FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took

place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the

Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two

natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could

not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union

of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.

Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the

flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a

certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.

Obj. 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other

unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine

and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for

Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii,

act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen

says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as

appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11). Therefore from two

natures one seems to have resulted.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the declaration of the Council of

Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten

Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without

change, without division, without separation--the distinction of

natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union

did not take place in the nature.

_I answer that,_ To make this question clear we must consider what is

"nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from

nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the

begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting

forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura."

Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of

this begetting; and because in living things the principle of

generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further

employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the

Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion

in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this

principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called

nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural

generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the

species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species

is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab.

Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,

"--i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now

speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is,"

or the quiddity of the species.

Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union

of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made

of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which

remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form

is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones

brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition;

and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and

fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by

manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of

commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First,

because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial

form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the

Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be

disproved later on (A. 6). Secondly, because thereby we should not

have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several

things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature,

but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be

constituted in Christ, as they wish.

Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but

changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way

some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by

manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine

Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, Q. 9, AA. 1, 2),

hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is

incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it

cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same

species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from

any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature

neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there

can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of

them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon

of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the

human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone

would remain.

Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but

imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers

members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.

First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its

specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures

cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as

the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal;

nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot

be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it

would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be

communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs.

Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in

the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity

varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).

Reply Obj. 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod

(i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone

proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not

receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human

natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ

results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or

substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be

anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results;

but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in

Person.

Reply Obj. 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature

and person--results in each individual--of nature inasmuch as the

soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one

nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from

matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the

Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, Q. 3,

A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there

is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the

likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.

Reply Obj. 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11), the

Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh

personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the

flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15, 17),

not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties

still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch

as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes

God.

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Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 17 / 654 题