place, which was to be our residence for three months, I shall now
proceed in the next chapter to relate all that occurred to us in that
interval, resuming my narration from the 18th day of June, being the
day in which the _Tryal_ sloop, having by a squall been driven out to
sea three days before, came again to her moorings, the day in which we
finished the sending our sick on shore, and about eight days after our
first anchoring at this island.
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