SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 7]

Whether This Is True: "Man Was Made God"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God." For

it is written (Rom. 1:2, 3): "Which He had promised before by His

prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to

Him of the seed of David according to the flesh." Now Christ, as man,

is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was

made the Son of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was this

assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this

assumption this is true: "God was made man." Therefore, in like

manner, this is true: "Man was made God."

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God was

humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call

it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore

with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and

thus it is true that "Man was made God."

Obj. 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject

of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word

"man" signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to

which the making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is truer

than "God was made man."

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not

say that man was deified, but that God was humanized." Now to be made

God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made

God."

_I answer that,_ This proposition, Man was made God, may be

understood in three ways. First, so that the participle "made"

absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in

this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is

predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said (AA. 8, 9). And

in the same sense this is false: "God was made man." But it is not of

this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so

understood that the word "made" determines the composition, with this

meaning: "Man was made God, i.e. it was brought about that Man is

God." And in this sense both are true, viz. that "Man was made God"

and that "God was made Man." But this is not the proper sense of

these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that "man" has

not a personal but a simple supposition. For although "this man" was

not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of

God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always

God. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle "made" attaches

making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in

this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the

same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),

this proposition is false, because, when it is said, "Man was made

God," "man" has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not

verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now

the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be God" is verified, is

the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was

always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or

is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to

be God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a

certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of

affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal

reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God,

and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who" which

refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as

affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed

of David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God--and it is

in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken

as affecting the subject, with this meaning--that the "Son of God was

made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds

it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say

"the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of

God."

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense

that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was

brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both

sayings are true as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is

the same as to be made God.

Reply Obj. 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e.

for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally,

i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was

made God," the being made is not attributed to the human nature but

to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity,

and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said

that "God was made Man," the making is taken to be terminated in the

human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: "God was made

Man," and this is false: "Man was made God"; even as if Socrates, who

was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would

be true: "This man was made white today," and this would be false;

"This white thing was made man today." Nevertheless, if on the part

of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in

the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the

making, e.g. if it were said that "human nature was made the Son of

God's."

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Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 131 / 654 题