His treatise entitled, “The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates,” was

published a fortnight after the King’s execution, and a week after the

Republic was proclaimed. The chief aim of the treatise was to argue

for the democratic principle, on which he insisted strongly. Touching

the right of a nation to depose a king who had become a tyrant, Milton

followed Buchanan’s line of argument. He assumed throughout that

Charles I. was unquestionably a tyrant, and explicitly avowed that the

people were justified in bringing the King, and such as he, to account

and punishment. In short, he justified Cromwell and his colleagues

in bringing the King to trial and execution. He continued a warm and

powerful defender of the Commonwealth and its leaders.

I will quote a single specimen of Milton’s power as a defender of the

Commonwealth, from his attack on Salmasius’s “Defence of Charles I.”

Salmasius himself was a voluminous writer and commentator, a very

learned man, with a European reputation; but he had oftener than once

changed some of his opinions, and now appeared as the defender of the

late King. So it fell to Milton to reply to this learned man’s book;

and the following quotation is a specimen of how he executed his task:

――“Who are you that bark at us? You, a learned man, who seem rather

to have been turning over lexicons and glossaries and collections of

extracts all your life, than to have read good authors with judgment

and profit; whence your chatter is of nothing but codices, various

readings, disarrangements and corruptions of text, while you show that

you have not imbibed even the smallest drop of more real learning? You

a wise man, who are constantly quarrelling about the merest minutiæ,

and carrying on beggarly wars, and making railing attacks, now on

astronomers, now on medical men, of good credit in their respective

sciences, though yourself without skill or accomplishment in either;

who, if anyone should try to snatch from you the petty glory of a

little word, or a little letter, restored by you in some copy, would

interdict him, if you could, from fire and water? And yet you are angry,

and yet you show your teeth, because people call you a grammarian. In

some trifling book of yours, you openly call Hammond, the beloved and

most favoured of the late King’s chaplains, a rascal, merely because

he had called you a grammarian; and you would be ready, I believe, to

say the same of the King himself, and to retract this whole defence of

him, if you heard that he had approved of his chaplain’s criticism of

you. Take notice then how I, one of those English, whom you dare to

describe as ‘fanatical, unlearned, obscure, blackguardly,’ do here on

my private account (for that the English nation itself should publicly

think anything at all about a weevil like you would be a degradation),

do here, I say, on my private account, despise you and make a

laughing-stock of you, declaring that, turn you upside down, downside

up, round about, or anyhow, you are still nothing but a Grammarian; ay,

and that, as if you had made a more foolish promise to some god than

even Midas did, whatever you touch, except when you commit solecisms,

is still only grammar. Whoever, then, of these ‘dregs of the common

people,’ that you so denounce (for those truly noble men among us,

whose wisdom, virtue, and nobility are proved by their illustrious acts,

I will not so dishonour as to think of comparing you to them or them

to you), whoever, I say, of these dregs of the common people, has only

persuaded himself to this principle, that he was not born for kings,

but for God and his country, is a far more learned, far wiser, far

better, man than you are, and deserves to be esteemed of far greater

worth to all time. For he is learned without letters; you have letters

but no learning, who know so many languages, turn over so many volumes,

write so many yourself, and are but a sheep after all.”¹

¹ Masson’s _Life of Milton_, Volume IV., pages 264‒265.

As an advocate of freedom, Milton has great merit, though he is not

always consistent. His “Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,”

was a scathing and powerful attack on the existing laws of censorship

of the press and licensing of books. It is comparatively short, but

it has much historic interest, though the doctrine which he so ably

pleaded for is now fully admitted in Britain.

James Harrington was the author of a political romance, entitled “The

Commonwealth of Oceana,” which was published in 1656, and attracted

some attention. In 1658 he issued another treatise, called “The

Prerogative of Popular Government,” reasserting his views in a more

direct style. He drew up a constitution for a commonwealth, the

legislative part consisting of two houses, and both to be elected

by the people. One of the houses should have the power of proposing

and debating laws; while the other, which was to be the largest body,

should have the power of passing or rejecting the laws thus proposed by

the smaller house. Further, it was proposed that a third of the members

of both houses should retire every year, not to be re-eligible for a

considerable time, and their places filled by newly-elected members:

thus the whole membership of both houses would be entirely renewed

every third year.

Richard Cumberland, bishop of Peterborough, was an ethical writer of

historical note, and an opponent of the moral doctrines of Hobbes. His

views were expressed in a work entitled “De Legibus Naturæ Disquisitio

Philosophica,” etc., etc., which appeared in 1672, and an English

translation of it was published in 1727. His chief aim was to show

that there are moral laws made known by nature, but not in the way

enunciated by Hobbes. He began with an exposition of the nature of

man and of things, and whence proceeded to derive the special ethical

duties. The fundamental law of morality was enunciated thus:――“The

greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, forms the

happiest state of each and of all the benevolent, as far as in their

power; and it is essentially requisite to the happiness which they can

attain; and, therefore, the common good is the supreme law.”

He insisted that the mind has an original regulative faculty, and

earnestly contended that the social feelings and the disinterested

affections are original elements of man’s nature. The human mind

is endowed with certain innate capacities, and has the power of

apprehending first principles, and whence deducting conclusions. True

propositions agree with the nature of things, and the dictates of

practical reason are propositions which point out the ethical end,

and the means by which it should be attained.

In the last half of the seventeenth century there arose in England

a class of writers sometimes called Platonists, Cambridge men, or

English Cartesians, but it should be observed that these writers

held diverse views on some important points, though they generally

agreed in assailing the psychology and the ethics of Hobbes. The most

distinguished amongst them all was the learned Ralph Cudworth.¹ In

his great work, “The Intellectual System of the Universe,” which he

did not live to complete, he assumed a plastic principle in nature,

and by this explained organic development. He supposed that this power,

or unconscious force, possessed a general and a special activity which

produced the results of design. He contended that the doctrine of

efficient causes does not exclude the possibility of final causes.

He attacked the position of the unlimited power of God as taught by

Descartes, on the ground that it would annul logical and geometrical

reasoning, and obliterate moral distinctions. He assailed Hobbes’s

nominalism, and his limitation of the powers of the human mind to sense

and fancy, and maintained that there was a higher faculty of reason.

Cudworth exhibited an enormous amount of learning and considerable

reasoning power. He gave many quotations from ancient writers, and

those who have the courage and perseverance to read his “Intellectual

System of the Universe,” will find that it is a curious and valuable

work, and a great monument of erudition.²

¹ Born 1617, died 1688.

² _The True Intellectual System of the Universe_, 1678; compare

Dr. Tulloch’s _Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in

England in the Seventeenth Century_, Volume II.

His “Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,” and also

one on “Free-will,” are unfinished fragments of long discussions,

originally designed to complete his Intellectual System, and not

published till long after his death. He argued for the independence of

moral distinctions, and maintained that they were discovered directly

by human reason.

Henry More was the author of several theological and ethical works of

an essentially Platonic and transcendental cast, interwoven with his

own notions and dreams. The leading principle of his ethics was that

moral goodness is simple and absolute, and that reason is the judge of

its nature and truth; but its distinctive beauty is felt by a special

capacity, a something like the moral sense of later writers. All moral

goodness may be called intellectual and divine. By the aid of reason

we are enabled to state the principles of ethics in propositions, and

hence derive the special maxims and rules.

An Englishman who holds a distinguished place in the history of modern

philosophy, and especially in psychology, now claims attention, namely,

John Locke. In political theory he was the chief expounder of the

principles of the Revolution of 1688; and indeed his political writings

became the source whence the Whig politicians drew their arguments for

several generations. But the “Social Contract Theory,” of which he was

an able exponent, is now entirely obsolete.

In his “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” the fundamental idea is

that all our knowledge is derived from experience. The work was mainly

directed to the exposition of two questions, namely, first to ascertain

the origin of human knowledge, and then to determine the limits and

the degrees of objective truth. His method was that of observation, the

object of investigation being his own mind, “looking into it and seeing

how it wrought.” He could find no innate ideas or principles in the

mind. The primary source of all our knowledge is sensation or external

perception, and reflection or internal perception; the former embraced

the apprehension of external objects through the senses, while the

latter comprised the apprehension of mental objects by internal or

self-reflection, a subjective operation of thought. The different

objects of external perception are variously related to objective

reality. Thus extension, figure, motion, and other qualities of bodies,

belong to the external objects themselves; while colour, sound, and

sensible qualities are only in ourselves, and not properly in the

objects perceived, being signs not copies of changes which take place

in external things. In the reception of simple ideas the mind is

merely passive, it cannot refuse to have them, or blot them out, any

more than a mirror can refuse to receive, alter, or obliterate the

images reflected on it; all that man can do is to unite them together,

classify them or separate them. By internal reflection we know the

action of our thinking and willing faculties; while through sensation

and reflection together we obtain the feelings of pleasure and pain,

the ideas of power, unity, existence, and others, but we have no clear

idea of substance.

The word idea has a wide meaning in Locke’s Essay, as he uses it to

denote whatever we apprehend, whether it be a mental modification

of an external object, or a subjective thought, the perception or

consciousness of feelings and passions; as when I form a mental picture

or image of anything, or am conscious of a pleasant sound――when I see

the moon or any external object, and when I remember any of these,

again when I understand the meaning of right, of property, or any other

abstract term――in all such cases, according to Locke, I am having ideas.

Thus he employed the term idea in its most unrestricted universality.

The theory of knowledge requires some definite word or words to

indicate the dependence of what is known on the power of knowing.

Descartes, Locke, and others, used the word idea in this relation,

sometimes with perception, and at a later date, with impression. At

present some use the term phenomenon to express those aspects of

existence of which we are conscious, rather than the words, ideas,

perceptions, or impressions; others, again, use the word consciousness

with a wide meaning, to express mental facts, modes, or states, in

their relation to the knowing mind. But all terms thus used touch

the prime assumption of philosophy, namely, that the universe and all

things which exist can become known to us only through our mental and

self-conscious experience; and thus arises the problem of the relation

of the human mind to the external world.

Now as already indicated in this chapter, there is a real difficulty

involved in understanding and stating the exact relation between mind

and matter; and the nature of the relation of the object known and

the knowing mind is still unknown. All that we know is that knowledge

consists in a certain relation of the object known to the knowing

subject. Of mind in itself or matter in itself we know nothing; simply

because we know only the qualities of our own faculties of knowledge,

as relations to their objects, and we only know the qualities of their

objects as relations to our minds: thus all qualities both of mind

and of matter are only known to us as relations, we know nothing in

itself.¹

¹ Hamilton’s _Reid_, Note N., page 965.

In Locke’s Essay the word idea is used to recall the truth that

external things become known to us through our presentative and

representative conscious experience; but on the other side of his

theory, ideas also represent qualities which exist external to our

conscious mind; thus they are, as it were, “effects in us,” produced

by powers that are independent of us: that is, he assumed that the mind

is merely passive in the reception of simple ideas.

Locke devoted the First Book of his Essay to the refutation in detail

of the doctrine of innate ideas. The argument that certain speculative

and practical principles are universally accepted as true, he disputed,

by showing that there was a mass of evidence against this alleged

agreement, and that though it were otherwise, innate ideas would not

be proved, as it might be shown that such agreement had arisen in

other ways. He had little difficulty in proving that the principles of

identity and of contradiction are unknown to children, and to all who

are not specially educated: and, therefore, it could not be maintained

that truths are inherent in the mind of which it has no consciousness

and no knowledge. To say that an idea is imprinted on the mind, and

yet at the same time to admit that the mind is ignorant of it, and

never took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. But it is

true that the capacity to know is innate, though all actual knowledge

is and must be acquired. And, therefore, those who adopt the theory

of innate ideas should distinguish them from other ideas which are

not innate; and thus they must hold that innate knowledge is from the

first conscious knowledge, for to be in the understanding means to be

understood. If it be asserted, that these principles are recognised

and admitted by all men when they come to exercise their reason, this

is not true or conclusive, whether in the sense that we know them

deductively by the use of reason, or in the sense that we think them

when we arrive at the use of reason, for we know many things before

them. That the bitter is not sweet, that a rod and a cherry are not the

same thing, are known by a child long before he understands and assents

to the universal proposition that it is impossible for the same thing

to be and not to be at the same moment. Practical principles stand

upon the same footing as speculative ones, none of them being innate;

and, moreover, they are not so clear or so universally received as the

principle just indicated. If principles are innate, the ideas involved

in them must also be innate. Now the most general principles contain

the most abstract ideas, which are the furthest from the thoughts

of children, and are unintelligible to them, and can only be clearly

formed after they have attained some degree of attention and reflection.

The ideas of identity of difference, possibility and impossibility, and

others of a similar character, are not in the child’s consciousness at

birth; and they are farthest removed in the order of development from

the sensations of hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure and pain,

which in reality are the earliest conscious experiences of a child.

Locke strongly maintained that the idea of God is not innate. And

he attempted to prove that some tribes in the lowest stages of

civilisation had no idea of God at all. He also pointed out the fact

that the ideas and conceptions which the various tribes and nations of

mankind have of God differed greatly.

Having thus cleared the ground, Locke, in his Second Book, proceeded

to show whence the understanding receives its ideas. He asks, “Whence

comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man

has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all

the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word,

from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that

it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about

external or sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our

minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies

our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These two are

the fountains of knowledge, from which all the ideas we have, or can

naturally have, do spring.”¹ Thus experience is twofold, external and

internal, sensation and reflection, according as its object is the

outer world of things, or the internal operations of our own minds.

The senses in contact with external objects supply the mind with the

elements and materials of ideas; and thus we attain the ideas of yellow,

white, heat, cold, soft, hard, and all those called sensible qualities.

Then when the mind attends and thinks on its own internal operations,

the understanding thence attains another set of ideas: such as

perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing,

and all the different operations of our minds of which we are conscious

and observe within ourselves.

¹ Book II., Chapter I., Section 2.

When the first impression is made on his senses, man begins to have

ideas. But before the first sensible impression, the mind no more

thinks than it does afterwards in a deep and dreamless sleep. That the

mind always thinks is as groundless an assertion as that all bodies are

continually in motion.

Some of our ideas are simple, others are complex; and of the former

class, some come into the mind by one sense only, some by more senses

than one, others through reflection, while some come both by the senses

and reflection. The simple ideas received by touch are heat, cold,

solidity, roughness, hardness, smoothness, and many others; by the

sense of sight, the ideas of light and colours; while the ideas which

we receive by more than one sense, by sight and touch, are those

of space, figure, rest, and motion. The simple ideas of reflection

which the mind acquires when it becomes conscious and observes its

own operations, are mainly two, namely, perception or thinking, and

volition or willing. But the other simple ideas acquired through all

the channels of the senses and reflection, are those of pleasure and

pain, power, existence, unity, and succession.

But most of the ideas of sensation are no more like anything existing

externally to ourselves, than words are like the ideas for which they

stand, and which they serve to recall to the mind. The inseparable

qualities of bodies themselves are those of bulk, figure, number,

position, motion and rest; and these he called the primary qualities of

body. Now our ideas of these primary qualities of bodies are copies of

these qualities; that is, they represent the thing mentally as it is in

itself. But the secondary qualities of bodies affect us in a different

way, they operate on the senses, and cause in us the sensations of

colours, sounds, smells, and the like, which are not in the bodies

themselves, but in our own minds. He further names a third class of

qualities: these are the powers of some bodies, which, owing to the

constitution of their primary qualities, make such changes in the bulk,

figure, and motion of other bodies as cause them to operate upon our

senses differently from what they did before; among these he instances

the power of the sun to make wax white, and of fire to melt lead.¹

¹ Book II., Chapters I.‒VIII.

Under the head of simple ideas acquired by reflection, he minutely

investigated the faculties of perception, retention, discerning,

compounding, abstracting, and other operations of the mind. The faculty

of perception distinguished man from animal and plant. The faculty of

memory is the power of preserving ideas by continued contemplation,

or by reviving them after their temporary absence from the mind, which

is too limited to be conscious at the same time of many ideas. Memory

is common to man and the lower animals. The power of abstraction is

peculiar to man. By this generalising faculty the ideas of single

objects are separated from all accidental qualities, and raised to the

rank of universal conceptions of the genera to which they belong.

The simple ideas being the elements of the complex ones, he reduced

complex ideas to three classes, namely, modes, substances, and

relations. Modes are complex ideas, but not involving existence by

themselves, being merely modifications of simple ideas when their

elements are similar, and mixed modes or modifications when their

elements are dissimilar. Ideas of substances are those combinations

of simple ideas employed to represent things existing by themselves.

The ideas of relation arise from the comparison of one idea with

another. To the purely modal ideas belong the mental modifications of

space, time, thought, power, and other abstract conceptions. Our own

experience and observation of the constant change of ideas in the mind,

partly depending on the impressions of external objects, and partly

on our own choice, soon leads the understanding to the conclusion

that the same changes as have already been observed will continue to

take place in the same objects through the same causes; accordingly,

the understanding conceives in one thing or object a liability to

change its form, and in another, the possibility of being the agent of

that change, and thus the mind attains the idea of a power. Thus the

clearest idea of power is derived from observing the activities of our

own minds, as internal experience teaches us that by a mere volition

we can set in motion parts of the body which were before at rest. If a

substance possessing a power manifest it by an action, it is called a

cause; and that which it brings to pass is called its effect. A cause

is that through which something else begins to be; an effect is that

which depends for its existence on something besides itself. The idea

of substance itself contains nothing but the supposition of an unknown

something serving as a support for qualities; we have no clear idea

of it. Nor is our idea of material substance more distinct than our

idea of spiritual substance. There is no reason for assuming that a

spiritual substance cannot exist; we have no more reason to doubt or

deny the existence of spirits, than we have to deny the existence of

bodies. Locke, in his treatment of the term substance――the term which

plays so great a part in the systems of Descartes and Spinoza――plainly

admitted his impotence. He says, “If anyone will examine himself

concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he

has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not

what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple

ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If anyone

should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres,

he would have nothing to say, but the solid, extended parts; and if

he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adheres in,”

he would be in much the same plight as the Indian was who supported

the world on the broad-backed tortoise. “And thus here, as in all

other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct

ideas, we talk like children.... The idea then we have, to which we

give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but

unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine

cannot subsist without something to support them, we call that

support, substantia, which means in plain English, standing under, or

upholding.” But again, in comparing our ideas of spirit and of body,

he says, “In short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea

we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirit is unknown to

us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us.”¹ An idea of

substance in itself, that is, apart from any qualities in relation to

our minds, is utterly barren; as we only conceive it as inconceivable

――as nothing at all.

¹ Chapter XXIII., Section 2, Section 30.

He treated at length of relations, including that of cause and effect,

of identity and diversity, of clear and distinct, obscure and confused

ideas, of adequate and inadequate ideas, of real and fanatical ideas,

of true and false ideas. Strictly speaking, truth and falsehood

belong only to propositions; but ideas are sometimes termed true or

false, though when so styled, there is some tacit proposition assumed,

as ideas are but bare perceptions in our own minds, and cannot in

themselves be said to be true or false. Any idea which we have in our

minds, whether it accords or not with the existence of things, or with

any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone

be called false. But an idea is false when formed of inconsistent

qualities or elements, or when it is judged to contain in it the real

essence of any existing body, whereas it only contains a few of these;

or again, when the mind judges its own idea to be the same as it is

in other men’s minds, signified by the same word, when in fact it is

not the same. He closed the Second Book with a short and interesting

chapter on the “Association of Ideas.” He was among the first to use

this expression which is now so familiar to all students of psychology.

In the Third Book, Locke treated on language at length as the medium

of stating and expressing our ideas and thoughts. Words are signs and

marks which are necessary for communication――general terms and names

of our ideas, considered as aids to the acquisition of knowledge, and

for recording and communicating our thoughts. This part of the work

is valuable, and contains some of Locke’s best thoughts. He sums up

his view of general terms in the following sentence:――“All the great

business of genera and species, and their essences, amounts to no more

but this, that men, making abstract ideas, and settling them in their

minds, with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to

consider things, and to discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for

the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge;

which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined

only to particulars.”¹

¹ Chapter III., Section 30.

The Fourth Book dealt with knowledge and opinion, and extended to

twenty-one chapters, in which many important and interesting matters

are handled with great candour and ability. Such as the degrees,

the limits, and the reality of our knowledge, of truth, universal

propositions, maxims, the existence of God; the improvement of our

knowledge, probability, and the degrees of assent; reason, faith and

reason, and the causes of error, were all handled.

According to Locke, knowledge is the perception of the agreement or

disagreement of our ideas; this agreement being fourfold, namely,

identity or diversity, relation, co-existence or necessary connection,

and real existence. He explained these kinds of knowledge and relations

of ideas at length, and proceeded to show that we know our own

existence, and the existence of God. His reasoning and arguments to

prove the existence of God are founded on the principle of mediate

inference, the only method which his system of the mind permitted; but

on this ground he argues well and wisely.

Locke discussed the provinces of faith and reason, and though faith

in divine revelation transcends rational knowledge, nevertheless

nothing can be regarded as a revelation which directly contradicts well

ascertained and distinct rational knowledge.¹

¹ Chapter XVIII.

In the discussion of the limits of human knowledge, though he made

many true and sagacious statements, yet it was here, perhaps, that

his main inconsistency culminated. Notwithstanding his doctrine that

we have only an obscure and relative idea of substance, he adopted

and expounded the distinction between the primary and the secondary

qualities of bodies, describing the primary qualities as those which

are inseparable from the conception of body. The primary qualities are

really in bodies, whether our senses perceive them or not, and when

we do perceive primary qualities, our ideas of them are resemblances

of qualities really existing in these bodies. His own words are “that

the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and

their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves.” While, on the

other hand, “the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have

no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing

in the bodies themselves.” Thus it seems we know primary qualities, not

simply as manifested to us, but as they exist in themselves; thus too

the primary qualities of bodies must be independent of the human mind.

Hence when he came to treat of the limits of knowledge, no necessary

connection between the primary and the secondary qualities could be

discovered; because the ideas obtained through the primary qualities

of bodies were entirely different from the ideas obtained through the

secondary qualities, there was no common root among these ideas for

comparison, and consequently no knowledge. There was no science of

bodies, or definite physics: “because we want perfect and adequate

ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our

command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names, and we

think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and

incomplete ideas of.... Adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any

body.”¹ Here the door was opened for the scepticism which Hume deduced

from the principles of Locke’s Essay. In treating on the limits of

our knowledge, Locke says:――“He that knows anything, knows this in the

first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance.

The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark

sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and

most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled,

and at a loss, in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder

to find it so when we consider the causes of our ignorance, which, I

suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:――1. Want of ideas;

2. Want of discoverable connection between the ideas we have; 3. Want

of tracing and examining our ideas.”

¹ Book II., Chapter VIII.; Book IV., Chapter III.

I have not space to speak of Locke’s other writings, and

restrict myself to a few words on his ethical doctrines. He

maintained that morality is solely based on the Will of God,

and that what is most conducive to the public welfare is to

be regarded as the expression of the Divine Will. Each man is

required by the Divine Law to do all the good and prevent all

the evil that he can; and good and evil being resolved into

pleasure and pain, the ultimate test of moral conduct is its

tendency to promote the pleasures and to avert the pains of

mankind. Book I., Chapter III., Section 6; Book II., Chapter

XXVIII.

Locke also maintained that morality is a science which can

be demonstrated as clearly as mathematics. Book IV., Chapter

III., Section 18; Chapter IV., Section 7; Chapter XII.,

Section 8.

Touching the will, he held that though a man is free to act,

the will itself is always determined by motives; this theory

is usually called determinism. Book II., Chapter XXI.

Although we have now a more scientific psychology than was possible in

Locke’s day, nevertheless, his “Essay concerning Human Understanding”

is a great monument of his genius, and one of the most interesting

works in this department of literature. Its merit consists in its

method, its general scope, its vast variety of topics, and the

spirit of candour which pervades it. It has had a wide and remarkable

influence on subsequent speculation, and on psychology, though at first

it met with opposition in various quarters.

At any given time, the causes favourable to the success of a novel line

of thought are various and complicated, and without at all pretending

to exhaust them, I may indicate some of the conditions which conduced

to the acceptance of Locke’s philosophy. A well-marked though slow

transformation of thought had been proceeding in Europe for several

centuries prior to Locke, which embraced in its sweep with more or

less distinctness physical science, religion, ethics, and politics,

while its social effects were manifested partly in the long political

struggles of the different nations among themselves, and especially

in the civil wars and internal conflicts of each nation within itself.

This vast movement had a general tendency throughout toward greater

freedom of thought, and religious and political liberty; but these

results were more keenly and earnestly fought for, and sooner obtained

in some of the nations than in others; in Britain the struggle for

political and religious freedom was very severe but not prolonged.

Hence Locke’s philosophy being in accord with the general movement

of the period, and more directly in unison with the intellectual and

social tendencies of England, as manifested in the Revolution of 1688,

it became a great power in history.¹

¹ Soon after the publication of Locke’s Essay, opponents and

critics, as well as defenders of it appeared, and Locke

himself entered the field to defend some of his views, his

controversy with Stillingfleet is well-known; indeed, many

attacks were made upon his philosophy, but it is unnecessary

to particularise them here.

There is a correlation between the creeds of a community and its

political and social organisation. The belief in the divine right and

the absolute power of a king, or a caste, the prevalence of certain

moral views touching the nature of marriage, or the highest ends of

national life, are often necessary for the continuance of a certain

order of society. When the belief is modified, the order shakes and

disappears, and the ties which hold a community together then assume

a somewhat different form. Anything which involves an attack upon

the theories implied in the existing social order, may modify the

principles or notions upon which power rests. As a struggle between

two different forms of government compels each to consider its own

constitution, this may issue in strengthening or in weakening the chief

features of their respective beliefs. In short, anything which really

stirs the social organism, afford a chance for the progress of fresh

seeds of thought and belief.¹

¹ It is mainly by the thorough investigation of the subjects

indicated above, in the two preceding paragraphs, and other

cognate matters, ♦and the proper use of the sources of facts

thus obtained, that philosophers can hope that at some future

day there will be a science of sociology. “Then we shall

unravel the laws of the growth of the social organism, and

determine the conditions of its health or disease. Then,

and not till then, will it be possible to present political

science as a coherent body of doctrines, deduced from certain

axioms of universal validity, but leading to different

conclusions, according to the varying conditions of human

society. We shall be able to say what form of government is

most favourable to the happiness of a nation at any given

period of its development.... But we are still so far from

possessing anything like a science of politics, that most

of the current maxims involve conceptions which could hardly

find place in a scientific system. Fragments of the old

theories by which men endeavoured to explain the origin of

government, or to show how it might be best administered,

still perplex our discussions, and hinder the attempt to lay

a sound foundation of theory.

“The difficulty of discovering anything approaching to

an historical development of political theory is the

greater, inasmuch as theories have followed, more than

they have guided, events. Happy is the nation which has no

political philosophy, for such philosophy is generally the

offspring of a recent, or the symptom of an approaching

revolution. During the quieter hours of the eighteenth

century, Englishmen rather played with political theories

than seriously discussed them. The interest in politics

was chiefly personal. References to general principles are

introduced in rhetorical flourishes, but do not form the

basis of serious argument. In the mass of pamphlets and

speeches which fill our library shelves, it is rare to find

even the show of political philosophy. The Tory argument is

that De Foe has been put in the pillory; the Whig argument is

that the French wear wooden shoes. Walpole’s friends rail at

the Pope and the Pretender; and Bolingbroke’s friends abuse

the excise and the Hanoverian subsidies.”――Stephen’s _History

of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, Volume II.,

pages 130‒131.

♦ “aud” replaced with “and”

Before the close of the seventeenth century, the discoveries in

physical science, wider geographical knowledge than formerly, and

many other influences, had enlarged men’s conceptions of the universe.

This was modifying religious ideas, while a marked tendency towards

rationalism was manifesting itself in the current theology, as well

as in philosophy. The movement in England appeared in various forms.

Discussions and disputes touching the immortality of the soul began

in the seventeenth century, increased amazingly after the Revolution,

and were continued through the greater part of the eighteenth century.

Locke had stated that matter might be endowed with the power of

thinking. The opponents of Christianity maintained that the future

existence of the soul was impossible, and many writers engaged in the

discussion of this subject.

English Deism was in some degree effected by the philosophy of Locke.

But the deistic creed was not essentially strong, as it was not founded

on the deepest convictions, or associated with the most powerful

emotions of the human breast, while its leaders lacked the glowing

sympathetic feeling, and the warm aspiration, the intense earnestness,

and the simple note of sincerity, which characterise the genuine

apostles of mankind. The conception of the Supreme Being which the

Deists presented, could not excite fervour in the heart of worshippers;

yet, though Deism soon decayed and died, rationalism and scepticism

have continued to spread.

Among the most eminent of the Deists who assailed the doctrines of

Christianity, were John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Anthony Collins;

while on the other side may be mentioned, Samuel Clark, Bishop Berkeley,

and Dr. Butler, and many other less known men. But the grounds and the

methods of the attack and the defence of Christianity have undergone a

transformation since the middle of the eighteenth century.

Toland published in 1696, “Christianity not Mysterious.” The aim

of this work was to show that there is nothing in the New Testament

contrary to reason, or above it, and, therefore, no Christian doctrine

can properly be called a mystery. Adopting Locke’s definition of

knowledge, he explained what was within man’s reach of knowing; and

maintained that statements which contradicted reason cannot be admitted,

and if above reason they cannot be understood. Reason was our only safe

guide; and Christianity itself does not claim to be mysterious. Many of

his explanations, however, were crude and unsatisfactory.¹

¹ Toland is the author of many pamphlets and unfinished

fragments, political, religious, and on other subjects. A

full account of his writings was given in Leland’s _View of

the Principal Deistical Writers_, 1754‒56; compare Skelton’s

_Deism Revealed_, 2 volumes, 1749; A. F. Farrar’s _Critical

History of Free Thought_.

Anthony Collins was a prominent representative of Deism, and is the

author of several treatises, which were famous in their day. His

“Discourse on Free Thinking” appeared in 1713, and in it he argued

that all sound belief must be based on free inquiry, and seemed anxious

to show that the adoption of this tenet would not necessitate the

relinquishment of a belief in the supernatural. In 1724 he published

his work entitled, “A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the

Christian Religion,” containing a plausible attack on Christianity.

But the most important of his works is the “Inquiry concerning Human

Liberty and Necessity,” and he gives the following account of its

scope:――“1. Though I deny not liberty in a certain meaning of that word,

yet I contend for liberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he

wills or pleases. 2. When I affirm necessity, I contend only for moral

necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible

being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny man to be

subject to such necessity, as in clocks, watches, and such other things,

which for want of intelligence are subject to an absolute physical and

mechanical necessity. 3. I have undertaken to show that the notions

advanced are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the

sole foundations of morality and laws, and of awards and punishments

in society; and that the notions I explode are subversive of them.” The

arguments which he advanced in support of his theory were six, namely:

“1. From experience; 2. From the impossibility of liberty; 3. From the

imperfection of liberty, and the perfection of necessity; 4. From the

consideration of the divine prescience; 5. From the nature and use of

rewards and punishments; 6. From the nature of morality.” He worked

out these arguments with much skill and ingenuity, and the following

six objections were concisely but ably answered:――“1. That if men

are necessary agents, punishments are unjust; 2. And are useless;

3. Reasoning, entreaties, blame, and praise, are useless; 4. Also the

use of physical remedies is useless; 5. The reproaches of conscience

are groundless; 6. The murder of Julius Cæsar could not possibly have

been murder.” The treatise is characteristic throughout, and had some

influence on subsequent speculation.

Mathew Tindal held a fellowship in All Souls at Oxford, and was past

seventy years of age when the first volume of his work, “Christianity

as Old as the Creation,” was published in 1732. Though the work was not

remarkable for its method or grasp of thought, the arrangement being

confused and abounding in repetitions, yet it attracted much attention.

Tindal maintained that natural religion is complete and sufficient,

consequently a revelation is unnecessary, so there can be no obligation

to accept it. All religion must have one aim, which is to attain human

perfection of character by a life in accord with human nature. In a

word, his theory is this: “Whosoever so regulates his natural appetites

as will conduce most to the exercise of his reason, the health of his

body, and the pleasures of his senses, taken and considered altogether,

since herein his happiness consists, may be certain he can never offend

his Maker; who, as He governs all things according to their natures,

cannot but expect His rational creatures should act according to

their natures.” He stated that there is no difference between religion

and morality, save that the one is acting according to the reason of

things considered in themselves, the other according to the same reason

of things considered as the rule of God; Christianity being only a

republication of the law of nature.¹

¹ _Christianity as Old as the Creation_, pages 2, 14, _et

seq._, page 270; compare Stephen’s _History of English

Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, Volume I., pages 134‒145.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, may be noticed among

those whose writings have influenced subsequent ethical views. He was

essentially a moralist, his chief aim being to show how a rational

scheme of life might be formed. A belief in God was an element of his

system. “For whoever thinks that there is a just God, and pretends

formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there

is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and

falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God

is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God

be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter

words of no significance at all.” Thus it seems a sound theism follows

from morality, not morality from theism. Hence also religion, according

to the conception which it presents of the character of God, “is

capable of doing great good or harm, and atheism nothing positive in

either way.”¹ Atheism indicates an unhealthy state of mind, as nothing

can be more distressing “than the thought of living in a distracted

universe from which many ills may be suspected, and where nothing good

or lovely presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation

or raise any passion, besides that of contempt, hatred, and dislike.”

This tends to embitter the temper, and “to impair and ruin the very

principle of virtue, namely, natural and kind affection.” In the main,

he argued that whoever has a firm belief in a just and benignant God

has a far stronger incentive to virtuous action than those who have

no such belief; and there is thus a relation between virtue and piety,

as where piety is wanting “there can neither be the same benignity,

firmness, or constancy, the same good composure of the affections, or

uniformity of mind.”²

¹ _Characteristics: An Inquiry concerning Virtue_, Book I.,

Part 3, Section 2.

² _Ibid._, Section 3.

He contended strongly for the existence of disinterested affection

in man, and used the term “moral sense” to express his doctrine.

He indicated the rise of this moral sense, and argued that it has

a foundation in nature. “There is in reality no rational creature

whatsoever who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm

to anyone, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like

harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity in everyone that

observes him. So that the offender must be conscious of being liable to

such treatment from everyone, as if he had in some degree offended all

... of this the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that

if there be any farther meaning in this sense of right and wrong, if

in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolutely wicked

creature has not, it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to

injustice or wrong, and in a real affection towards equity and right

for its own sake, and on account of its natural beauty and worth.

“It is impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature, originally so

ill-conditioned and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to

be tried by sensible objects, he should have no good passion towards

his kind, no foundation either of piety, love, kindness, or social

affection. It is fully as impossible to conceive that a rational

creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving

into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity,

gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike

of their contraries, but be found absolutely indifferent towards

whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as

well be without a sense, as without admiration in the things of which

it has any knowledge.... Sense of right and wrong, therefore, being as

natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle

in our constitution, there is no speculative idea or belief which is

capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it.”¹ From these

passages and from others of a similar import, it may be observed that

several of Shaftesbury’s ethical views were transferred into Scottish

philosophy. His influence is also notable on Kant’s doctrine of the

relation between Morality and Religion.

¹ _Inquiry concerning Virtue_, Part II., Section 3; Part III.,

Section 1; _Moralist_, Part III., Section 3.

Shaftesbury was a real optimist, and held that there was no positive

evil in the world. He exerted all his eloquence and ingenuity in

efforts to exalt the wondrous harmonies of nature. “Everything is for

the best in the best of all possible worlds.” In the opening section

of the “Inquiry concerning Virtue,” he argued that there can be no real

ill in the universe. “If everything which exists be according to good,

and for the best, then, of necessity, there is no such thing as real

ill in the universe, nothing ill with respect to the whole.... To

believe, therefore, that everything is governed, ordered, and regulated

for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and

permanent, is to be a perfect theist.”¹

¹ Part I., Section 2; also his _Moralist_, Part III., Section

1. The influence of these views is observable in the

theory of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and

grace, developed in the “Théodicée” of Leibnitz; indeed,

Shaftesbury’s views had considerable influence in various

directions.

His usual method of arguing is that of placing alternatives before the

mind; he manifests no great metaphysical grasp of principles, and his

power of exposition was very limited. He often repeats himself, and his

style, though sometimes vigorous, is diffuse and stilted.

Dr. Samuel Clarke was a great authority in his day, both in theology

and in philosophy. But as his method of philosophising has almost

ceased to have influence in Britain, I will only give a brief statement

of his ethical theory and views.

His moral theory may be shortly stated as follows:――All existing things

have their necessary relations one to another. Man must attribute the

same law of perception to every being to whom he attributes thought,

and, therefore, he must believe that the sum of the relations of all

things to each other must have always been present to God; and these

relations, then, are eternal, however recent the things may be between

which they subsist; and the whole together constitute truth. These

eternal different relations of things, one to another, involve a

consequent eternal fitness in the application of things one to another,

with regard to which the will of God always chooses, and which also

ought to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings. Such

eternal relations make it fit and reasonable for the creatures thus

to act; and, indeed, it becomes their duty so to act, prior to and

independent of any foreseen advantage or reward.¹

¹ _Being and Attributes of God_, Proposition 12; _Evidence of

Natural and Revealed Religion_.

The three great classes of primary duties, namely, the duties we owe

to God, to each other, and to ourselves, might be deduced in the same

way as the propositions of geometry. Thus Clarke attempted to give the

rules of morality a mathematical cast; and his theory also sought to

found moral distinctions solely upon reason. But reason can never be

a complete basis for morality, because it does not afford the motives

of action. “The abusive extension of the term reason to the moral

faculties, one of the predominant errors of ancient and modern times,

has arisen from causes which it is not difficult to discover. Reason

does in truth perform a great part in every case of moral sentiment. To

reason often belong the preliminaries of the act; to reason altogether

belongs the choice of the means of execution. The operations of reason,

in both cases, are comparatively slow and lasting, they are capable

of being distinctly recalled by memory. The emotion which intervenes

between the previous and succeeding exertions of reason is often faint,

generally transient, and scarcely ever capable of being reproduced

by an effort of the mind. Hence the name of reason is applied to this

mixed state of mind, more especially when the feeling, being of a

cold and general nature, and scarcely ruffling the surface of the

soul, such as those of prudence, and ordinary kindness, and propriety,

almost passes unnoticed, and is irretrievably forgotten. Hence the

mind is, in such conditions, said by the moralists to act from reason,

in contra-distinction to its more excited and disturbed state, when it

is said to act from passion. The calmness of reason gives to the whole

compound the appearance of unmixed reason. The illusion is further

promoted by a mode of expression used in most languages. A man is

said to act reasonably when his conduct is such as may be reasonably

expected.”¹

¹ Mackintosh’s _Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy_, pages

155‒156, 1837.

Bishop Berkeley is the author of a form of idealism, explained in

several works which appeared at different periods of his life. He

maintained that the external world had no real existence in itself,

apart from thinking and reasoning beings. By this he meant that

matter and all external objects have only a phenomenal existence, an

appearance, but no real existence at all, distinct from their being

perceived by some person, or mind and spirit. If, therefore, we detach

external objects from perception, they cease to be, because they

have no existence apart from perception. All the choir of heaven, and

all the bodies composing the mighty frame of the world, have not any

substance without a mind; and that their very being is to be perceived

as part of the significant sense-experience of a conscious person;

“consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do

not actually exist in my mind, or in that of any created spirit, they

must either have no existence at all, or they must exist in the mind of

some Eternal Spirit.”¹

¹ _Compare._ Berkeley’s Works, edited by Professor Fraser, and

the excellent volume by the same author on Berkeley and his

Philosophy, in the series of “Philosophical Classics for

English Readers.”

Thus in result, Berkeley’s external world consisted of spirits, as it

were, external to his own spirit; conscious, in concert with himself,

of intelligible sense-impressions, by which they could communicate

with one another. By a refined process of thought, he arrived at

the conclusion that there was an external will and an external

intellect, and that will and intellect constituted spirit. This was

his explanation of the problem of the relation of the human mind to

the external world.

In the later stage of the development of his views, he attempted to

explain what is meant by God. He maintained that the supreme power is

Spirit; God is more than the unknowable behind the phenomena of nature.

God means the eternally sustaining spirit――the active conscious reason

of the universe; the Supreme Spirit or Universal Mind. But he did not

intend to reduce all to God and phenomena; he recognises the existence

of finite free agents, responsible and subject to a moral government.

Still he seemed to approach the principle of pantheism.

The aim of his speculations was to extinguish the scheme of materialism;

he thought that, when matter was expelled out of nature, sceptical and

impious ideas would have no ground to stand upon. But in the hands of

subsequent thinkers, his principles have yielded very different results.

Berkeley wrote a fine pleasing style, and contributed much to excite

the philosophic mind in England and Scotland. Indeed, he said himself

that his reasonings had been nowhere better understood than among a

club of young Scotchmen in Edinburgh.

* * * * *

In conclusion, the period covered in this volume has been exceedingly

important in the history of Scotland. After the Union of the Crowns,

the king’s power was vastly increased, and one of the baneful results

of this was that the kings used their power to enforce their own

religious and political views upon the people, and attempted to

extinguish their freedom of thought and speech, and their civil rights.

Hence the Covenanting struggle, and after the Restoration the long and

severe persecution of the Covenanters; yet, despite all the harassments

of war, of persecution, and oppression, the Covenanters executed their

work heroically and successfully, and contributed considerably to the

Revolution of 1688, and to the freedom of the British people. Peace and

glory to the memory of the heroes, who boldly faced danger, privation,

and death for the tenets of their faith! The proceedings connected

with the passing of the Union were narrated; and an account of the

subsequent disaffection in Scotland, and the risings of 1715 and

1745 was presented. A detailed and exhaustive account of the social

condition of the people, and the introduction of manufactures,

the progress of industry and commercial enterprise were given. I

then treated the ballad and Jacobite literature and other branches,

historically, and noted the progress of science, of education, and art.

In the closing chapter, I have presented an outline of European Thought,

in which the systems of Bruno, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hobbes,

Locke, Shaftesbury, and others are concisely expounded, in order to

show the historic relations of the philosophy which subsequently arose

in Scotland.

INDEX.

Abercorn, i., 116;

castle of, 343, 390;

Earl of, iii., 19.

Abercromby, Dr. Patrick, iv., 143.

Aberdeen, i., 148, 151, 234, 238‒9, 264, 284, 288, 306, 325, 366,

370, 386‒7, 390;

ii., 116, 123, 192, 202, 212, 241, 247;

iii., 28, 90, 91, 219, 223, 228;

iv., 370, 375;

University of, i., 415, 467;

ii., 412, 413;

iii., 62, 392‒3;

iv., 60, 139, 317‒320.

Aberdeen, Earl of, iv., 482.

Aberdeenshire, i., 28, 49, 52, 68, 75, 90, 95, 140, 184, 271, 284,

287, 325;

ii., 154;

iii., 244;

iv., 370, 371.

Abernethy, i., 114, 165, 245.

Aboyne, i., 174;

Viscount of, iii., 93.

Ada, daughter of Earl David, i., 204, 256.

Adam,

Dr. Alexander, iv., 153;

William, Robert, James, 402.

Adamson, Archbishop of St. Andrews, ii., 182‒4, 189, 271, 380.

Aed, King, i., 136.

Agricola, General, i., 105, 109.

Agriculture, i., 100, 133, 150, 250‒254, 376‒381;

ii., 266, 289, 290;

iii., 303‒305;

iv., 332‒339.

Aidan, King of Dalriada, i., 117‒8.

Aikman, iv., ♦429.

♦ page number provided by transcriber

Airlie, Earl of, iii., 90;

castle of, 337.

Alan, Lord of Galloway, i., 211.

Albany,

Duke of, i., 319, 321‒2, 324‒6;

Murdoch, 326, 327, 328;

Alexander, 348‒351;

John, Regent, ii., 36‒37.

Ale, i., 251, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404;

ii., 291‒292;

iii., 217‒219;

iv., 395.

Alexander I., reign of, i., 200, 201.

Alexander II., reign of, i., 209‒212, 242.

Alexander, III.,

coronation of, i., 213;

reign of, 213‒217.

Alexander, William, iv., 209‒211.

Alison,

Rev. Archibald, iv., 86;

Sir Archibald, 155‒6;

Dr. William, 312.

Allan,

David, iv., 433;

Sir William, 443.

Alloa, iv., 433.

Alnwick castle, i., 143, 300.

Amberley, Viscount, ii., 43, 44.

Anderson,

Dr. Joseph, i., 52, 55, 57, 61, 65, 66, 168, 180;

William, ii., 68;

James, iv., 143, 144;

Robert, 173.

Angles, i., 113, 118, 119.

Angus,

Pictish King, i., 120;

Angus, Chief, 116, 202;

Angus Duff, 329;

Angus, Lord of the Isles, 218, 285, 292, 293;

Angus, Earl of, 342, 343, 350, 351;

ii., 36, 37, 38, 61, 63, 64, 65, 181, 195, 212.

Annandale, i., 26, 203, 223, 349.

Annandale, Earl of, iii., 179.

Anne, Queen, iii., 204, 205, 209, 211, 220, 222.

Anstruther, ii., 192.

Arbroath,

monastery of, i., 249, 296, 432, 433, 434;

town of, 238, 409;

iii., 93, 301;

iv., 375.

Arbuthnot,

Alexander, ii., 372, 373, 413;

Dr. John, iv., 228‒230.

Architecture, i., 157‒165, 247‒250, 428‒431;

ii., 396, 397;

iii., 396‒7;

iv., 401‒411.

Ardnamurchan, i., 24, 261, 356;

iii., 90.

Ardoch, i., 106.

Argyle,

Earl of, i., 356‒7, 364, 365;

ii., 63, 64, 89, 96, 97, 130, 134, 135, 145, 150, 181, 201,

202, 224, 226, 229;

iii., 90, 91, 92, 99, 104, 121, 123, 159, 167, 192;

Duke of, 206, 223, 241.

Argyleshire, i., 53, 116, ♦117, 121, 127, 210, 261, 369;

iii., 91; iv.

♦ “177” replaced with “117”

Arkinholm, battle of, i., 343.

Armada, ii., 191, 192.

Armstrong,

John, a marauder, ii., 224, 225;

Dr. John, iv., 169.

Arran, island of, i., 23, 95, 216, 286, 379, 380.

Arran,

Earl of, i., 346;

Regent, ii., 63, 65, 67, 70, 74, 78, 86, 87;

Stewart, Earl of Arran, 175, 177, 181, 184, 185, 187.

Arrowheads, i., 49, 50.

Art,

early, i., 52, 75‒79, 166‒174, 176‒180, 241‒243, 470, 471;

ii., 423‒425;

iii., 393‒396;

Progress of, in Scotland, iv., 428.

Aryan race, i., 38‒42;

language of, 43.

Arth, a friar, ii., 51‒53.

Asceticism, i., 131, 156, 157, 244;

ii., 43‒46, 261, 262.

Assembly, General,

ii., 115, 129, 149, 151, 160, 166, 167, 169, 188, 193, 211,

213;

iii., 28, 34, 36, 39, 69‒72, 77, 83, 84, 98, 104, 186;

iv., 465‒485.

Athole,

Earl of, i., 208, 209, 214, 217, 255, 263, 283, 285, 305, 306,

335, 337;

ii., 143, 148;

iii., 110;

Marquis of, 174;

Duke of, 207, 212.

Attwood, iv., 143, 144.

Auldearn, battle of, iii., 94.

Ayr,

Burgh of, i., 240, 356, 359, 386, 387;

ii., 69;

iii., 303;

iv., 369‒372;

Castle of, i., 215, 248, 274, 287.

Ayrshire, i., 29, 114, 286, 287, 379;

ii., 78;

iii., 134, 153;

iv., 341, 342.

Aytoun, William E., iv., 194.

Bacon, Lord, ii., 395;

iii., 434‒435.

Badenoch, i., 211, 276, 356;

iii., 181.

Badenoch, Lord of, i., 217, 256, 271, 274, 275, 277.

Baillie,

General, iii., 93, 94, 95;

Rev. Robert, 75, 76, 87, 88, 357, 358.

Bain, Dr. Alexander, ii., 420;

iv., 139, 140, 141, 155.

Balcanqhall, Walter, ii., 177, 184, 187, 206.

Balfour,

Sir James, ii., 75, 135, 144, 146;

John, of Burley, iii., 151, 153, 343;

Sir Andrew, 369.

Baliol, Bernard de, i., 203.

Baliol,

King John, i., 256, 258, 259, 260‒262, 263, 264, 366;

Edward, 304, 305, 306, 307.

Ballads,

early, i., 184‒5, 441‒450;

ii., 76, 77, 244, 245, 341‒345;

referring to the Civil War and persecution, iii., 237‒346;

Jacobite ballads, 346‒353.

Balmerino, Lord, iii., 18, 60.

Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, iii., 32.

Bane, Donald, King, i., 144.

Banff, i., 148, 248, 307, 385, 390, 391;

iii., 301;

iv., 373.

Bank of Scotland established, iii., 327‒329.

Bannatyne, George, ii., 371, 372.

Bannockburn, battle of, i., 291‒295.

Barbour, John, i., 451‒454.

Barclay,

Robert, iii., 258;

Dr., iv., 308.

Barlow, Bishop, ii., 54, 56.

Barmekyn hill, fort on, i., 90.

Barony, i., 223, 225.

Barton, Captain, i., 359, 363.

Beaton,

James, Archbishop, ii., 38, 58;

David, Cardinal, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70‒72, 79.

Beaumont, Henry, i., 301, 305, 306.

Beck, Bishop of Durham, i., 266, 270.

Bede, i., 116, 122, 126.

Bellhaven, Lord, iii., 197, 211‒12.

Bell Rock, i., 23.

Bell,

Dr. John, iv., 306, 307;

Sir Charles, 307, 308.

Bellenden,

John, ii., 317, 318;

Sir John, 158;

Sir Lewis, 274.

Berkeley, Bishop, iii., 470, 471.

Berwick-North, i., 387, 389.

Berwick, i., 206, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 248, 259, 260, 263,

264, 268, 279, 285, 295, 305, 350, 382;

Treaty of, ii., 100, 272.

Bible, translations of, ii., 25‒27, 49, 170.

Bisset, Thomas, i., 271.

Black,

David, ii., 204‒206;

Dr. Joseph iv., 260‒263, 273, 276, 278.

Blackadder, John, iii., 139.

Blackie, John S., iv., 247‒249.

Blakey, Robert, iv., 160.

Blacklock, Dr. Thomas, iv., 171, 172.

Blair,

Robert, iv., 169, 170;

Dr. Hugh, 215.

Blair Athole, iii., 90.

Blair Castle, iii., 181.

Bœce, Hector, ii., 316.

Bondmen, i., 252, 380‒382.

Book of Common Order, ii., 113, 114;

Book of Discipline, the first, 105‒113;

the second, 171‒173.

Book of Canons, iii., 45, 46.

Boot and shoe manufactures, iv., 392, 393.

Borders,

state of, i., 309, 315‒318, 322, 324, 342;

ii., 223‒225;

order established on the Borders, iii., 20‒28.

Borthwick Castle, ii., 143.

Bothwell,

Earl of, i., 353, 426;

ii., 69, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138‒145;

Francis Stewart, Earl of, 198, 272, 273, 274‒276.

Bothwell Bridge, Battle of, iii., 153, 154.

Botriphnie, i., 378;

iv., 197.

Bower, Walter, i., 376, 463.

Boyd,

Robert, of Kilmarnock, i., 283;

Robert, Lord Boyd, 345, 346, 347;

Sir Thomas, created Earl of Arran, 146, 147.

Boyd, Zachary, iii., 358, 359.

Braemar, iii., 222.

Brahmanism, ii., 428, 429, 431, 433.

Braxfield, Lord, iv., 458.

Breadalbane, Earl of, iii., 190, 191.

Brechin, i., 138, 164, 183, 238, 249, 276, 409;

Castle of, 264, 276;

Battle of, 342.

Bridges, Early, i., 250.

Briggs, Henry, ii., 389, 390, 391.

Brigham, treaty of, i., 218.

Britons of Strathclyde, i., 113, 114, 117, 123‒125, 138.

Britons and Scots, early laws of, i., 151‒153.

Brochs, i., 157‒163.

Brodick Castle, i., 286.

Brodie,

Alexander, iii., 255;

William, iv., 454.

Bronze weapons and tools, i., 74‒79.

Brooches, i., 117‒119.

Brown,

Janet, ii., 231;

Dr. Thomas, iv., 87‒97;

John, 216;

Dr. John, 217;

Dr. William L., 218, 219.

Bruce,

Robert, of Annandale, i., 203, 218, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259,

260;

Robert, Earl of Carrick, 266, 267, 271, 276, 278, 281‒283.

Bruce,

Nigel, Thomas, Alexander, i., 285;

Edward, 287, 290, 291, 292;

Robert, ii., 201, 208, 216, 381, 382;

Michael, iv., 177.

Brude, King of the Picts, i., 127.

Bruno, Giordano, writings of, iii., 399‒401.

Brunston, Laird of, ii., 69.

Buchan, Earl of, i., 208, 209, 211, 213, 217, 262, 287, 288, 319,

325, 352, 353, 373.

Buchan, Peter, i., 446.

Buchanan,

George, ii., 58, 145;

writings of, 364‒369, 409;

Thomas, 260;

Dr. Robert, iv., 224.

Buddha, his life and work, ii., 429‒432.

Buddhism, ii., 233, 432.

Burghs,

the origin and organisation of, i., 33, 82, 83, 152, 232‒237;

Custom and trade of, 382‒391;

Social life and characteristics of the burghal communities,

397‒408, 414, 438, 439;

ii., 230‒243, 291‒294;

iii., 245‒248, 274‒278, 283‒289.

Burghs of regality, barony, and church, i., 226, 237, 238, 408,

409.

Burial dues exacted by the Church, ii., 39, 40.

Burnet,

Bishop, his works, iii., 364‒366;

John, iv., 441.

Burns, Robert, iv., 179‒182.

Burntisland, iii., 301.

Burton, Dr. John H., iv., 160.

Caerlaverock Castle, i., 247, 272.

Cairns, burial, chambered, i., 53‒64, 91, 92.

Caithness,

prehistoric structures in, i., 53‒58;

Norseman inroads, 136, 138, 139.

Caithness, Earls of, i., 207, 208;

ii., 227;

iii., 237, 238, 239.

Calderwood, David, iii., 38, 356, 357.

Caledonians, i., 105‒109, 110, 111, 114.

Caledonian Canal, iv., 354.

Calvin, ii., 119, 357‒360.

Cambuskenneth, i., 249, 367.

Cameron of Lochiel, i., 356;

iii., 181.

Cameron, Richard, iii., 155, 156.

Cameronians, iii., 155, 174, 185, 186, 187.

Campbell of Glenlyon, iii., 192.

Campbell,

Sir Colin, iii., 395;

Dr. John, iv., 144;

Dr. George, 85, 86;

Thomas, his writings, 185‒187;

Colin, architect, 402;

Thomas, sculptor, 454.

Candlish, Dr. R. T., iv., 221, 222.

Canterbury, Archbishop of, i., 200, 201, 272.

Cantyre, i., 21, 215, 261, 285, 348.

Canute, i., 139, 192.

Carberry Hill, ii., 144.

Cardross, i., 302, 303.

Cargill, Donald, iii., 155, 156, 157.

Carham, battle of, i., 138.

Carlisle, i., 210, 318;

iii., 227.

Carlyle,

Thomas, iv., 156‒159;

Dr. Alexander, 19, 43, 44.

Carmichael, Lord, iii., 186, 187.

Carmichael,

John, of ♦Meadowflat, iii., 27;

William, 151;

Gershom, iv., 18.

♦ “Meadowflatt” replaced with “Meadowflat”

♦Carmon, Colonel, iii., 183.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Carrick, Earl of, i., 217, 266, 271, 278, 281, 302, 305, 314,

316.

Carswell, John, ii., 108.

Carstairs, William, iii., 178, 179.

Carved woodwork, i., 430;

ii., 423.

Casket Letters, ii., 141, 142;

iv., 145.

Cassillis, Earl of, i., 365;

ii., 69, 150;

iii., 19, 56, 87, 99, 104.

Castellio, Sebastia, ii., 359.

Castles, i., 247, 248, 428, 430;

ii., 422, 423.

Catechisms, ii., 77, 78, 85, 109, 110;

iii., 89.

Caterthun, hill fort, i., 89, 90.

Cathen, the King’s adviser, i., 125.

Caves, i., 43, 83, 163.

Celestius, ii., 356.

Celibacy, i., 131, 156, 244, 245;

ii., 21, 22, 41‒43, 45, 46, 261, 262.

Celtic tribes, i., 44, 45, 90, 100, 101, 105, 110, 113‒116, 119.

Censorship of the press, ii., 277, 278.

Chalmer, James, ii., 90.

Chalmers,

George, iv., 153;

Dr. Thomas, 219‒221.

Chambered Cairns, i., 53‒65.

Chambers,

Thomas, i., 336, 337;

David, ii., 138;

Dr. Robert, iv., 163.

Charles I.,

reign of, iii., 42‒100;

policy of, 43‒50, 51‒54, 57, 58, 59, 63‒65, 66‒68, 71, 73‒75,

76, 77, 78‒82, 90, 95, 96, 97.

Charles II., reign of, iii., 103, 107, 110, 119‒163.

Charles Stewart, prince, iii., 226‒229.

Charters, i., 148, 201, 223‒225, 227, 232‒234, 373, 387, 422.

Chartularies, i., 247.

Chatelherault, Duke of, ii., 86, 130.

Chemical Science, iv., 260‒266, 273, 286, 296‒298, 397.

Chepman, Walter, ii., 300‒302.

Christian I., King of Denmark, i., 346.

Christianity,

introduced, i., 121‒129;

early form of, 130‒134;

influence of, 134, 135, 168, 181, 186, 232, 245, 248‒250, 288,

289, 466, 467;

ii., 437‒439, 443.

Church,

early, i., 130‒134, 155‒157, 200, 201;

re-organisation of, 212, 213, 243‒245;

property of, 227, 252‒254, 380, 431‒433;

state of, 332, 333, 431, 432;

ii., 40‒43, 51, 76‒78, 79, 102.

Church, the Reformed,

organisation of, ii., 104‒115;

conflict with the Government, 165‒173, 177‒189, 192‒194,

197‒220;

iii., 20‒42, 46‒82, 83‒87, 95‒101, 110, 120‒163, 164‒169;

internal struggles of, iv., 467, _et seq._

Circuit Courts, i., 222, 355, 356, 424;

Lords of Council, Judicial Committee, i., 370, 371;

Court of Session, ii., 216, 223;

iii., 112, 113, 124, 232‒235; iv.;

Church Courts, i., 227, 230, 371.

Cists, i., 55, 93, 95.

Civilisation,

primary causes of, i., 19‒20, 31‒33, 34, 35;

ii., 426, 427;

gradual progress of, i., 53, 70, 71, 98‒102, 119‒121, 135,

149‒151, 161, 164, 169, 170, 181‒188, 232‒241, 245‒55,

330‒332, 366‒371, 382‒397, 408, 418‒422, 465‒472;

ii., 109, 278‒291, 398, 419;

iii., 101, 102, 294‒335;

rapid development of, iii., 215;

iv., 142‒145, 165, 284, 324‒332; _et seq._, 341‒400.

Clackmannan, iv., 343.

Claim of Right,

of the Scotch Parliament, iii., 176, 177;

Claim of Right, of General Assembly of the Church, iv., 480,

_et seq._

Clan, i., 146;

iii., 225.

Clan Canan, i., 150.

Clan Morgan, i., 150.

Clanranald, chief of, i., 356;

ii., 226;

iii., 242, 243.

Cleland, William, iii., 153.

Clunymore, i., 378.

Coal,

early notice of, i., 238, 409;

mining, ii., 286;

iii., 292‒293;

iv., 341‒343.

Cochrane, Robert, i., 348‒350.

Cockburne, of Henderland, ii., 224.

Cockburn, Sir Richard, Sir John, iii., 18.

Coinage, i., 238, 394‒397;

ii., 279‒282;

iii., 320‒327;

paper currency, 327‒329.

Coldingham, i., 209, 246.

Colin, King, i., 137.

Colliers, iii., 291‒292;

iv., 342‒344.

Colville, John, i., 448.

Commerce, i., 239‒240, 391‒394;

ii., 286‒290;

iii., 112, 300‒303, 311;

iv., 352‒357, 359‒363, _et seq._

Compurgators, i., 228‒229.

Comyn, Clan, i., 213‒214.

Comyn,

John, i., 217, 256, 271, 275, 277;

slaughter of, 281.

Confessions of Faith, ii., 34‒35, 102, 204‒205;

iii., 89.

Constantine, Roman general, i., 112.

Constantine I., son of Kenneth M‘Alpin, i., 136.

Constantine II., 136‒137.

Constantine III., 138.

Conventicles, acts against, iii., 130, 131, 133, 138, 140, 146,

148, 149.

Convention of Royal Burgh, i., 234, 235.

Convention of Estates, iii., 173‒177.

Cope, Sir John, iii., 226, 227.

Corrichie, battle of, ii., 123, 124.

Cotterel, Colonel, iii., 110, 111.

Covenant,

National, iii., 59‒62;

Solemn League and Covenant, 83‒86.

Covenanters, iii., 68‒73, 74‒77, 78‒82, 86, 89‒102, 103‒105, 107.

♦Craftsmen, i., 335, 336, 404‒408;

ii., 240, 241, 242, 293, 294;

iii., 287‒289.

♦ “Craftesmen” replaced with “Craftsmen”

Craig,

John, ii., 110, 158, 167, 185;

Sir Thomas, 384;

Andrew, iii., 245.

Craigellachie, iv., 354.

Craigmiller Castle, i., 349.

Craigphadrig, vitrified fort, i., 91.

Crannogs, i., 42, 84‒87.

Cranstoun, Sir William, iii., 21, 24, 25, 27.

Crawar, Paul, i., 332.

Crawford, Earl of, i., 321, 340, 341, 342, 343, 364;

iii., 120, 179, 186.

Crawford, Sir William, i., 388, 389.

Crawford Moor, ii., 282;

iii., 293.

Crichton, Sir William, i., 338, 339, 340.

Crinan, Abbot of Dunkeld, i., 139, 140.

Cromwell, iii., 99, 108, 100, 110, 111, 112‒115.

Culblean, battle of, i., 306.

Cullen, burgh of, i., 385, 386.

Culloden, battle of, iii., 229, 230, 351, 352;

iv., 172, 173.

Cumberland, i., 105, 125, 142.

Cumberland, Duke of, iii., 228, 229.

Cummene, i., 181.

Cunningham, Allan, iv., 192, 193.

Cupar, i., 465;

iii., 157.

Curates, under Charles II., iii., 130, 132, 173.

Dacre, Lord, ii., 62.

Dalkeith, iii., 227;

castle of, i., 316, 342;

ii., 423.

Dalriada, i., 116, 117, 127.

Dalry, iii., 133.

Dalrymple, Sir John, iii., 191‒193, 233, 234.

Dalziel, General, iii., 134, 135, 342.

Dancing, i., 457, 468;

ii., 124, 125, 415;

iv., 416.

Darien Colony, iii., 196‒204.

Darnaway Castle, i., 360;

ii., 124.

Darnley, ii., 128, 129, 130‒136, 137, 138.

Dauney, William, iv., 416.

David I., reign of, i., 201‒204, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228,

230, 232, 234, 235, 243, 244.

David II., reign of, i., 304, 306, 307‒313, 429.

David, Earl of Huntingdon, i., 204, 256.

Davidson,

John, ii., 198, 214, 373, 374;

Thomas, 302, 303;

John, Principal of the University of Glasgow, 352, 408;

Dr. Patrick, iv., 164.

Dean of Lismore’s Book, i., 442, 443.

Defence of the Country, armour, weapons, organisation of the

army, i., 409‒413.

Denmark, marriage treaty, i., 346.

Descartes, method and principles of his system, iii., 403‒418.

Dickson, David, iii., 61, 359.

Dingwall, i., 385, 386.

Divorce, ii., 265, 266.

Donald I., i., 136.

Donald II., i., 136.

Donald Bane, i., 144.

Donald Balloch, i., 329, 330.

Donald, Lord of the Isles, i., 324‒326.

Douglas,

Sir William, i., 266, 267;

Sir James, 283, 286, 287, 290, 292, 300, 303;

Sir Archibald, 305, 306;

Sir William, 307;

Sir John of Dalkeith, 342;

Sir James, 435;

Sir William of Drumlanrig, 389;

Sir James, ii., 225;

George of Parkhead, 284, 285;

Sir Archibald, iii., 18.

Douglas, Earl of, i., 316, 317, 318, 321, 323, 326, 338, 339,

340, 341, 342, 343, 349, 388, 389, 390.

Douglas,

Gavin, ii., 36, 310‒315;

Dr. James, iv., 320.

Drumclog, battle of, iii., 153.

Drummond,

Lord, i., 360;

ii., 228;

Earl of Perth, iii., 171, 172;

Lady Margaret, i., 360.

Drummond,

General, iii., 135;

James, 227;

William, 366, 367.

Dryburgh, Monastery, ii., 66.

Duff,

King, i., 137;

Angus Chief, 329;

♦Dumbarton, i., 114, 121;

castle of, 248, 278;

ii., 149, 154, 155;

burgh of, i., 386, 391;

iii., 302, 303;

iv., 361.

♦ Separate item, not part of Duff.

♦Dumfries,

Castle of, i., 248, 290;

burgh of, 282, 356, 384;

ii., 131, 186;

iii., 24, 27, 134, 212, 228, 342, 386;

iv., 371.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

♦Dumplin, battle of, i., 305.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Dunaverty Castle, i., 285, 355.

Dunbar,

Castle, i., 263, 383;

ii., 133, 140, 141, 143, 149;

town of, i., 383, 503;

iii., 227, 300, 387;

battle of, 109.

Dunbar, Earl of, i., 212, 214, 217, 218;

iii., 18, 25, 26, 30.

Dunbar, William, ii., 303‒310.

Dunblane,

cathedral, i., 249;

ii., 423;

city of, i., 238, 408.

Duncan I., i., 139, 140.

Duncan II., i., 143, 144.

Duncan, Dr. Andrew, iv., 302‒304.

Dundee, i., 83, 119, 248, 265, 267, 288, 387, 391, 437;

ii., 69, 93, 197, 202, 233, 235, 237, 240, 243, 400;

iii., 93, 223, 301, 303;

iv., 243, 331, 357, 358, 375, 376.

Dundee, Viscount, iii., 174, 175, 181, 182, 183.

Dunfermline,

Abbey of, i., 141, 144, 156, 239, 248, 252, 303, 385;

burgh of, 238, 258, 408;

ii., 400;

iv., 375.

Dunfermline, Earl of, iii., 18, 30.

Dunkeld, i., 119;

church of, 120, 134;

abbot of, 138, 139, 143;

bishopric of, 210, 218, 222, 225.

Dunlop,

John, iv., 155;

Alexander, 480.

Dunnichen, i., 116.

Dunnotter, i., 136.

Duns Law, iii., 74.

Dunsinnane, i., 91, 92, 140.

Dupin, Nicolas, iii., 313, 318, 333.

Durham, i., 203;

battle of, 308;

iii., 97.

Durham, James, iii., 359.

♦Durrisdeer, i., 91.

♦ Printed out of alphabetic order.

Durward, Alan, i., 214, 216.

Dury, John, ii., 167, 178, 179, 182.

Eadmer, i., 200, 201.

Earth-houses, i., 65‒70.

Earthenware, iii., 317;

iv., 365, 366.

Edgar, King, i., 143, 144, 148.

Edinburgh,

annexed, i., 137, 144, 151, 233, 247, 258, 276, 301, 306, 312,

317, 319, 338, 352, 354, 370, 388, 389;

ii., 35, 54, 58, 65, 66, 78, 89, 90, 91, 93, 97, 99, 100,

115, 117, 119, 124, 128, 132, 133, 135, 140, 143, 148,

151, 154, 163, 167, 179, 183, 203, 206, 213, 219, 237;

iii., 37, 41, 42‒44, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 67, 81, 99, 110,

120, 129, 134, 135, 147, 153, 163, 168, 171‒173, 174‒176,

180, 182, 186, 203, 206, 213, 219, 227, 236, 241, 274, 285;

iv., 44, 70, 75, 87, 97, 144, 148, 165, 174, 178, 194, 211,

222, 234, 330, 391, 405‒6;

Castle of, i., 248, 264, 274, 307, 322, 339, 349, 350, 358,

429;

ii., 101, 134, 142, 144, 149, 152, 155;

iii., 73, 159, 174, 175, 227;

University of, ii., 414‒419;

iii., 392, 393;

iv., 18, 69, 70, 74, 75, 87, 97, 102, 103, 136, 148, 156,

157, 167, 257, 263, 274, 291‒315.

Edinburgh, treaty of, ii., 100.

Edmund, i., 143.

Education, i., 184, 245, 466;

first Educational Act, 466, 467, 468;

ii., 109, 110, 397‒422;

iii., 375‒393;

iv., 324‒330.

Edward I., policy of, i., 218, 219, 255‒260, 261, 262, 263‒265,

266, 269‒271, 272, 273‒279, 283, 287.

Edward II., i., 287, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 296, 298, 299, 300.

Edward III.,

Invasions of Scotland, i., 305, 306, 307;

policy of, 309, 310, 311, 312.

Edward IV., i., 348, 349, 351.

Edward VI., ii., 75, 86, 87.

Egfrid, defeat of, i., 116.

Eglinton, Earl of, ii., 140, 229;

iii., 56, 75, 99.

Elgin, i., 139, 264, 385, 390;

ii., 251;

iii., 92, 94;

iv., 370;

Elizabeth, wife of Robert I., i., 303.

Elizabeth, Queen, ii., 92, 93, 99, 100, 145, 150, 220;

iv., 147.

Elliot, Robert, iii., 27.

Ellon, iv., 370.

Elphinstone, Bishop, i., 467;

ii., 300, 301.

Elphinstone,

Lord, iii., 19;

master of, 292.

England, policy of toward Scotland, i., 206, 214, 218, 257‒260,

261, 263‒265, 271, 273, 278, 280, 283, 287, 299, 300, 301,

305, 306, 309, 310, 322, 349, 361, 362;

ii., 54‒57, 63‒67, 76, 99‒101, 155;

iii., 179, 183, 184, 190‒193, 198, 201‒204, 206, 217‒221.

English language, i., 441, 443, 464.

English money, i., 396;

ii., 282;

one standard fixed, iii., 216.

Eocha, King, i., 136.

Episcopacy, ii., 108, 109, 157‒160, 164‒171, 177, 182‒185, 188,

210‒218;

iii., 28‒42, 44‒69;

abolished, 70‒72;

reintroduced, 122‒128;

again abolished, 180, 181, 184.

Erc, Chief, i., 116.

Eric II., King of Norway, i., 217, 259.

Errol, Earl of, i., 365, 373;

ii., 195, 196, 199, 201, 212;

iii., 19.

Erskine,

Lord Robert, i., 334;

John, of Dun, ii., 88, 89, 93, 108, 158, 185;

Rev. Ebenezer, iv., 213;

Rev. Ralph, 213;

Dr. John, 213, 214;

Thomas, Lord, 232‒234.

Ethnology, i., 38‒43;

of Scotland, 43‒47, 114, 115, 116, 118.

Etive, Loch, vitrified fort on, i., 91.

Evans, Dr. John, i., 50, 51.

Exchequer, i., 221.

Excise, difficulties connected with, iii., 217‒219;

iv., 395, 396.

Excommunication of Robert I., i., 295, 303;

form of, ii., 255, 257.

Fairfax, iii., 342.

Falasie, i., 192.

Falkirk, battle of, i., 269‒271;

iii., 228.

Falkland Castle, i., 323, 430;

ii., 213, 274.

Fast Castle, i., 324, 353.

Fasting, i., 131;

ii., 257‒260;

iii., 272, 273.

Fergus,

King, i., 120;

Chief, 116, 205.

Ferguson,

David, ii., 352;

Adam, iv., 69‒74, 152.

Fergusson, Robert, iv., 178, 179.

Feudalism, i., 161, 190, 193, 198, 199, 201, 203, 209, 211,

220‒228, 256, 260, 261, 269, 337, 371‒376, 411.

Fife, Earl of, i., 143, 204, 209, 213, 217, 225, 271, 308, 314,

317, 319, 333.

Fifeshire, i., 105, 119, 121, 136, 304;

ii., 66;

iii., 151;

iv., 142, 143, 341, 373.

Finlay, John, i., 446.

Firth of Forth, i., 23, 28, 109, 110, 115, 119.

Fisheries, i., 239, 377, 390, 391, 432;

ii., 40, 54;

iii., 301, 302, 303, 308;

iv., 400.

Flanders, Count of, i., 240, 241, 391, 392.

Fleming,

Robert, i., 283;

Malcolm, 327, 339.

Fleming, Lord, i., 345;

ii., 150.