CHAPTER I. THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS

Produced by The James J. Kelly Library Of St. Gregory's

University; Alev Akman, Dianne Bean, and Joe Buersmeyer

THE CANADIAN DOMINION

A CHRONICLE OF OUR NORTHERN NEIGHBOR

By Oscar D. Skelton

NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

TORONTO: GLASGOW, BROOK & CO.

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1919

Copyright, 1919, by Yale University Press

PREFACE

The history of Canada since the close of the French regime falls into

three clearly marked half centuries. The first fifty years after

the Peace of Paris determined that Canada was to maintain a separate

existence under the British flag and was not to become a fourteenth

colony or be merged with the United States. The second fifty years

brought the winning of self-government and the achievement of

Confederation. The third fifty years witnessed the expansion of the

Dominion from sea to sea and the endeavor to make the unity of the

political map a living reality--the endeavor to weld the far-flung

provinces into one country, to give Canada a distinctive place in the

Empire and in the world, and eventually in the alliance of peoples

banded together in mankind's greatest task of enforcing peace and

justice among nations.

The author has found it expedient in this narrative to depart from the

usual method of these Chronicles and arrange the matter in chronological

rather than in biographical or topical divisions. The first period of

fifty years is accordingly covered in one chapter, the second in two

chapters, and the third in two chapters. Authorities and a list

of publications for a more extended study will be found in the

Bibliographical Note.

O. D. S.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, CANADA, July, 1919.

CONTENTS

I. THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS

II. THE FIGHT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

III. THE UNION ERA

IV. THE DAYS OF TRIAL

V. THE YEARS OF FULFILMENT

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

THE CANADIAN DOMINION

CHAPTER I. THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS

Scarcely more than half a century has passed since the Dominion of

Canada, in its present form, came into existence. But thrice that period

has elapsed since the fateful day when Montcalm and Wolfe laid down

their lives in battle on the Plains of Abraham, and the lands which now

comprise the Dominion finally passed from French hands and came under

British rule.

The Peace of Paris, which brought the Seven Years' War to a close in

1763, marked the termination of the empire of France in the New World.

Over the continent of North America, after that peace, only two flags

floated, the red and yellow banner of Spain and the Union Jack of

Great Britain. Of these the Union Jack held sway over by far the larger

domain--over the vague territories about Hudson Bay, over the great

valley of the St. Lawrence, and over all the lands lying east of the

Mississippi, save only New Orleans. To whom it would fall to develop

this vast claim, what mighty empires would be carved out of the

wilderness, where the boundary lines would run between the nations yet

to be, were secrets the future held. Yet in retrospect it is now

clear that in solving these questions the Peace of Paris played no

inconsiderable part. By removing from the American colonies the menace

of French aggression from the north it relieved them of a sense of

dependence on the mother country and so made possible the birth of a new

nation in the United States. At the same time, in the northern half of

the continent, it made possible that other experiment in democracy, in

the union of diverse races, in international neighborliness, and in

the reconciliation of empire with liberty, which Canada presents to the

whole world, and especially to her elder sister in freedom.

In 1763 the territories which later were to make up the Dominion of

Canada were divided roughly into three parts. These parts had little or

nothing in common. They shared together neither traditions of suffering

or glory nor ties of blood or trade. Acadia, or Nova Scotia, by the

Atlantic, was an old French colony, now British for over a generation.

Canada, or Quebec, on the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, with seventy

thousand French habitants and a few hundred English camp followers,

had just passed under the British flag. West and north lay the vaguely

outlined domains of the Hudson's Bay Company, where the red man and the

buffalo still reigned supreme and almost unchallenged.

The old colony of Acadia, save only the island outliers, Cape Breton

and Prince Edward Island, now ceded by the Peace of Paris, had been

in British hands since 1713. It was not, however, until 1749 that any

concerted effort had been made at a settlement of this region. The

menace from the mighty fortress which the French were rebuilding at that

time at Louisbourg, in Cape Breton, and the hostility of the restless

Acadians or old French settlers on the mainland, had compelled action

and the British Government departed from its usual policy of laissez

faire in matters of emigration. Twenty-five hundred English settlers

were brought out to found and hold the town and fort of Halifax. Nearly

as many Germans were planted in Lunenburg, where their descendants

flourish to this day. Then the hapless Acadians were driven into

exile and into the room they left, New Englanders of strictest Puritan

ancestry came, on their own initiative, and built up new communities

like those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Other waves

of voluntary immigration followed--Ulster Presbyterians, driven out by

the attempt of England to crush the Irish woolen manufacture, and,

still later, Highlanders, Roman Catholic and Presbyterian, who soon made

Gaelic the prevailing tongue of the easternmost counties. By 1767 the

colony of Nova Scotia, which then included all Acadia, north and east of

Maine, had a prosperous population of some seven thousand Americans,

two thousand Irish, two thousand Germans, barely a thousand English,

and well over a thousand surviving Acadian French. In short, this

northernmost of the Atlantic colonies appeared to be fast on the way

to become a part of New England. It was chiefly New Englanders who had

peopled it, and it was with New England that for many a year its whole

social and commercial intercourse was carried on. It was no accident

that Nova Scotia later produced the first Yankee humorist, "Sam Slick."

With the future sister province of Canada, or Quebec, which lay along

the St. Lawrence as far as the Great Lakes, Acadia or Nova Scotia had

much less in common than with New England. Hundreds of miles of unbroken

forest wilderness lay between the two colonies, and the sea lanes ran

between the St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, or Halifax and Havre or

Plymouth, and not between Quebec and Halifax. Even the French settlers

came of different stocks. The Acadians were chiefly men of La Rochelle

and the Loire, while the Canadians came, for the most part, from the

coast provinces stretching from Normandy and Picardy to Poitou and

Bordeaux.

The situation in Canada proper presented the British authorities with a

problem new in their imperial experience. Hitherto, save for Acadia and

New Netherland, where the settlers were few in numbers and, even in

New Netherland, closely akin to the conquerors in race, religion, and

speech, no colony containing men of European stocks had been acquired

by conquest. Canada held some sixty or seventy thousand settlers,

French and Catholic almost to a man. Despite the inefficiency of French

colonial methods the plantation had taken firm root. The colony had

developed a strength, a social structure, and an individuality all its

own. Along the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu the settlements lay close

and compact; the habitants' whitewashed cottages lined the river banks

only a few arpents apart. The social cohesion of the colony was equally

marked. Alike in government, in religion, and in industry, it was a land

where authority was strong. Governor and intendant, feudal seigneur,

bishop and Jesuit superior, ruled each in his own sphere and provided a

rigid mold and framework for the growth of the colony. There were, it

is true, limits to the reach of the arm of authority. Beyond Montreal

stretched a vast wilderness merging at some uncertain point into the

other wilderness that was Louisiana. Along the waterways which threaded

this great No Man's Land the coureurs-de-bois roamed with little heed to

law or license, glad to escape from the paternal strictness that irked

youth on the lower St. Lawrence. But the liberty of these rovers of the

forest was not liberty after the English pattern; the coureur-de-bois

was of an entirely different type from the pioneers of British stock who

were even then pushing their way through the gaps in the Alleghanies

and making homes in the backwoods. Priest and seigneur, habitant and

coureur-de-bois were one and all difficult to fit into accepted English

ways. Clearly Canada promised to strain the digestive capacity of the

British lion.

The present western provinces of the Dominion were still the haunt of

Indian and buffalo. French-Canadian explorers and fur traders, it is

true, had penetrated to the Rockies a few years before the Conquest, and

had built forts on Lake Winnipeg, on the Assiniboine and Red rivers,

and at half a dozen portages on the Saskatchewan. But the "Company of

Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay" had not yet ventured

inland, still content to carry on its trade with the Indians from its

forts along the shores of that great sea. On the Pacific the Russians

had coasted as far south as Mount Saint Elias, but no white man, so far

as is known, had set foot on the shores of what is now British Columbia.

Two immediate problems were bequeathed to the British Government by the

Treaty of Paris: what was to be done with the unsettled lands between

the Alleghanies and the Mississippi; and how were the seventy thousand

French subjects in the valley of the St. Lawrence to be dealt with? The

first difficulty was not solved. It was merely postponed. The whole back

country of the English colonies was proclaimed an Indian reserve where

the King's white subjects might trade but might not acquire land. This

policy was not devised in order to set bounds to the expansion of the

older colonies; that was an afterthought. The policy had its root in

an honest desire to protect the Indians from the frauds of unscrupulous

traders and from the encroachments of settlers on their hunting grounds.

The need of a conciliatory, if firm, policy in regard to the great

interior was made evident by the Pontiac rising in 1763, the aftermath

of the defeat of the French, who had done all they could to inspire the

Indians with hatred for the advancing English.

How to deal with Canada was a more thorny problem. The colony had not

been sought by its conquerors for itself. It was counted of little

worth. The verdict of its late possessors, as recorded in Voltaire's

light farewell to "a few arpents of snow," might be discounted as an

instance of sour grapes; but the estimate of its new possessors was

evidently little higher, since they debated long and dubiously whether

in the peace settlement they should retain Canada or the little sugar

island of Guadeloupe, a mere pin point on the map. Canada had been

conquered not for the good it might bring but for the harm it was doing

as a base for French attack upon the English colonies--"the wasps' nest

must be smoked out." But once it had been taken, it had to be dealt with

for itself.

The policy first adopted was a simple one, natural enough for

eighteenth-century Englishmen. They decided to make Canada* over in

the image of the old colonies, to turn the "new subjects," as they were

called, in good time into Englishmen and Protestants. A generation

or two would suffice, in the phrase of Francis Maseres--himself a

descendant of a Huguenot refugee but now wholly an Englishman--for

"melting down the French nation into the English in point of language,

affections, religion, and laws." Immigration was to be encouraged from

Britain and from the other American colonies, which, in the view of the

Lords of Trade, were already overstocked and in danger of being forced

by the scarcity or monopoly of land to take up manufactures which would

compete with English wares. And since it would greatly contribute to

speedy settlement, so the Royal Proclamation of 1763 declared, that the

King's subjects should be informed of his paternal care for the security

of their liberties and properties, it was promised that, as soon as

circumstances would permit, a General Assembly would be summoned, as in

the older colonies. The laws of England, civil and criminal, as near as

might be, were to prevail. The Roman Catholic subjects were to be free

to profess their own religion, "so far as the laws of Great Britain

permit," but they were to be shown a better way. To the first Governor

instructions were issued "that all possible Encouragement shall be given

to the erecting Protestant Schools in the said Districts, Townships and

Precincts, by settling and appointing and allotting proper Quantities

of Land for that Purpose and also for a Glebe and Maintenance for a

Protestant minister and Protestant schoolmasters." Thus in the fullness

of time, like Acadia, but without any Evangelise of Grand Pre, without

any drastic policy of expulsion, impossible with seventy thousand people

scattered over a wide area, even Canada would become a good English

land, a newer New England.

* The Royal Proclamation of 1763 set the bounds of the new

colony. They were surprisingly narrow, a mere strip along

both sides of the St. Lawrence from a short distance beyond

the Ottawa on the west, to the end of the Gasps peninsula on

the east. The land to the northeast was put under the

jurisdiction of the Governor of Newfoundland, and the Great

Lakes region was included in the territory reserved for the

Indians.

It is questionable whether this policy could ever have achieved success

even if it had been followed for generations without rest or turning.

But it was not destined to be given a long trial. From the very

beginning the men on the spot, the soldier Governors of Canada, urged

an entirely contrary policy on the Home Government, and the pressure of

events soon brought His Majesty's Ministers to concur.

As the first civil Governor of Canada, the British authorities chose

General Murray, one of Wolfe's ablest lieutenants, who since 1760 had

served as military Governor of the Quebec district. He was to be

aided in his task by a council composed of the Lieutenant Governors of

Montreal and Three Rivers, the Chief Justice, the head of the

customs, and eight citizens to be named by the Governor from "the most

considerable of the persons of property" in the province.

The new Governor was a blunt, soldierly man, upright and just according

to his lights, but deeply influenced by his military and aristocratic

leanings. Statesmen thousands of miles away might plan to encourage

English settlers and English political ways and to put down all that was

French. To the man on the spot English settlers meant "the four hundred

and fifty contemptible sutlers and traders" who had come in the wake of

the army from New England and New York, with no proper respect for their

betters, and vulgarly and annoyingly insistent upon what they claimed to

be their rights. The French might be alien in speech and creed, but at

least the seigneurs and the higher clergy were gentlemen, with a due

respect for authority, the King's and their own, and the habitants were

docile, the best of soldier stuff. "Little, very little," Murray wrote

in 1764 to the Lords of Trade, "will content the New Subjects, but

nothing will satisfy the Licentious Fanaticks Trading here, but the

expulsion of the Canadians, who are perhaps the bravest and best

race upon the Globe, a Race, who cou'd they be indulged with a few

priviledges wch the Laws of England deny to Roman Catholicks at

home, wou'd soon get the better of every National Antipathy to their

Conquerors and become the most faithful and most useful set of Men in

this American Empire."*

* This quotation and those following in this chapter are

from official documents most conveniently assembled in Shorn

and Doughty, "Documents relating to the Constitutional

History of Canada, 1759-1791", and Doughty and McArthur,

"Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada,

1791-1818".

Certainly there was much in the immediate situation to justify Murray's

attitude. It was preposterous to set up a legislature in which only the

four hundred Protestants might sit and from which the seventy thousand

Catholics would be barred. It would have been difficult in any case

to change suddenly the system of laws governing the most intimate

transactions of everyday life. But when, as happened, the Administration

was entrusted in large part to newly created justices of the peace, men

with "little French and less honour," "to whom it is only possible to

speak with guineas in one's hand," the change became flatly impossible.

Such an alteration, if still insisted upon, must come more slowly than

the impatient traders in Montreal and Quebec desired.

The British Government, however, was not yet ready to abandon its

policy. The Quebec traders petitioned for Murray's recall, alleging that

the measures required to encourage settlement had not been adopted, that

the Governor was encouraging factions by his partiality to the French,

that he treated the traders with "a Rage and Rudeness of Language and

Demeanor" and--a fair thrust in return for his reference to them as "the

most immoral collection of men I ever knew"--as "discountenancing the

Protestant Religion by almost a Total Neglect of Attendance upon the

Service of the Church." When the London business correspondents of

the traders backed up this petition, the Government gave heed. In 1766

Murray was recalled to England and, though he was acquitted of the

charges against him, he did not return to his post in Canada.

The triumph of the English merchants was short. They had jumped from the

frying pan into the fire. General Guy Carleton, Murray's successor and

brother officer under Wolfe, was an even abler man, and he was still

less in sympathy with democracy of the New England pattern. Moreover, a

new factor had come in to reenforce the soldier's instinctive preference

for gentlemen over shopkeepers. The first rumblings of the American

Revolution had reached Quebec. It was no time, in Carleton's view, to

set up another sucking republic. Rather, he believed, the utmost should

be made of the opportunity Canada afforded as a barrier against the

advance of democracy, a curb upon colonial insolence. The need of

cultivating the new subjects was the greater, Carleton contended,

because the plan of settlement by Englishmen gave no sign of succeeding:

"barring a Catastrophe shocking to think of, this Country must, to the

end of Time, be peopled by the Canadian race."

To bind the Canadians firmly to England, Carleton proposed to work

chiefly through their old leaders, the seigneurs and the clergy. He

would restore to the people their old system of laws, both civil and

criminal. He would confirm the seigneurs in their feudal dues and

fines, which the habitants were growing slack in paying now that the

old penalties were not enforced, and he would give them honors and

emoluments such as they had before enjoyed as officers in regular or

militia regiments. The Roman Catholic clergy were already, in fact,

confirmed in their right to tithe and toll; and, without objection

from the Governor, Bishop Briand, elected by the chapter in Quebec and

consecrated in Paris, once more assumed control over the flock.

Carleton's proposals did not pass unquestioned. His own chief legal

adviser, Francis Maseres, was a sturdy adherent of the older policy,

though he agreed that the time was not yet ripe for setting up an

Assembly and suggested some well-considered compromise between the old

laws and the new. The Advocate General of England, James Marriott, urged

the same course. The policy of 1768, he contended eleven years later,

had already succeeded in great measure. The assimilation of government

had been effected; an assimilation of manners would follow. The

excessive military spirit of the inhabitants had begun to dwindle, as

England's interest required. The back settlements of New York and Canada

were fast being joined. Two or three thousand men of British stock, many

of them men of substance, had gone to the new colony; warehouses and

foundries were being built; and many of the principal seigneuries

had passed into English hands. All that was needed, he concluded, was

persistence along the old path. The same view was of course strenuously

urged by the English merchants in the colony, who continued to demand,

down to the very eve of the Revolution, an elective Assembly and other

rights of freeborn Britons.

Carleton carried the day. His advice, tendered at close range during

four years' absentee residence in London, from 1770 to 1774, fell in

with the mood of Lord North's Government. The measure in which the new

policy was embodied, the famous Quebec Act of 1774, was essentially a

part of the ministerial programme for strengthening British power to

cope with the resistance then rising to rebellious heights in the old

colonies. Though not, as was long believed, designed in retaliation for

the Boston disturbances, it is clear that its framers had Massachusetts

in mind when deciding on their policy for Quebec. The main purpose of

the Act, the motive which turned the scale against the old Anglicizing

policy, was to attach the leaders of French-Canadian opinion firmly

to the British Crown, and thus not only to prevent Canada itself from

becoming infected with democratic contagion or turning in a crisis

toward France, but to ensure, if the worst came to the worst, a military

base in that northland whose terrors had in old days kept the seaboard

colonies circumspectly loyal. Ministers in London had been driven by

events to accept Carleton's paradox, that to make Quebec British,

it must be prevented from becoming English. If in later years the

solidarity and aloofness of the French-Canadian people were sometimes to

prove inconvenient to British interests, it was always to be remembered

that this situation was due in great part to the deliberate action of

Great Britain in strengthening French-Canadian institutions as a means

of advancing what she considered her own interests in America. "The

views of the British Government in respect to the political uses to

which it means to make Canada subservient," Marriott had truly declared,

"must direct the spirit of any code of laws."

The Quebec Act multiplied the area of the colony sevenfold by the

restoration of all Labrador on the east and the region west as far as

the Ohio and the Mississippi and north to the Hudson's Bay Company's

territory. It restored the old French civil law but continued the milder

English criminal law already in operation. It gave to the Roman Catholic

inhabitants the free exercise of their religion, subject to a modified

oath of allegiance, and confirmed the clergy in their right "to hold,

receive and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights, with respect to such

persons only as shall confess the said religion." The promised elective

Assembly was not granted, but a Council appointed by the Crown received

a measure of legislative power.

On his return to Canada in September, 1774, Carleton reported that the

Canadians had "testified the strongest marks of Joy and Gratitude and

Fidelity to their King and to His Government for the late Arrangements

made at Home in their Favor." The "most respectable part of the

English," he continued, urged peaceful acceptance of the new order.

Evidently, however, the respectable members of society were few, as the

great body of the English settlers joined in a petition for the repeal

of the Act on the ground that it deprived them of the incalculable

benefits of habeas corpus and trial by jury. The Montreal merchants,

whether, as Carleton commented, they "were of a more turbulent Turn, or

that they caught the Fire from some Colonists settled among them," were

particularly outspoken in the town meetings they held. In the older

colonies the opposition was still more emphatic. An Act which hemmed

them in to the seacoast, established on the American continent a Church

they feared and hated, and continued an autocratic political system,

appeared to many to be the undoing of the work of Pitt and Wolfe and

the revival on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi of a

serious menace to their liberty and progress.

Then came the clash at Lexington, and the War of American Independence

had begun. The causes, the course, and the ending of that great civil

war have been treated elsewhere in this series.* Here it is necessary

only to note its bearings on the fate of Canada.

* See "The Eve of the Revolution" and "Washington and His

Comrades in Arms" (in "The Chronicles of America").

Early in 1775 the Continental Congress undertook the conquest of Canada,

or, as it was more diplomatically phrased, the relief of its inhabitants

from British tyranny. Richard Montgomery led an expedition over the old

route by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, along which French and Indian

raiding parties used to pass years before, and Benedict Arnold made a

daring and difficult march up the Kennebec and down the Chaudiere

to Quebec. Montreal fell to Montgomery; and Carleton himself escaped

capture only by the audacity of some French-Canadian voyageurs, who,

under cover of darkness, rowed his whaleboat or paddled it with their

hands silently past the American sentinels on the shore. Once down the

river and in Quebec, Carleton threw himself with vigor and skill into

the defense of his capital. His generalship and the natural strength

of the position proved more than a match for Montgomery and Arnold.

Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded in a vain attempt to carry the

city by storm on the last night of 1775. At Montreal a delegation from

Congress, composed of Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles

Carroll of Carrollton, accompanied by Carroll's brother, a Jesuit priest

and a future archbishop, failed to achieve-more by diplomacy than their

generals had done by the sword. The Canadians seemed, content enough to

wear the British yoke. In the spring, when a British fleet arrived with

reenforcements, the American troops retired in haste and, before the

Declaration of Independence had been proclaimed, Canada was free from

the last of its ten thousand invaders.

The expedition had put Carleton's policy to the test. On the whole it

stood the strain. The seigneurs had rallied to the Government which had

restored their rights, and the clergy had called on the people to stand

fast by the King. So far all went as Carleton had hoped: "The Noblesse,

Clergy, and greater part of the Bourgeoisie," he wrote, "have given

Government every Assistance in their Power." But the habitants refused

to follow their appointed leaders with the old docility, and some even

mobbed the seigneurs who tried to enroll them. Ten years of freedom had

worked a democratic change in them, and they were much less enthusiastic

than their betters about the restoration of seigneurial privileges.

Carleton, like many another, had held as public opinion what were merely

the opinions of those whom he met at dinner. "These people had been

governed with too loose a rein for many years," he now wrote to

Burgoyne, "and had imbibed too much of the American Spirit of

Licentiousness and Independence administered by a numerous and turbulent

Faction here, to be suddenly restored to a proper and desirable

Subordination." A few of the habitants joined his forces; fewer joined

the invaders or sold them supplies--till they grew suspicious of paper

"Continentals." But the majority held passively aloof. Even when France

joined the warring colonies and Admiral d'Estaing appealed to the

Canadians to rise, they did not heed; though it is difficult to say what

the result would have been if Washington had agreed to Lafayette's plan

of a joint French and American invasion in 1778.

Nova Scotia also held aloof, in spite of the fact that many of the men

who had come from New England and from Ulster were eager to join the

colonies to the south. In Nova Scotia democracy was a less hardy plant

than in Massachusetts. The town and township institutions, which had

been the nurseries of resistance in New England, had not been allowed to

take root there. The circumstances of the founding of Halifax had given

ripe to a greater tendency, which lasted long, to lean upon the mother

country. The Maine wilderness made intercourse between Nova Scotia and

New England difficult by land, and the British fleet was in control

of the sea until near the close of the war. Nova Scotia stood by Great

Britain, and was reserved to become part of a northern nation still in

the making.

That nation was to owe its separate existence to the success of the

American Revolution. But for that event, coming when it did, the

struggling colonies of Quebec and Nova Scotia would in time have become

merged with the colonies to the youth and would have followed them,

whether they remained within the British Empire or not. Thus it was due

to the quarrel between the thirteen colonies and the motherland that

Canada did not become merely a fourteenth colony or state. Nor was this

the only bearing of the Revolution on Canada's destiny. Thanks to the

coming of the Loyalists, those exiles of the Revolution who settled in

Canada in large numbers, Canada was after all to be dominantly a land of

English speech and of English sympathies. By one of the many paradoxes

which mark the history of Canada, the very success of the plan which

aimed to save British power by confirming French-Canadian nationality

and the loyalty of the French led in the end to making a large part of

Canada English. The Revolution meant also that for many a year those in

authority in England and in Canada itself were to stand in fear of the

principles and institutions which had led the old colonies to rebellion

and separation, and were to try to build up in Canada buttresses against

the advance of democracy.

The British statesmen who helped to frame the Peace of 1783 were men

with broad and generous views as to the future of the seceding colonies

and their relations with the mother country. It was perhaps inevitable

that they should have given less thought to the future of the colonies

in America which remained under the British flag. Few men could realize

at the moment that out of these scattered fragments a new nation and a

second empire would arise. Not only were the seceding colonies given a

share in the fishing grounds of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, which was

unfortunately to prove a constant source of friction, but the

boundary line was drawn with no thought of the need of broad and easy

communication between Nova Scotia and Canada, much less between Canada

and the far West. Vague definitions of the boundaries, naturally

incident to the prevailing lack of geographical knowledge of the vast

continent, held further seeds of trouble. These contentions, however,

were far in the future. At the moment another defect of the treaty

proved to be Canada's gain. The failure of Lord Shelburne's Ministry to

insist upon effective safeguards for the fair treatment of those who had

taken the King's side in the old colonies, condemned as it was not only

by North and the Tories but by Fox and Sheridan and Burke, led to that

Loyalist migration which changed the racial complexion of Canada.

The Treaty of 1783 provided that Congress would "earnestly recommend"

to the various States that the Loyalists be granted amnesty and

restitution. This pious resolution proved not worth the paper on which

it was written. In State after State the property of the Loyalists

was withheld or confiscated anew. Yet this ungenerous treatment of the

defeated by the victors is not hard to understand. The struggle had been

waged with all the bitterness of civil war. The smallness of the field

of combat had intensified personal ill-will. Both sides had practiced

cruelties in guerrilla warfare; but the Patriots forgot Marion's raids,

Simsbury mines, and the drumhead hangings, and remembered only Hessian

brutalities, Indian scalpings, Tarleton's harryings, and the infamous

prison ships of New York. The war had been a long one. The tide of

battle had ebbed and flowed. A district that was Patriot one year was

frequently Loyalist the next. These circumstances engendered fear and

suspicion and led to nervous reprisals.

At least a third, if not a half, of the people of the old colonies

had been opposed to revolution. New York was strongly Loyalist, with

Pennsylvania, Georgia, and the Carolinas closely following. In the end

some fifty or sixty thousand Loyalists abandoned their homes or suffered

expulsion rather than submit to the new order. They counted in their

ranks many of the men who had held first place in their old communities,

men of wealth, of education, and of standing, as well as thousands

who had nothing to give but their fidelity to the old order. Many,

especially of the well-to-do, went to England; a few found refuge in the

West Indies; but the great majority, over fifty thousand in all, sought

new homes in the northern wilderness. Over thirty thousand, including

many of the most influential of the whole number (with about three

thousand negro slaves, afterwards freed and deported to Sierra Leone)

were carried by ship to Nova Scotia. They found homes chiefly in

that part of the province which in 1784 became New Brunswick. Others,

trekking overland or sailing around by the Gulf and up the River,

settled in the upper valley of the St. Lawrence--on Lake St. Francis, on

the Cataraqui and the Bay of Quinte, and in the Niagara District.

Though these pioneers were generously aided by the British Government

with grants of land and supplies, their hardships and disappointments

during the first years in the wilderness were such as would have daunted

any but brave and desperate men and women whom fate had winnowed. Yet

all but a few, who drifted back to their old homes, held out; and the

foundations of two more provinces of the future Dominion--New Brunswick

and Upper Canada--were thus broadly and soundly laid by the men whom

future generations honored as "United Empire Loyalists." Through all

the later years, their sacrifices and sufferings, their ideals and

prejudices, were to make a deep impress on the development of the nation

which they helped to found and were to influence its relations with the

country which they had left and with the mother country which had held

their allegiance.

Once the first tasks of hewing and hauling and planting were done, the

new settlers called for the organization of local governments. They

were quite as determined as their late foes to have a voice in their

own governing, even though they yielded ultimate obedience to rulers

overseas.

In the provinces by the sea a measure of self-government was at once

established. New Brunswick received, without question, a constitution on

the Nova Scotia model, with a Lieutenant Governor, an Executive Council

appointed to advise him, which served also as the upper house of the

legislature, and an elective Assembly. Of the twenty-six members of the

first Assembly, twenty-three were Loyalists. With a population so much

at one, and with the tasks of road making and school building and tax

collecting insistent and absorbing, no party strife divided the province

for many years. In Nova Scotia, too, the Loyalists were in the majority.

There, however, the earlier settlers soon joined with some of the

newcomers to form an opposition. The island of St. John, renamed Prince

Edward Island in 1798, had been made a separate Government and had

received an Assembly in 1773. Its one absorbing question was the tenure

of land. On a single day in 1767 the British authorities had granted the

whole island by lottery to army and navy officers and country gentlemen,

on condition of the payment of small quitrents. The quitrents were

rarely paid, and the tenants of the absentee landlords kept up an

agitation for reform which was unceasing but which was not to be

successful for a hundred years. In all three Maritime Provinces

political and party controversy was little known for a generation after

the Revolution.

It was more difficult to decide what form of government should be set up

in Canada, now that tens of thousands of English-speaking settlers dwelt

beside the old Canadians. Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, had returned

as Governor in 1786, after eight years' absence. He was still averse

to granting an Assembly so long as the French subjects were in the

majority: they did not want it, he insisted, and could not use it.

But the Loyalist settlers, not to be put off, joined with the English

merchants of Montreal and Quebec in demanding an Assembly and relief

from the old French laws. Carleton himself was compelled to admit the

force of the conclusion of William Grenville, Secretary of State for the

Home Department, then in control of the remnants of the colonial empire,

and son of that George Grenville who, as Prime Minister, had introduced

the American Stamp Act of 1765: "I am persuaded that it is a point

of true Policy to make these Concessions at a time when they may be

received as a matter of favour, and when it is in Our own power to

regulate and direct the manner of applying them, rather than to wait

till they shall be extorted from us by a necessity which shall neither

leave us any discretion in the form nor any merit in the substance of

what We give." Accordingly, in 1791, the British Parliament passed the

Constitutional Act dividing Canada into two provinces separated by

the Ottawa River, Lower or French-speaking Canada and Upper or

English-speaking Canada, and granting each an elective Assembly.

Thus far the tide of democracy had risen, but thus far only. Few in

high places had learned the full lesson of the American Revolution. The

majority believed that the old colonies had been lost because they had

not been kept under a sufficiently tight rein; that democracy had been

allowed too great headway; that the remaining colonies, therefore,

should be brought under stricter administrative control; and that care

should be taken to build up forces to counteract the democracy which

grew so rank and swift in frontier soil. This conservative tendency

was strengthened by the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789.* The

rulers of England had witnessed two revolutions, and the lesson they

drew from both was that it was best to smother democracy in the cradle.

* It will be remembered that in the debate on the

Constitutional Act the conflicting views of Burke and Fox on

the French Revolution led to the dramatic break in their

lifelong friendship.

For this reason the measure of representative government that had been

granted each of the remaining British colonies in North America was

carefully hedged about. The whole executive power remained in the hands

of the Governor or his nominees. No one yet conceived it possible that

the Assembly should control the Executive Council. The elective Assembly

was compelled to share even the lawmaking power with an upper house,

the Legislative Council. Not only were the members of this upper house

appointed by the Crown for life, but the King was empowered to bestow

hereditary titles upon them with a view to making the Council in the

fullness of time a copy of the House of Lords. A blow was struck even

at that traditional prerogative of the popular house, the control of

the purse. Carleton had urged that in every township a sixth of the

land should be reserved to enable His Majesty "to reward such of His

provincial Servants as may merit the Royal favour" and "to create and

strengthen an Aristocracy, of which the best use may be made on this

Continent, where all Governments are feeble and the general condition of

things tends to a wild Democracy." Grenville saw further possibilities

in this suggestion. It would give the Crown a revenue which would

make it independent of the Assembly, "a measure, which, if it had been

adopted when the Old Colonies were first settled, would have retained

them to this hour in obedience and Loyalty." Nor was this all. From

the same source an endowment might be obtained for a state church which

would be a bulwark of order and conservatism. The Constitutional

Act accordingly provided for setting aside lands equal in value to

one-seventh of all lands granted from time to time, for the support of

a Protestant clergy. The Executive Council received power to set up

rectories in every parish, to endow them liberally, and to name as

rectors ministers of the Church of England. Further, the Executive

Council was instructed to retain an equal amount of land as crown

reserves, distributed judiciously in blocks between the grants made to

settlers. Were any radical tendencies to survive these attentions, the

veto power of the British Government could be counted on in the last

resort.

For a time the installment of self-government thus granted satisfied the

people. The pioneer years left little leisure for political discussion,

nor were there at first any general issues about which men might

differ. The Government was carrying on acceptably the essential tasks

of surveying, land granting, and road building; and each member of the

Assembly played his own hand and was chiefly concerned in obtaining

for his constituents the roads and bridges, they needed so badly. The

English-speaking settlers of Upper Canada were too widely scattered,

and the French-speaking citizens of Lower Canada were too ignorant of

representative institutions, to act in groups or parties.

Much turned in these early years upon the personality of the Governor.

In several instances, the choice of rulers for the new provinces proved

fortunate. This was particularly so in the case of John Graves Simcoe,

Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada from 1792 to 1799. He was a good

soldier and a just and vigorous administrator, particularly wise in

setting his regulars to work building roads such as Yonge Street and

Dundas Street, which to this day are great provincial arteries of

travel. Yet there were many sources of weakness in the scheme of

government--divided authority, absenteeism, personal unfitness. When

Dorchester was reappointed in 1786, he had been made Governor in

Chief of all British North America. From the beginning, however, the

Lieutenant Governors of the various provinces asserted independent

authority, and in a few years the Governor General became in fact merely

the Governor of the most populous province, Lower Canada, in which he

resided.

In Upper Canada, as in New Brunswick, the population was at first much

at one. In time, however, discordant elements appeared. Religious, or

at least denominational, differences began to cause friction. The great

majority of the early settlers in Upper Canada belonged to the Church of

England, whose adherents in the older colonies had nearly all taken

the Loyalist side. Of the Ulster Presbyterians and New England

Congregationalists who formed the backbone of the Revolution, few came

to Canada. The growth of the Methodists and Baptists in the United

States after the Revolution, however, made its mark on the neighboring

country. The first Methodist class meetings in Upper Canada, held in

the United Empire Loyalist settlement on the Bay of Quinte in 1791,

were organized by itinerant preachers from the United States; and in the

western part of the province pioneer Baptist evangelists from the same

country reached the scattered settlers neglected by the older churches.

Nor was it in religion alone that diversity grew. Simcoe had set up a

generous land policy which brought in many "late Loyalists," American

settlers whose devotion to monarchical principles would not always bear

close inquiry. The fantastic experiment of planting in the heart of

the woods of Upper Canada a group of French nobles driven out by

the Revolution left no trace; but Mennonites, Quakers, and Scottish

Highlanders contributed diverse and permanent factors to the life of the

province. Colonel Thomas Talbot of Malahide, "a fierce little Irishman

who hated Scotchmen and women, turned teetotallers out of his house,

and built the only good road in the province," made the beginnings

of settlement midway on Lake Erie. A shrewd Massachusetts merchant,

Philemon Wright, with his comrades, their families, servants, horses,

oxen, and 10,000 pounds, sledded from Boston to Montreal in the winter

of 1800, and thence a hundred miles beyond, to found the town of Hull

and establish a great lumbering industry in the Ottawa Valley.

These differences of origin and ways of thought had not yet been

reflected in political life. Party strife in Upper Canada began with

a factional fight which took place in 1805-07 between a group of Irish

officeholders and a Scotch clique who held the reins of government.

Weekes, an Irish-American barrister, Thorpe, a puisne judge, Wyatt,

the surveyor general, and Willcocks, a United Irishman who had become

sheriff of one of the four Upper Canada districts, began to question the

right to rule of "the Scotch pedlars" or "the Shopkeeper Aristocracy,"

as Thorpe called those merchants who, for the lack of other leaders,

had developed an influence with the governors or ruled in their frequent

absence. But the insurgents were backed by only a small minority in the

Assembly, and when the four leaders disappeared from the stage,* this

curtain raiser to the serious political drama which was to follow came

quickly to its end.

* Weekes was slain in a duel. Wyatt and Thorpe were

suspended by the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Gore, only

to win redress later in England. Willcocks was dismissed

from office and fell fighting on the American side in the

War of 1812.

In Lower Canada the clash was more serious. The French Canadians, who

had not asked for representative government, eventually grasped its

possibilities and found leaders other than those ordained for them. In

the first Assembly there were many seigneurs and aristocrats who

bore names notable for six generations back Taschereau, Duchesnay,

Lothiniere, Rouville, Salaberry. But they soon found their surroundings

uncongenial or failed to be reelected. Writing in 1810 to Lord

Liverpool, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, the Governor,

Sir James Craig, with a fine patrician scorn thus pictures the Assembly

of his day.

"It really, my Lord, appears to me an absurdity, that the Interests of

certainly not an unimportant Colony, involving in them those also of no

inconsiderable portion of the Commercial concerns of the British Empire,

should be in the hands of six petty shopkeepers, a Blacksmith, a Miller,

and 15 ignorant peasants who form part of our present House; a Doctor

or Apothecary, twelve Canadian Avocats and Notaries, and four so far

respectable people that at least they do not keep shops, together with

ten English members compleat the List: there is not one person coming

under the description of a Canadian Gentleman among them."

And again:

"A Governor cannot obtain among them even that sort of influence that

might arise from personal intercourse. I can have none with Blacksmiths,

Millers, and Shopkeepers; even the Avocats and Notaries who compose so

considerable a portion of the House, are, generally speaking, such as I

can nowhere meet, except during the actual sitting of Parliament, when

I have a day of the week expressly appropriated to the receiving a large

portion of them at dinner."

Leadership under these conditions fell to the "unprincipled Demagogues,"

half-educated lawyers, men "with nothing to lose."

But it was not merely as an aristocrat facing peasants and shopkeepers,

nor as a soldier faced by talkers, but as an Englishman on guard against

Frenchmen that Craig found himself at odds with his Assembly. For nearly

twenty years in this period England was at death grips with France,

end to hate and despise all Frenchmen was part of the hereditary and

congenial duty of all true Britons. Craig and those who counseled him

were firmly convinced that the new subjects were French at heart. Of

the 250,000 inhabitants of Lower Canada, he declared, "about 20,000 or

25,000 may be English or Americans, the rest are French. I use the term

designedly, my Lord, because I mean to say that they are in Language, in

religion, in manner and in attachment completely French." That there

was still some affection for old France, stirred by war and French

victories, there is no question, but that the Canadians wished to return

to French allegiance was untrue, even though Craig reported that such

was "the general opinion of all ranks with whom it is possible to

converse on the subject." The French Revolution had created a great gulf

between Old France and New France. The clergy did their utmost to bar

all intercourse with the land where deism and revolution held sway, and

when the Roman Catholic Church and the British Government combined for

years on a single object, it was little wonder they succeeded. Nelson's

victory at Trafalgar was celebrated by a Te Deum in the Roman Catholic

Cathedral at Quebec. In fact, as Craig elsewhere noted, the habitants

were becoming rather a new and distinct nationality, a nation

canadienne. They ceased to be French; they declined to become English;

and sheltered under their "Sacred Charter"* they became Canadians first

and last.

* "It cannot be sufficiently inculcated ON THE PART OF

GOVERNMENT that the Quebec Act is a Sacred Charter, granted

by the King in Parliament to the Canadians as a Security for

their Religion, Laws, and Property." Governor Sir Frederick

Haldimand to Lord George Germaine, Oct. 25, 1780.

The governors were not alone in this hostility to the mass of

the people. There had grown up in the colony a little clique of

officeholders, of whom Jonathan Sewell, the Loyalist Attorney General,

and later Chief Justice, was the chief, full of racial and class

prejudice, and in some cases greedy for personal gain. Sewell declared

it "indispensably necessary to overwhelm and sink the Canadian

population by English Protestants," and was even ready to run the

risk of bringing in Americans to effect this end. Of the non-official

English, some were strongly opposed to the pretensions of the "Chateau

Clique"; but others, and especially the merchants, with their organ the

Quebec "Mercury", were loud in their denunciations of the French who

were unprogressive and who as landowners were incidentally trying to

throw the burden of taxation chiefly on the traders.

The first open sign of the racial division which was to bedevil the life

of the province came in 1806 when, in order to meet the attacks of

the Anglicizing party, the newspaper "Le Canadien" was established at

Quebec. Its motto was significant: "Notre langue, nos institutions, et

nos lois." Craig and his counselors took up the challenge. In 1808 he

dismissed five militia officers, because of their connection with the

irritating journal, and in 1810 he went so far as to suppress it and

to throw into prison four of those responsible for its management. The

Assembly, which was proving hard to control, was twice dissolved in

three years. Naturally the Governor's arbitrary course only stiffened

resistance; and passions were rising fast and high when illness led

to his recall and the shadow of a common danger from the south, the

imminence of war with the United States, for a time drew all men

together.

While the foundations of the eastern provinces of Canada were being

laid, the wildernesses which one day were to become the western

provinces were just rising above the horizon of discovery. In the plains

and prairies between the Great Lakes and the Rockies, fur traders warred

for the privilege of exchanging with the Indians bad whiskey for good

furs. Scottish traders from Montreal, following in the footsteps of La

Verendrye and Niverville, pushed far into the northern wilds.* In 1788

the leading traders joined forces in organizing the North-West Company.

Their great canoes, manned by French-Canadian voyageurs, penetrated the

network of waters from the Ottawa to the Saskatchewan, and poured wealth

into the pockets of the lordly partners in Montreal. Their rivalry

wakened the sleepy Hudson's Bay Company, which was now forced to leave

the shores of the inland sea and build posts in the interior.

* It is interesting to note the dominant share taken in the

trade and exploration of the North and West by men of

Highland Scotch and French extraction. For an account of La

Verendrye see "The Conquest of New France" and for the

Scotch fur traders of Montreal see "Adventurers of Oregon"

(in "The Chronicles of America").

On the Pacific coast rivalry was still keener. The sea otter and the

seal were a lure to the men of many nations. Canada took its part in

this rivalry. In 1792, when the Russians were pressing down from their

Alaskan posts, when the Spaniards, claiming the Pacific for their own,

were exploring the mouth of the Fraser, when Captain Robert Gray of

Boston was sailing up the mighty Columbia, and Captain Vancouver

was charting the northern coasts for the British Government, a young

North-West Company factor, Alexander Mackenzie, in his lonely post on

Lake Athabaska, was planning to cross the wilderness of mountains to

the coast. With a fellow trader, Mackay, and six Canadian voyageurs, he

pushed up the Peace and the Parsnip, passed by way of the Fraser and

the Blackwater to the Bella Coola, and thence to the Pacific, the first

white man to cross the northern continent. Paddling for life through

swirling rapids on rivers which rushed madly through sheer rock-bound

canyons, swimming for shore when rock or sand bar had wrecked the

precious bark canoe, struggling over heartbreaking portages, clinging

to the sides of precipices, contending against hostile Indians and

fear-stricken followers, and at last winning through, Mackenzie summed

up what will ever remain one of the great achievements of exploration

in the simple record, painted in vermilion on a rock in Burke Channel:

Alexander Mackenzie, from Canada, by land, the twenty-second of July,

one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three. The first bond had been

woven in the union of East and West. Between the eastern provinces a

stronger link was soon to be forged. The War of 1812 gave the scattered

British colonies in America for the first time a living sense of unity

that transcended all differences, a memory of perils and of victories

which nourished a common patriotism.

The War of 1812 was no quarrel of Canada's. It was merely an incident

in the struggle between England and Napoleon. At desperate grips, both

contestants used whatever weapons lay ready to their hands. Sea power

was England's weapon, and in her claim to forbid all neutral traffic

with her enemies and to exercise the galling right of search, she

pressed it far. France trampled still more ruthlessly on American and

neutral rights; but, with memories of 1776 still fresh, the dominant

party in the United States was disposed to forgive France and to hold

England to strict account.

England had struck at France, regardless of how the blow might injure

neutrals. Now the United States sought to strike at England through the

colonies, regardless of their lack of any responsibility for English

policy. The "war hawks" of the South and West called loudly for the

speedy invasion and capture of Canada as a means of punishing England.

In so far as the British North American colonies were but possessions

of Great Britain, overseas plantations, the course of the United States

could be justified. But potentially these colonies were more than mere

possessions. They were a nation in the making, with a right to their own

development; they were not simply a pawn in the game of Britain and the

United States. Quite aside from the original rights or wrongs of

the war, the invasion of Canada was from this standpoint an act of

aggression. "Agrarian cupidity, not maritime right, wages this war,"

insisted John Randolph of Roanoke, the chief opponent of the "war

hawks" in Congress. "Ever since the report of the Committee on Foreign

Relations came into the House, we have heard but one word--like the

whippoorwill, but one eternal monotonous tone--Canada, Canada, Canada!"

At the outset there appeared no question that the conquest of Canada

could be, as Jefferson forecast, other than "a mere matter of marching."

Eustis, the Secretary of War, prophesied that "we can take Canada

without soldiers." Clay insisted that the Canadas were "as much under

our command as the Ocean is under Great Britain's." The provinces had

barely half a million people, two-thirds of them allied by ties of

blood to Britain's chief enemy, to set against the eight millions of the

Republic. There were fewer than ten thousand regular troops in all the

colonies, half of them down by the sea, far away from the danger zone,

and less than fifteen hundred west of Montreal. Little help could

come from England, herself at war with Napoleon, the master of half of

Europe.

But there was another side. The United States was not a unit in the war;

New England was apathetic or hostile to the war throughout, and as late

as 1814 two-thirds of the army of Canada were eating beef supplied

by Vermont and New York contractors. Weak as was the militia of the

Canadas, it was stiffened by English and Canadian regulars, hardened by

frontier experience, and led for the most part by trained and able

men, whereas an inefficient system and political interference greatly

weakened the military force of the fighting States. Above all, the

Canadians were fighting for their homes. To them the war was a matter of

life and death; to the United States it was at best a struggle to assert

commercial rights or national prestige.

The course and fortunes of the war call for only the briefest notice.

In the first year the American plans for invading Upper Canada came to

grief through the surrender of Hull at Detroit to Isaac Brock and the

defeat at Queenston Heights of the American army under Van Rensselaer.

The campaign ended with not a foot of Canadian soil in the invaders'

hands, and with Michigan lost, but Brock, Canada's brilliant leader, had

fallen at Queenston, and at sea the British had tasted unwonted defeat.

In single actions one American frigate after another proved too much for

its British opponent. It was a rude shock to the Mistress of the Seas.

The second year's campaign was more checkered. In the West the Americans

gained the command of the Great Lakes by rapid building and good

sailing, and with it followed the command of all the western peninsula

of Upper Canada. The British General Procter was disastrously defeated

at Moraviantown, and his ally, the Shawanoe chief Tecumseh, one of

the half dozen great men of his race, was killed. York, later known

as Toronto, the capital of the province, was captured, and its public

buildings were burned and looted. But in the East fortune was kinder

to the Canadians. The American plan of invasion called for an attack on

Montreal from two directions; General Wilkinson was to sail and march

down the St. Lawrence from Sackett's Harbor with some eight thousand

men, while General Hampton, with four thousand, was to take the historic

route by Lake Champlain. Half-way down the St. Lawrence Wilkinson came

to grief. Eighteen hundred men whom he landed to drive off a force of

a thousand hampering his rear were decisively defeated at Chrystler's

Farm. Wilkinson pushed on for a few days, but when word came that

Hampton had also met disaster he withdrew into winter quarters. Hampton

had found Colonel de Salaberry, with less than sixteen hundred troops,

nearly all French Canadians, making a stand on the banks of the

Chateauguay, thirty-five miles south of Montreal. He divided his

force in order to take the Canadians in front and rear, only to be

outmaneuvered and outfought in one of the most brilliant actions of

the war and forced to retire. In the closing months of the year the

Americans, compelled to withdraw from Fort George on the Niagara, burned

the adjoining town of Newark and turned its women and children into the

December snow. Drummond, who had succeeded Brock, gained control of both

sides of the Niagara and retaliated in kind by laying waste the frontier

villages from Lewiston to Buffalo. The year closed with Amherstburg on

the Detroit the only Canadian post in American hands. On the sea the

capture of the Chesapeake by the Shannon salved the pride of England.

The last year of the war was also a year of varying fortunes. In the far

West a small body of Canadians and Indians captured Prairie du Chien, on

the Mississippi, while Michilimackinac, which a force chiefly composed

of French-Canadian voyageurs and Indians had captured in the first

months of war, defied a strong assault. In Upper Canada the Americans

raided the western peninsula from Detroit but made their chief attack

on the Niagara frontier. Though they scored no permanent success, they

fought well and with a fair measure of fortune. The generals with whom

they had been encumbered at the outset of the war, Revolutionary relics

or political favorites, had now nearly all been replaced by abler

men--Scott, Brown, Exert--and their troops were better trained and

better equipped. In July the British forces on the Niagara were

decisively beaten at Chippawa. Three weeks later was fought the

bloodiest battle on Canadian soil, at Lundy's Lane, either side's

victory at the moment but soon followed by the retirement of the

invading force. The British had now outbuilt their opponents on Lake

Ontario; and, though American ships controlled Lake Erie to the end, the

Ontario flotilla aided Drummond, Brock's able successor, in forcing the

withdrawal of Exert forces from the whole peninsula in November. Farther

east a third attempt to capture Montreal had been defeated in the

spring, after Wilkinson with four thousand men had failed to drive five

hundred regulars and militia from the stone walls of Lacolle's Mill.

Until this closing year Britain had been unable, in face of the more

vital danger from Napoleon, to send any but trifling reenforcements to

what she considered a minor theater of the war. Now, with Napoleon in

Elba, she was free to take more vigorous action. Her navy had already

swept the daring little fleet of American frigates and American merchant

marine from the seas. Now it maintained a close blockade of all the

coast and, with troops from Halifax, captured and held the Maine coast

north of the Penobscot. Large forces of Wellington's hardy veterans

crossed the ocean, sixteen thousand to Canada, four thousand to aid in

harrying the Atlantic coast, and later nine thousand to seize the mouth

of the Mississippi. Yet, strangely, these hosts fared worse, because

of hard fortune and poor leadership, than the handful of militia and

regulars who had borne the brunt of the war in the first two years.

Under Ross they captured Washington and burned the official buildings;

but under Prevost they failed at Plattsburg; and under Pakenham, in

January, 1815, they failed against Andrew Jackson's sharpshooters at New

Orleans.

Before the last-named fight occurred, peace had been made. Both sides

were weary of the war, which had now, by the seeming end of the struggle

between England and Napoleon in which it was an incident, lost whatever

it formerly had of reason. Though Napoleon was still in Elba, Europe

was far from being at rest, and the British Ministers, backed by

Wellington's advice, were keen to end the war. They showed their

contempt for the issues at stake by sending to the peace conference at

Ghent three commissioners as incompetent as ever represented a great

power, Gambier, Goulburn, and Adams. To face these the United States had

sent John Quincy Adams, Albert Gallatin, Henry Clay, James Bayard, and

Jonathan Russell, as able and astute a group of players for great stakes

as ever gathered round a table. In these circumstances the British

representatives were lucky to secure peace on the basis of the status

quo ante. Canada had hoped that sufficient of the unsettled Maine

wilderness would be retained to link up New Brunswick with the inland

colony of Quebec, but this proposal was soon abandoned. In the treaty

not one of the ostensible causes of the war was even mentioned.

The war had the effect of unifying Canadian feeling. Once more it had

been determined that Canada was not to lose her identity in the nation

to the south. In Upper Canada, especially in the west, there were many

recent American settlers who sympathized openly with their kinsmen, but

of these some departed, some were jailed, and others had a change of

heart. Lower Canada was a unit against the invader, and French-Canadian

troops on every occasion covered themselves with glory. To the

Canadians, as the smaller people, and as the people whose country had

been the chief battle ground, the war in later years naturally bulked

larger than to their neighbors. It left behind it unfortunate legacies

of hostility to the United States and, among the governing classes, of

deep-rooted opposition to its democratic institutions. But it left also

memories precious for a young people--the memory of Brock and Macdonell

and De Salaberry, of Laura Secord and her daring tramp through the

woods to warn of American attacks, of Stony Creek and Lundy's Lane,

Chrystler's Farm and Chateauguay, the memory of sacrifice, of endurance,

and of courage that did not count the odds.

Nor were the evil legacies to last for all time. Three years after peace

had been made the statesmen of the United States and of Great Britain

had the uncommon sense to take a great step toward banishing war between

the neighbor peoples. The Rush-Bagot Convention, limiting the naval

armament on the Great Lakes to three vessels not exceeding one hundred

tons each, and armed only with one eighteen-pounder, though not always

observed in the letter, proved the beginning of a sane relationship

which has lasted for a century. Had not this agreement nipped naval

rivalry in the bud, fleets and forts might have lined the shores and

increased the strain of policy and the likelihood of conflict. The New

World was already preparing to sound its message to the Old.

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