CHAPTER XI

The first governorship of Gonzalo de Guzman was marked with two features

of very great importance to the young nation--for such we may properly

regard Cuba as having been at that time. One of these was the

development of the ecclesiastical establishment into a strong and

sometimes dominant force in the body politic and social; and the other

was the crisis of the protracted problem of dealing with or disposing of

the native Indians. These two matters were, as they had been from the

beginning, closely related to each other.

It is a commonplace of history that there was a certain thread of

religious motive running all through the exploits of Columbus. He

emphasized the significance of his name, Christopher, Christ-Bearer,

sometimes signing himself X. Ferens. The same idea was expressed, as we

have already seen, in the names which he gave to the various lands which

he discovered. Nor were his successors in exploration and conquest

neglectful of the same spirit. Accordingly the first Spanish settlers in

Cuba took pains to plant there immediately the church of their faith,

and to seek to convert the natives to Christianity. Among the very

earliest to land upon the shores of the island were priests of the Roman

Catholic church, and the first church was built at the first point of

settlement, Baracoa.

Some obscurity invests the records of the early ecclesiastical

organization, but it seems altogether probable that the first Bishop was

Hernando de Mesa, a member of the Order of St. Dominic. There is no

available record of his appointment and consecration, but he appears to

have begun his episcopal work at Baracoa in 1513 and 1514. He built the

first Cuban cathedral at Baracoa, and secured from the Spanish

government in 1515 a system of tithes for the support and propagation of

the church. These tithes were to be paid not in coin but in

merchandise, and they were to be collected not by the priests or other

agents of the church, but by officers of the secular government. The

latter was, moreover, to retain one-third of them for the erection of

new church buildings, a task which it took upon itself as a measure of

public works. It was not infrequently remarked that these royal

tithe-gatherers were much more diligent, prompt and efficient in

collecting the tithes from the people than in turning the proceeds over

to the church.

Bishop De Mesa reigned over the diocese for about three years, and then

was succeeded by Juan de Ubite, concerning whom the records are much

more detailed and explicit. He seems to have been an aggressive and

fearless man, who did not hesitate to engage in controversy and even in

litigation with the royal government over the matter of the tithes. He

protested against the government's retaining and administering the

one-third of the tithes which was devoted to church-building, insisting

that it also should be turned over to the ecclesiastical authorities,

who were best fitted to know the needs and to direct the work of church

building. In this contention he was not successful, but he did manage to

secure the levying of tithes upon the crown estates the same as upon all

other property.

One of the most important achievements of Bishop Ubite was the transfer

of the cathedral from Baracoa to Santiago. For this change he gave two

reasons. One was, that Baracoa was an unhealthful spot; in which he was

surely in error. The other was, that Santiago was a larger and more

important place, indeed, the chief city of the island; in which he was

quite correct. The transfer was authorized by the civil government in

October, 1522, and plots of land were granted to the Bishop for the

sites of the new cathedral and of the houses of the Bishop and other

clergy. These latter were the same plots which are still occupied by

ecclesiastical buildings, in the heart of the city of Santiago de Cuba.

This change of the site of the cathedral was doubtless to the advantage

of the church. It was probably profitable, also, to the good Bishop

personally. Following it he became the proprietor of extensive lands, of

great herds of cattle, and of a number of Negro and Indian slaves. He

interested himself to good effect in seeing to it that the civil

government provided from its third of the tithes abundant funds for

church building, and thus secured the erection of two churches at

Trinidad, one at Sancti Spiritus, and one at Havana, a place even at

that early date rising rapidly in importance.

Bishop Ubite reigned over the diocese until April, 1525, and then, in

circumstances which are obscure and for reasons not clearly apparent,

took the extraordinary step of resigning his see. The office remained

vacant until early in 1527, when Miguel Ramirez was appointed to it.

This third Bishop was, like each of his predecessors, a Dominican. He

was officially styled not only Bishop but also Protector of the Indians,

with the purpose of making him a sort of check upon the Repartidor. He

did not arrive at Santiago until the fall of 1528, when he promptly made

up for the delay by plunging into both industrial and political

activities. Like Bishop Ubite, he was an extensive land owner,

cattle-raiser and slaveholder.

Bishop Ramirez appears to have been a great meddler into politics,

particularly as a hot partisan of Gonzalo de Guzman. He came into

conflict more than once with the royal treasurer, Hurtado, and was

denounced by that austere censor as a scandalous disturber of the peace.

This characterization was provoked by the Bishop's attitude and conduct

toward Vadillo's investigation of Guzman's administration; and it is

probably not unjust to assume that the Bishop's attitude and conduct

were due to the fact that Vadillo had seized a lot of gold which had

been mined by the husband of the Bishop's niece. Vadillo made this

seizure on two grounds: That the nephew-in-law was a mere figure-head

for the Bishop himself, who had no legal right to engage in

gold-mining; and that the gold in question properly belonged to the

royal treasury and therefore should be turned over to Hurtado. At any

rate the Bishop was furious, and strove to restrain, with threats of

excommunication, witnesses from testifying against Guzman in the

inquests which Vadillo was conducting. Vadillo was not at all alarmed or

abashed by the episcopal wrath, but proceeded to look into the affairs

of the church as well as the civil government, and among other reforms

ordered the Bishop and clergy to stop charging for funeral masses higher

fees than those which were charged in Hispaniola. At this the Bishop

seems quite to have lost his head. He began a denunciatory tirade

against Vadillo in the cathedral, at which the latter contemptuously

turned his back upon the speaker and walked out of the building. Then

the Bishop excommunicated him. Vadillo made appeal to the King, and the

King, after careful consideration and investigation, compelled the

Bishop to withdraw the excommunication, and in addition gave his royal

approval to all that Vadillo had done with respect to the church.

In the first clash between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities,

therefore, the former were victorious. Nevertheless, the church exerted

much and steadily increasing influence, particularly in matters relating

to the Indian natives. And these matters were of much importance.

Although the repartimiento system, adopted early in the administration

of Velasquez, was designed and supposed to put all the natives under

government control, it failed to do so. Among those apportioned to the

colonists as serfs--practically slaves--dissatisfaction and resentment

widely prevailed, and insurrections sometimes occurred. But by no means

all the natives were thus apportioned. Some fled to mountain fastnesses,

and others, perhaps the majority, to the small islands or Keys off the

Cuban coast, whence they became known as Key Indians. They used these

islands, moreover, not alone as places of refuge but also as bases from

which to make depredatory raids upon the mainland of Cuba, to the great

detriment and disturbance of the Spanish settlers.

So numerous, extensive and disastrous did these raids become that

Velasquez in 1523 commissioned Rodrigo de Tamayo to organize a military

and naval expedition against the Key Indians, and to kill or capture

them all. This programme was not fully carried out, but it was

sufficiently executed to abate the troubles and to secure peace on the

coasts for several years. Tamayo's commission was renewed by Altamarino,

as a matter of form, there being then no need of action; and when in the

administration of Gonzalo de Guzman there was some recrudescence of

hostilities, the royal government specially authorized the waging of a

campaign which should bring the last of the Key Indians into subjection.

The new outbreaks did not, however, prove sufficiently serious to call

for or to warrant strenuous action.

The scene of trouble was, however, shifted from the coast to the

interior of the island. Several numerous companies of Indians, securely

lodged among the mountains, began hostilities, raiding the very suburbs

of Santiago itself. They were known as Cimarrons, or Wild Indians, to

distinguish them from the serfs and slaves. Their pernicious activities

began in 1529, and in the following year their operations were so

extensive and persistent as to simulate civil war. Manuel de Rojas

organized a force and led it against them with much success, and would

probably have soon made an end of the troubles had he not been

restrained by Guzman. The governor was probably jealous of the ability,

popularity and rising influence of Rojas, and was not willing that he

should gain the prestige which complete victory would confer upon him.

So he called him back in circumstances which would, he thought,

discredit Rojas and make his campaign seem a failure. Vadillo during his

brief administration sought to end the troubles by pacific and

conciliatory overtures, but failed.

It was thus left for Rojas, on becoming governor in succession to

Guzman, to take up again the work from which he had been recalled by his

predecessor. This he did to much effect at the end of 1532. He sent a

strong force against the mountain fastness of Guama, the foremost

chieftain of the Cimarrons, and completely defeated him, putting him to

flight and almost extirpating his band. Shortly after this victory of

Rojas's, Guama was killed by one of his own few remaining followers.

Rojas then sent his troops to disperse Cimarron bands near Bayamo, and

Baracoa, which they did with much success, so that peace and security

were pretty well restored throughout the island.

This left unsettled, however, the other and in some respects more

important and more trying phase of the Indian question, namely, the

treatment and disposal of the "tame" Indians, who for years had been in

a state of practical slavery under the repartimiento system. It will be

recalled that at the beginning they were placed under the protection of

the Jeronimite Order of monks; a protection which did not effectively

protect. In fact, within a dozen years of the foundation of the system

the Jeronimites were more oppressors than protectors, and were chiefly

engaged in making what pecuniary profit they could out of their hapless

wards. On this account their nominal protectorate was formally abolished

by the crown, in 1526, and Gonzalo de Guzman was made repartidor with

powers equal to those which Velasquez had exercised. Indeed, his powers

were even more absolute than those of Velasquez, since the supreme court

of Hispaniola was deprived of jurisdiction over him in his

administration of Indian affairs. Later the Bishop, Ramirez, was made

co-repartidor with him.

There then arose a protracted and bitter rivalry between the governor

and Bishop on the one side and the municipal alcaldes on the other, for

the exercise of powers of inspection of and supervision over the labor

of the natives. Both sides appointed inspectors, whose functions

clashed. Appeal was made to the crown, with the result that the dispute

was decided in favor of the alcaldes, who were authorized to appoint

inspectors, which the governor and Bishop were forbidden to do. As is

usual in such cases, the objects of the contention were the chief

sufferers. Indeed, so wretched became their plight that some inkling of

the truth reached the ears of the King, who thereupon commissioned a

Provincial of the Franciscan Order to go from Hispaniola to Cuba, to

investigate charges of cruelty, and to punish severely all who were

found guilty. The King also directed that he should arrange for the

liberation of the natives to the fullest extent for which they seemed to

be fitted.

Learning of this before the arrival of this commissioner, Guzman and his

friends set energetically to work to defeat his mission in advance. A

vast mass of "evidence" was cooked up, pretending to demonstrate the

unfitness of the Indians for any greater measure of liberty than they

were already enjoying, which was practically none at all. It was

declared that the Indians were at that very time largely armed and

threatening the Spaniards with massacre and extermination, and that any

further privileges granted to them would certainly provoke a tragic

catastrophe. The Indians would exterminate the Spanish colonists and of

course revert to heathen idolatry, and it would be necessary to conquer

and to convert the island over again. This perjured stuff,

responsibility for which must be regarded as the worst stain upon

Gonzalo de Guzman's fame, was presented to the King in the name of the

government and people of Cuba.

But King Charles was no fool. Thousands of miles away though he was, and

absorbed in important problems of other parts of his vast empire, he

took pains to find out the truth about Cuba. Learning it, he threw the

stuff which Guzman had sent him into the waste basket, gave his

Franciscan commissioner stronger orders, declared that he wanted the

Indians to be treated as free men and not as slaves, and promulgated a

set of new laws concerning them. In connection with these laws, as a

statement of the need of them, the King delivered himself of a scathing

indictment of the Cuban government and people for ill-treatment of the

natives and for causing depopulation of the island. (The original

population of the island at the time of the first Spanish settlements is

unknown, but has reasonably been estimated at several hundred thousand.

By the end of Guzman's administration the number of surviving Indians

was reckoned at not more than five thousand!)

These new laws, issued in the latter part of 1526, forbade further

compulsion of the Indians as laborers in the mines. But in the course of

a few weeks some modifications of them--to the disadvantage of the

Indians--were obtained through false representations at court, with the

result that conditions became almost as bad as before. The King next

directed Sebastian Ramirez, who was Bishop of Hispaniola and president

of the supreme court, to report to him on the desirability of retaining

or abolishing the repartimiento system; and that functionary reported in

favor of retaining it. Then Miguel Ramirez was made Bishop of Cuba and

Protector of the Indians; and he, as we have seen, fell completely under

the influence of Guzman. The result was that no reforms were effected,

and the state of the Indians went from bad to worse.

The King learned of this, and was profoundly dissatisfied. In the latter

part of 1529 he demanded to know why reforms had not been effected, and

especially why there had not been made the experiment of granting the

natives entire freedom. Equivocal replies were made, and it was not

until the spring of 1531 that Guzman undertook the experiment. At that

time one of the colonists, who had held some 120 slaves, died, and

Guzman directed that they be set at liberty and be given a chance to

show what they could do as farmers. Every conceivable condition was

imposed upon them which would tend to make the experiment the failure

which Guzman intended that it should be. In the midst of the

experiment, which was to last a year, Guzman was removed from office.

Vadillo, who succeeded him for sixty days, had no authority to do

anything in the premises, and so the completion of the ill-begun

business was left for Manuel de Rojas.

Then began one of the most deplorable passages in all the early history

of Cuba, in which good intentions were frustrated, benevolent purposes

defeated, and the remnants of a race undeservedly doomed to destruction.

Manuel de Rojas should be credited with having been of all men of this

time one of the most honest and able, and most sincere in his desire to

do justice to the native Indians. He saw through the web of trickery and

malign conditions in which they had been enmeshed by those who were

predetermined that the experiment of emancipation should fail, and he

unsparingly denounced it all. The Indians who had been "selected" for

the experiment had in fact not been selected at all, but had been taken

at haphazard, without regard to their fitness; if indeed they had not

been taken largely because of their unfitness. They had, moreover, been

subjected to the instruction and direction of those who seemed more

interested in extorting profit from them than in assisting them to

independence.

Rojas demanded that these abuses should be corrected, and that the

natives should have at least a fair, unhampered chance to show

themselves fit for freedom and Cuban citizenship. As a result of his own

painstaking investigation, he reported to the King that the tales of

Indian insurrections, actual or threatened, which his predecessor had

circulated, were chiefly false; obviously invented for the purpose of

discrediting the Indians. It was the old story: "Give a dog a bad name,

and hang him." The Indians were to be slandered, and represented as

incorrigible criminals, and then doomed to slavery. Moreover, in the few

cases in which revolts or attempted revolts had occurred, the blame

should rest upon the Spaniards more than upon the Indians, for the

former had goaded the latter to desperation by inhuman cruelties, in

resisting which the Indians were manifesting not savagery but manhood.

In support of this view of the situation, Rojas was able to cite many

specific and perfectly well authenticated instances of cruelty and

injustice. To correct these evils he recommended that whenever it was

proved that a mine-owner, farmer or other employer of native labor, had

deliberately treated his Indians cruelly or unjustly, the men should be

taken away from him and either set at liberty or be assigned to a more

humane employer. The danger of thus being deprived of their workmen

would, he plausibly believed, restrain employers from brutality. He also

insisted that the professional "slave catchers," who made a profitable

business of running down and returning to their employers fugitive

Indians, and who notoriously treated such captives with gross cruelty,

should be forbidden longer to ply their nefarious trade.

This wise and humane policy was approved by the crown, and Rojas

sincerely and perseveringly strove to make it effective throughout the

island; devoting to it for a couple of years the greater part of his

time and attention. But unfortunately he found the people, the civil

officials, and to a large extent the clergy, arrayed against him. The

_auri sacra fames_ possessed the people. Slave labor was profitable;

therefore they resented and opposed anything which would deprive them of

it. Especially did they oppose the provision that men should be deprived

of their workmen because they had treated them cruelly. Fines or other

penalties for excessive brutality might be well enough, but to take a

man's slaves away from him was, in their opinion, going too far. He was

not thus deprived of his horses and cattle. Why should he be deprived of

his Indians?

Yet in the face of such opposition Rojas bravely persevered. He seems to

have been animated by two motives, both creditable and honorable. One

was that of humanity and justice. It revolted him to see his fellow

human beings treated as badly as beasts. The other was that of patriotic

policy. He believed that it was bad for Cuba, that it corrupted the

present and compromised the future, to maintain this abominable system

of human slavery. So he flung himself into the work of emancipation and

reform with all the resolution and energy of which he was capable. He

travelled over the island, personally inspecting the conditions of labor

at all points, and personally listening to all complaints, petitions,

suggestions and what not that were offered. Particularly was he

interested in the "experimental village" near Bayamo, where natives were

trying to work out their own salvation on farms of their own. He

corrected as far as possible the unfavorable conditions which had been

imposed upon them, and encouraged them to their best efforts.

Unfortunately the royal government had been misled into sanctioning the

imposition upon these people of burdens "almost too heavy to be borne."

Regardless of the fact that as inexpert beginners in agriculture they

were not likely in the first year or two to make large profits from

their labor, they were weighed down with far heavier taxation than that

to which Spanish colonists were subjected. They were required to pay a

large tribute in cash as "vassals." They were also required to pay large

salaries to various functionaries who were saddled upon them without

their desire or need. One was an ecclesiastic, who was charged with

protecting their spiritual welfare. Another was a layman, who was

supposed to be their political guide, philosopher and friend. These

overseers probably did them much more harm than good, though Rojas seems

to have selected for those places the best men he could find. But the

result of these impositions was that many of the Indians became

discouraged and indicated a preference for returning to serfdom or

slavery. As free men in the experimental village they had to support

themselves and in addition to pay practically all their earnings to the

tax-gatherer. It would be better to give all their labor to an employer

who in return would at least provide them with the necessaries of

existence.

On this ground many of the villagers indicated a desire to abandon the

experiment and return to the old system. It is probable that some of

them were really convinced that this would be best. They were driven to

despair by being thrown upon their own resources and then being

oppressed with unjust taxes. But there is also reason to suspect that

other influences were brought to bear upon many of them. They were

threatened with all manner of punishment and persecution if they did not

renounce the experiment and ask to be returned to slavery. Similar

tactics were certainly employed against those outside of the villages.

Wherever Rojas went on his tours of inspection and investigation, he

heard of natives who had complaints to make, or petitions to offer, or

who wished to be released from serfdom and to enter the free village.

But when he reached the spot and sought for these Indians, they had

disappeared, or had changed their minds. He had little doubt of foul

play, that they were smuggled out of sight, or were coerced into action

and speech contrary to their real desires; but he was seldom able to

prove it, so general was the conspiracy against emancipation.

The result was inevitable. Rojas lost heart. It is possible that he

still clung to his beliefs, but realized that the obstacles to his

policy were too great for him to overcome. It may be, on the other hand,

that he became convinced that he had erred, that the Indians were not as

fit for freedom as he had supposed, and that their general emancipation

was impracticable. In any case, he gave up the struggle. "Before God and

his conscience," he said, he was convinced that little if any good had

come of the experiment of freedom, and that it would be best to abandon

it and to return the Indians to the control of well-disposed Spaniards;

with a proviso that any who wished for freedom and showed fitness for

it should be emancipated. A tone of sadness but of sincerity pervaded

the report in which he made this recommendation. The King accepted it

and approved it, doubtless with the same reluctance and regret which

Rojas must have had in making it; and that chapter of Cuban history was

ended.

Not one of all the early governors of Cuba deserves more grateful memory

than Rojas. Not one of them surpassed him in ability, in statesmanship,

in executive efficiency, in breadth and penetration of vision in

discerning the needs and the possibilities of the island. Not one,

certainly, surpassed if indeed any rivalled him in integrity,

benevolence, and self-sacrificing devotion to duty. Velasquez, indeed,

occupied the governorship for a longer period, and was associated with

more striking events; naturally, being the first and the founder of the

line. But not even he had as true a public spirit or as just a

conception of the ways and means by which a substantial and prosperous

commonwealth was to be developed, as had Manuel de Rojas.

Yet no other governor in those times was more shabbily and ungratefully

treated than he, both during and after his administration. A wise, just

judge, an indefatigable administrator, above all an honest man, he

devoted himself to the task of promoting the interests of the island, of

its people, with a sincerity and a whole-heartedness unfortunately

uncommon in those days or in any days. It is true that he failed to

solve the problem of saving the Indian natives, and some others which

confronted him. But that was not for lack of noble effort or high

purpose. It was because he was either honestly misled by those upon whom

it was necessary for him to rely, or because he found himself confronted

with difficulties too great for a man to overcome alone, and at the same

time abandoned if not actually betrayed and antagonized by those who

should have aided him and with whose aid he might have been triumphant.

He labored at the cost of great self-sacrifice. The salary which was

paid to him by the Crown was insufficient, and his personal fortune was

not large. He was, moreover, too busy with public affairs to engage in

gainful occupations of any kind while governor, and he was too honest to

enrich himself in any devious ways. He spent his own private means

freely for public purposes, not only in official tours of the island,

but in paying the expenses of suppressing Indian outbreaks and

apprehending criminals. The result was that he found himself becoming

impoverished. Nor did he have so much as the consolation of

appreciation. Doubtless the King did appreciate, theoretically, his

loyalty, efficiency and integrity; but he altogether neglected to

manifest his appreciation in a practical manner by giving Rojas the

encouragement and support which he deserved and which he greatly needed.

So far as the people of Cuba were concerned, they showed still less

regard for him, while the majority of their political and social leaders

were openly hostile to him. Guzman and his relatives and friends, who

were numerous and powerful, in particular neglected no opportunity to

thwart, annoy or discredit him.

In these circumstances it was not to be wondered at that Rojas grew

weary of his discouraging and ungrateful task, in which he had not even

the satisfaction of feeling that he was accomplishing something, and

consequently begged to be relieved of it. He had too high a sense of

duty to abandon his place without the permission of the King, and that

for some time was withheld. But at last his increasingly importunate

appeals had their effect. In October, 1535, the King accepted his

resignation, and, it is pleasant to record, paid him a tribute which was

unique and which must have been peculiarly gratifying to Rojas. That

was, that the examination of his accounts should be of an altogether

perfunctory and formal character. There was to be no such inquest as all

other governors had been compelled to endure. There was really no need

of any, but in order to maintain the custom one must be held. But there

were no charges, no investigations, no trials. This was the more

noteworthy because of the hostility of so many of the people, and above

all of Rojas's successor.

But this exemption from inquest was his sole reward. He had asked to be

relieved not merely of the governorship of Cuba but also of all public

duties, in order that he might give his undivided attention to his own

personal and private interests. But this was denied him. The King

accepted his resignation of the governorship, but refused to grant him

permission to join his brother in Peru, where he had hoped to recoup his

fortunes. Instead, he sent him to Jamaica, as a royal auditor of

accounts, an arduous and somewhat invidious duty, which Rojas accepted

doubtless with much reluctance. Still more distasteful was the task

which followed it, which was to return to Cuba to conduct a judicial

investigation into the conduct of the royal officials there, including

the governor himself, and to try those who seemed deserving of

prosecution. To some this would have been a welcome undertaking, since

it involved the prosecution for serious misdemeanors of those

politicians who had been most hostile to him and had given him the

greatest annoyance; and even bringing his arch-enemy, the governor,

Guzman, under scrutiny. But it was a repugnant task to Rojas, who had no

vindictiveness in his nature, and who wished above all to get away and

remain away from the scenes of his unsuccessful labors and agonizing

ordeals. He bore himself, however, with the same firmness, integrity and

high spirit that had marked his former services, and at the end

departed, with the royal permission, from Cuba, not to visit it again.

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