Whether There Are Two Wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills,
one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and
first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and
commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was
moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was
only one will, viz. the Divine.
Obj. 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by
the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to
the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for
natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of
necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will
in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect,"
i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will,
since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in
some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person.
But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ
there is only one will.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord says (Luke 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done."
And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7)
says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Luke
22:42 he says: "His will, He refers to the Man--the Father's, to the
Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead
eternal."
_I answer that,_ Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem
to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did
not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word
was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence
since "the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima
iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus
there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held
one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him.
Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one
of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on,
Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of
Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one
will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two
natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ's
human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it
was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of
Pope Agatho [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it
was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ,
in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of
old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the
Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two
natural wills in Him and two natural operations." And this much it
was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed
a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Q. 5; Q. 9, A. 1). Now
the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its
natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the First
Part (QQ. 79, 80). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a
human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of
human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains
to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said
in the First Part (Q. 19, A. 1). Hence it must be said that there are
two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at
the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ
there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the
good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh" in
them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For
although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it
can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 105,
A. 4). And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine
will according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I
have desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where
the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,'
what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that
His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's
will ought to be subject to God's will?"
Reply Obj. 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul
is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is
moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2, 4; _Ethic._ viii, 11). And hence it
was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument
of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily
follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power--which
is also called will--is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with
respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is
neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated
in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 10, AA. 1, 2) [*Cf. I, Q. 82, A. 2]. And
yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is
natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in
Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural
movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply Obj. 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a
determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing
of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature,
"to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed
considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the
human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in
a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the
bidding of the Divine will.
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